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The Mask of Command
The author asserts that generalship is a cultural activity as well as an exercise in power or military skill and that it provides great insights into particular eras or places
368 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1987
About the author
John Keegan
139 books817 followersSir John Desmond Patrick Keegan, OBE, FRSL was a British military historian, lecturer and journalist. He published many works on the nature of combat between the 14th and 21st centuries concerning land, air, maritime and intelligence warfare as well as the psychology of battle.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 109 reviews
March 25, 2012
“Where to stand, how often to be seen? In front always, sometimes or never?” Keegan puts these questions to the warmakers of the West, from the Iliad to NORAD, from the hacking and thrusting of the Greeks' "toil of war" to Armageddonite button-pushing in air-conditioned underground silos, and pays extended individual attention to Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant, and Adolf Hitler, their command styles and cultural assumptions. The middle two are among my favorite people in history. There’s something comic about the gruff, hawk-faced Duke and his always outnumbered little army of often incompetent gentry types who had purchased their officer commissions, and redcoat rankers the Duke called “the mere scum of the earth,” “fellows who have all enlisted for drink,” but who with drill and terrifying discipline (the Duke was a great flogger) made for the finest infantry in Europe, however prone to spectacular orgies of hooliganism. “I remember once at Badajoz entering a cellar and seeing some soldiers so dead drunk that the wine was actually flowing from their mouths! Yet others were coming in not at all disgusted…and going to do the same. Our soldiers could not resist wine.” I have always gotten a kick out of the Duke’s cool, curt verbal orders (“drive those fellows off”; “now is your time”), his way of impugning the ability of an opponent by saying things like “that fellow doesn’t know his business”; his austere stylishness and air of undemonstrative omnicompetence.
Keegan calls Wellington “perhaps the most perfect embodiment of the gentlemanly ideal England has ever produced”—a paragon of “reticence, sensitivity, unseflseeking, personal discipline and sobriety in dress, conduct and speech, all married to total self-assurance”—and recognizes a related if more rough-hewn ethos in Grant:
And like Wellington, Grant wrote good, clear prose while on horseback and under fire, an ability Keegan particularly prizes. In his memoirs Grant says prose style was a conscious study of his military education; a subordinate said that he had to read Grant's battlefield orders but once to get a precise vision of the field and what action Grant wanted done upon it. The clarity of communication is, as Hector's arm was once, one of few guards in the chaos of war.
For the next two hours he was engaged at close range to the French in deploying his battalions, hurrying forward reinforcements, siting his artillery positions and, at one moment, galloping to escape French cavalry. He just won the race, jumping the bayonets of the 92nd Gordon Highlanders (‘Ninety-second, lie down!’) to land out of reach of the French lances.
Keegan calls Wellington “perhaps the most perfect embodiment of the gentlemanly ideal England has ever produced”—a paragon of “reticence, sensitivity, unseflseeking, personal discipline and sobriety in dress, conduct and speech, all married to total self-assurance”—and recognizes a related if more rough-hewn ethos in Grant:
In 1861, on the eve of the Civil War, Grant, aged thirty-nine, with four children at home and scarcely a penny in the bank, had made no mark on the world and looked unlikely to do so, for all the boom conditions of mid-century America. His Plymouth Rock ancestry, his specialist education, his military rank, which together must have ensured him a sheltered corner in the life of the Old World, counted for nothing in the New. He lacked the essential quality to be what Jacques Barzun has called a “booster,” one of those bustling, bonhomous, penny-counting, chance-grabbing optimists who, whether in the frenetic commercial activity of the Atlantic coast, in the emergent industries of New England and Pennsylvania or on the westward-moving frontier, were to make America’s fortune. Grant, in his introspective and undemonstrative style, was a gentleman, and was crippled by the quality.
And like Wellington, Grant wrote good, clear prose while on horseback and under fire, an ability Keegan particularly prizes. In his memoirs Grant says prose style was a conscious study of his military education; a subordinate said that he had to read Grant's battlefield orders but once to get a precise vision of the field and what action Grant wanted done upon it. The clarity of communication is, as Hector's arm was once, one of few guards in the chaos of war.
June 10, 2026
You know when you’ve read a good book no later than the moment of closing the back cover. Although I’ve owned this book for thirty years, I kept it on my bookshelves because I knew it would be good, but it never really “beckoned.” I was never really tempted to start it. But something told me recently that it was time, and it turned out to be great. I don’t think I’d have enjoyed it as much had I read it earlier.
John Keegan’s reputation as a military historian was impeccable. His conservative bent could be respected by the most radically liberal of his colleagues. That’s because he could back up his history with facts and coherent argument. Written mid-career, The Mask of Command uses the excuses of Alexander the Great, Lord Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant and Adolf Hitler, viewed purely from the perspective of how they conducted themselves as military leaders. On a superficial level, the four represent the transition over time of a military commander, like Alexander, who led his troops into battle, to Hitler, who stayed far behind the lines, but felt he was the equal and superior to his military commanders because of his experience as a messenger in the World War I, which Keegan convincingly explains was as or more dangerous as a regular soldier in the trenches.
All of this, however, is just an excuse for Keegan to weave in examples from military campaigns from throughout history. Alexander’s military exploits, justifiably innovative and daring, were spurred by and ended by realities on the ground. By eliminating taxation of Macedonian citizens, he was forced to engage in conquest to plunder and pay his growing military. Only when they reached the Indus River did his soldiers’ desire to return home prompt him to stop moving forward. Wellington tested the limits of being on the front lines, never quite out of range of fire. Grant didn’t make that mistake but stayed close enough to his men to supplement his tactical vision with a genuine devotion to the man.
The true joy of Keegan’s narrative, however, can be easily missed. He only mentions them twice, the second time in his concluding sentences. However much we may glorify military actions, it is in the work of human governing where our future as humanity must rest. The argument is more effective because of Keegan’s illumination of the military mind of command. Ultimately, whether it be through a monarchy or a democracy, the implementation of military action must be measures of last resort. The real action of human interaction is in governing and ultimately comes down to the lives of individuals, not abstract concepts.
John Keegan’s reputation as a military historian was impeccable. His conservative bent could be respected by the most radically liberal of his colleagues. That’s because he could back up his history with facts and coherent argument. Written mid-career, The Mask of Command uses the excuses of Alexander the Great, Lord Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant and Adolf Hitler, viewed purely from the perspective of how they conducted themselves as military leaders. On a superficial level, the four represent the transition over time of a military commander, like Alexander, who led his troops into battle, to Hitler, who stayed far behind the lines, but felt he was the equal and superior to his military commanders because of his experience as a messenger in the World War I, which Keegan convincingly explains was as or more dangerous as a regular soldier in the trenches.
All of this, however, is just an excuse for Keegan to weave in examples from military campaigns from throughout history. Alexander’s military exploits, justifiably innovative and daring, were spurred by and ended by realities on the ground. By eliminating taxation of Macedonian citizens, he was forced to engage in conquest to plunder and pay his growing military. Only when they reached the Indus River did his soldiers’ desire to return home prompt him to stop moving forward. Wellington tested the limits of being on the front lines, never quite out of range of fire. Grant didn’t make that mistake but stayed close enough to his men to supplement his tactical vision with a genuine devotion to the man.
The true joy of Keegan’s narrative, however, can be easily missed. He only mentions them twice, the second time in his concluding sentences. However much we may glorify military actions, it is in the work of human governing where our future as humanity must rest. The argument is more effective because of Keegan’s illumination of the military mind of command. Ultimately, whether it be through a monarchy or a democracy, the implementation of military action must be measures of last resort. The real action of human interaction is in governing and ultimately comes down to the lives of individuals, not abstract concepts.
Government is complex: its practice requires an endless and subtle manipulation of the skills of inducement, persuasion, coercion, compromise, threat and bluff. Command, by contrast, is ultimately quite straightforward; its exercise turns on the recognition that those who are asked to die must not be left to feel that they die alone.And then, after 351 pages of providing examples of how military command has affected world history, Keegan’s concluding sentences steer as far away from military action as possible. The real hero of world history is the engaged citizen.
Passing brave it may once have been to ride in triumph through Persepolis. Today the best must find conviction to play the hero no more.
September 23, 2021
I have a long-held an interest in military history, and Keegan made his reputation as a military historian. I read this long ago in Business School. It was assigned reading in a squishy management-class. The point was to assist in illustrating styles-of-leadership. This was the second book I'd read by Keegan. (The first was Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris; June 6 - Aug. 5, 1944.) I've since read almost all of his books.
The insight I received on leadership in organizations, be they military or otherwise from reading this book has stuck with me for years. Its provided a valuable template for evaluating organizational behavior at: work, play, and reading history and fiction.
For example, edgy software development teams are Led from the Front like Alexander the Great did. The leader is in the thick of it, leading the charge. Stogy, hierarchical bureaucracies are Led from the Rear like Napoleon Bonaparte did. Although, its not necessary to have a brilliant leader in the rear to be somewhat successful. The bureaucracy just needs to be well-trained and deep enough.
Recommended for folks interested in org behavior.
The insight I received on leadership in organizations, be they military or otherwise from reading this book has stuck with me for years. Its provided a valuable template for evaluating organizational behavior at: work, play, and reading history and fiction.
For example, edgy software development teams are Led from the Front like Alexander the Great did. The leader is in the thick of it, leading the charge. Stogy, hierarchical bureaucracies are Led from the Rear like Napoleon Bonaparte did. Although, its not necessary to have a brilliant leader in the rear to be somewhat successful. The bureaucracy just needs to be well-trained and deep enough.
Recommended for folks interested in org behavior.
