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The First Soldier: Hitler as Military Leader
After Germany’s humiliating World War II defeat, numerous German generals published memoirs claiming that their country’s brilliant military leadership had been undermined by the Führer’s erratic decision making. The author of three highly acclaimed books on the era, Stephen Fritz upends this characterization of Hitler as an ill-informed fantasist and demonstrates the ways in which his strategy was coherent and even competent.
That Hitler saw World War II as the only way to retrieve Germany’s fortunes and build an expansionist Thousand-Year Reich is uncontroversial. But while his generals did sometimes object to Hitler’s tactics and operational direction, they often made the same errors in judgment and were in agreement regarding larger strategic and political goals. A necessary volume for understanding the influence of World War I on Hitler’s thinking, this work is also an eye-opening reappraisal of major events like the invasion of Russia and the battle for Normandy.
That Hitler saw World War II as the only way to retrieve Germany’s fortunes and build an expansionist Thousand-Year Reich is uncontroversial. But while his generals did sometimes object to Hitler’s tactics and operational direction, they often made the same errors in judgment and were in agreement regarding larger strategic and political goals. A necessary volume for understanding the influence of World War I on Hitler’s thinking, this work is also an eye-opening reappraisal of major events like the invasion of Russia and the battle for Normandy.
480 pages, Hardcover
First published November 13, 2018
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Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
February 29, 2020
An highly original portrait of Hitler as a competent military commander and strategist
After the end of World War II, Hitler was often described by his surviving generals as someone who made strategic blunders, erratic decisions and disastrously interfered with his generals in managing the war.
In this book, Stephen Fritz puts an end to this myth. It shows Hitler as a competent strategist, who - especially in the early years of the war - had more strategic and economic insight than his generals. The book mainly focusses on the strategic decisions on the Eastern Front, where of course most of the important decisions were taken. It shows that until the end of 1941 Hitler allowed himself to be misled by his generals, who often provided him with incorrect information and grossly overestimated the importance of Moscow. On the contrary, Hitler's decision to focus first of all on the economic centers in the Ukraine and the Caucasus was a logical one, of which the generals were unaware and only Hitler, with his insight into the economic interests of the Third Reich, rightfully understood its importance.
A small downside: strategic mistakes such as the war on the Atlantic and the decision of Hitler to declare war on the US are hardly mentioned. It does not detract from the originality of this book. It gave me insights into Hitler's way of thinking and showed that many of his decisions were logical in the views that Hitler had made at the beginning of the war.
After the end of World War II, Hitler was often described by his surviving generals as someone who made strategic blunders, erratic decisions and disastrously interfered with his generals in managing the war.
In this book, Stephen Fritz puts an end to this myth. It shows Hitler as a competent strategist, who - especially in the early years of the war - had more strategic and economic insight than his generals. The book mainly focusses on the strategic decisions on the Eastern Front, where of course most of the important decisions were taken. It shows that until the end of 1941 Hitler allowed himself to be misled by his generals, who often provided him with incorrect information and grossly overestimated the importance of Moscow. On the contrary, Hitler's decision to focus first of all on the economic centers in the Ukraine and the Caucasus was a logical one, of which the generals were unaware and only Hitler, with his insight into the economic interests of the Third Reich, rightfully understood its importance.
A small downside: strategic mistakes such as the war on the Atlantic and the decision of Hitler to declare war on the US are hardly mentioned. It does not detract from the originality of this book. It gave me insights into Hitler's way of thinking and showed that many of his decisions were logical in the views that Hitler had made at the beginning of the war.
September 30, 2018
Its a awesome book. Hitler is analysed as a military leader. yes the author aknoledge that he commited genocide and to reach is goal of vital space in the east, specialy the Soviet Union he had to mass murder slavic peoples and jews. Hitler wasn,t irrational in the way that he knew that time was going against his project. He was cleaver to use diplomacy till it suited him or could work.
He wanted a series of short wars before the final showdown with thew Soviet Union. His generals just had a different opinion about the timing of the war. He actualy till 1942 was arguing with his generals wich is not an attitude of an all powerfull warlord. In the Barbarossa campagin he let Halder manage the troups till the disastrous winter of 1941. His order to stand and hold were better than withdrawing and being routed on the way. Actually , Hitler ideas of focusing in the southern Soviet Union like Ukraine and the Caucassus were better than aiming for Moscow that even taken Stalin would just withdraw to another place like Kubyashev.
