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Rorke's Drift
The defence of Rorke's Drift has gone down in history as one of the grandest heroic actions of British colonial wars. About a hundred men defeated an enemy force 30 or 40 times their size, and 11 of the defenders were awarded Britain's highest military decoration, the Victoria Cross. The action has been immortalized in the film "Zulu". Michael Glover shows how this undoubted act of bravery was exploited for political ends, and why an event of little military consequence found its way into the "National Hagiography of Battles".
146 pages, Paperback
First published April 28, 1975
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About the author
Michael Glover
90 books7 followersMichael Glover served in the British army during the Second World War, after which he joined the British Council and became a professional author. He wrote many articles and books on Napoleonic and Victorian warfare.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
July 28, 2011
Excellent history and reasons why of one of the most famous battles in British History. A short take on the Zulu wars. All and all a good book.
March 14, 2024
This book has exceed expectations for me: I often find Leo Cooper/Pen&Sword books can be very militarily "geeky", diving down the rabbit-holes of equipment or drill, minute descriptions of tactical movements, which make the books of value only if the reader already has broader knowledge of the incident or battle in question. Thankfully Rorke's Drift does not fall into that category.
Although this is a short book (less than 150 pages) Glover has not only given us a blow-by-blow description of the action at Rorke's Drift, but also a close description of the disaster at Isandhlwana earlier in the day, and a concise exposition of the history of Southern Africa that had led to the situation where Cetshwayo's Impis attacked the British after they had crossed the Buffalo River into Zululand.
Glover well describes how it was as much British public opinion at home as it was activity on the ground that drove the British to expand their hold on Natal, which impinged on the Boers and also the Zulus, who were finding that the Boers were impinging on their land. The Zulu tribe had emerged as a successful warrior force, and their social structure almost required them to engage in battle (warriors had to have "washed their spears" in blood before they could marry).
In the clashes between Zulu and Boer, the British, given the times, naturally leaned toward supporting the white man over the black, and so gave an ultimatum to Cetshwayo to disband his army, something that he couldn't and wouldn't contemplate. That ultimately was the reason Chelmsford crossed the Buffalo in January 1879.
Glover explains quite clearly how the Zulus defeated the British at Isandhlwana - a combination of poor leadership, and poor use of the country doomed the British column - in open ground and in loose formation, less than two thousand British troopers armed with Martini-Henry rifles could not but succumb to an estimated 15,000 Zulu warriors. Conversely, in a well-led defense of a well-fortified position, approximately 150 British troopers could fight off 4,000 Zulus. Glover explains that it was much safer for the garrison to stay put than try to run, as in the open all the advantages lay with the Zulu warriors, but in a fortified position, the advantage lay with the British.
I won't go into the detail of Glover's description of both battles, other than to state they are well-written, clear, and concise. Along the way he puts paid to some of the images that might be in the reader's head from the movie Zulu (although the battle scenes do ring true). Bromhead was not young, and he and Chard worked well together from the start. The 24th Foot was a regiment of experienced and hardened soldiers. And Private Hook, far from being a shirker, was an out-and-out hero during the battle (and he was also in real life teetotal!).
Glover's final chapter looks at the politics surrounding the battle - the heroic stand at Rorke's Drift covered up for the disaster at Isandhlwana and so was boosted by those who's careers could have been ended by the loss of the first battle. There is no doubt that incredible heroism was shown by the members of the garrison, but one wonders whether the award of eleven VCs wasn't at least in part influenced by factors other than those which occurred during the Battle. Glover also makes clear the heroism of the Zulu warriors, who time after time flung themselves forward into a rain of bullets.
So, if you want a short history of the battle, and one that sets it in full context, and is good reading, I can recommend this book.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
Although this is a short book (less than 150 pages) Glover has not only given us a blow-by-blow description of the action at Rorke's Drift, but also a close description of the disaster at Isandhlwana earlier in the day, and a concise exposition of the history of Southern Africa that had led to the situation where Cetshwayo's Impis attacked the British after they had crossed the Buffalo River into Zululand.
Glover well describes how it was as much British public opinion at home as it was activity on the ground that drove the British to expand their hold on Natal, which impinged on the Boers and also the Zulus, who were finding that the Boers were impinging on their land. The Zulu tribe had emerged as a successful warrior force, and their social structure almost required them to engage in battle (warriors had to have "washed their spears" in blood before they could marry).
In the clashes between Zulu and Boer, the British, given the times, naturally leaned toward supporting the white man over the black, and so gave an ultimatum to Cetshwayo to disband his army, something that he couldn't and wouldn't contemplate. That ultimately was the reason Chelmsford crossed the Buffalo in January 1879.