August 23, 2015
Overall this was a good military leadership discussion. I enjoyed the comparison of Alexander, Wellington, Grant, and of course, even Adolf Hitler. The historical discussion and comparison of the leadership styles with the modes of warfare technology provide an interesting discussion of leadership changes. Alexander from the front, always victorious. Wellington not so close, but in the thick of bullets whizzing about. Grant, always everywhere on the battlefield but in artillery range of the Confederates. Hitler ensconced in his different HQ's hundreds of miles from any front completely oblivious to frontline happenings, but always on the radio. It helps having a good understanding of all the times under discussion. I am very poor at Civil War history so I needed to look up quite a bit on Grant. I gave this one four stars and I was happy to read it.
August 26, 2008
4.0 stars. Terrific book that analyzes and explores what it takes to be an effective and capable commander in light of the ever changing nature of the war. The book looks at four leaders that had vastly different styles but were aall extremely effective commanders in their own right: Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant and Adolf Hitler. A terrific read.
July 16, 2012
There are two books by author John Keegan that need to be read together or one after the other. The Mask of Command is one and The Face of Battle is the other. Neither series nor followup work(s) these two books are complimentary and cover similar territory, but from different angles.
The Mask of Command examines in a unique fashion what great commanders did and did not do. Keegan does not seek to forcibly find the similarities as much as the unique capabilities that each of his four chosen subjects brought to their era and commands. Three of them, Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, and Ulysses S Grant were successful beyond wildest imagination and thus became legendary. The fourth subject, Adolf Hitler the definition of epic failure, however not in the obvious way that Germany lost the War and Hitler killed himself, is presented by Keegan as the soldier he truly was.
Each of these great commanders brought unique skills and were truly people of their age in a way that was serendipitous. Luck, right man, right time, but also the right preparation was vital. The preparation and its end result was wildly different for each of the four. The persona and self imposed behaviors that are written about are each of their Masks assumed to allow for the greatness.
Alexander was a heroic ancient warrior who got into the mix and individually and personally shed a great deal of blood. Alexander wasn't above using killing as a political tool. He was required to be constantly proving his own worthiness to have succeeded both his father and others, great warriors among them, as the leader and commander of the great forces under his command. Drinking, debauching, individual combat, and political machination all were things he had to excel at to maintain his role.
The Duke of Wellington, one of the greatest figures in the history of the British Empire, was obsessed with noblesse oblige to the extreme. His personal discipline to the study and practice of blood and iron may never have been exceeded. Keegan avoids like many biographers and writers the adulatory hero worship that results in so much of the Wellington story being hagiography. Wellington's life and career including becoming Prime Minister is mentioned, but Keegan focuses on his time in the saddle. Literally as this was the era of Cavalry and commanders being mounted on horseback. Wellington's greatest strength as a commander may have been his common touch and care of his soldiers. Wellington also was quick to be in the thick of battle to be best able to direct his troops, though by his era a commander was not expected or required to be a front line combatant. He led from the front certainly as often he was 'ahead' of the front and where the action would be next. Wellington also may have had the greatest anticipation of his opponents moves and this would prove the key to Waterloo, Napoleons great errors aside.
Grant who would fail at nearly everything but war and autobiography is Keegan's third subject. A professional soldier who though educated beyond almost any of his non military contemporaries was so ill struck by fate that he couldn't find work as an engineer and during a peacetime sojourn failed at farming and nearly at every business he tried. Grant had those great leadership abilities including but not limited to being able to withstand the horror of war, a innate understanding of the men he commanded, like the previous two as well the ability to deliver both oral and written orders that were clear and correct in what they needed to say. Grant was actually the best Civil War General in terms of a modern strategy and logistics. Like those he studied, Grant knew, along with Sherman, that the war had to be taken to the enemy. It was not merely a holding action and thus the formulation of what would be known as Sherman's march to the Sea as the penultimate act of 'taking it to the enemy'. Grant would be at great personal risk at times and engaged in actions that add to his 'story' that modern commanders might never have taken.
The rest of this work while divided between the aforementioned section regarding Hitler and final words to summarize, is also a warning against many of the actions of the past being emulated, even if in similar circumstance. Keegan as a teacher of military students at Sandhurst makes a strong case with these studies of the great that becomes a warning against future heroic behavior in military leadership. From the lessons learned of societal cost to the not winnable finality in Nuclear Exchange, this book ends as a cautionary document. Keegan says it best with his closing sentence, "Today the best must find conviction to play the hero no more."
An important book for those studying any facet of the leadership, command, and heroic behavior.
The Mask of Command examines in a unique fashion what great commanders did and did not do. Keegan does not seek to forcibly find the similarities as much as the unique capabilities that each of his four chosen subjects brought to their era and commands. Three of them, Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, and Ulysses S Grant were successful beyond wildest imagination and thus became legendary. The fourth subject, Adolf Hitler the definition of epic failure, however not in the obvious way that Germany lost the War and Hitler killed himself, is presented by Keegan as the soldier he truly was.
Each of these great commanders brought unique skills and were truly people of their age in a way that was serendipitous. Luck, right man, right time, but also the right preparation was vital. The preparation and its end result was wildly different for each of the four. The persona and self imposed behaviors that are written about are each of their Masks assumed to allow for the greatness.
Alexander was a heroic ancient warrior who got into the mix and individually and personally shed a great deal of blood. Alexander wasn't above using killing as a political tool. He was required to be constantly proving his own worthiness to have succeeded both his father and others, great warriors among them, as the leader and commander of the great forces under his command. Drinking, debauching, individual combat, and political machination all were things he had to excel at to maintain his role.
The Duke of Wellington, one of the greatest figures in the history of the British Empire, was obsessed with noblesse oblige to the extreme. His personal discipline to the study and practice of blood and iron may never have been exceeded. Keegan avoids like many biographers and writers the adulatory hero worship that results in so much of the Wellington story being hagiography. Wellington's life and career including becoming Prime Minister is mentioned, but Keegan focuses on his time in the saddle. Literally as this was the era of Cavalry and commanders being mounted on horseback. Wellington's greatest strength as a commander may have been his common touch and care of his soldiers. Wellington also was quick to be in the thick of battle to be best able to direct his troops, though by his era a commander was not expected or required to be a front line combatant. He led from the front certainly as often he was 'ahead' of the front and where the action would be next. Wellington also may have had the greatest anticipation of his opponents moves and this would prove the key to Waterloo, Napoleons great errors aside.
Grant who would fail at nearly everything but war and autobiography is Keegan's third subject. A professional soldier who though educated beyond almost any of his non military contemporaries was so ill struck by fate that he couldn't find work as an engineer and during a peacetime sojourn failed at farming and nearly at every business he tried. Grant had those great leadership abilities including but not limited to being able to withstand the horror of war, a innate understanding of the men he commanded, like the previous two as well the ability to deliver both oral and written orders that were clear and correct in what they needed to say. Grant was actually the best Civil War General in terms of a modern strategy and logistics. Like those he studied, Grant knew, along with Sherman, that the war had to be taken to the enemy. It was not merely a holding action and thus the formulation of what would be known as Sherman's march to the Sea as the penultimate act of 'taking it to the enemy'. Grant would be at great personal risk at times and engaged in actions that add to his 'story' that modern commanders might never have taken.
The rest of this work while divided between the aforementioned section regarding Hitler and final words to summarize, is also a warning against many of the actions of the past being emulated, even if in similar circumstance. Keegan as a teacher of military students at Sandhurst makes a strong case with these studies of the great that becomes a warning against future heroic behavior in military leadership. From the lessons learned of societal cost to the not winnable finality in Nuclear Exchange, this book ends as a cautionary document. Keegan says it best with his closing sentence, "Today the best must find conviction to play the hero no more."
An important book for those studying any facet of the leadership, command, and heroic behavior.
July 5, 2014
3.5 stars
My brother in law is a huge Keegan fan and loaned me this book but it never really struck a chord with me and at times it was a bit dry. I know this was written in the late 80's but his statement from the conclusion concerning the nuclear age made me shudder
Mankind, if it is to survive, must choose its leaders by the test of their intellectuality; and, contrarily, leadership must justify itself by its detachment, moderation and power of analysis.
I haven't seen leaders on either side of the aisle, or anywhere for that matter, with those qualities.
My brother in law is a huge Keegan fan and loaned me this book but it never really struck a chord with me and at times it was a bit dry. I know this was written in the late 80's but his statement from the conclusion concerning the nuclear age made me shudder
Mankind, if it is to survive, must choose its leaders by the test of their intellectuality; and, contrarily, leadership must justify itself by its detachment, moderation and power of analysis.
I haven't seen leaders on either side of the aisle, or anywhere for that matter, with those qualities.
May 18, 2024
Hay libros que en apenas 20 páginas de introducción tienen más sabiduría y conocimientos que sesudos, amplios y tediosos ensayos actuales, y este es uno de esos libros.
Si alguien busca comentarios y recopilaciones de hazañas que no se moleste en abrirlo, es un libro más complicado que nos obliga a proyectarnos hacia el pasado (pero también la actualidad y el futuro) y tratar de comprender como a lo largo del tiempo algunas figuras han sido capaces de llevar a extremos inconcebibles a sus congéneres, para bien o para mal.
Si alguien busca comentarios y recopilaciones de hazañas que no se moleste en abrirlo, es un libro más complicado que nos obliga a proyectarnos hacia el pasado (pero también la actualidad y el futuro) y tratar de comprender como a lo largo del tiempo algunas figuras han sido capaces de llevar a extremos inconcebibles a sus congéneres, para bien o para mal.