Hitler did make a war losing mistake in July 1942 in splitting his force for Fall Blau where the germans aimed at the same tame to take the Caucassus Oil and Stalingrad. Actually Stalingrad was just to be bombed and ignored. In 1943 Hitler didn't answer to Stalin peace feelers because he wanted to keep what he earned. He wanted to avoid a political issue for the war till he was in a stronger position to didacte the terms. He still had a global view of the war and knew that things war goings against him. He still had the mindset of winning it till at least January 1945 after the failure of the Ardennes offensive. His goal was to defeat the Anglo-American landing and after crush the soviets in the east.
I wasn't disapointed of this book.
He wanted a series of short wars before the final showdown with thew Soviet Union. His generals just had a different opinion about the timing of the war. He actualy till 1942 was arguing with his generals wich is not an attitude of an all powerfull warlord. In the Barbarossa campagin he let Halder manage the troups till the disastrous winter of 1941. His order to stand and hold were better than withdrawing and being routed on the way. Actually , Hitler ideas of focusing in the southern Soviet Union like Ukraine and the Caucassus were better than aiming for Moscow that even taken Stalin would just withdraw to another place like Kubyashev.
Hitler did make a war losing mistake in July 1942 in splitting his force for Fall Blau where the germans aimed at the same tame to take the Caucassus Oil and Stalingrad. Actually Stalingrad was just to be bombed and ignored. In 1943 Hitler didn't answer to Stalin peace feelers because he wanted to keep what he earned. He wanted to avoid a political issue for the war till he was in a stronger position to didacte the terms. He still had a global view of the war and knew that things war goings against him. He still had the mindset of winning it till at least January 1945 after the failure of the Ardennes offensive. His goal was to defeat the Anglo-American landing and after crush the soviets in the east.
I wasn't disapointed of this book.
December 5, 2019
After the end of WWII, many German generals blamed the dead Fuhrer for the defeat of Germany. In WWI the generals also blamed others (socialist politicians, communists etc), and that created what is know as the myth of the stab in the back. This time around they couldn't make the same move as the military defeat was complete, so they blamed Hitler.
They portrayed Hitler as a crazy irrational leader who caused the defeat in the war becuase of his constant intervention in military decisions that he knew nothing about. If only Hitler had given them free rein, they'd have won the war, the often claimed.
The truth couldn't be further from that. Hitler in fact discussed his plans with them, and especially at the first stages of the war showed sound judgement and his decisions were always supported by some or many generals. Some of the big mistakes attributed to him such as the Dunkirk stop order was actually made by one of his generals, and Hitler's role was approving, not initiating. Hitler's military philosophy even up to the last days was not irrational, but based on the writings of Carl von Clausewitz.
While the book sometimes borders on becoming apologetic to Hitler, it does recognize the mistakes he made, especially at the latter stage of the war when he took military command himself. The book doesn't give enough focus to the criminality and immorality of Hitler's ideology, and how this factor played a significant role in losing the war.
For example, the USSR soldiers fought really hard and didn't surrender, because they knew that surrender meant death; 3.1 million USSR prisoners of war died due to intentional starvation. This was of annihilation that Hitler launched, with the agreement of his generals left no chance for any compromise.
They portrayed Hitler as a crazy irrational leader who caused the defeat in the war becuase of his constant intervention in military decisions that he knew nothing about. If only Hitler had given them free rein, they'd have won the war, the often claimed.
The truth couldn't be further from that. Hitler in fact discussed his plans with them, and especially at the first stages of the war showed sound judgement and his decisions were always supported by some or many generals. Some of the big mistakes attributed to him such as the Dunkirk stop order was actually made by one of his generals, and Hitler's role was approving, not initiating. Hitler's military philosophy even up to the last days was not irrational, but based on the writings of Carl von Clausewitz.
While the book sometimes borders on becoming apologetic to Hitler, it does recognize the mistakes he made, especially at the latter stage of the war when he took military command himself. The book doesn't give enough focus to the criminality and immorality of Hitler's ideology, and how this factor played a significant role in losing the war.
For example, the USSR soldiers fought really hard and didn't surrender, because they knew that surrender meant death; 3.1 million USSR prisoners of war died due to intentional starvation. This was of annihilation that Hitler launched, with the agreement of his generals left no chance for any compromise.