Glover explains quite clearly how the Zulus defeated the British at Isandhlwana - a combination of poor leadership, and poor use of the country doomed the British column - in open ground and in loose formation, less than two thousand British troopers armed with Martini-Henry rifles could not but succumb to an estimated 15,000 Zulu warriors. Conversely, in a well-led defense of a well-fortified position, approximately 150 British troopers could fight off 4,000 Zulus. Glover explains that it was much safer for the garrison to stay put than try to run, as in the open all the advantages lay with the Zulu warriors, but in a fortified position, the advantage lay with the British.
I won't go into the detail of Glover's description of both battles, other than to state they are well-written, clear, and concise. Along the way he puts paid to some of the images that might be in the reader's head from the movie Zulu (although the battle scenes do ring true). Bromhead was not young, and he and Chard worked well together from the start. The 24th Foot was a regiment of experienced and hardened soldiers. And Private Hook, far from being a shirker, was an out-and-out hero during the battle (and he was also in real life teetotal!).
Glover's final chapter looks at the politics surrounding the battle - the heroic stand at Rorke's Drift covered up for the disaster at Isandhlwana and so was boosted by those who's careers could have been ended by the loss of the first battle. There is no doubt that incredible heroism was shown by the members of the garrison, but one wonders whether the award of eleven VCs wasn't at least in part influenced by factors other than those which occurred during the Battle. Glover also makes clear the heroism of the Zulu warriors, who time after time flung themselves forward into a rain of bullets.
So, if you want a short history of the battle, and one that sets it in full context, and is good reading, I can recommend this book.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
April 21, 2015
The successful defense of the fortified mission at Rorke's Drift on the border between Natal and Zululand Jan 22-23, 1879, was immortalized in the movie Zulu, starring Michael Caine. The battle in which about 140 men, mostly British regulars, of whom 39 were hospitalized, successfully held off some 4000 Zulu warriors, received far more attention than several other examples of British military valor in face of insurmountable odds.
The author attempts to explain what happened and why, drawing on a number of sources on the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 and British politics at the time in this concise 146 page book. The Anglo-Zulu War is usually presented from a South African perspective, which is relatively simple, in that the defeat of the Zulus ensured the safety of both Boer and British settlers in the four colonies of Cape Town, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal. The book lacked only a few more maps and one or two more chapters detailing the second campaign to be an excellent condensed history of the war.
Britain did not want the colonies, considering them a costly nuisance that they were stuck with, gold and diamonds not yet having been discovered. The Dutch had established Capetown in 1652 and over the next two hundred years, Dutch, German and Huguenot settlers gradually expanded out into the country. Britain took it from the Dutch and kept it after the Napoleonic wars. When they tried to enforce British laws on the Boers, abolishing slavery and arresting whites for murdering Blacks, the Boers packed up and left on the Great Trek, establishing the other three colonies. Public opinion in Britain forced the government to annex them to protect the Blacks from the Boers. The Boers' attitude was "Then the British can protect us from the Blacks". Which required soldiers AND budget expenditure. There were not enough soldiers to defend the colonies; a few thousand regular foot and no cavalry.
The British Army was a mess, to say the least. The Crimean War, in which the Charge of the Light Brigade was the least of the problems had exposed how badly in need of reform it actually was. Leadership was not the real problem, it was organizational management. Different parts of the army reported to different Ministries and Treasury parsimoniously squeezed every farthing of expenditure before approving it. Attempts were being made at reform but as is usual in the military, change was resisted as the greatest enemy. Wolseley who had the ear of the establishment in London, was in charge of reforms, promoting those in his inner circle and poisoning the wells of those who were not.
The Zulu nation had come together in the early 19th century under Dingiswayo. Shaka succeeded him and by 1825 the Zulu warriors struck terror into the hearts of Whites and Blacks alike, massacring everyone in sight, including his own people until he was murdered. By the 1870's Cetshwayo had established a kingdom, Zululand, with capital at Ulundi, bordered by Natal, Transvaal, Orange Free State and the Atlantic, with an army of 40,000 warriors, armed with short, stabbing sears, (assegai) and cowhide shields.
If they decided to go raiding in force, they could wreak havoc in the thinly settled colonies. Cetshawyo did not want trouble and preferred a negotiated settlement with the British but whether he could or would control his army was the question in the minds of the Whites. He was sent an ultimatum which he could in no way accept; the intent was to trigger a war and defeat him. Cetshwayo, in rejecting the ultimatum, said he would not invade Natal but if the British army crossed into Zululand he would fight. They did and he did.
