I spent a few hours in the airports of Hong Kong and Singapore in the year 2001 on my way to India from San Francisco. I remember then the book stores in both airports prominently displaying volumes on the economic rise of both China and India and how the 21st century would belong to Asia. The optimism in those books was intoxicating if one happened to be Asian. Some authors opined that southern and western India would mostly become middle-class by 2015 and that India as a whole would become a middle-income nation in four decades. The prognosis for China was even more audacious. China was expected to dethrone the US from its pre-eminent position in the world, both in economic and scientific advancement, in three decades. For one like me, who grew up in India for three decades, it all sounded too bullish to be true. My skepticism was mainly due to my experience of the massive challenges we face in India in the spheres of education, health, employment, environmental pollution, poverty, democracy, and literacy. I knew that even China confronts many of these problems though in a somewhat different proportion. Neither China's Jiang Zemin nor India's Atal Behari Vajpayee seemed to possess a magic wand that could catapult these nations in two or three decades to the relatively tropospheric heights that many of these books suggested. Since then, more and more books and articles have continued on this theme as if history progresses linearly upward. However, by 2015, more and more experts have started expressing doubts about the inevitable rise of Asia and the 'decline' of the US. There has been more focus on the many problems that China is facing and will encounter in the future. I felt that I derived my instinctive skepticism from my experience of growing up in India rather than any innate pessimism or a colonial complex. The rather bold and provocative title of this book appealed to my doubts and induced me to read it. Reading the book clarified to me the reasons for my reservations on the future of Asia.
Though the title of the book proclaims the end of the Asian century, author Michael Auslin does not make any definitive predictions about Asia's future. He mainly disputes the notion of the 'inexorable rise of Asia' to world dominance without adequate analysis of the many formidable roadblocks that obstruct the path. He identifies five significant problems that can drag Asia down. They are as follows:
- The sharp economic slowdowns in many Asian countries,
- demographic concerns due to rising and declining populations,
- absence of regional cooperation mechanisms,
- incomplete and unfinished political revolutions within the nations, and finally,
- the many lingering conflicts between them, which can lead to War.
These questions are analyzed over five chapters, mainly involving countries in South, South-East, and East Asia. Even in these regions, the focus is primarily on Japan, S.Korea, China, and India. West Asia and Central Asia are conspicuous by their absence.
The author says that the economic downturn in Asia in recent years has affected practically all the leading democratic as well as dictatorial nations. Since the financial crisis of 2008, China's growth has sharply declined and is likely to plunge further. Whatever growth that occurs, does so through reliance on credit and relatively unproductive infrastructure investments. There is not much movement on economic reforms to advance its services sector or climbing up the technology pole. China's total debt, from corporations, households, and the government, is now said to top 300 percent of GDP. There is little transparency in all these debt transactions. Hence, it could be a ticking time bomb. China's exports to the world have shrunk. Since 2017, it has had to contend with a trade war with the US as well. Japan has been stagnant for twenty-five years, growing at 1%. S.Korea and Taiwan also have slowed down to barely under 3% GDP growth. India, after many heady years of growth till 2015, has dropped to 5% since then. Reforms in India have not progressed in spite of all the fanfare surrounding the Modi regime.
On the demographic front, Japan, Taiwan, and S.Korea are already into the 'low fertility trap' of reaching a TFR of less than 1.5. Dystopian images of robots at hotel receptions and restaurants are already a reality in these countries. China, though officially said to be at a fertility rate of 1.56, is believed to be at a much lower rate. Coupled with their one-child policy of the past decades, it is facing the start of population decline and peaking of its workforce by 2025. All this portends the rapid aging of its population by 2050, bringing with it associated problems. Immigration is the obvious answer to this problem. But these East Asian nations are too insular to contemplate such a solution. India and Indonesia, on the contrary, face the challenge of too many young men and women but too few jobs for them. India also has the dubious distinction of 30% of its population deemed 'functionally illiterate.'
Michael Auslin makes some perceptive observations on the idea of Asia as a regional entity. He says that, unlike Europe or North America, Asia has not been successful in building an Asian organization like the EU or NATO. The main reason for this is that not much binds most of the Asian nations together except that they are 'all Asian.' Politically, militarily, and economically, they are at different stages of development. Unlike the EU, culturally also the Asian nations are quite diverse. All these factors make it hard to find common cause. On the economic front, though ASEAN has been in existence for twenty-five years, it does not speak with one voice. Nor did the ASEAN spring to the aid of Indonesia during the tsunami tragedy of 2004, which killed more than two hundred thousand people. When the Myanmar government carried out ethnic cleansing of its Rohingya Muslims, no ASEAN nation came forward to provide relief or asylum for the hundreds of thousands of refugees. In both cases, it was the Western powers that went to the aid of the affected. Similarly, any security architecture for Asia will have a problematic starting point because India, Japan, and some ASEAN nations see China as the principal threat. China, on the other hand, though militarily by far the most powerful, still fears countries like India, Japan, and Australia ganging up against it in the Indo-Pacific.