January 9, 2022
Four splendid character studies in high-level leadership: Alexander, Wellington, Grant, and (a pathological case for contrast) Hitler. I looked at these characters with new eyes, though I was by no means unfamiliar with them. Keegan discusses how leadership necessarily changes with time, as well as pointing out things that stay the same. However, the final section, oriented towards leadership in the conditions of general thermonuclear war, lands with a thud. How about leadership in asymmetrical war? But this was published in 1987, when large-scale nuclear war still seemed to be the biggest looming threat.
April 26, 2024
After History of Warfare and The face of battle, this is the third book I read of the great historian John Keegan, which focus on the more traditional subject of leaders. The innovation is that he defines four categories of leadership ; heroic, anti-hero, unheroic, false heroic, with each time a figure, respectively Alexander the Great, Wellington, Grant and Hitler.
The book is around 400 pages, as usual very well written, each category has arguments thoroughly researched, with historical facts to prove the point. You have maps, pictures and a very comprehensive bibliography divided in chapters. It is at the level of what we could expect from such a scholar.
Yet, the limits of this book are substantial. Even if I get the point, I am not convinced that making an analogy between leaders who fought hundreds of years distance, for Alexandre thousands of years, is really appropriate. Technology has changed so radically the way of warfare takes place firearms, canons, airplanes, logistics, state structure, military hierarchy, social and contemporary contexts are too stretched to have a proper comparison. What if Alexander the Great was leading Greece during WWII or even Germany, would he be on the front line in a tank ? Besides, he wasn't just a leader of soldiers, but a king head of a nation. It would have been better to compare what is comparable, leaders more or less from the same period with the same status. I wouldn't even compare Napoleon and Wellington, because one was an Emperor leading nations, the other just a general. So the power of decision and the problems they have to deal with are not the same. For instance, Alexandre and Cyrus would work, or Wellington and Bismarck maybe. A comparison by pairs with an example and counter example for each category would be better.
Nevertheless, this is an excellent book to apprehend leadership and to improve our knowledge on warfare history.
The book is around 400 pages, as usual very well written, each category has arguments thoroughly researched, with historical facts to prove the point. You have maps, pictures and a very comprehensive bibliography divided in chapters. It is at the level of what we could expect from such a scholar.
Yet, the limits of this book are substantial. Even if I get the point, I am not convinced that making an analogy between leaders who fought hundreds of years distance, for Alexandre thousands of years, is really appropriate. Technology has changed so radically the way of warfare takes place firearms, canons, airplanes, logistics, state structure, military hierarchy, social and contemporary contexts are too stretched to have a proper comparison. What if Alexander the Great was leading Greece during WWII or even Germany, would he be on the front line in a tank ? Besides, he wasn't just a leader of soldiers, but a king head of a nation. It would have been better to compare what is comparable, leaders more or less from the same period with the same status. I wouldn't even compare Napoleon and Wellington, because one was an Emperor leading nations, the other just a general. So the power of decision and the problems they have to deal with are not the same. For instance, Alexandre and Cyrus would work, or Wellington and Bismarck maybe. A comparison by pairs with an example and counter example for each category would be better.
Nevertheless, this is an excellent book to apprehend leadership and to improve our knowledge on warfare history.
February 18, 2011
I read this while I was working on my dissertation, along with several other books by John Keegan. He really is the best military historian writing in English right now. He makes military matters comprehensible to people who are neither military buffs nor militarists (I'm neither, and much military history is written for people who are). He starts with a brief discussion of pre-heroic military leadership, then traces the changing nature of both war and our notions of leadership and heroism through studies of Alexander the Great (an example of traditional heroic leadership), the Duke of Wellington (anti-heroic leadership), Ulysses S Grant (unheroic leadership), and Adolf Hitler (false heroic leadership), then ends with a discussion of what heroism and heroic leadership could mean in the "post-heroic" nuclear world. Keegan writes clearly and well, and he understands war in cultural, moral, and ethical as well as technical terms. Many political figures like to dress themselves up in the trappings of miltary heroism, hoping thereby to fortify their claims to being leaders; Keegan will give you some context for assessing those claims for what they're really worth.
November 24, 2025
Pretty dry and not m a riveting read. But wow this is such a well researched book on both history and human behavior. I really enjoyed learning about the 4 generals historically, while also getting to understand how they portrayed themselves as leaders.
September 8, 2023
Keegan har skrivit en serie korta biografier, vinklade mot befälsmetod och effekten av denna metod på underlydande. Boken är spännande men inte speciellt djup.
August 26, 2024
A highly recommended leadership study of 4 leaders - Alexander the Great, Wellington, Grant and Hitler.
September 21, 2019
Hamvas gyermekkorom jó része azzal telt, hogy képzeletbeli seregeket vezettem olyan félelmetes pokolbéli ellenségek ellen, mint amilyen egy baromfiól lakóközössége, vagy húgom plüssállatai. Gondolom, akad még hímnemű egyed, aki hasonló cipőben jár, és esetleg néhány hölgy is, amennyiben elég bátor volt fittyet hányni a „teázzál csak szépen az új Barbie-babáddal”-tradícióra. Na már most: Keegan akkora mázlista, hogy megmaradhatott örök gyereknek, és nemcsak büntetlenül képzelheti magát a hadtörténet ürügyén Nagy Sándor helyébe, de még fizetnek is neki ezért.
A parancsnoklás álarca a hadtudomány* több mint kétezer éves fejlődését tekinti át, a hadvezetésben használt személyes és stratégiai módszerekre fókuszálva. Négy közismert személyiségen (Nagy Sándor, Wellington, Grant, Hitler) keresztül mutatja be a jól elkülönülő vezéri típusokat. Ezek a monográfiák önmagukban is megállnak a lábukon (személy szerint különösen Wellingtonról és Grantről olvastam szívesen – olyan kevés szöveg létezik magyar nyelven róluk, holott rendkívül izgalmas figurák), de a lényeg az ív, amit a négy elkülönülő életpálya (természetesen az előszóval és az utószóval karöltve) kirajzol. Keegan számára a parancsnoklás központi kérdése a következő: „Mindig? Néha? Soha?”, magyarán hogy a hadvezérnek hősiesen ki kell-e tennie magát a veszélynek embereit vezetve, vagy elegendő valahonnan a hátországból kommandíroznia a jónépet – esetleg ajánlatos kombinálnia a kettőt. A négy személyiség erre a kérdésre különböző válaszokat adott, és ez pályafutásukat is meghatározta – Hitler például a sok lózung ellenére, hogy ő igazi frontbaka, német katonát vezérezredesi rang alatt legfeljebb véletlenül látott. Ami nyilván közrejátszott abban, miért volt képtelen megérteni Paulust és 6. hadseregét, amikor azok (ó, borzalom!) az éhhalál meg a megfagyás helyett inkább megadták magukat. Persze ezen kívül lényeges elem a fegyverrendszerek és a logisztikai lehetőségek változása, valamint a taktikai újítások is – Keegan minderről szót ejt, mégpedig olyan logikusan és érthetően, hogy valami megdöbbentően jól olvasható szöveg lett a végeredmény.
Egyetlen negatívumként az utolsó fejezetet említeném a nukleáris kor hadászatáról – valahogy ezt túl absztraktnak, túl elméletinek éreztem, ráadásul a Szovjetunió bukásával alighanem el is avult megállapításainak számos eleme. Talán ha most kéne zárszót írnia Keegannek, nem is erről ejtene szót, hanem mondjuk az aszimmetrikus hadviselésről, amiben reguláris hadseregek harcolnak a polgári lakosság között elvegyült fegyveres sejtekkel – ez talán inkább meghatározza a jelenkor harceljárásait, mint az atombomba. De ettől függetlenül nagyon inspiratív, nagyon élvezetes könyv. Örök gyerekeknek mindenképpen ajánlom.
* Talán helyesebb volna európai vagy nyugati hadtudományt írni, mert a könyvben legfeljebb említés szintjén bukkannak fel az ázsiai módszerek. Gondolom azért, mert az ő vezetési elveik teljesen elütnek a nyugati gyakorlatról, és nem is igen hatottak rájuk.
A parancsnoklás álarca a hadtudomány* több mint kétezer éves fejlődését tekinti át, a hadvezetésben használt személyes és stratégiai módszerekre fókuszálva. Négy közismert személyiségen (Nagy Sándor, Wellington, Grant, Hitler) keresztül mutatja be a jól elkülönülő vezéri típusokat. Ezek a monográfiák önmagukban is megállnak a lábukon (személy szerint különösen Wellingtonról és Grantről olvastam szívesen – olyan kevés szöveg létezik magyar nyelven róluk, holott rendkívül izgalmas figurák), de a lényeg az ív, amit a négy elkülönülő életpálya (természetesen az előszóval és az utószóval karöltve) kirajzol. Keegan számára a parancsnoklás központi kérdése a következő: „Mindig? Néha? Soha?”, magyarán hogy a hadvezérnek hősiesen ki kell-e tennie magát a veszélynek embereit vezetve, vagy elegendő valahonnan a hátországból kommandíroznia a jónépet – esetleg ajánlatos kombinálnia a kettőt. A négy személyiség erre a kérdésre különböző válaszokat adott, és ez pályafutásukat is meghatározta – Hitler például a sok lózung ellenére, hogy ő igazi frontbaka, német katonát vezérezredesi rang alatt legfeljebb véletlenül látott. Ami nyilván közrejátszott abban, miért volt képtelen megérteni Paulust és 6. hadseregét, amikor azok (ó, borzalom!) az éhhalál meg a megfagyás helyett inkább megadták magukat. Persze ezen kívül lényeges elem a fegyverrendszerek és a logisztikai lehetőségek változása, valamint a taktikai újítások is – Keegan minderről szót ejt, mégpedig olyan logikusan és érthetően, hogy valami megdöbbentően jól olvasható szöveg lett a végeredmény.