Chelmsford, a good officer, respected by his men, was in charge of the military expidition. His problem was how to invade Zululand without leaving Natal totally defenseless against a Zulu army that traveled light and could cover 50 miles a day. London had VERY reluctantly agreed to send him two battalions of infantry and two companies of engineers who would arrive December 1978. There were also 9,000 poorly armed natives and 1100 mounted colonial troops for a total of 18,000 men, 1,000 wagons, 10,000 oxen.
Chelmsford crossed the majority of his troops and supplies, including 220 wagons, at Rorke's Drift (ford) on the Buffalo River, setting up a base camp and hospital in the mission buildings, leaving a large qualtity of bagged mealie (corn) and boxes of biscuit, with about hundred men to guard the ford until reinforcements arrived. He reached the conical hill called Isandlhwana on January 20, where he made camp and sent out scouts in force. In mud and rain, it had taken 10 days to move 10 miles. The wagons were to be unloaded and sent back for more supplies.
Early the morning of January 22, the scouting parties from the south east sent back word of large numbers of Zulus and requested troops to go on the attack. Chelmsford took half his troops leaving roughly 1000 men to defend the camp and headed about 10 miles east.
The Boers had warned Chelmsford to laager the wagons and fortify the camp. In December 1838, 500 Boers stood off some 15,000 Zulu warriors from the safety of their circled wagons so they knew where of they spoke. But laagering is a particular difficult job and the rear of the camp was assumed to be secured by the hill behind them and the number of men left to defend it large enough. The rear was not secure; the camp for 4500 men was too big.
Into this mix, throw a loose cannon named Durnford, in command of native infantry and about 300 mounted native cavalry. His instructions from Chelmsford were to re-enforce the troops at the camp. Instead he took off to the North East and ran into the entire Zulu Army of 20,000 men who promptly charged. Th ecamp commander had to scatter his troops to try to rescue Durnford. From there it was just a matter of time. As long as the troops held together and had ammunition, their front firing line kept the Zulus at bay but their flanks were unprotected and they were over run. Of about 1700 men, only three or four hundred mounted men escaped.
Two of the survivors came by Rorke's Drift and told of the disaster, warning that 4000 Zulus were on their way. These were the reserves who had not "washed their spears" and were itching for glory. The two men in charge of the station, Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead had time for the troops to make barricades of the mealie bags and biscuit boxes. The re-enforcements never arrived and any troops which were not British regulars ran or galloped as fast as they could to escape, leaving about 100 able bodied men. The attack came at about 5:00 pm and lasted most of the night. The Zulus were brave but badly led and took serious casualties, breaking off the attack in the early morning.
If you have seen the movie Zulu Dawn, they had it backwards of course. Burt Lancaster's Durnford is made out the hero and Peter O'Toole's Chelmsford the villain.
England was aghast at the Isandlwana massacre. Nothing like it had happened since the retreat from Kabul in 1841. The government and Wolseley were desperate to blame Chelmsford who was not one of the inner circle, to keep their own mismanagement of the South African situation out of it. However he got his report to Queen Victoria who came down firmly on his side. To this day he has his supporters and detractors. The courageous defense of Rorke's Drift gave the government just the opportunity they needed to shift attention away from the disaster, so they spun it mercilessly.
For further details and good maps, see Wikipedia which has a very detailed series of articles on the Military History of South Africa. Start with the Anglo-Zulu War and follow the various links.
The author attempts to explain what happened and why, drawing on a number of sources on the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 and British politics at the time in this concise 146 page book. The Anglo-Zulu War is usually presented from a South African perspective, which is relatively simple, in that the defeat of the Zulus ensured the safety of both Boer and British settlers in the four colonies of Cape Town, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal. The book lacked only a few more maps and one or two more chapters detailing the second campaign to be an excellent condensed history of the war.
Britain did not want the colonies, considering them a costly nuisance that they were stuck with, gold and diamonds not yet having been discovered. The Dutch had established Capetown in 1652 and over the next two hundred years, Dutch, German and Huguenot settlers gradually expanded out into the country. Britain took it from the Dutch and kept it after the Napoleonic wars. When they tried to enforce British laws on the Boers, abolishing slavery and arresting whites for murdering Blacks, the Boers packed up and left on the Great Trek, establishing the other three colonies. Public opinion in Britain forced the government to annex them to protect the Blacks from the Boers. The Boers' attitude was "Then the British can protect us from the Blacks". Which required soldiers AND budget expenditure. There were not enough soldiers to defend the colonies; a few thousand regular foot and no cavalry.
