A FEW CRITICAL COMMENTS
While ethics has always been embedded in technological contexts, humans have, until very recently, been the primary authors of their moral choices, and the consequences of those choices were usually restricted to impacts on individual or local group welfare. Today, however, our aggregated moral choices in technological contexts routinely impact the well-being of people on the other side of the planet, a staggering number of other species and whole generations not yet born. (p. 2).
Comment: I fail to understand how in their “aggregated moral choices” humans do not remain primary authors of their moral choices, as the author seems to imply.
Such complexities [of the contemporary human situation] remind us that predicting the general shape of tomorrow’s innovations is not in fact, our biggest challenge: far harder, and more significant, is the job of figuring out what we will do with these technologies once we have them, and what they will do with us. This cannot be done without attending to a host of interrelated political, cultural, economic, environmental, and historical factors that co-direct human innovation and practice [Vallor’s emphasis] (p. 5).
Comment: The human being is the only consciously deliberate actor in moral ethical situations. I see no reason to posit any conscious deliberate initiative on the part of the human being’s environment, unless it is another human being, of course. I distinguish between movement and action. While parts of the human being’s environment may move, they do not consciously act.
To see what relational understanding is and why it is essential to the practice of moral self-cultivation, it helps to recognize how classical virtue traditions conceive of the human person: namely, as a relational being, someone whose identity is formed through a network of relationships. While some virtue traditions regard one’s relationships with other living things, objects, places, or deities as part of one’s unique identity, all virtue traditions acknowledge the central importance of our formative relationships with other human beings: our family, friends, neighbors, citizens, teachers, leaders, and models [Vallor’s emphasis] (p.76).
Comment: It is a bit of a stretch, I think, in classical virtue ethics to recognize a person’s identity as formed by relationships. Her suggestion of relational formation, in fact, belongs to a distinct contemporary philosophy of consciousness that requires the rejection of the Hellenic concepts of essence and existence, characteristic of classical philosophy in forming personal identity.
In discussing “competing visions of human (or posthuman) flourishing” on page 231 she opts not to expand on the clarification and significant difference between “transhumanism” and “a coming posthuman era” for reasons of space, as she admits in an endnote (p. 277).
For reasons of space, this passes over two key distinctions: the first is between the strong transhumanist program for enhancement and more modest enhancement goals that stop short of radical alteration of the human species. The second is the distinction between “transhuman” and “posthuman” philosophies; some transhumanists explicitly call for a posthuman future, that is, one in which humanity has been surpassed. Others … reject the notion of leaving our humanity behind, while simultaneously regarding the nature of our humanity as almost infinitely malleable. Finally, there are uses of “posthuman” in literary theory, gender, and culture studies … that do not map neatly onto the transhumanist conception of posthumanity. Both distinctions are important but fluid and contested.
Comment: To my mind, the very reasons she cites to pass over this distinction ought to merit a deeper and more serious study. A return to classical principles, no matter how successfully “tweaked” cannot do justice to this contemporary philosophical question. Our human experience already indicates that the products of digital technology are not impossible fictions in many cases, and we experience the boundaries of such products, not as “fixed” (as is Hellenistic philosophy) but fluid (as in phenomenological philosophy). Since human experience has not ceased to evolve, since the human being has not ceased to evolve, it follows that to be human is not a static state, but a fluid one subject to further evolutionary development — under the direction of a conscious human agent — unlike the previous process of pre-conscious biological evolution. That is to say, “pre-conscious humanity” has been surpassed by a “conscious humanity,” which, potentially, may be surpassed again in the future. That there are “uses of ‘posthuman’ in literary theory. gender, and culture studies” that do not integrate well with our present understanding is no reason to opt for an up-dating of the classics, and ignore an alternate philosophical approach that is likely to be more fitting to contemporary human experience. To my mind, this rejection is a major weakness of Vallor’s approach to the whole challenge of technology and virtues, which cannot be resolved by a sophisticated return to traditional thinking.
The brief review below, which I posted on Amazon ( 27 May, 2019) was generated in light of these and similar criticisms I have regarding her perspectives which are peppered throughout her book.
“On the whole I am sympathetic to Dr. Ezzat F. Guirguis’s review and am in general agreement with it. The journalistic style and generous use of the subjunctive mood (often characteristic of contemporary academic writing) frustrates more than assists the critical reader in arriving at a resolution of competing ideas. I am tempted to restate the subtitle after the fashion of a thesis prefatory page: A Philosophical Guide “in Partial Fulfillment” to a Future Worth Wanting, since this more accurately reflects the book’s achievement and the author’s conclusion on her own research. She writes: This book recommends a classical solution: an energetic (perhaps even desperate) collective effort to reinvest our cultures in the habits of moral self-cultivation and education for technological wisdom [her emphasis] (p. 145). To my mind, there is more to be said, and what is discussed here the reader must not assume to exhaust the topic. That is to say a critical reader will consciously place the book in context and thus possibly gain some worthwhile insights. To my mind, to understand her perspective (and her apparent conviction of thought) on the material she presents requires a generous stretch of one’s imagination. The book is more likely to impress and convince the less critical academic. The comment on the jacket of the book from the Notre Dame Philosophical Review is an excellent clue to identifying the intended readership of this book. For the anxiously inquiring mind, it “captures the special blend of excitement and precariousness that is woven into our lives today by our use and reliance on constantly changing technology.” As a guide to critical philosophical thought, however — caveat emptor.”
A note for the theologically erudite: It might be advantageous to view Vallor’s perspective at updating classical philosophy to meet the experience of the contemporary age as similar to that of the ecclesiastical authorities’ attempt at updating theology to meet the experience of the modern world. They opted for an aggiornamento, rather than for a ressourcement of philosophical thought, the latter being the more resourceful.