Egyetlen negatívumként az utolsó fejezetet említeném a nukleáris kor hadászatáról – valahogy ezt túl absztraktnak, túl elméletinek éreztem, ráadásul a Szovjetunió bukásával alighanem el is avult megállapításainak számos eleme. Talán ha most kéne zárszót írnia Keegannek, nem is erről ejtene szót, hanem mondjuk az aszimmetrikus hadviselésről, amiben reguláris hadseregek harcolnak a polgári lakosság között elvegyült fegyveres sejtekkel – ez talán inkább meghatározza a jelenkor harceljárásait, mint az atombomba. De ettől függetlenül nagyon inspiratív, nagyon élvezetes könyv. Örök gyerekeknek mindenképpen ajánlom.
* Talán helyesebb volna európai vagy nyugati hadtudományt írni, mert a könyvben legfeljebb említés szintjén bukkannak fel az ázsiai módszerek. Gondolom azért, mert az ő vezetési elveik teljesen elütnek a nyugati gyakorlatról, és nem is igen hatottak rájuk.
January 2, 2024
The Mask of Command examines in a unique fashion what great commanders did and did not do. Keegan does not seek to forcibly find the similarities as much as the unique capabilities that each of his four chosen subjects brought to their era and commands. Three of them, Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, and Ulysses S Grant were successful beyond wildest imagination and thus became legendary. The fourth subject, Adolf Hitler the definition of epic failure, however not in the obvious way that Germany lost the War and Hitler killed himself, is presented by Keegan as the soldier he truly was.
Each of these great commanders brought unique skills and were truly people of their age in a way that was serendipitous. Luck, right man, right time, but also the right preparation was vital. The preparation and its end result was wildly different for each of the four. The persona and self imposed behaviours that are written about are each of their Masks assumed to allow for the greatness. Keegan’s central argument is that what should leaders reveal and what should they conceal at all cost to effectively lead their men. “ The leader of men in warfare can show himself to his followers only through a mask, a mask that he must make for himself, but a mask made in such form as will mark him to men of his time and place as the leader they want and need.”
Alexander was a heroic ancient warrior who got into the mix and individually and personally shed a great deal of blood. Alexander wasn't above using killing as a political tool. He was required to be constantly proving his own worthiness to have succeeded both his father and others, great warriors among them, as the leader and commander of the great forces under his command. Drinking, debauching, individual combat, and political machination all were things he had to excel at to maintain his role. He led by heroic example and in that sense he bleed and fought as he expected his men to fight. He suffered 8 wounds and one nearly fatal across his numerous battles. Superhuman though he sought to appear, he accepted and indulged the ordinary human nature of his soldiers.
The Duke of Wellington, one of the greatest figures in the history of the British Empire, was obsessed with noblesse oblige to the extreme. His personal discipline to the study and practice of blood and iron may never have been exceeded. able to direct the battle as a whole. Keegan's analysis of Wellington's command at Waterloo gives an excellent picture of the Duke's tireless movement from one section of the battlefield to the next, in close range of the fighting. His used personal direction of the action, using the topography to screen his troops. He scrutinised enemy movements in search of an advantage and moved decisively when an opportunity arose. Wellington was, in Keegan's words, "perhaps the most perfect embodiment of the gentlemanly ideal England has ever produced." He was disciplined, modest, self-assured, and reticent. Wearing civilian clothes, he avoided all self-dramatisation and scorned Napoleon's dramatics. His was a deliberately antiheroic style. If Wellington's style suited aristocratic Georgian England, Ulysses Grant's reflected both the mood of American democracy and the vast technological changes that transformed war in the next half-century.
Grant a professional soldier who though educated beyond almost any of his non military contemporaries was so ill struck by fate that he couldn't find work as an engineer and during a peacetime sojourn failed at farming and nearly at every business he tried. Grant had those great leadership abilities including but not limited to being able to withstand the horror of war, a innate understanding of the men he commanded, like the previous two as well the ability to deliver both oral and written orders that were clear and correct in what they needed to say. Grant was actually the best Civil War General in terms of a modern strategy and logistics. Like those he studied, Grant knew, along with Sherman, that the war had to be taken to the enemy. It was not merely a holding action and thus the formulation of what would be known as Sherman's march to the Sea as the penultimate act of 'taking it to the enemy'. Grant would be at great personal risk at times and engaged in actions that add to his 'story' that modern commanders might never have taken.
Keegan's final example of command is Hitler, who, like Alexander, combined in one personality, supreme political ability and the planning inconsistencies that marred the invasion of Soviet Russia. Numerous accounts have detailed his stubborn refusal to contemplate the real circumstances of his armies in the East. Keegan offers a fresh and perspective on Hitler's strengths and deficiencies as a military leader. The figure that emerges from this analysis is more soldier and front-fighter than politician. Hitler politics was war, at least the preparation for war, and his unswerving goal was to realize the victory that seemed near in 1918. While stubbornness epitomised his larger strategy, meddling with details increasingly substituted for professional tactics. This, Keegan argues, was superficial generalship, haphazard, amateurish. It was also "false heroic," chiefly because it sought to eliminate the distance between commander and combat troops. Propaganda portrayed Hitler as a suffering hero allowing him to share the hardships of his soldiers.
Each of these four case studies forms a separate entity of its own. Combined, they show a general theme about the reshaping of heroic leadership in response to social and military change. This has contemporary significance as well, and Keegan concludes with the nuclear age. His comments are brief, more tantalising than substantive. He notes that the inevitable secrecy surrounding nuclear command procedures conflicts with democratic openness, but does little to explore the consequences. Keegan calls for a "post-heroic" style, one that will inhibit, not instigate, conflict. He calls for less posturing, less readiness to use foreign policy for domestic political ends, and more modesty, prudence and rational thinking to counter the computerized technology. Keegan's recommended style may be is too limited and too passive in the contemporary environment but, there is need for a different kind of heroism. Perhaps the courage to pursue forthrightly and unambiguously new strategies requires our leaders' place to be out in front, like Alexander. The Mask of Command causes us to think about what this new leader would look like.
An important book for those studying any facet of the leadership, command, and heroic behaviour. The battlefield descriptions are superb and Keegan’s argument is well presented – even if not wholly convincing as their shades of heroism which are beyond the physical domain. Still, regardless if you are new to military history or a veteran of any military genre, I think you’ll enjoy this book.
Each of these great commanders brought unique skills and were truly people of their age in a way that was serendipitous. Luck, right man, right time, but also the right preparation was vital. The preparation and its end result was wildly different for each of the four. The persona and self imposed behaviours that are written about are each of their Masks assumed to allow for the greatness. Keegan’s central argument is that what should leaders reveal and what should they conceal at all cost to effectively lead their men. “ The leader of men in warfare can show himself to his followers only through a mask, a mask that he must make for himself, but a mask made in such form as will mark him to men of his time and place as the leader they want and need.”
Alexander was a heroic ancient warrior who got into the mix and individually and personally shed a great deal of blood. Alexander wasn't above using killing as a political tool. He was required to be constantly proving his own worthiness to have succeeded both his father and others, great warriors among them, as the leader and commander of the great forces under his command. Drinking, debauching, individual combat, and political machination all were things he had to excel at to maintain his role. He led by heroic example and in that sense he bleed and fought as he expected his men to fight. He suffered 8 wounds and one nearly fatal across his numerous battles. Superhuman though he sought to appear, he accepted and indulged the ordinary human nature of his soldiers.
The Duke of Wellington, one of the greatest figures in the history of the British Empire, was obsessed with noblesse oblige to the extreme. His personal discipline to the study and practice of blood and iron may never have been exceeded. able to direct the battle as a whole. Keegan's analysis of Wellington's command at Waterloo gives an excellent picture of the Duke's tireless movement from one section of the battlefield to the next, in close range of the fighting. His used personal direction of the action, using the topography to screen his troops. He scrutinised enemy movements in search of an advantage and moved decisively when an opportunity arose. Wellington was, in Keegan's words, "perhaps the most perfect embodiment of the gentlemanly ideal England has ever produced." He was disciplined, modest, self-assured, and reticent. Wearing civilian clothes, he avoided all self-dramatisation and scorned Napoleon's dramatics. His was a deliberately antiheroic style. If Wellington's style suited aristocratic Georgian England, Ulysses Grant's reflected both the mood of American democracy and the vast technological changes that transformed war in the next half-century.
Grant a professional soldier who though educated beyond almost any of his non military contemporaries was so ill struck by fate that he couldn't find work as an engineer and during a peacetime sojourn failed at farming and nearly at every business he tried. Grant had those great leadership abilities including but not limited to being able to withstand the horror of war, a innate understanding of the men he commanded, like the previous two as well the ability to deliver both oral and written orders that were clear and correct in what they needed to say. Grant was actually the best Civil War General in terms of a modern strategy and logistics. Like those he studied, Grant knew, along with Sherman, that the war had to be taken to the enemy. It was not merely a holding action and thus the formulation of what would be known as Sherman's march to the Sea as the penultimate act of 'taking it to the enemy'. Grant would be at great personal risk at times and engaged in actions that add to his 'story' that modern commanders might never have taken.
