The Medieval Machine is very much a book of two unequal parts.
The first is an account of the dynamism and inventiveness of the Medieval economy and technology. It’s intended as a corrective to the view of the Middle Ages as one of stasis between the classical era and the renaissance. Even though this revised view of the period is well established in the historiography, it’s still an interesting and valuable read.
The second is an account of the end of this era, which sets up an epilogue drawing parallels with the contemporary world situation. This is much much weaker. The chapter on the end of the age of progress is very shallow in explaining the causes, and even raises points that make you question the previous section. The epilogue is barely coherent. Fortunately, this is just two chapters of the book.
Gimpel views the period from, very roughly, the 11th to the 13th centuries as being a happy confluence of factors promoting economic and technical development. Christianity played an important role, both in learning – particularly from Greek and Islamic texts – and practical implementation – Cistercian abbeys, church clocks, cathedrals, etc.. A long period of mild weather led to good harvests and population growth. War was – *perhaps*, although Gimpel doesn’t really argue this case – more directed outwards than inwards.
There’s some loose and deliberately provocative use of terminology like “capitalism” and “socialism” to describe the modernity of a society which Gimpel perceives as fluid and open. There are enough examples of people from humble backgrounds rising to prominence in the church/academia to make this persuasive. I would have liked more detail on society, though, and who did and didn’t benefit from this flexibility.
The chapters on the spread of water and wind power and on pollution were perhaps the most interesting. Water and wind power were used in Roman times, and in the Islamic world, but Western Europe made major technical improvements, and made massively more extensive use of these sources of power. More intensive use of natural resources ran up against their limits, while the density of industry and habitation causes localised pollution problems.
This period of progress came to a close with an intellectual closing, the devastation of the black death, bank collapses, cooler temperatures, poor harvests and war. However Gimpel doesn’t really draw out the causal links between these, or explain their relative importance. This chapter also inadvertently highlights some of the weaknesses in the previous chapters.
For example, following the black death, there was a shortage of labour. Incomes for the poorer sections of society improved considerably, and the powerful complained bitterly. Basic economics would suggest this should be a stimulus for labour-saving mechanisation. Why didn’t this happen? One possible reason was the distribution of income had changed and “capitalists” were no longer making such large profits to invest (and financial systems to mobilise the savings of lower classes did not exist).
On top of this, if the lot of the poor – ie. most people – improved most in the period of “decline”, who was all this progress really for? One of the tales of technological progress is of an abbot of St Albans, who spent a considerable sum of money repairing mills, and then forbade the people in his demesne from grinding their own corn, to their great anger. You can see from this that the aim of the mill isn't to make corn *cheaper* but to centralise economic power in the hands of the abbot, and generate a profit for him, at the expense of the common people.
This is a poor setting-off point for the epilogue (originally written in 1976, revised in 1988), which argues that "the West" - or perhaps specifically the United States - is in the early phases of decline, likely to be overtaken by Pacific nations. We should maybe give Gimpel some allowances here, firstly because making predictions is hard, especially about the future, and secondly because his arguments are heavily compressed here. However, while there are certainly signs of "decline", Gimpel's diagnosis of their causes and prediction that the process will continue are not very persuasive. The logic in the chapter fails to hang together. To give one example, at one point Gimpel complains that Americans no longer like to show off the latest gadgets, while at another he highlights a love of gadgets as a sign of decline. Even where you can see a parallel, the lack of any weighting attached to different factors makes it impossible to know how significant they are.
In the short term, at least, the predictions miss just as much as they hit. Japan is highlighted as a dynamic economy, despite being on the brink of its "lost decade" (now stretching into a third decade of relative underperformance). Equally, Gimpel suggests that computerisation may be starting to retreat, when it was about to begin an extraordinary expansion. When it comes to the US, it's also notable that while the 80s and 90s were decades of reasonable growth by historic standards, they also saw stagnant or declining incomes for most people - the benefits were being going to the wealthy and to corporations.
In conclusion, most of the book is an interesting read, even if it has its flaws. The last chapter is weaker, and the epilogue is something to skim through or skip entirely.