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Civil War America
River of Death: The Chickamauga Campaign: Volume One: The Fall of Chattanooga
The Battle of Chickamauga was the third bloodiest of the American Civil War and the only major Confederate victory in the conflict's western theater. It pitted Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee against William S. Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland and resulted in more than 34,500 casualties. In this first volume of an authoritative two-volume history of the Chickamauga campaign, William Glenn Robertson provides a richly detailed narrative of military operations in southeastern and eastern Tennessee as two armies prepared to meet along the "River of Death." Robertson tracks the two opposing armies from July 1863 through Bragg's strategic decision to abandon Chattanooga on September 9. Drawing on all relevant primary and secondary sources, Robertson devotes special attention to the personalities and thinking of the opposing generals and their staffs. He also sheds new light on the role of railroads on operations in these landlocked battlegrounds, as well as the intelligence gathered and used by both sides.
Delving deep into the strategic machinations, maneuvers, and smaller clashes that led to the bloody events of September 19@-20, 1863, Robertson reveals that the road to Chickamauga was as consequential as the unfolding of the battle itself.
Delving deep into the strategic machinations, maneuvers, and smaller clashes that led to the bloody events of September 19@-20, 1863, Robertson reveals that the road to Chickamauga was as consequential as the unfolding of the battle itself.
680 pages, Hardcover
First published October 8, 2018
12 people are currently reading
79 people want to read
About the author
William Glenn Robertson
17 books2 followersWilliam Glenn Robertson received his Ph.D from the University of Virginia in 1975. After a ten-year career in academic institutions in Virginia, New Mexico and Colorado, he joined the faculty of the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1981, where he worked for thirty years.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
November 2, 2018
I have just finished reading William Glenn Robertson’s first volume of his projected two book account of the Chickamauga Campaign; “River of Death: The Chickamauga Campaign - Volume One: The Fall of Chattanooga”. The book is 680 pages of which 471 pages is narrative, the rest, over 200 pages, is appendices, extensive notes and a detailed bibliography. There are however very few maps, eight in total, not great but detailed enough to follow the movements of the various forces involved.
Now if your looking for a book covering the advance to battle; the Blue and the Grey facing off in lines of battle with muskets and cannons roaring death and destruction then you best look elsewhere. This book is a book of movements and counter-movements covering the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Cumberland as the Federal forces advance from Tullahoma to the area around Chattanooga. It was hard for me to make up my mind how to grade this book as usually I prefer more tactical battle studies but the author has conducted extensive research and put a lot of work into telling this story in a way that was both easy to read and to comprehend, so for that reason it deserves a high rating
This is a strategic look at the campaign, not a tactical study. The author spends a lot of time explaining the make up of the command structure of both armies, detailing the personalities involved and how their relationships with each other impacted on the campaign. For example here the author outlines some of the issues within the Army of Tennessee. I don't think many could argue with his summary:
"In truth, the source of the Army of Tennessee's failure lay in neither its numbers nor its obsolescent weaponry. Instead, the army's lack of success could be ascribed primarily to the utter indiscipline of the army's principal subordinate commanders. For good or ill, the Confederate government had placed the Army of Tennessee in the hands of Braxton Bragg, but neither Leonidas Polk or William Hardee could accept that fact and willingly support the army commander. Beginning with the ill-starred Kentucky campaign, each corps commander in his own way assiduously worked to undermine his chief and his plans. Worse, they turned their junior officers against Bragg at every opportunity. Bragg's personality hindered any effort to conciliate his recalcitrant subordinates, but even a more collegial individual would have been unlikely to have brought Polk and Hardee into line without being able to threaten their removal. Thus Polk could disregard Bragg's direct orders at Perryville, Hardee could select an incompetent officer to lead the assault at Stones River, and both could contemplate mutiny at Elk River. Unless that glaring fault was rectified, the Army of Tennessee would continue to risk a catastrophic failure in the campaign soon to begin."