Keegan's final example of command is Hitler, who, like Alexander, combined in one personality, supreme political ability and the planning inconsistencies that marred the invasion of Soviet Russia. Numerous accounts have detailed his stubborn refusal to contemplate the real circumstances of his armies in the East. Keegan offers a fresh and perspective on Hitler's strengths and deficiencies as a military leader. The figure that emerges from this analysis is more soldier and front-fighter than politician. Hitler politics was war, at least the preparation for war, and his unswerving goal was to realize the victory that seemed near in 1918. While stubbornness epitomised his larger strategy, meddling with details increasingly substituted for professional tactics. This, Keegan argues, was superficial generalship, haphazard, amateurish. It was also "false heroic," chiefly because it sought to eliminate the distance between commander and combat troops. Propaganda portrayed Hitler as a suffering hero allowing him to share the hardships of his soldiers.
Each of these four case studies forms a separate entity of its own. Combined, they show a general theme about the reshaping of heroic leadership in response to social and military change. This has contemporary significance as well, and Keegan concludes with the nuclear age. His comments are brief, more tantalising than substantive. He notes that the inevitable secrecy surrounding nuclear command procedures conflicts with democratic openness, but does little to explore the consequences. Keegan calls for a "post-heroic" style, one that will inhibit, not instigate, conflict. He calls for less posturing, less readiness to use foreign policy for domestic political ends, and more modesty, prudence and rational thinking to counter the computerized technology. Keegan's recommended style may be is too limited and too passive in the contemporary environment but, there is need for a different kind of heroism. Perhaps the courage to pursue forthrightly and unambiguously new strategies requires our leaders' place to be out in front, like Alexander. The Mask of Command causes us to think about what this new leader would look like.
An important book for those studying any facet of the leadership, command, and heroic behaviour. The battlefield descriptions are superb and Keegan’s argument is well presented – even if not wholly convincing as their shades of heroism which are beyond the physical domain. Still, regardless if you are new to military history or a veteran of any military genre, I think you’ll enjoy this book.
March 14, 2021
I don't know how John Keegan, the author, settled on the four Commanders he selected for this profile - Alexander the Great, Wellington, Grant and Hitler. Keegan attempts to explain his selection of the four, including that they best represent the most dominant Commander ushering in a new style of warfare and leadership, but I still have a difficult time placing Hitler alongside Grant. The proper caveats are there, I just couldn't get there.
The final commentary jumps into an analysis on how Command has now changed as a result of the Nuclear area. Interesting points on the relationship between open democratic societies and the need for secrecy revolving around Nuclear decisions which ironically the most important decision a democracy now should consider when selecting leadership.
I have worked under dozens of Generals and have studied many more. I don't think there is a one size fits all approach, but this book does do a decent job of analyzing certain admirable and dishonorable leadership styles and characteristics of four men that change history and the exercise of using warfare forever.
The final commentary jumps into an analysis on how Command has now changed as a result of the Nuclear area. Interesting points on the relationship between open democratic societies and the need for secrecy revolving around Nuclear decisions which ironically the most important decision a democracy now should consider when selecting leadership.
I have worked under dozens of Generals and have studied many more. I don't think there is a one size fits all approach, but this book does do a decent job of analyzing certain admirable and dishonorable leadership styles and characteristics of four men that change history and the exercise of using warfare forever.
September 14, 2022
This book contains many offhandedly sweeping historical claims that, upon closer inspection, don't necessarily stand up to examination. Whenever a sentence begins, "Never before in history had anyone ...", reach for your wallet and hold on. The Civil War did not manage to be the first war fought on behalf of ideological beliefs in all of history. Steppe groups coming from Asia did not prove themselves completely incapable of defeating settled Europeans throughout the entirety of known history (fall of Rome ring a bell?). But those are usually incidental claims separate from the main narrative, and beyond that tendency, it's a very illuminating book and deserves the place it has on many recommended defense reading lists.
January 22, 2010
John Keegan asks us to consider questions that are seldom asked: What makes a great military leader? Why is it that men, indeed sometimes entire nations, follow a single leader, often to victory, but with equal dedication also to defeat?
Dozens of names come to mind...Napoleon, Lee, Charlemagne, Hannibal, Castro, Hussein. From a wide array, Keegan chooses four commanders who profoundly influenced the course of history: Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant and Adolph Hitler. All powerful leaders, each cast in a different mold, each with diverse results.
"THE MASK OF COMMAND is as good as military history can get."
Dozens of names come to mind...Napoleon, Lee, Charlemagne, Hannibal, Castro, Hussein. From a wide array, Keegan chooses four commanders who profoundly influenced the course of history: Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant and Adolph Hitler. All powerful leaders, each cast in a different mold, each with diverse results.
"THE MASK OF COMMAND is as good as military history can get."
August 27, 2009
Analyzes Alexander, Wellington, Grant, and Hitler as well as their place in the history of military leadership. The logical companion to "The Face of Battle", this is amazing and bound to shatter a lot of presumptions you may already have on the subject.
January 22, 2020
The Mask Of Command — book review
Today’s book review is for “The Mask Of Command” (1987©), written by John Keegan. Sir John Desmond Patrick Keegan OBE (Order of the British Empire) and FRSL (Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature) was an English military historian, lecturer (at Sandhurst – the English equivalent of West Point) and writer. Keegan is considered (in my opinion) one of the “modern” expert military historians. I understand his basic premise to be that conflict in general and war in specific is cultural and not necessarily an extension of political governance. This is in contrast with Clausewitz who stated that war is politics by other means. Keegan is criticized for “disagreement” with Clausewitz.
As a secondary aside, I started reading about military theory (“strategy”) back in my early 20’s when I began reading about generals (mostly Patton) and the works of B. H. Liddell Hart were recommended to me by a roommate. I read Liddell Hart’s book: “Strategy: The Indirect Approach“, which I must say greatly influenced my life by profoundly changing my view of the world. My hope was to learn about leadership by studying the great generals. Instead, what I found was that leadership is not the same thing as strategy and is, instead, founded on the person and the time in history the person lives, whereas strategy tends to be principled and more timeless.
This realization pretty much ties into the basis for this book, which is a study of four “great” commanders / leaders and looks at what made three succeed and one (ultimately) fail terribly. The three successful commanders are: Alexander the Great, Wellington, and U.S. Grant. The failure is: Hitler.
Keegan’s proposal in this book is based on “heroic” aspects (“title”) of military leadership: heroic, anti-heroic, non-heroic, and fake heroic. To do this, Keegan establishes the cultural climate of each commander and then tries to explain it’s (the culture’s) effect on the military leader via their proximity to combat and personal exposure to danger. Essentially, for most of man’s history, muscle and physical courage were the requirement of military leadership. As the age of gunpowder emerged, the risk to the commander increased and they were forced to withdrawal from danger and thus “military” leadership changed. Alexander had to fight hand-to-hand to prove his courage while leading from the front; Wellington could stay within sight of his forces, but had to stay a minimal distance from accurate musket range; Grant could not frequently approach the front lines; and, Hitler never exposed himself to physical danger (with the exception of possible assassination) and used propaganda to convince his forces that he was a soldier battling at their side.
The book has five main chapters (one for each leader / type) and the last is about leadership in the age of nuclear weapons. I found this the most fascinating (timely?) chapter of the book as it proposes a “new” type of post-heroic military / political leader and attempts to posit President Kennedy as this “ideal” leader.
While I found the book to be an interesting (sometimes fascinating) read, it was not an easy read. Keegan loves his erudite words and his complicated phrasing of sentences. The punctuation is “British” (I guess), and I found many times I had to go back and re-read a sentence or paragraph to figure out what the heck he was talking about. Frequently, his sentences appeared to be declarative, but were, in fact, interrogatory (questions), or vice-versa, and you (“I”) couldn’t tell until you (“I”) hit the question mark or period at the end of the sentence. Occasionally, even though I was aware of this writing style, Keegan still caught me off guard and I had to go back and try to figure out what he was on about. Which means I knew it was happening, and anticipating it, but continued to find it distracting.
Other than this (quibble), I found the book to be quite enjoyable. Keegan has a keen method of describing battles and you can sometimes feel yourself seeing the carnage and tasting the spent gunpowder in the air. At less than 400 pages, it seems also to be a quick read, but I suggest not rushing head-long through it in one or two sittings as the book is widely considered to be a classic and deserves a bit of contemplation as well as enjoyment.
Final recommendation: highly recommended! This book is a classic for a reason… The battlefield descriptions are superb and Keegan’s argument is well presented – even if not wholly convincing (to me, anyway). Still, regardless if you are new to military history or a veteran of any military genre, I think you’ll enjoy this book. There will, of course, be a few quotes from this book appearing on my blog in the coming weeks / months.
Two final thoughts: 1) I was not (am not) convinced President Kennedy is THE model for the post-heroic commander. I found Keegan’s reporting on / analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis a bit simplistic. And, 2) even if I had read this book on first printing, I doubt it would have influenced my world-view the way Liddell Hart’s book did. Both are classics for any military reader, just different. Just sayin’…
Today’s book review is for “The Mask Of Command” (1987©), written by John Keegan. Sir John Desmond Patrick Keegan OBE (Order of the British Empire) and FRSL (Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature) was an English military historian, lecturer (at Sandhurst – the English equivalent of West Point) and writer. Keegan is considered (in my opinion) one of the “modern” expert military historians. I understand his basic premise to be that conflict in general and war in specific is cultural and not necessarily an extension of political governance. This is in contrast with Clausewitz who stated that war is politics by other means. Keegan is criticized for “disagreement” with Clausewitz.
As a secondary aside, I started reading about military theory (“strategy”) back in my early 20’s when I began reading about generals (mostly Patton) and the works of B. H. Liddell Hart were recommended to me by a roommate. I read Liddell Hart’s book: “Strategy: The Indirect Approach“, which I must say greatly influenced my life by profoundly changing my view of the world. My hope was to learn about leadership by studying the great generals. Instead, what I found was that leadership is not the same thing as strategy and is, instead, founded on the person and the time in history the person lives, whereas strategy tends to be principled and more timeless.
