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A Hard Pounding: Politics and Economic Crisis 1974-1976
This book offers a penetrating insider account of the policy issues involved in managing Britain's economy from 1974 to the crisis of 1976. Throughout these years the author served as Deputy to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and then Secretary of State. The book contains entirely new primary material--much of it based on the diaries Dell kept at the time--and covers years which were pivotal in post-war history in general, and for Labor in particular.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 1991
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January 5, 2026
I read this after reading Dell's “The Chancellors”. It covers a period when I was around, but not very interested in politics or economics.
It explains why Thatcherism became almost inevitable. The Labour Party was in power because of their support by the trades unions. Inflation was extremely high, and Dennis Healey faced immense problems in passing a budget. There was a clear need to keep wages under control, and the cabinet fondly believed that their special relationship with the unions would succeed in moderating pay claims. The government had promised various improvements in social services and welfare, which they believed would provide a quid pro quo sufficient to win over the union leaders.
This was, of course, pure fantasy. It's not even clear if it could ever have been realistic, as the TUC had a very limited influence over the behaviour of its members. The leaders of the unions had a duty to get the best deal for their members, not to keep Labour in power. Obviously, the outcome of this behaviour was catastrophic for organised labour, but that's the Prisoner's Dilemma. The challenges of coordination were too great.
Dell paints very nuanced portraits of the various cabinet members: Barbara Castle, Jim Callaghan, Healey, Michael Foot, Tony Benn. As befits his previous occupation as a professional historian, he reads the memoirs of all of them, and contrasts what they claim in those memoirs to his contemporaneous notes. Inevitably, these memoirs are shown to contain a generous helping of selective memory and self-justification.
In many ways, the deficits of this period were modest compared to those of today. Debt to GDP peaked at around sixty percent: something that today's chancellors, of any party, would kill for. How times change. In spite of all the dire warnings, it seems that deficits really don't matter.
It explains why Thatcherism became almost inevitable. The Labour Party was in power because of their support by the trades unions. Inflation was extremely high, and Dennis Healey faced immense problems in passing a budget. There was a clear need to keep wages under control, and the cabinet fondly believed that their special relationship with the unions would succeed in moderating pay claims. The government had promised various improvements in social services and welfare, which they believed would provide a quid pro quo sufficient to win over the union leaders.
This was, of course, pure fantasy. It's not even clear if it could ever have been realistic, as the TUC had a very limited influence over the behaviour of its members. The leaders of the unions had a duty to get the best deal for their members, not to keep Labour in power. Obviously, the outcome of this behaviour was catastrophic for organised labour, but that's the Prisoner's Dilemma. The challenges of coordination were too great.
Dell paints very nuanced portraits of the various cabinet members: Barbara Castle, Jim Callaghan, Healey, Michael Foot, Tony Benn. As befits his previous occupation as a professional historian, he reads the memoirs of all of them, and contrasts what they claim in those memoirs to his contemporaneous notes. Inevitably, these memoirs are shown to contain a generous helping of selective memory and self-justification.
In many ways, the deficits of this period were modest compared to those of today. Debt to GDP peaked at around sixty percent: something that today's chancellors, of any party, would kill for. How times change. In spite of all the dire warnings, it seems that deficits really don't matter.
Displaying 1 of 1 review