March 11, 2019
Brilliant insight capture by Fritz - master historian - I will read it again. The maps layout catches my attention. Pouring it over and over again, flipping it back and forth.
May 1, 2022
It is said that history is written by the victors. The notable exception is the eastern front in World War Two. As the cold war started before the final surrender of the Third Reich there were no histories written by Russian generals or historians, and the archives of that country were closed to western historians until after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As a result the histories of the war on the Eastern Front were written by German generals, whose war crimes were overlooked by western powers due to the need to obtain intelligence on the fighting doctrine of the Russian army, their new enemy.
The `defeated' German generals were unanimous in showing Hitler as Feldherr (Supreme Commander) to be a bumbling amateur; had only their advice been heeded Germany may have prevailed in the east. This view was accepted uncritically in the west, as the histories written by these generals were used to develop the doctrines used by western militaries should the cold war ever turn hot. The author, a distinguished military historian, has undertaken a study of the eastern front campaign to determine if the depiction of Hitler as the bumbling amateur is justified.
In short the answer is no. The author considers the development of the German army from the limited force allowed by the Versailles Treaty to the mighty military machine that devastated Europe, and the leadership of the army that developed during that time. He makes the point that Hitler had a greater appreciation of the political and economic factors at play than his generals ever did, the constant undermining of his orders by the chief of staff Franz Halder and the contribution that made to the failure of Operation Barbarossa. The setting of strategy by Hitler took account of political and economic factors that his generals had little or no appreciation for. When Hitler intervened in the setting of operational orders his decisions were usually rational and justified, and could not be said to be inferior to the decisions that his generals recommended.
Ironically the same Halder that interfered in the execution of Barbarossa co-ordinated the writing of post-war military histories by the surviving German generals and was decorated by President Kennedy for his efforts.
The book is written for the reader with a general interest in military history; it is not a technical work. It is readable, well written, and the material is well ordered. It sits well alongside the works of Antony Beevor, Max Hastings, and other authors of general military history.
The `defeated' German generals were unanimous in showing Hitler as Feldherr (Supreme Commander) to be a bumbling amateur; had only their advice been heeded Germany may have prevailed in the east. This view was accepted uncritically in the west, as the histories written by these generals were used to develop the doctrines used by western militaries should the cold war ever turn hot. The author, a distinguished military historian, has undertaken a study of the eastern front campaign to determine if the depiction of Hitler as the bumbling amateur is justified.
In short the answer is no. The author considers the development of the German army from the limited force allowed by the Versailles Treaty to the mighty military machine that devastated Europe, and the leadership of the army that developed during that time. He makes the point that Hitler had a greater appreciation of the political and economic factors at play than his generals ever did, the constant undermining of his orders by the chief of staff Franz Halder and the contribution that made to the failure of Operation Barbarossa. The setting of strategy by Hitler took account of political and economic factors that his generals had little or no appreciation for. When Hitler intervened in the setting of operational orders his decisions were usually rational and justified, and could not be said to be inferior to the decisions that his generals recommended.
Ironically the same Halder that interfered in the execution of Barbarossa co-ordinated the writing of post-war military histories by the surviving German generals and was decorated by President Kennedy for his efforts.
The book is written for the reader with a general interest in military history; it is not a technical work. It is readable, well written, and the material is well ordered. It sits well alongside the works of Antony Beevor, Max Hastings, and other authors of general military history.
November 23, 2021
A valuable new perspective on an often discussed, yet often one sided, rinsed and repeated argument that is; Hitler the great military blunderer.
History often leads us down paths we don't want to travel and makes us engage with people and events that we would rather avoid, while forcing us to confront our prejudices in the interest of objectivity and personal growth. To have to re-evaluate so loathsome an individual as Hitler can only bring with it such challenges, yet it must be done in order to better understand the thinking and machinations of one of humanities most malignant figures. As Stephen G. Fritz clarifies, this is no apology, rather it is an attempt to evaluate and examine the decisions made by Hitler, both political and military, prior to and during World War Two.
Fritz's argument is based upon the pervading belief, exemplified even today in many history books and documentaries, that Hitler was a blundering military novice who lost it all by invading Russia, and going against the advice of his military leaders, took on ever more control and made ever more mistakes with his stand fast, fortress cities, do or die approach to defense.