This realization pretty much ties into the basis for this book, which is a study of four “great” commanders / leaders and looks at what made three succeed and one (ultimately) fail terribly. The three successful commanders are: Alexander the Great, Wellington, and U.S. Grant. The failure is: Hitler.
Keegan’s proposal in this book is based on “heroic” aspects (“title”) of military leadership: heroic, anti-heroic, non-heroic, and fake heroic. To do this, Keegan establishes the cultural climate of each commander and then tries to explain it’s (the culture’s) effect on the military leader via their proximity to combat and personal exposure to danger. Essentially, for most of man’s history, muscle and physical courage were the requirement of military leadership. As the age of gunpowder emerged, the risk to the commander increased and they were forced to withdrawal from danger and thus “military” leadership changed. Alexander had to fight hand-to-hand to prove his courage while leading from the front; Wellington could stay within sight of his forces, but had to stay a minimal distance from accurate musket range; Grant could not frequently approach the front lines; and, Hitler never exposed himself to physical danger (with the exception of possible assassination) and used propaganda to convince his forces that he was a soldier battling at their side.
The book has five main chapters (one for each leader / type) and the last is about leadership in the age of nuclear weapons. I found this the most fascinating (timely?) chapter of the book as it proposes a “new” type of post-heroic military / political leader and attempts to posit President Kennedy as this “ideal” leader.
While I found the book to be an interesting (sometimes fascinating) read, it was not an easy read. Keegan loves his erudite words and his complicated phrasing of sentences. The punctuation is “British” (I guess), and I found many times I had to go back and re-read a sentence or paragraph to figure out what the heck he was talking about. Frequently, his sentences appeared to be declarative, but were, in fact, interrogatory (questions), or vice-versa, and you (“I”) couldn’t tell until you (“I”) hit the question mark or period at the end of the sentence. Occasionally, even though I was aware of this writing style, Keegan still caught me off guard and I had to go back and try to figure out what he was on about. Which means I knew it was happening, and anticipating it, but continued to find it distracting.
Other than this (quibble), I found the book to be quite enjoyable. Keegan has a keen method of describing battles and you can sometimes feel yourself seeing the carnage and tasting the spent gunpowder in the air. At less than 400 pages, it seems also to be a quick read, but I suggest not rushing head-long through it in one or two sittings as the book is widely considered to be a classic and deserves a bit of contemplation as well as enjoyment.
Final recommendation: highly recommended! This book is a classic for a reason… The battlefield descriptions are superb and Keegan’s argument is well presented – even if not wholly convincing (to me, anyway). Still, regardless if you are new to military history or a veteran of any military genre, I think you’ll enjoy this book. There will, of course, be a few quotes from this book appearing on my blog in the coming weeks / months.
Two final thoughts: 1) I was not (am not) convinced President Kennedy is THE model for the post-heroic commander. I found Keegan’s reporting on / analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis a bit simplistic. And, 2) even if I had read this book on first printing, I doubt it would have influenced my world-view the way Liddell Hart’s book did. Both are classics for any military reader, just different. Just sayin’…
July 30, 2013
I read this book at airborne school on the weekend and enjoyed it
March 6, 2018
An examination of the changing essence of (military) leadership through the profiling of 4 military leaders operating at different points in history, this book can more accurately be termed as the rise and fall of the hero archetype.
The author begins by noting that a society's army is a reflection of that society, and so too is the nature of generalship. He then begins to adumbrate the rise of generalship and the heroic archetype from the prehistoric indistinguishability of combat and ritualistic display, before detailing the emergence of the archetype blazingly embodied in the leadership of Alexander. In the latter, political and military leadership are commingled in the same person, as the Macedonian city-state with its primitive political culture saw no issue with the strongest and most able warrior leading the state, thus giving full reign to the heroic archetype.
Fast forward close to two millennia later, as we are brought to the battlefields of Waterloo and the generalship of Wellington, and the focus of the author's investigation becomes clear - beneath the polished prose, the effortless grasp of subject matter beyond the military historian's ken, and the wealth of information about battle tactics, military psychology and topography, the actual focus of the book (as its title would indicate is) : the mask of command and how it differs with time and clime, as different groups of people have different expectations of (or different solutions to) the exercise of raw power.
Wellington's time and place is of a sophistication that is qualitatively distinct from that of Alexanders' kinsmen, and it shows in how Wellington exercised his command ; the title of the chapter focusing on him is labelled "The Anti-Hero", and here the distinct separation between political power on the one hand and military power on the other is clearly evidenced. The details of Wellington's command simply proceed to service this point.
So too does the book proceed to its two remaining figures, Ulysses S Grant on the one hand, and Adolf Hitler on the other, the former exhibiting the "Unheroic" leadership style, and the latter the "False Heroic". In Grant's case, the title is no slander, but once again a reflection of the leadership style that grew out of a continent open to technological progress and founded on democratic principles - both of which mitigated against Grant employing any variant of a heroic style of leadership. In Hitler's case, his leadership style, a clumsy but shockingly effective employment of the ancient heroic archetype, is an aberration ; a curious throwback in a world rapidly modernizing and progressing towards increased political sophistication and the general deemphasis on all-consuming and all-encompassed violence that had been contained in the heroic ideal. Where Hitler failed, and thus evinced the False Heroism of the chapter title allocated to him, is in the exercise of the very real physical, oral and existential risks associated with that ideal.
The author concludes that in the era of nuclear proliferation and increased global interconnectivity, the time to put away the heroic ideal once and for all has finally arrived, as the complexities and the dangers of the brave new world can only be taken up appropriately by those possessed of caution, poise, intelligence, and sang-froid - precisely the anti-thesis of the hero.
This is a well-written book, with wonderfully crafted and chiselled prose that you come to expect from John Keegan, with a surety of touch over not only his subject matter, but a variety of subject matter that he feels are of import to whatever military/political point he is making.
Even though the book is about leadership, it's not really a quick read perfect for management graduates or whatever - his analysis rather, as I have outlined, is more about the changing nature of leadership as evinced in the military sphere of human affairs, and what that says about us and our societies, especially the political organization thereof. Another factor mitigating against general and superficial enjoyment of this book is the relatively high level it is written at - while you do not have to be a military enthusiast, or a battle connoisseur to appreciate this book, some historical knowledge, a familiarity with maps as well as a knowledge (or ability to gain knowledge) of military jargon would be probably be necessary.
September 24, 2021
I admit I only read the chapter in Keegan's book on Ulysses S. Grant. But it's significant that of four figures of top importance to global military history, Keegan decides to include Grant, along with two other successful commanders, Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, and one disastrously unsuccessful leader, Adolf Hitler.
From the standpoint of Grant, it's significant also that he made it into a book about the best generals in history while other contenders from American history and especially the Civil War did not. While Americans certainly rank George Washington ahead of Grant as a leader, Keegan finds Grant to be America's top battlefield commander. Keegan doesn't even bother with Confederate generals beloved of Civil War buffs and white Southerners alike, Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson.
In his chapter "Grant and Unheroic Leadership," Keegan starts by depositing the reader next to Grant right two hours after the beginning of the Battle of Shiloh on April 6, 1862. Keegan explains how Grant snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, riding around the battlefield to gain intelligence and issue orders for commanders ready to retreat to instead stand firm and work to close gaps in the Union line. On the evening of the first day of battle, after Sherman tells Grant that "we've had the devil's own day" and Grant replies "Yes. Lick 'em tomorrow, though," Keegan describes how this moment opened up a place in history for Grant: "And so he did. The greatest general of the American Civil War had begun his ascent from obscurity."
Unlike Wellington, who fought and defeated Napoleon in "the old style," Grant valued innovation on the battlefield, writing that "War is progressive." Grant became the first general to understand the new citizen-soldier created by a democratic republic and he managed his commanders and troops accordingly, with respect and a light hand. Yet Grant was a fighter and he got superior performance out of his men through his own determination to do what was necessary to defeat the enemy by destroying not his cities, but his armies.
Grant also embraced new technology effectively, especially the telegraph, which allowed him to oversee and manage all theaters of the war and not be limited to one theater alone or even a particular battle or campaign, unlike Lee, whose myopic focus on his native Virginia helped lead to the Confederacy's defeat first in the West and then on Lee's own ground.
Keegan offers many other reasons why Grant is the only American general who deserves to be ranked with Alexander the Great and the Duke of Wellington, though Grant's trademark modesty would have prevented him from making the same claim of himself. And it was this modesty that has come down in history as a key part of Grant's appeal to Americans, just as what Keegan calls Grant's "familiar reverence" which his command inspired in his soldiers and helped motivate them to fight from one victory to the next to win a war whose outcome was never certain.
From the standpoint of Grant, it's significant also that he made it into a book about the best generals in history while other contenders from American history and especially the Civil War did not. While Americans certainly rank George Washington ahead of Grant as a leader, Keegan finds Grant to be America's top battlefield commander. Keegan doesn't even bother with Confederate generals beloved of Civil War buffs and white Southerners alike, Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson.
In his chapter "Grant and Unheroic Leadership," Keegan starts by depositing the reader next to Grant right two hours after the beginning of the Battle of Shiloh on April 6, 1862. Keegan explains how Grant snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, riding around the battlefield to gain intelligence and issue orders for commanders ready to retreat to instead stand firm and work to close gaps in the Union line. On the evening of the first day of battle, after Sherman tells Grant that "we've had the devil's own day" and Grant replies "Yes. Lick 'em tomorrow, though," Keegan describes how this moment opened up a place in history for Grant: "And so he did. The greatest general of the American Civil War had begun his ascent from obscurity."