He provides some witty first-hand observations from participants, like this great description of the Confederate General Daniel Harvey Hill, from Robert Kean, a War Department bureau chief: "Harsh, abrupt, often insulting in the effort to be sarcastic, he will offend many and conciliate none. Nor has he talents to reduce this disadvantage, though brave and loyal."
Throughout the book the author has utilised letters and diaries of the participants to tell their story or to explain to family members back home the goings-on of the army; " … In the same letter, Hall then identified the crux of the Army of Tennessee's command problems: 'There is one very remarkable fact which is, that as a general rule the best officers of his army like him while the poorest ones dislike him. Whenever you find an officer who never attends to his duty or who is incompetent he abuses Bragg. I found this a very good rule to judge the qualifications of Braggs officers by'."
The author also goes into great detail explaining the topography and terrain that the two armies had to manoeuvrer in, how railway lines were the crux of the supply issues for an advancing army in this region:
"That same day, Chief Quartermaster John Taylor submitted his estimate of the railroad cars needed daily to supply the army during its campaign. Taylor used planning figures of 45,000 animals and 70,000 men in computing the army's needs, with the capacity of each railroad car placed at eight tons. He expected that fodder or long forage would be procured locally, leaving only the grain or short forage to be transported by rail. Therefore the army's animals would need 450,000 pounds of grain per day, accounting for twenty-eight railroad cars. Standard bacon-based rations for the men equalled 210,000 pounds per day, carried in thirteen cars. Quartermaster stores amounted to 160,000 pounds per day, or ten cars. Medical stores accounted for 32,000 pounds per day, filling only two cars. Finally 'Contingencies' added 112,000 pounds per day, the equivalent of seven freight cars. In total, Taylor estimated that Rosecran's four corps would require the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad to deliver at the railhead an average of 964,000 pounds of supplies per day, the equivalent of sixty loaded freight trains. This quantity of supplies had to be delivered every day for the duration of the campaign."
This account certainly gives you an idea of the difficulties in operating in this theatre during the Chickamauga campaign:
"As Sirwell's brigade camped around what they called Warren's Mill, Stanley's Second Brigade was toiling up the mountain. Stanley's battery had difficulty making the climb. Only by hitching twelve horses on each gun was it able to reach the crest, and three horses died in the process."
Throughout the book the author highlights issues that both Rosecrans and Bragg had to contend with in regards to their subordinates. It seems that the Confederate cavalry commander Joseph Wheeler was quite ineffective during the opening moves of the Chickamauga campaign: "Wheeler himself had established his headquarters at Summerville, eight miles to the east. There, in a manner reminiscent of Stanley's timidity, he had resisted all orders by Bragg to probe aggressively toward the Federal concentration at Winston's plantation. Wheeler's maddening inaction had forced Bragg to send Forrest all the way from the army's right to its left in order to gain information on Federal activity beyond Lookout Mountain."
So again I reiterate that this book is not about battles and hard fought encounters between the Union and the Confederacy, it’s a strategic oversight of the campaign, with movements, orders, counter-orders and command issues that were faced by both Rosecrans and Bragg. The one thing I did take away from this book is that a re-evaluation of Bragg and his command may be long overdue, maybe he wasn’t such a failure as I was led to believe in previous accounts.
The last paragraph in the book states: "The hot dusty day of 9 September 1863 ultimately would prove to be a turning point in the campaign." This is because finally Bragg is in a position to counter Rosecrans movements and take the initiative in; "the tangled terrain south of Chattanooga". However we will have to wait for the second volume to read about the actual battle.