What Fritz very convincingly argues and demonstrates is that, though megalomaniacal and micro-managing, Hitler was by no means unaware of what he was doing, nor was his approach flawed, at least in theory, with rational arguments to back up his approach. Indeed he always paid a sort of deference and gave a relatively free hand to his generals right up to 1944, only taking greater control after the July bomb plot, and even then not entirely cutting out the general staff. Indeed it was these generals who's memoires paint a picture of a stupid and ineffectual military leader who cost Germany the war. Indeed these same generals created the myth of the 'good Wehrmacht' only debunked in more recent years, and decrying Hitlers military ability naturally added to this myth.
Starting with a discussion on Hitlers world view and philosophy, Fritz shows how in Hitler existed a firm belief in Social Darwinism with an in depth understanding of Clausewitzian military philosophy. These combined with Hitlers own frustration of Germany's post World War I years and and formed a political ideology which from the onset would pin the German nation against the world for its 'survival' in an all or nothing struggle in which it would either emerge victorious or perish. Indeed, as Fritz points out, there was no question that Hitler wanted and would go to war, the question remained when.
On the road to war, Fritz argues successfully that Hitler had very good understanding of the world political stage, which allowed him to achieve his aims where others had doubted him, such as his exploits in the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia. His primary aim was was to build up German industrial and natural resources to withstand a long war whilst mitigating the economical defects that cost Germany the first War. Indeed his invasions were calculated based on the narrow window of Germanys military edge, a window that would be closed within a few years thus making the 1939 invasion of Poland unavoidable.
Indeed in military matters in both 1939 & 1940 Hitler had proven correct in his political judgement regarding the ineptitude of British and French leaders and had encouraged his generals to embrace and adapt daring and modern forms of Warfare. The stall of the tanks before Dunkirk was actually more Rundstedts mistake, Hitler having given him leave to act freely, yet taking all the blame today.
Even the war against Russia was feasibly winnable. The object was to capture the resources of the Ukraine, not conquer all of Russia, and this had been partially achieved in the First World War when revolution at home caused a change of government and peace with German. Why shouldn't he expect the same here. In actuality the failure of the Wehrmacht in 1941 was as much due to logistics, a lack of a clear objective by the Generals and insubordination by General Halder towards Hitler as it was his fault. Hitler wanted the resources of the Caucauses, Halder wanted Moscow for which the former had no interest.
For the later war it is often noted that Hitler became fixed in his stance, forbidding any form of retreat, yet through much of 1943-44 he took General Mansteins advice to use the space of the east as an advantage for giving ground and counter attacking until by late 1944 this was no longer an option and digging in was natural. The idea of his fortress cities such as Breslau, though a failure in the east, were more successful in the west when we look at examples of the Atlantic ports which held out to the end of the war.
These are just some of the topics covered by Fritz and overall the book does a good job of demonstrating what appears to be a more honest depiction Hitlers military abilities. Though he was lacking in many areas was not the Russia invading fool presented to us today. He possessed a sharp political, and military strategic sense right up to the end. Though seemingly deluded there was always a rationale behind his thinking which worked in theory, even if Germanys reality guaranteed it wouldn't. Indeed he came very close to realizing his goals and the idea that his nation should perish should they fail in their titanic struggle was perfectly in line with the principles of Social Darwinism. We should be ever more thankful that these rationales did not come to fruition.
History often leads us down paths we don't want to travel and makes us engage with people and events that we would rather avoid, while forcing us to confront our prejudices in the interest of objectivity and personal growth. To have to re-evaluate so loathsome an individual as Hitler can only bring with it such challenges, yet it must be done in order to better understand the thinking and machinations of one of humanities most malignant figures. As Stephen G. Fritz clarifies, this is no apology, rather it is an attempt to evaluate and examine the decisions made by Hitler, both political and military, prior to and during World War Two.
Fritz's argument is based upon the pervading belief, exemplified even today in many history books and documentaries, that Hitler was a blundering military novice who lost it all by invading Russia, and going against the advice of his military leaders, took on ever more control and made ever more mistakes with his stand fast, fortress cities, do or die approach to defense.