Unlike Wellington, who fought and defeated Napoleon in "the old style," Grant valued innovation on the battlefield, writing that "War is progressive." Grant became the first general to understand the new citizen-soldier created by a democratic republic and he managed his commanders and troops accordingly, with respect and a light hand. Yet Grant was a fighter and he got superior performance out of his men through his own determination to do what was necessary to defeat the enemy by destroying not his cities, but his armies.
Grant also embraced new technology effectively, especially the telegraph, which allowed him to oversee and manage all theaters of the war and not be limited to one theater alone or even a particular battle or campaign, unlike Lee, whose myopic focus on his native Virginia helped lead to the Confederacy's defeat first in the West and then on Lee's own ground.
Keegan offers many other reasons why Grant is the only American general who deserves to be ranked with Alexander the Great and the Duke of Wellington, though Grant's trademark modesty would have prevented him from making the same claim of himself. And it was this modesty that has come down in history as a key part of Grant's appeal to Americans, just as what Keegan calls Grant's "familiar reverence" which his command inspired in his soldiers and helped motivate them to fight from one victory to the next to win a war whose outcome was never certain.
December 30, 2024
The famous historian John Keegan asserts in The Mask of Command that the great generals of history are merely actors putting on a persona, or "mask", that allows them to lead fellow men. Four men are examined throughout the book: Alexander The Great, The Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant, and Adolf Hitler. For each, he dives deep into each of their different leadership styles, showing how they were emblematic of the time. Where did they lead? From behind the front lines? In front alongside their men? Who helped them lead? Did they have trusted advisors or subordinates? Did they listen to their advice? What were each of their routines? Did they remain calm and collected in the heat of battle?
Keegan does not use much space in describing historical events, but more so on how each commander navigated them. Wellington and Grant were personally revealing. Wellington navigated the age of sword and musket expertly, leading in front when need be but never putting himself at risk unless absolutely necessary. He appreciated the importance of reconnaissance and geography, using both to his advantage expertly. Grant saw himself in a conflict that birthed much of modern warfare. He trusted his subordinates, and especially the spirit of his men, in their ability to fight. He hosted regular barbershop meetings at night with his subordinates, allwong Grant to blend his midwestern routines with effective communication.
The section on Alexander got to be repetitive, with Keegan elaborating constantly on how Alexander always lead his men in attacking positions where the enemy least expected them. Much of this was from the weapon limitations of the time, but it was also true that Alexader was a unique individual in his theatrics so as to inspire others. While interesting, it could have been shortened without losing any content. Much of this may have to do with the historians age old dilemma of working with a lack of sources.
The portion on Hitler was eye-opening. Keegan lays forth Hitler's faults expertly; he micromanaged, set unrealistic expectations, and held such a lack of trust in subordinates that it broke the chain of command and helped lead to his defeat. This is especially true during the Battle of Stalingrad, which Keegan goes into great lengths describing its importance in breaking the German war machine. Again, not much detail into the actual fighting, but more so on how it affected Hitler's leadership. Curiously though, rarely a word was said on the holocaust. This is disappointing. Keegan states it's beyond the scope of the book, but it can be argued that diverting precious resources to the extermination of entire peoples instead of fighting on the front lines is a serious and revealing command decision.
The Mask of Command is a great book with many lessons present and future leaders should heed. I see myself adopting parts of Grant's leadership style if I ever have to lead others, preferably on a work presentation and not, say, storming the beaches of China in WW3. Here's hoping.
Keegan does not use much space in describing historical events, but more so on how each commander navigated them. Wellington and Grant were personally revealing. Wellington navigated the age of sword and musket expertly, leading in front when need be but never putting himself at risk unless absolutely necessary. He appreciated the importance of reconnaissance and geography, using both to his advantage expertly. Grant saw himself in a conflict that birthed much of modern warfare. He trusted his subordinates, and especially the spirit of his men, in their ability to fight. He hosted regular barbershop meetings at night with his subordinates, allwong Grant to blend his midwestern routines with effective communication.
The section on Alexander got to be repetitive, with Keegan elaborating constantly on how Alexander always lead his men in attacking positions where the enemy least expected them. Much of this was from the weapon limitations of the time, but it was also true that Alexader was a unique individual in his theatrics so as to inspire others. While interesting, it could have been shortened without losing any content. Much of this may have to do with the historians age old dilemma of working with a lack of sources.
The portion on Hitler was eye-opening. Keegan lays forth Hitler's faults expertly; he micromanaged, set unrealistic expectations, and held such a lack of trust in subordinates that it broke the chain of command and helped lead to his defeat. This is especially true during the Battle of Stalingrad, which Keegan goes into great lengths describing its importance in breaking the German war machine. Again, not much detail into the actual fighting, but more so on how it affected Hitler's leadership. Curiously though, rarely a word was said on the holocaust. This is disappointing. Keegan states it's beyond the scope of the book, but it can be argued that diverting precious resources to the extermination of entire peoples instead of fighting on the front lines is a serious and revealing command decision.
The Mask of Command is a great book with many lessons present and future leaders should heed. I see myself adopting parts of Grant's leadership style if I ever have to lead others, preferably on a work presentation and not, say, storming the beaches of China in WW3. Here's hoping.
February 22, 2022
¿Donde debe ubicarse el mando durante una operación militar ? ¿ Cuando debe influir en la ejecución? ¿ Cual debe ser el comportamiento del líder durante la acción?
No hay axioma en la respuesta, vislumbrándose un claro “depende”.
Alejandro Magno, Wellington, U. Grant y Hitler ejercieron el mando. Por su puesto su desempeño es visto en las dimensiones operacional y estratégica, en el nivel táctico el ejercicio del mando se da por el ejemplo y no hay mucha vuelta que darle, involucrarse en la acción es imperativo.
El autor usa como eje la figura del héroe.
Alejandro lo fue para su reino y ejército, conceptos casi indivisibles en aquellos tiempos. Poseía una oratoria diferenciada (Aristóteles fue su tutor), y si bien planificaba operaciones , su método era en el frente. No conduciendo en las primeras líneas, sino que enfrascándose en duros combates cuerpo a cuerpo. ¿Que generaba? Euforia en las fuerzas, las que se volcaban sobre el enemigo buscando seguir (y proteger) a su rey. Prueba de lo anterior es que resulta herido en casi todas sus acciones, con riesgo vital en algunas.
Wellington y Grant presentan similitudes. Compartían el riesgo con sus tropas pero no a niveles desproporcionados. Preferían omitir la oratoria inspirativa, reemplazándola por órdenes claras y concisas. Ambos conocían bien a sus adversarios. El duque fue educado en Francia, mientras que el futuro presidente de EEUU , había compartido aula en West Point con sus adversarios confederados.
Hitler es catalogado como el no héroe. Tras el declive de las operaciones en el frente oriental , su liderazgo se tornó en centralismo puro. Führer del Reich, Jefe del OKW , jefe del OKH y Comandante del Ejército A…. simultáneamente. Nunca compartió las vivencias de sus tropas, nunca estuvo en el frente, nunca entendió la situación logística… y aun así imponía órdenes hasta en el nivel táctico, desde un búnker a miles de kilómetros.
Abusó de las comunicaciones militares ,característica de los supervisores extremos que pretenden dominar el panorama a costa de una intensa molestia e interferencia en los niveles más bajos ( todo lo contrario a los fundamentos del Guerra de Maniobra). En fin, un entrometido en todo sentido.
Que héroe nos propone el autor para los nuevos tiempos … el que impida el azote de la guerra.En la era nuclear será héroe quien en un delicado balance de poder logre ,evitar el conflicto…. No habrán nuevos Alejandros ni Napoleones.
El libro tiene cerca de 400 páginas , con muy interesantes detalles y anécdotas. Para los que ejercen el mando un buen auto diagnóstico.
No hay axioma en la respuesta, vislumbrándose un claro “depende”.
Alejandro Magno, Wellington, U. Grant y Hitler ejercieron el mando. Por su puesto su desempeño es visto en las dimensiones operacional y estratégica, en el nivel táctico el ejercicio del mando se da por el ejemplo y no hay mucha vuelta que darle, involucrarse en la acción es imperativo.
El autor usa como eje la figura del héroe.
Alejandro lo fue para su reino y ejército, conceptos casi indivisibles en aquellos tiempos. Poseía una oratoria diferenciada (Aristóteles fue su tutor), y si bien planificaba operaciones , su método era en el frente. No conduciendo en las primeras líneas, sino que enfrascándose en duros combates cuerpo a cuerpo. ¿Que generaba? Euforia en las fuerzas, las que se volcaban sobre el enemigo buscando seguir (y proteger) a su rey. Prueba de lo anterior es que resulta herido en casi todas sus acciones, con riesgo vital en algunas.
Wellington y Grant presentan similitudes. Compartían el riesgo con sus tropas pero no a niveles desproporcionados. Preferían omitir la oratoria inspirativa, reemplazándola por órdenes claras y concisas. Ambos conocían bien a sus adversarios. El duque fue educado en Francia, mientras que el futuro presidente de EEUU , había compartido aula en West Point con sus adversarios confederados.
Hitler es catalogado como el no héroe. Tras el declive de las operaciones en el frente oriental , su liderazgo se tornó en centralismo puro. Führer del Reich, Jefe del OKW , jefe del OKH y Comandante del Ejército A…. simultáneamente. Nunca compartió las vivencias de sus tropas, nunca estuvo en el frente, nunca entendió la situación logística… y aun así imponía órdenes hasta en el nivel táctico, desde un búnker a miles de kilómetros.