Now if your looking for a book covering the advance to battle; the Blue and the Grey facing off in lines of battle with muskets and cannons roaring death and destruction then you best look elsewhere. This book is a book of movements and counter-movements covering the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Cumberland as the Federal forces advance from Tullahoma to the area around Chattanooga. It was hard for me to make up my mind how to grade this book as usually I prefer more tactical battle studies but the author has conducted extensive research and put a lot of work into telling this story in a way that was both easy to read and to comprehend, so for that reason it deserves a high rating
This is a strategic look at the campaign, not a tactical study. The author spends a lot of time explaining the make up of the command structure of both armies, detailing the personalities involved and how their relationships with each other impacted on the campaign. For example here the author outlines some of the issues within the Army of Tennessee. I don't think many could argue with his summary:
"In truth, the source of the Army of Tennessee's failure lay in neither its numbers nor its obsolescent weaponry. Instead, the army's lack of success could be ascribed primarily to the utter indiscipline of the army's principal subordinate commanders. For good or ill, the Confederate government had placed the Army of Tennessee in the hands of Braxton Bragg, but neither Leonidas Polk or William Hardee could accept that fact and willingly support the army commander. Beginning with the ill-starred Kentucky campaign, each corps commander in his own way assiduously worked to undermine his chief and his plans. Worse, they turned their junior officers against Bragg at every opportunity. Bragg's personality hindered any effort to conciliate his recalcitrant subordinates, but even a more collegial individual would have been unlikely to have brought Polk and Hardee into line without being able to threaten their removal. Thus Polk could disregard Bragg's direct orders at Perryville, Hardee could select an incompetent officer to lead the assault at Stones River, and both could contemplate mutiny at Elk River. Unless that glaring fault was rectified, the Army of Tennessee would continue to risk a catastrophic failure in the campaign soon to begin."
He provides some witty first-hand observations from participants, like this great description of the Confederate General Daniel Harvey Hill, from Robert Kean, a War Department bureau chief: "Harsh, abrupt, often insulting in the effort to be sarcastic, he will offend many and conciliate none. Nor has he talents to reduce this disadvantage, though brave and loyal."
Throughout the book the author has utilised letters and diaries of the participants to tell their story or to explain to family members back home the goings-on of the army; " … In the same letter, Hall then identified the crux of the Army of Tennessee's command problems: 'There is one very remarkable fact which is, that as a general rule the best officers of his army like him while the poorest ones dislike him. Whenever you find an officer who never attends to his duty or who is incompetent he abuses Bragg. I found this a very good rule to judge the qualifications of Braggs officers by'."
The author also goes into great detail explaining the topography and terrain that the two armies had to manoeuvrer in, how railway lines were the crux of the supply issues for an advancing army in this region:
"That same day, Chief Quartermaster John Taylor submitted his estimate of the railroad cars needed daily to supply the army during its campaign. Taylor used planning figures of 45,000 animals and 70,000 men in computing the army's needs, with the capacity of each railroad car placed at eight tons. He expected that fodder or long forage would be procured locally, leaving only the grain or short forage to be transported by rail. Therefore the army's animals would need 450,000 pounds of grain per day, accounting for twenty-eight railroad cars. Standard bacon-based rations for the men equalled 210,000 pounds per day, carried in thirteen cars. Quartermaster stores amounted to 160,000 pounds per day, or ten cars. Medical stores accounted for 32,000 pounds per day, filling only two cars. Finally 'Contingencies' added 112,000 pounds per day, the equivalent of seven freight cars. In total, Taylor estimated that Rosecran's four corps would require the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad to deliver at the railhead an average of 964,000 pounds of supplies per day, the equivalent of sixty loaded freight trains. This quantity of supplies had to be delivered every day for the duration of the campaign."
This account certainly gives you an idea of the difficulties in operating in this theatre during the Chickamauga campaign:
"As Sirwell's brigade camped around what they called Warren's Mill, Stanley's Second Brigade was toiling up the mountain. Stanley's battery had difficulty making the climb. Only by hitching twelve horses on each gun was it able to reach the crest, and three horses died in the process."
Throughout the book the author highlights issues that both Rosecrans and Bragg had to contend with in regards to their subordinates. It seems that the Confederate cavalry commander Joseph Wheeler was quite ineffective during the opening moves of the Chickamauga campaign: "Wheeler himself had established his headquarters at Summerville, eight miles to the east. There, in a manner reminiscent of Stanley's timidity, he had resisted all orders by Bragg to probe aggressively toward the Federal concentration at Winston's plantation. Wheeler's maddening inaction had forced Bragg to send Forrest all the way from the army's right to its left in order to gain information on Federal activity beyond Lookout Mountain."