What Fritz very convincingly argues and demonstrates is that, though megalomaniacal and micro-managing, Hitler was by no means unaware of what he was doing, nor was his approach flawed, at least in theory, with rational arguments to back up his approach. Indeed he always paid a sort of deference and gave a relatively free hand to his generals right up to 1944, only taking greater control after the July bomb plot, and even then not entirely cutting out the general staff. Indeed it was these generals who's memoires paint a picture of a stupid and ineffectual military leader who cost Germany the war. Indeed these same generals created the myth of the 'good Wehrmacht' only debunked in more recent years, and decrying Hitlers military ability naturally added to this myth.
Starting with a discussion on Hitlers world view and philosophy, Fritz shows how in Hitler existed a firm belief in Social Darwinism with an in depth understanding of Clausewitzian military philosophy. These combined with Hitlers own frustration of Germany's post World War I years and and formed a political ideology which from the onset would pin the German nation against the world for its 'survival' in an all or nothing struggle in which it would either emerge victorious or perish. Indeed, as Fritz points out, there was no question that Hitler wanted and would go to war, the question remained when.
On the road to war, Fritz argues successfully that Hitler had very good understanding of the world political stage, which allowed him to achieve his aims where others had doubted him, such as his exploits in the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia. His primary aim was was to build up German industrial and natural resources to withstand a long war whilst mitigating the economical defects that cost Germany the first War. Indeed his invasions were calculated based on the narrow window of Germanys military edge, a window that would be closed within a few years thus making the 1939 invasion of Poland unavoidable.
Indeed in military matters in both 1939 & 1940 Hitler had proven correct in his political judgement regarding the ineptitude of British and French leaders and had encouraged his generals to embrace and adapt daring and modern forms of Warfare. The stall of the tanks before Dunkirk was actually more Rundstedts mistake, Hitler having given him leave to act freely, yet taking all the blame today.
Even the war against Russia was feasibly winnable. The object was to capture the resources of the Ukraine, not conquer all of Russia, and this had been partially achieved in the First World War when revolution at home caused a change of government and peace with German. Why shouldn't he expect the same here. In actuality the failure of the Wehrmacht in 1941 was as much due to logistics, a lack of a clear objective by the Generals and insubordination by General Halder towards Hitler as it was his fault. Hitler wanted the resources of the Caucauses, Halder wanted Moscow for which the former had no interest.
For the later war it is often noted that Hitler became fixed in his stance, forbidding any form of retreat, yet through much of 1943-44 he took General Mansteins advice to use the space of the east as an advantage for giving ground and counter attacking until by late 1944 this was no longer an option and digging in was natural. The idea of his fortress cities such as Breslau, though a failure in the east, were more successful in the west when we look at examples of the Atlantic ports which held out to the end of the war.
These are just some of the topics covered by Fritz and overall the book does a good job of demonstrating what appears to be a more honest depiction Hitlers military abilities. Though he was lacking in many areas was not the Russia invading fool presented to us today. He possessed a sharp political, and military strategic sense right up to the end. Though seemingly deluded there was always a rationale behind his thinking which worked in theory, even if Germanys reality guaranteed it wouldn't. Indeed he came very close to realizing his goals and the idea that his nation should perish should they fail in their titanic struggle was perfectly in line with the principles of Social Darwinism. We should be ever more thankful that these rationales did not come to fruition.
May 30, 2020
Fascinating look into Hitler as an underrated military leader.
March 3, 2024
Stephen Fritz counters the portrait of Hitler as a military illiterate who caused his generals to lose the war. Instead, Hitler’s actions were a rational enactment of his grand strategy. As has recently been argued, Hitler saw America as the ultimate threat to Germany’s status as a great power. Lebensraum was the quest to provide Germany with an economic sphere that would allow her to withstand an Anglo-American blockade. Hitler’s objectives in Barbarossa were aimed at achieving economic objectives, while the generals were obsessed with capturing the enemy’s capitol (Moscow). The book shows that Hitler was prone to compromise with the generals, instead of forcing them to follow his directives. However, as the war progressed, Hitler came increasingly to interfere and\or dictate tactical decisions, instead of leaving such matters to the local commanders. Hitler’s decision to fight on after there was no hope of victory was inspired by a desire to avoid another November 1918, when Germany stopped fighting even though it was still in a strong military position. Many in the army shared this opinion. Also, Hitler felt that the example of Germany fighting to the last would serve as an inspiration for a future revival of the Reich. And his belief that the alliance between east and west, capitalism and communism, could not last was ultimately proved correct. Of course, the breakup occurred too late to help him.