The book raises another issue that the 'Asian century' euphoria mostly chooses to miss. Political stability in Asia is still fragile, and governance often echoes third-world characteristics. Politically, China is becoming increasingly authoritarian and centralized in spite of economic advancement. The Communist Party has increased its control of the internet and has concentrated more powers in its hands. In South Korea, democracy is well-rooted, but politicians' corruption is a stubborn issue. The courts have indicted three of the nation's Prime Ministers for bribery. Crony capitalism permeates the economy. Security worries regarding N.Korea and its eventual collapse are significant concerns. Indonesia's political democracy is nascent, as it has been a democracy only since 2004. The country spans 16000 islands, and hence, political stability and governance are essential concerns. Singapore and Malaysia govern in a top-down model, giving rise to dissatisfaction with their political systems. Demands for democracy have often bogged them down. Corruption and Islamic fundamentalism are worrying issues in Malaysia. Jihadist threat is a concern in Indonesia.
Thailand's democracy also has shown itself to be unstable. India and Japan are stable democracies. However, corruption and the underground black money economy are problems that defy solutions in India. Year after year, air pollution in Delhi and elsewhere in northern India during the winter months is at unacceptable levels, exposing incompetent governance. Governance problems in China were evident in 2013 when 3000 dead pigs floated down the Shanghai river. China's water pollution is worse than its air pollution. Both are at unsustainable levels. Its factories destroy numerous lakes, and half the population still lacks access to safe drinking water. Cleaning up the environment to enable better living conditions is a mammoth task in many Asian countries.
The closing point that Michael Auslin makes is that War is a great danger facing Asia. It must come as a shock to many 'Asian century' partisans. With four nuclear powers amongst them, there can be a complacency that War is not a possibility. But tensions over the Senkakou islands in the East China Sea between Japan and China, the Takeshima islands between Japan and S.Korea, the Spratly islands in the south China sea between China and the S.E.Asian states are all smoldering problems. Land border disputes between India and China are still unresolved for more than half a century. The author warns against a naïve belief that China and Japan will not go to War over the Senkakou islands because their economic ties are too deep. In the same way, we cannot rely on the belief that North Korea will not launch a nuclear missile at Seoul or Tokyo because to do so would be suicidal. Asia does not have a multilateral institution or architecture like NATO or the EU to de-escalate tensions and develop collective solutions. The absence of such mechanisms makes the escalation of conflicts more likely.
In the final chapter, Auslin suggests more democracy, more liberalization, a rules-based framework for the Indo-Pacific, and greater American involvement in Asia as solutions. Many Asian nations would probably welcome such a solution. Nonetheless, the author can also come under sharp criticism for such a US-centric view of Asia. After all, Asians have been at the receiving end of violent American engagement in Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan, and Iraq for half a century. Nor can India and Bangladesh easily forget the disastrous US support to the Pakistani military regime during the 1971 liberation of East Pakistan. One has to have something akin to a missionary zeal to believe that greater US involvement in Asia can prevent conflicts and War. Still, we know that China is by far militarily the most powerful state in Asia today. It is an authoritarian and illiberal state, and other Asian nations are justified in their fear of China. In such a scenario, the US is the only power that can genuinely act as a deterrent to this threat. So, one cannot fault the author for opting for greater US involvement in Asia, as a way to keep the peace.
Regarding the other problems enumerated by the author, one could argue that Asia has had these problems for many years now, but it has still been growing at a rapid pace. Both Japan and S.Korea are still very much first-world nations in spite of their economic slowdown and other regional security problems with N.Korea and China. Experts have been predicting a collapse of the Chinese economy since 2004, but China has been growing stronger each year. Still, the Chinese economic growth model may hide more than it reveals. It was in March 2007, at the height of a decade-long economic boom, the then-Premier Wen Jiabao gave an uncharacteristically gloomy press conference. He warned that the Chinese growth model had become "unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable." Michael Auslin's book echoes this sentiment with a lot of supporting evidence.
On the issue of possible 'war in Asia', we know that internecine conflicts between Asian nations have been persistent for long, but diplomacy has been able to keep a lid on them. However, it is also true that these problems are still unresolved, and they continue to simmer. India and China had a testy border standoff in Doklam a couple of years ago. Though a temporary truce has been worked out, India is uneasy that China will try to achieve its strategic objective by pressuring Bhutan. There is a general unease among the smaller states in Asia that China is always waiting for the opportune moment to strike and achieve its geo-strategic objectives. If China grows stronger and stronger, and the US retreats from the Indo-Pacific further, War does not seem improbable in many theatres in Asia.
Michael Auslin gives many persuasive arguments to temper the euphoria on the 'Asian century' theme. Asian nations may not seek out a more active US involvement in the region, as advised by Auslin. But they sure can consider the five roadblocks for Asia carefully. In the short run, we may continue to hear about China as the new superpower challenging the US and the rise of ASEAN countries and India. However, the problems talked about in this book are likely to manifest within the next ten years. That could bring about a more sobering assessment for the next decades of this century.