Abusó de las comunicaciones militares ,característica de los supervisores extremos que pretenden dominar el panorama a costa de una intensa molestia e interferencia en los niveles más bajos ( todo lo contrario a los fundamentos del Guerra de Maniobra). En fin, un entrometido en todo sentido.
Que héroe nos propone el autor para los nuevos tiempos … el que impida el azote de la guerra.En la era nuclear será héroe quien en un delicado balance de poder logre ,evitar el conflicto…. No habrán nuevos Alejandros ni Napoleones.
El libro tiene cerca de 400 páginas , con muy interesantes detalles y anécdotas. Para los que ejercen el mando un buen auto diagnóstico.
April 17, 2022
The Mask of Command by military historian John Keegan is a tour de force exegesis of 2,000 years of Western Military evolution through the lives and leaderships of four primary players who ushered in critical advances in their respective war-making. The universal appeal of this book can be gauged from the fact that high-performing business students; military commanders and leaders in all fields are expected to read and imbibe it for the lessons it imparts.
Keegan's vocabulary, it must be said, is antiquated. But this is to be expected given the age of the book. However if one can surmount this stumbling block then it is easy to immerse oneself into the practicalities of leadership he explores. He follows a pattern of his own making while analyzing the abilities and lives of the below four European Military Leaders:
-Alexander the Great.
-Wellington during the Napoleonic Wars.
-General U.S. Grant during the American Civil War.
-Adolf Hitler throughout the entirety of World War One.
He focuses on:
-Their conflictual style i.e. did they command from the frontline or the rear and why.
-The technological advances they utilized and how these came about.
-Their staff and the role it played in shaping their outlook as well as executing their orders.
-Their balancing of the military/political equilibrium.
The greatest takeaways from this book for leaders, if summarized efficiently, are:
(a) Establish the parameters of your authority and enforce them equally and without hesitation.
(b) Construct a staff of high calibre and avoid yes men.
(c) Keep abreast of all technological advances and use the most practical to your advantage.
(d) Underscore and comprehend your loyalties and stick to them.
(e) Be ready for change.
(f) Do not micromanage.
As unbelievable as it might be, the entire apotheosis of Keegan's leadership theory is delivered in a summarized fashion during his analysis of Adolf Hitler. Naturally, they are in the form of don'ts rather than do's.
I thoroughly enjoyed this book. While it might take some time getting used to Keegan's prose, it packs a riveting punch and concludes with the rejoinder that in the current nuclear age we have entered the post-heroic epoch. Military balance is universal and developed/developing powers can destroy each other at the push of the button. In such an age, restraint and the avoidance of confrontation will produce a new pacifist hero in lieu of the sanguinary warmongers of the past.
Keegan's vocabulary, it must be said, is antiquated. But this is to be expected given the age of the book. However if one can surmount this stumbling block then it is easy to immerse oneself into the practicalities of leadership he explores. He follows a pattern of his own making while analyzing the abilities and lives of the below four European Military Leaders:
-Alexander the Great.
-Wellington during the Napoleonic Wars.
-General U.S. Grant during the American Civil War.
-Adolf Hitler throughout the entirety of World War One.
He focuses on:
-Their conflictual style i.e. did they command from the frontline or the rear and why.
-The technological advances they utilized and how these came about.
-Their staff and the role it played in shaping their outlook as well as executing their orders.
-Their balancing of the military/political equilibrium.
The greatest takeaways from this book for leaders, if summarized efficiently, are:
(a) Establish the parameters of your authority and enforce them equally and without hesitation.
(b) Construct a staff of high calibre and avoid yes men.
(c) Keep abreast of all technological advances and use the most practical to your advantage.
(d) Underscore and comprehend your loyalties and stick to them.
(e) Be ready for change.
(f) Do not micromanage.
As unbelievable as it might be, the entire apotheosis of Keegan's leadership theory is delivered in a summarized fashion during his analysis of Adolf Hitler. Naturally, they are in the form of don'ts rather than do's.
I thoroughly enjoyed this book. While it might take some time getting used to Keegan's prose, it packs a riveting punch and concludes with the rejoinder that in the current nuclear age we have entered the post-heroic epoch. Military balance is universal and developed/developing powers can destroy each other at the push of the button. In such an age, restraint and the avoidance of confrontation will produce a new pacifist hero in lieu of the sanguinary warmongers of the past.
January 22, 2025
John Keegan is a modern master of military analysis. In this book, he applies his powers to the field of generalship, with consistently good results. 4 generals come under his scrutiny: 1. Alexander the Great, with his propensity to lead from the front of his army, regardless of personal danger. 2. The Duke of Wellington, following his comapaigns in India and Spain up to the Battle of Waterloo - a man who lead from the midst of his army, but close enough to be in considerable personal danger. 3. Ulysses Grant in the American Civil War, who led from the rear but still close to his army. 4. Adolf Hitler, leading the German forces in WWII, a man who led from as far in the rear as was practical, never seeing his armies, and rarely seeing his operational generals.
The analysis of each individual general is impeccable. For each, there are sections dealing with their respective armies' staff structure, intelligence operations, and campaigns. In addition, and more originally, each general is analysed as a product of the society they are raised in, and why they were so successful based on the political/military system they were born into and used. Additionally, each is compared with each of the other 3 main generals in the book, and also with each general's contemporaries. The general theme is that as weapons came to have longer and longer ranges, generals naturally had to move further from the fighting front. He praises Wellington and Grant's abilities to maintain contact with the fighting troops in spite of their removal from the front line. At the same time, he condemns Hitler specifically (and by extension, many WWI generals, who shared this disease) for being too isolated to get a good feel for the mood and abilities of his army in any given situation.
The book finishes off with a section on generalship in the nuclear age, which was very interesting and well presented. However, just as in Keegan's Face of Battle, there are some minor point with which I take exception in the analysis. For example, there seems to be a serious dichotomy between Grant and Wellington on one hand and Alexander and Hitler on the other. The latter pair were both civilian dictators in addition to being head of their armed forces. This contrasts with Grant and Wellington who, although later rising to the high political offices, were never civilian leaders and generals at the same time. So I wonder if these two types can really be compared?
The analysis of each individual general is impeccable. For each, there are sections dealing with their respective armies' staff structure, intelligence operations, and campaigns. In addition, and more originally, each general is analysed as a product of the society they are raised in, and why they were so successful based on the political/military system they were born into and used. Additionally, each is compared with each of the other 3 main generals in the book, and also with each general's contemporaries. The general theme is that as weapons came to have longer and longer ranges, generals naturally had to move further from the fighting front. He praises Wellington and Grant's abilities to maintain contact with the fighting troops in spite of their removal from the front line. At the same time, he condemns Hitler specifically (and by extension, many WWI generals, who shared this disease) for being too isolated to get a good feel for the mood and abilities of his army in any given situation.
The book finishes off with a section on generalship in the nuclear age, which was very interesting and well presented. However, just as in Keegan's Face of Battle, there are some minor point with which I take exception in the analysis. For example, there seems to be a serious dichotomy between Grant and Wellington on one hand and Alexander and Hitler on the other. The latter pair were both civilian dictators in addition to being head of their armed forces. This contrasts with Grant and Wellington who, although later rising to the high political offices, were never civilian leaders and generals at the same time. So I wonder if these two types can really be compared?
August 19, 2018
This is a very enjoyable and informative book. There are four commanders whose profiles are contrasted with the same questions of leadership. The repetition of each questions and the historical events from the professional life of each commander informs the definition and function of a successful heroic commander.
In the book, the description of each commander's profile was very opinionated and although I think that there were all well-informed, I believe that the judgement that was made about the humility of Grant wasn't adequately proven until you read the entire novel and work to extract that the authour is biased towards passive politics. Despite the assumption, the description of each commander gives a personal touch at the beginning of each chapter that captures your attention. After being acquainted with the commander, the zeitgeist is depicted; the battlefields are described so that they become immersive rather than static. Overall it is a engaging read with a lot of good observations about what kind of performance is expected from a heroic commander.
In the book, the description of each commander's profile was very opinionated and although I think that there were all well-informed, I believe that the judgement that was made about the humility of Grant wasn't adequately proven until you read the entire novel and work to extract that the authour is biased towards passive politics. Despite the assumption, the description of each commander gives a personal touch at the beginning of each chapter that captures your attention. After being acquainted with the commander, the zeitgeist is depicted; the battlefields are described so that they become immersive rather than static. Overall it is a engaging read with a lot of good observations about what kind of performance is expected from a heroic commander.
May 11, 2024
"The exceptional are both shown to and hidden from the mass of humankind, revealed by artifice, presented by theatre. ... The leader of men in warfare can show himself to his followers only through a mask, a mask he must make for himself, but a mask made in such form as will mark him to men of his time and place as the leader they want and need." (11)
"Military rank -- a new concept -- was thereby brought back into the aristocracy, thus on the one hand preserving the ancient nexus between land and arms and on the other reforging the old relationship between aristocracy and sovereign on a new basis." (174)
"Star Wars therefore offers hope; but only through the prospect it promises of reverting from the diplomacy of the hair-trigger to the more traditional rhythms which animated international relations before the coming of nuclear weapons." (350)
"Military rank -- a new concept -- was thereby brought back into the aristocracy, thus on the one hand preserving the ancient nexus between land and arms and on the other reforging the old relationship between aristocracy and sovereign on a new basis." (174)
"Star Wars therefore offers hope; but only through the prospect it promises of reverting from the diplomacy of the hair-trigger to the more traditional rhythms which animated international relations before the coming of nuclear weapons." (350)
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