So again I reiterate that this book is not about battles and hard fought encounters between the Union and the Confederacy, it’s a strategic oversight of the campaign, with movements, orders, counter-orders and command issues that were faced by both Rosecrans and Bragg. The one thing I did take away from this book is that a re-evaluation of Bragg and his command may be long overdue, maybe he wasn’t such a failure as I was led to believe in previous accounts.
The last paragraph in the book states: "The hot dusty day of 9 September 1863 ultimately would prove to be a turning point in the campaign." This is because finally Bragg is in a position to counter Rosecrans movements and take the initiative in; "the tangled terrain south of Chattanooga". However we will have to wait for the second volume to read about the actual battle.
September 4, 2020
This highly detailed narrative of Union General William Rosecrans’ 1863 campaign against the key transportation center of Chattanooga, Tennessee, starts on July 4th of that year, just as his Tullahoma campaign—“a resounding success”—was prematurely stopped by the weather. The book describes the Union army’s operations up to its reaching Chattanooga and the commander’s fateful decision on September 9th to continue pursuit of Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee.
Dr. Robertson does an exemplary job in his extensive descriptions of the principal and subordinate commanders of both armies down to brigade level, even including important staff members, with critical observations about many of the participants.
After the Tullahoma campaign ended, the Union army faced the most difficult portion of its logistical operations. Its supply line was bound to the single-track railroad back to Nashville, Tennessee, and further back to Louisville, Kentucky. Going forward, it went up and over the relatively barren Cumberland Plateau, only to reach the barrier presented by the Tennessee River. After that, Sand and Lookout Mountains—geologic continuations of the Cumberland Plateau—and then ridge after ridge after ridge had to be crossed, in order to reach Chattanooga and another key railroad hub at Dalton, Georgia. The Union Army of the Potomac in Virginia and the Army of the Tennessee along the Mississippi River had no such obstacles in their respective theatres.
The author finely depicts Rosecrans’ arduous advance and the ensuing feints that worked so well to confuse Bragg, who did better in this situation than the standard version of American Civil War history usually credits him. The Union maneuvers that resulted in the crossing of the Tennessee River are especially well-told.
As the book notes, one historian—of the Army of the Cumberland—Rev. Larry Daniels, flatly denied that Union corps commander George Thomas had argued for a pause until the Union force could temporarily halt at the evacuated city of Chattanooga in order to adequately prepare for further operations. Dr. Robertson does not offer a definitive pronouncement—as first-hand evidence is lacking—but makes it clear that Thomas may well have done just that. He could have also supported such a conclusion with John Watts DePeyster’s account of a talk with Thomas, who stated that, “Rosecrans should have waited to get another ‘good ready’ before he pushed forward again.”
As is well-known, the campaign turned out badly. Lacking good information or supportive activity from General Ulysses S. Grant in Mississippi and being given misinformation by General-in-Chief Henry Halleck in Washington, Rosecrans and his Union Army of the Cumberland were unknowingly facing more and more Confederates, even as its supply lines lengthened. Chickamauga was one of the rare major battles in which the Confederacy’s forces outnumbered those of the Union.
The information contained in this book is thick upon every page. Even given the usual difficulties in ascertaining historical truth amongst the multiplicity of conflicting Civil War-related sources, there is little to quibble about concerning the author’s eminently reasonable judgments, descriptions, and analyses. The lengthy bibliography includes a very long list of manuscript collections, besides a multitude of published sources. In contrast to some historians who have only a single source in many of their foot- or endnotes (and often the same source in note after note), Dr. Robertson’s are chock-a-block with his research materials. At least one endnote exceeded a page in length. The book contains nine nicely-compiled maps and an appendix with the Union and Confederate orders of battle.
