This book has a bit of a hard time finding and keeping its footing. Of course, the titular subject, is the great influx of new congressmen after the 1974 Watergate election, most importantly 76 Democrats (two-thirds replacing Republicans) and 17 Republicans, who would help reshape the Congress. It helped that they 291 Democratic majority, won with 58% of the vote, more than the 287 required to override President Ford vetoes. The new members were young (almost all under 40) and they tended to be more white collar and educated than typical, labor Democrats. But they were not babes in the wilderness: 60% had served in public office, more than the previous standard.
The old House was problematic, as the author often points out. John Blatnik of Minnesota recalled in his Freshman year, 1947, seeing the elderly Carl Vinson, who had arrived in 1914, and was the lead Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, shamble around and think "Well, this guy can't last. I'll be important someday." Vinson served another 18 years, the longest in history to that point, and Blatnik didn't look like he would get a chairmanship anytime soon. The "21 day rule" which allowed congressmen to call for a bill held up in the recalcitrant Rules Committee, lasted only from 1948 to 1967, when it was repealed again. Committee chairs were kings, the caucus was defanged, and the Conservative Coalition ruled.
There had been many attempts at reforms before. The number of committees had been reduced from 62 to 46 back in 1927 (an 1921 Senate reform had shrunk them from 74 to 34), and the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act further reduced them to 19 (and Senate to 15) and expanded their staff; subcommittees were cut almost in half to 89 in the House the next year and by more in the Senate. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 opened committees to the public, mandated recorded votes in markups, and allowed the majority of committees to do things like schedule votes and allowed minority party members to call their own witnesses. A bipartisan floor amendment to this bill reshaped Congress more than most realized when it allowed a record vote if just 20 members of the Committee on the Whole requested one. The same year the caucus agreed to allow easy votes for anyone nominated for a chairmanship, limited members to chair only one subcommittee, and subcommittee chairs were authorized to hire one staffer independent of the chair and hold independent hearings (congressional reformer Richard Bolling was suspicious of creating dozens of "baronies" in these subcommittees). In 1973 the caucus created a steering committee to allow the Speaker to make committee assignments as opposed to the Ways and Means Committee, allowed 50 members to offer germane amendments of a bill and have those amendments voted on by the full caucus instead of the Rules Committee. The House the same year allowed electronic voting.
After the 1974 these reformers continued: they had the rambunctious, talented but alcoholic Philip Burton elected to Chair of the caucus, gave the speaker the power to appoint the Rules Committee, gave a permanent 2:1 ratio on committees for Democrats (which enraged Republicans), and had each committee establish one subcommittee on investigations. Most famously, they "dethroned" three chairs by vote, Bog Poage of Agriculture, Edward Hebert of Armed Services, and the progressive but aged Wright Patman of Banking. They also got the caucus to take positions on particular subjects, such as ending funding for the Vietnam War.
The problem is that most of the action with the Class comes at the beginning with these caucus votes, and they themselves were just easy votes, as opposed to organizers, of those changes. Otherwise the 94th was a relatively uneventful Congress, punctuated by Ford's many vetoes, albeit with some big changes like the Energy Conservation Act of 1975, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Government in the Sunshine Act, emergency aid to New York City, and an anti-busing amendment (authored by Senator Joe Biden). But the Class itself was secondary to many of these (except Rep. Bob Carr of MI's Vietnam funding resolution.) Using some expanded printing subsidies the Class helped put in, all except 2 members of the Class were reelected (unlike the previous "one term wonders" of 1964), and many went on to illustrative careers. As the author points out, the chairs Max Baucus, Christopher Dodd, Henry Waxman, George Miller, and Tom Harkin that helped pass Obamacare were all class members (When they told Obama about the class he said "I was 13!"). Because of the committee reforms, and the fact that 1976 saw the largest amount of retirements in a quarter century, including five committee chairs (also Wayne Hays stepped down from his chair and one more, Ray Madden of Rules, was defeated in the primary), almost half of committee chairs were new by the beginning of 1977.
Yet the problems with reform are prominent here. By the early 1980s there were 154 committees and subcommittees, the latter with more power than ever. The number of recorded votes, which had risen from 177 in 1969 to 537 in 1974, grew to 800 in 1976. The fact that Republicans often used these open rules to force difficult votes on social issues soon led the Democrats to increase the number of votes required for an open vote, and by the 1980s they had largely gone to completely limited rules. The more "open" Congress was also a more fractured and partisan Congress, one where Republicans had more chance to gain public attention. Thus much of the "goals" of the reformers was not achieved, and the Class that supported them (the "reinforcements" as Bella Abzug called them) often ended up disappointed (many retired in 1994 before the wave). But they did help create a fundamental change in how Congress worked, for better or worse.