The British Army was a mess, to say the least. The Crimean War, in which the Charge of the Light Brigade was the least of the problems had exposed how badly in need of reform it actually was. Leadership was not the real problem, it was organizational management. Different parts of the army reported to different Ministries and Treasury parsimoniously squeezed every farthing of expenditure before approving it. Attempts were being made at reform but as is usual in the military, change was resisted as the greatest enemy. Wolseley who had the ear of the establishment in London, was in charge of reforms, promoting those in his inner circle and poisoning the wells of those who were not.
The Zulu nation had come together in the early 19th century under Dingiswayo. Shaka succeeded him and by 1825 the Zulu warriors struck terror into the hearts of Whites and Blacks alike, massacring everyone in sight, including his own people until he was murdered. By the 1870's Cetshwayo had established a kingdom, Zululand, with capital at Ulundi, bordered by Natal, Transvaal, Orange Free State and the Atlantic, with an army of 40,000 warriors, armed with short, stabbing sears, (assegai) and cowhide shields.
If they decided to go raiding in force, they could wreak havoc in the thinly settled colonies. Cetshawyo did not want trouble and preferred a negotiated settlement with the British but whether he could or would control his army was the question in the minds of the Whites. He was sent an ultimatum which he could in no way accept; the intent was to trigger a war and defeat him. Cetshwayo, in rejecting the ultimatum, said he would not invade Natal but if the British army crossed into Zululand he would fight. They did and he did.
Chelmsford, a good officer, respected by his men, was in charge of the military expidition. His problem was how to invade Zululand without leaving Natal totally defenseless against a Zulu army that traveled light and could cover 50 miles a day. London had VERY reluctantly agreed to send him two battalions of infantry and two companies of engineers who would arrive December 1978. There were also 9,000 poorly armed natives and 1100 mounted colonial troops for a total of 18,000 men, 1,000 wagons, 10,000 oxen.
Chelmsford crossed the majority of his troops and supplies, including 220 wagons, at Rorke's Drift (ford) on the Buffalo River, setting up a base camp and hospital in the mission buildings, leaving a large qualtity of bagged mealie (corn) and boxes of biscuit, with about hundred men to guard the ford until reinforcements arrived. He reached the conical hill called Isandlhwana on January 20, where he made camp and sent out scouts in force. In mud and rain, it had taken 10 days to move 10 miles. The wagons were to be unloaded and sent back for more supplies.
Early the morning of January 22, the scouting parties from the south east sent back word of large numbers of Zulus and requested troops to go on the attack. Chelmsford took half his troops leaving roughly 1000 men to defend the camp and headed about 10 miles east.
The Boers had warned Chelmsford to laager the wagons and fortify the camp. In December 1838, 500 Boers stood off some 15,000 Zulu warriors from the safety of their circled wagons so they knew where of they spoke. But laagering is a particular difficult job and the rear of the camp was assumed to be secured by the hill behind them and the number of men left to defend it large enough. The rear was not secure; the camp for 4500 men was too big.
Into this mix, throw a loose cannon named Durnford, in command of native infantry and about 300 mounted native cavalry. His instructions from Chelmsford were to re-enforce the troops at the camp. Instead he took off to the North East and ran into the entire Zulu Army of 20,000 men who promptly charged. Th ecamp commander had to scatter his troops to try to rescue Durnford. From there it was just a matter of time. As long as the troops held together and had ammunition, their front firing line kept the Zulus at bay but their flanks were unprotected and they were over run. Of about 1700 men, only three or four hundred mounted men escaped.
Two of the survivors came by Rorke's Drift and told of the disaster, warning that 4000 Zulus were on their way. These were the reserves who had not "washed their spears" and were itching for glory. The two men in charge of the station, Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead had time for the troops to make barricades of the mealie bags and biscuit boxes. The re-enforcements never arrived and any troops which were not British regulars ran or galloped as fast as they could to escape, leaving about 100 able bodied men. The attack came at about 5:00 pm and lasted most of the night. The Zulus were brave but badly led and took serious casualties, breaking off the attack in the early morning.
If you have seen the movie Zulu Dawn, they had it backwards of course. Burt Lancaster's Durnford is made out the hero and Peter O'Toole's Chelmsford the villain.