The second volume will pick up as the opposing armies maneuver and then meet in the bloody Battle of Chickamauga, where the fighting begins in earnest. It will assuredly be as valuable a history as the one under review.
Dr. Robertson does an exemplary job in his extensive descriptions of the principal and subordinate commanders of both armies down to brigade level, even including important staff members, with critical observations about many of the participants.
After the Tullahoma campaign ended, the Union army faced the most difficult portion of its logistical operations. Its supply line was bound to the single-track railroad back to Nashville, Tennessee, and further back to Louisville, Kentucky. Going forward, it went up and over the relatively barren Cumberland Plateau, only to reach the barrier presented by the Tennessee River. After that, Sand and Lookout Mountains—geologic continuations of the Cumberland Plateau—and then ridge after ridge after ridge had to be crossed, in order to reach Chattanooga and another key railroad hub at Dalton, Georgia. The Union Army of the Potomac in Virginia and the Army of the Tennessee along the Mississippi River had no such obstacles in their respective theatres.
The author finely depicts Rosecrans’ arduous advance and the ensuing feints that worked so well to confuse Bragg, who did better in this situation than the standard version of American Civil War history usually credits him. The Union maneuvers that resulted in the crossing of the Tennessee River are especially well-told.
As the book notes, one historian—of the Army of the Cumberland—Rev. Larry Daniels, flatly denied that Union corps commander George Thomas had argued for a pause until the Union force could temporarily halt at the evacuated city of Chattanooga in order to adequately prepare for further operations. Dr. Robertson does not offer a definitive pronouncement—as first-hand evidence is lacking—but makes it clear that Thomas may well have done just that. He could have also supported such a conclusion with John Watts DePeyster’s account of a talk with Thomas, who stated that, “Rosecrans should have waited to get another ‘good ready’ before he pushed forward again.”
As is well-known, the campaign turned out badly. Lacking good information or supportive activity from General Ulysses S. Grant in Mississippi and being given misinformation by General-in-Chief Henry Halleck in Washington, Rosecrans and his Union Army of the Cumberland were unknowingly facing more and more Confederates, even as its supply lines lengthened. Chickamauga was one of the rare major battles in which the Confederacy’s forces outnumbered those of the Union.
The information contained in this book is thick upon every page. Even given the usual difficulties in ascertaining historical truth amongst the multiplicity of conflicting Civil War-related sources, there is little to quibble about concerning the author’s eminently reasonable judgments, descriptions, and analyses. The lengthy bibliography includes a very long list of manuscript collections, besides a multitude of published sources. In contrast to some historians who have only a single source in many of their foot- or endnotes (and often the same source in note after note), Dr. Robertson’s are chock-a-block with his research materials. At least one endnote exceeded a page in length. The book contains nine nicely-compiled maps and an appendix with the Union and Confederate orders of battle.
The second volume will pick up as the opposing armies maneuver and then meet in the bloody Battle of Chickamauga, where the fighting begins in earnest. It will assuredly be as valuable a history as the one under review.
July 18, 2022
This is an excellent book IF one wants to know the day by day minutia that let to the start of the Battle of Chickamauga. The one glaring weakness I found was a shortage of maps, compounded by discussion that named places not on the maps that were provided. To really appreciate the author’s story requires either a firm grasp of the terrain AND a knowledge of where all the places he describes are located. The book cries for a series of topographic maps. That aside, this is well written and researched (duh) by the man universally acclaimed the expert on this campaign.
October 13, 2025
So much history that we never talked about in class. I was blown away by how invoked the entire southeastern part of the state was thoroughly involved. Not just Chatt and Chikamaga but also Cleveland, Benton, Athen, etc. And even the areas between Chatt and Murfreesboro which had their own battle at Stones River. If you live local nonfiction stories, this should be added to your list ☺️
June 19, 2019
An excellent beginning for what is sure to be the definitive history of the Battle of Chickamauga. I was very pleased at the flow of the text and some of the insights I gained from Dr. Robertson. Highly recommended.
December 16, 2025
Pretty detailed.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews