Irving L. Janis was a research psychologist at Yale University and a professor emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley most famous for his theory of "groupthink" which described the systematic errors made by groups when taking collective decisions. He retired in 1986.
He also collaborated with Carl Hovland on his studies of attitude change, including the sleeper effect.
A fantastic book that discusses the theory of "Groupthink" and recounts the issues related to it during two of the most significant failures in US military history, i..e The Bay of Pigs and Pearl Harbor. While a Professor friend of mine recommended it with caveats that it had some factual biases, it is an excellent piece that explicates some of the problems in bureaucratic structures. This book could easily be updated with the recent problems experienced in the Middle East.
Without giving away too much of the plot lines of the book, I would highlight a few concepts that I personally think sell the book.
1) "Secrecy of Information" - Need to know attitudes and the potential downfall associated with it. 2) "The effectiveness trap" - Picking your battles can often result in a lot of stalemates 3) "Newness" - the value of trust, when back-peddling becomes the main mode of operation 4) "Political Calculations" - backing yourself into a corner as a function of the verbiage
It was also interesting to hear Janis's thoughts on various illusions that occur as a function of the group thought and repetition. The way that he has drawn apart the framework is quite brilliant and should be closely studied by people of most humanitarian disciplines.
A fascinating must read for those that are interested in group interaction.
This was required reading in college and discussed in depth in group dynamics classes. The theory of group-think is very well supported and anyone in management needs to understand the group dynamics that make it all too real and a threat to the world.
2021-03-17 This was a fairly decent book I was assigned and read in my intro political science class in college. The premise, as I remember it is that some bad decisions can come out of groups whose purpose is to consider as many sides to a big issue as possible and come to "the best" decision, but the dynamics of "groupthink" often sabotage good decisions.
Interesting thesis, that can indeed play out if the leader of the group: - picks too many of the same type of participants - is not careful in how the decisions are reached.
I am sure there is much more to the book than this summary from 45+ years later...
Another reason I am glad I read it is that I am still hearing references to the idea, if not the book itself, today, and throughout the years since I originally read it. That is neat to know what folks are talking about when they make such references.
To me this was a rather disappointing history book about mid-20th century America war decision making based on the author's mostly unexplained theories of Group Think. I selected the book based on mention from Dr. Malone's book about the Covid-19 debacle and his belief group think is still very much alive in Federal Government Science (sic) agencies. This book was written well before the obvious perversion of government by its group think deep state... still there were obvious examples of group think well beyond the narrow discussion of American military decisions presented by this book. I was disappointed but possible its only upset with a poorly selected boot. Anticipation can lead one to disappointment (and often does).