Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940

Cambridge Military Histories

by John Kiszely

The British campaign in Norway in 1940 was an ignominious and abject failure. It is perhaps best known as the fiasco which directly led to the fall of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his replacement by Winston Churchill. But what were the reasons for failure? Why did the decision makers, including Churchill, make such poor decisions and exercise such bad judgement? What other factors played a part? John Kiszely draws on his own experience of working at all levels in the military to assess the campaign as a whole, its context and evolution from strategic failures, intelligence blunders and German air superiority to the performance of the troops and the serious errors of judgement by those responsible for the higher direction of the war. The result helps us to understand not only the outcome of the Norwegian campaign but also why more recent military campaigns have found success so elusive.

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, Nonfiction

390 pages, ebook

First published June 30, 2017

Reviews

[Shrike58 · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's been my intention to read this case study for awhile, and while I can report that the main title is blandly accurate, the subtitle is what cuts to the chase. Kiszely finds little or nothing to respect in the Anglo-French Scandinavian sideshow of 1940, as he checks off wishful thinking, lack of imagination (in respects for failing to get to grips with reality), poor preparation, and a general lack of effective organization.

Being a retired lieutenant general in the British Army, Kiszely reserves his strongest criticism for the British service chiefs; Edmund Ironside of the British Army, Dudley Pound of the Royal Navy, and Cyril Newall of the Royal Air Force. If these men are not remembered for their great deeds, Kiszely essentially argues that they should be remembered for their collective dysfunctionalism. They failed to effectively work together, they failed to be an institutional bulwark for their civilian masters, and they just seem to have been totally out of their depth. It is fortunate that the younger generation that took over after them were much more effective. Kiszely has his own criticisms of the likes of Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill, but it is the above trio who should have been trying to save the collective national executive from themselves; at least on the functional end, if not that of policy.

Besides that Kiszely also has a lot of effective operational and tactical detail. Even if the strategy had been reasonable, the instrument London wielded in Norway was very flawed. The British ground force was poorly trained, supplied, and organized. The air component was almost non-existent. The Royal Navy, which had some actual successes, was mostly lucky; and luck is not a strategy. Finally, it's still not clear why the intelligence component that should have provided advanced warning was so bad; so deeply buried are the bodies.

I could go on and on about the virtues of this study, even for the current day, as what used to be called the "Free World" suddenly finds itself coping with military menace again. About the only thing that's a negative is that this is really not the first book you should read on the subject, as it's very much staff-grade history.

Rounding up from 4.5, as the reality is that studies like this have a half life until they're replaced by a newer study.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

When it comes to niche campaigns of World War Two, the Allied operations that were planned and then enacted after the Germans initiated Operation Weserubüng, as related to the invasion of Norway, are somewhat ignored. For every book about the events associated with the Norwegian theatre of war there are dozens about D-Day, Stalingrad, El Alamein etc. When one considers the amount of men and materiel invested by both sides this is understandable, and for the most part it also reflects the strategic importance of the campaign. However, when one considers that it was in Norway and its territorial waters that the western Allies first truly came to grips with the Nazis in battle during the Second World War, and the disastrous leadership provided by Neville Chamberlain during the campaign led to his replacement by Winston Churchill, means that the events and issues related in this book are still highly significant. Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway 1940 by John Kiszely provides a seriously informative and detailed analysis of what went wrong for the British war effort, and how as a result of its military and political failures, lessons were learned that began the process of helping that country work towards defeating Germany.

Kiszely adopts a top-down perspective as he analysises the Britain approach to Norway as a theatre of war during World War Two, focusing for the most part on those leaders and policy makers across the British government and armed forces who were responsible for planning and operational activities from before 1939 to the final evacuation from Narvik in early June 1940. He does a deep dive into the structural elements and problems in both the war cabinet that was put in place by Chamberlain after the outbreak of war, and also the leadership of the British army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. Throughout the text the author recounts failure and misdirection, impulsive and ill-informed decisions that led to flawed actions in almost every avenue. There is no doubt that from the PM down, including almost all the cabinet members, intelligence officers, generals, admirals and air staff, there was haphazard thinking, irresolute action and basic incompetence that defined what transpired.

Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway 1940 places plenty of the spotlight on Winston Churchill, who through his often precipate and even foolhardy desire for action propelled the British into a situation that was doomed to end in disaster. His advocacy for various interventions in Norway, either to prevent German access to Swedish iron ore and/or to deny the sea lanes to the Third Reich, as well as to possibly support the Finns in their war against Stalin's Soviet Union, is shown to be a farrago of wishful thinking and bravado. Kiszely notes that of the main members of Chamberlain's war cabinet he was perhaps the only one with an aggressive mindset, but Churchill's desire for action was not based on a realistic appraisal of the capabilities of the relevant forces.

As the book details, almost everything that was done by the British when it came to the Norway campaign was slapdash and almost amateurish, and virtually no one escapes Kiszely's criticism. When it comes to the more tactical aspects of the fighting in and around Norway he is detailed enough in his appraisal to note where there were some notable achievements (e.g. the two naval battles in Narvik, the efforts of Auchinleck to develop a unified command structure in the final days of the Allied operations in Norway, the mostly successful evacuations carried out as the Anglo-French abandoned the Norwegians). He also offers a very underwhelming consideration of the training and qualities of the British army units deployed to the front, the abysmal attitude to cooperation between services and Allies that held true for most of the campaign, and the contrasting superiority exhibited on the most part by the Germans.

Kiszely's account is thorough, well researched and footnoted, supported by informative and relevant images and mas, and is written in such a way to be accessible for most potential readers. It might have been helpful both for the overall depth of his work as well as a means to differentiate much of the strategic level narrative from the combat experiences by including more personal accounts and details as to specific actions. Considering that for the most part the author is trying to conduct a post mortem on the policies and personalities that made the British so inept in their actions in Norway, then perhaps expecting more material from 'in the trenches' is maybe unfair.

I would expect anyone with an interest in World War II, and more specifically the Norwegian campaign of 1940, will find much to appreciate in Kiszely's work. It certainly offers a sober lesson in how dysfunctional command and organisational structures can defeat a military effort even before it's launched, and it reminds one that it took more than a few setbacks for the Allies to learn how to actually fight and win battles against the Third Reich. Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway 1940 is a welcome addition to my own personal reading experiences related to WW2 history, and I expect it has received similar plaudits and appreciation from other readers.

[Erik Steeb (on StoryGraph now) · Rating 5 out of 5]

I meant to read this while I was in Norway a few months ago, but life got in the way and I spent that month dealing with some of the same issues the British and French dealt with in Spring 1940. Norway’s geography is punishing and demands considerable planning, while environmental factors can dramatically hinder operations.

As with any other analysis of a failed campaign, most of the lessons that should have been learned were not. Communication and air superiority continue to be the two most important components of modern warfare, and I’m not sure how much emphasis is being out on that.

[Terry · Rating 5 out of 5]

Probably the best unvarnished look at the inept British decision making in 1940. Provides a good strategic overview of the Norway campaign. A bit dry in pieces, but an enjoyable read.