The author does not give enough credit to the improvisational nature of Hitler’s actions. He had overall goals, but did he really have a well worked out plan? Did he act because this was what a plan required, or was he responding to circumstances? If Britain had not backstopped Poland, would everything that followed have still happened? Wasn’t Hitler something of a gambler? Near the end of the Polish crisis, Goering said to Hitler, "It is time to stop this va banque", to which Hitler replied: "It is the only call I ever make." But like many gamblers, he went back to the table too many times.
The author argues that the German war was a risk run against great odds. Germany was too weak to take on three empires. Everything had to go right in order to succeed. Blitzkrieg was a tactic that could work in the relatively confined spaces of Western Europe, but not in Russia’s great plains, where things were too far and the roads and railways too poor. Germany didn’t have the resources and manpower to win the war that began with Barbarossa. Hitler felt that he couldn’t attempt a negotiated peace without a victory, a victory that never came.
The author does not give enough credit to the improvisational nature of Hitler’s actions. He had overall goals, but did he really have a well worked out plan? Did he act because this was what a plan required, or was he responding to circumstances? If Britain had not backstopped Poland, would everything that followed have still happened? Wasn’t Hitler something of a gambler? Near the end of the Polish crisis, Goering said to Hitler, "It is time to stop this va banque", to which Hitler replied: "It is the only call I ever make." But like many gamblers, he went back to the table too many times.
The author argues that the German war was a risk run against great odds. Germany was too weak to take on three empires. Everything had to go right in order to succeed. Blitzkrieg was a tactic that could work in the relatively confined spaces of Western Europe, but not in Russia’s great plains, where things were too far and the roads and railways too poor. Germany didn’t have the resources and manpower to win the war that began with Barbarossa. Hitler felt that he couldn’t attempt a negotiated peace without a victory, a victory that never came.
February 13, 2025
Superb analysis.
Germany lost the war by September 1941 thanks to its lack of any counterpart to Stalin's GKO. But Professor Fritz does the world a service by showing how the machinations of the arrogant Westmorelandish Halder and von Kluge caused even greater disasters than were necessary. In other words, Clausewitzian fanaticism as preached by Andrew Bacevich, Douglas Porch and Gian Gentile leads only to avoidable and unnecessary disaster.
Germany lost the war by September 1941 thanks to its lack of any counterpart to Stalin's GKO. But Professor Fritz does the world a service by showing how the machinations of the arrogant Westmorelandish Halder and von Kluge caused even greater disasters than were necessary. In other words, Clausewitzian fanaticism as preached by Andrew Bacevich, Douglas Porch and Gian Gentile leads only to avoidable and unnecessary disaster.
September 13, 2024
We acknowledge that Hitler was evil and was responsible for the death of millions of people. But where does he stand as a military leader. During the war, the propaganda was that he was a military genius. Historians since then have blamed Germany's demise on his decisions and micro-managing of the military. The truth is somewhere in the middle. This book takes us through Hitler's time not just as political leader but military leader. The author presents a clear and helpful view of Hitler that acknowledges what he did right (militarily, not morally) and where he failed.
March 19, 2021
A very good, thorough, and non-hysterical look at Hitler's military leadership.
Fritz really knows the material. On a subject that most authors skip over, the Soviet use of the "Free Germany Committee" or the "Seydlitz Committee," Fritz displays a depth of knowledge that is impressive.
This should become a key book for the study of the Second World War in Europe. Highly recommended.
Fritz really knows the material. On a subject that most authors skip over, the Soviet use of the "Free Germany Committee" or the "Seydlitz Committee," Fritz displays a depth of knowledge that is impressive.
This should become a key book for the study of the Second World War in Europe. Highly recommended.
October 8, 2020
Informativo y analítico. Pero lo más importante es la objetividad del autor. Se dedica a presentar al Hitler real y no la versión producto de la propaganda de los últimos 70 años. Exponiendo tantos sus virtudes como falencias, objetivos y procesos lógicos en la toma de decisiones.
Excelente.
Excelente.
January 23, 2024
While reading through command documents and journals is not the most thrilling thing but given all of the mythologizing that happened around the German high command after the war I think this was the most honest and fair way to do it.
August 1, 2019
3.5/5
July 1, 2023
18/20
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