England was aghast at the Isandlwana massacre. Nothing like it had happened since the retreat from Kabul in 1841. The government and Wolseley were desperate to blame Chelmsford who was not one of the inner circle, to keep their own mismanagement of the South African situation out of it. However he got his report to Queen Victoria who came down firmly on his side. To this day he has his supporters and detractors. The courageous defense of Rorke's Drift gave the government just the opportunity they needed to shift attention away from the disaster, so they spun it mercilessly.
For further details and good maps, see Wikipedia which has a very detailed series of articles on the Military History of South Africa. Start with the Anglo-Zulu War and follow the various links.
January 11, 2023
This is a slim volume of 133 pages of text and more than half of the book recounts the background to one of the most well known heroic actions of the British colonial wars. It might be more accurate to have a title such as "Events Leading up to Rorke's Drift".
Although the cover blurb states that the author shows how this undoubted act of bravery was exploited for political ends ( such as it ever was!), his evidence for that is little more than politicians in particular emphasising the glorious action of the defence of Rorke's Drift and glossing over the ignominious defeat a day or two previously at Isandhlwana. The commander, Lord Chelmsford, got the blame to deflect attention away from long term underfunding of the armed forces by Government over many years and lack of strategy, policy or indeed interest in this part of the British Empire.
The book has some good photos of some of the heroes, 11 of whom won the Victoria Cross. And a photo of the store building to assist the imagination of the events plus a map of the buildings and terrain of Rorke's Drift.
Although the cover blurb states that the author shows how this undoubted act of bravery was exploited for political ends ( such as it ever was!), his evidence for that is little more than politicians in particular emphasising the glorious action of the defence of Rorke's Drift and glossing over the ignominious defeat a day or two previously at Isandhlwana. The commander, Lord Chelmsford, got the blame to deflect attention away from long term underfunding of the armed forces by Government over many years and lack of strategy, policy or indeed interest in this part of the British Empire.
The book has some good photos of some of the heroes, 11 of whom won the Victoria Cross. And a photo of the store building to assist the imagination of the events plus a map of the buildings and terrain of Rorke's Drift.
June 23, 2020
Most of us are aware of Rorke's Drift as the name of the mission in the film Zulu, but as good as the film was it gives no indication of its place in the Zulu rising of 1879. This is the only book I have read concerning Rorke's Drift and as such there will be other opinions. The author initially states that his aim is to place the battle in its context and spends most of the book describing the history, politics and leading characters. The preparation made by the defenders with what they had is detailed, and his description of the attack is left to the penultimate chapter. His argument is well made and his final opinion is worthy of thought. I found this book to be an enjoyable read and I am certainly now much more aware of this era in South African history.
November 3, 2020
Small but concise story of battle in surprising detail
January 16, 2023
Very interesting aspect of history that's been written in a pretty boring way.
February 3, 2019
Rorke's Drift is one of the epics of the race, but why? This is a question Michael Glover asks, pointing out many other battles could have been chosen, and his answer isn't particularly pleasant. The lionisation of the stand at Rorke's Drift was a deliberate ploy to distract attention from the major disaster at Isandhlana and, more importantly, the state into which the army had been allowed to drift which had led to that disaster. The chief conspirators in the affair for Glover are the Prime Minister of the day, Disraeli, (it didn't save him...) and Sir Garnett Wolseley whom Glover clearly dislikes. Glover defends the Zulu expedition CinC, Lord Chelmsford, who has often become the fall guy for the disaster, and suggests he was the victim of a protracted smear campaign organised by Wolseley. He has no time at all for Durnford whom he blames for the disaster and thus the judgments made popular by the film Zulu Dawn are turned on their head. Zulu Dawn was produced some four years after the book and I suspect its portrayal is what sits in most people's minds so a comparison with this book is perhaps an interesting side light on the power of cinema to influence popular perceptions of history. Glover also argues that Britain had no wish to be in Southern Africa at all which was seen as nothing but a financial drain on the empire. He presents a powerful case and this, in some ways, is the most interesting part of the book. Otherwise, the reader gets a good background description of the events leading up to the action (it's worth knowing this is substantially longer than the description of the battle itself) and a clear account of the battle itself. This has a good map to accompany it and is vivid but not theatrical. In short, the book is a very good read, providing a lot to think about. Despite his worries about why Rorke's Drift has become so famous, Glover takes nothing away from its defenders: "It may be that the defenders of the mission station got more acclamation than would have normally come to them. It cannot be said that they got more than they deserved". War and politics often make ill bed fellows. This is an old book I should have read years ago. It was revisionist in its day, is it now the new orthodoxy? I for one have been inspired to read more to find out.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews