Linhagens do Estado Absolutista

by Perry Anderson

Esta obra traça o desenvolvimento dos Estados absolutistas no início do período moderno a partir de suas raízes no feudalismo europeu, avaliando suas diversas trajetórias. Ao abarcar uma variada gama de exemplos e cenários, Perry Anderson coloca o desenvolvimento dos Estados europeus no cerne das discussões sobre uma história universal, dando novo fôlego ao estudo das monarquias absolutistas e do modo de produção que gestou o sistema capitalista.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, Philosophy, Economics, European History, Sociology

650 pages, Hardcover

First published June 1, 1974

About the author

Perry Anderson is an English Marxist intellectual and historian. He is Professor of History and Sociology at UCLA and an editor of the New Left Review. He is the brother of historian Benedict Anderson.

He was an influence on the New Left. He bore the brunt of the disapproval of E.P. Thompson in the latter's The Poverty of Theory, in a controversy during the late 1970s over the scientific Marxism of Louis Althusser, and the use of history and theory in the politics of the Left. In the mid-1960s, Thompson wrote an essay for the annual Socialist Register that rejected Anderson's view of aristocratic dominance of Britain's historical trajectory, as well as Anderson's seeming preference for continental European theorists over radical British traditions and empiricism. Anderson delivered two responses to Thompson's polemics, first in an essay in New Left Review (January-February 1966) called "Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism" and then in a more conciliatory yet ambitious overview, Arguments within English Marxism (1980).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perry_An...

Reviews

[David M]

Today, when 'history from below' has become a watchword in both Marxist and non-Marxist circles, and has produced major gains in our understanding of the past, it is nevertheless necessary to recall one of the basic axioms of historical materialism: that secular struggle between classes is ultimately resolved at the political - not at the economic or cultural - level of society. In other words, it is the construction and destruction of States which seal the basic shifts in the relations of production, so long as classes subsist... The abolition of the state altogether remains one of the goals of revolutionary socialism. But the supreme significance accorded to its final disappearance testifies to all the weight of its prior presence in history. Absolutism, the first international State system in the modern world, has by no means yet exhausted its secrets or lessons for us.

This book can be read as a long detour - or series of detours - leading to capitalism. Capitalism, as the first universalizable mode of production, is also the beginning of a universal history of humanity. However, Anderson shows that this universal history did not come about all at once. Paradoxical as it may seem, its birth was an altogether staggered and piecemeal. Moreover, no revolution is so radical as to completely abolish the past, and capitalism came about embedded in premodern social formations

Too often the categories of Marxism become hypostatized abstractions leaving actual history in the lurch. On the other hand, without theory we tend to fall into a barren nominalism that would deny there even is such a thing as a social totality. In his joint capacity as historian and all-around theoretical guru of the left, Anderson is uniquely suited to redress this balance.

*
This book is probably Anderson's single most impressive scholarly achievement. However I'm not sure I'd recommend reading it straight through in a linear fashion (as I just oh-so-foolishly did). It's really more of a reference work.

What I do strongly recommend is that everyone pick up the New Left Review, that great journal formed largely in the old boy's image. Guranteed to take you to the next level in your political consciousness.

Also, read Anderson's essays. No one stretches your vocabulary better than the magus of western Marxism. Some of his best collections include:

Considerations on Western Marxism
A Zone of Engagement
Spectrum: From Right to Left in the World of Ideas
American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers

[Camilo Ruiz Tassinari · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book (together with its long introductory study, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism) is arguably the most important single contribution to Marxist thought in the historical discipline since Trotsky's History of the Russian Revolution. The scope of its conception and the depth of its analysis are still unrivaled. Even if he had written nothing else after, Anderson would have earned a chapel in the cathedral of historical materialism with it.

[Brecht Rogissart · Rating 5 out of 5]

There is an essay to be written on the Althusserian influence on the historical work of Anderson. They were both Western Marxists torn between successful social democracy at home and disfunctional Stalinism at the other side of the iron curtain. They both searched for a new Marxist analysis that could incorporate the different levels of society while reaffirming a materialist reading of it, a framework that could withstand the scrutiny of fine-grained historians. Althusser brought the philosophy, Anderson applied it to history.

Lineages of the Absolutist State is a wonderful product of this framework. The basic structure of the argument matches well with the thesis of Althusser’s Marxism, that of the relative autonomy of different levels in society, in which some factors overdetermine the development of others within a specific mode of production. For the period of Absolutism is set by Anderson in between the feudal and capitalist mode of production, in which the feudal structures morphed, adapted, and transformed to realign with and battle against the new capitalist ones. Societies did not do this as a whole: disjunctions occurred between the political, the elites, the cultural, and the, of course, the economic. Only in this philosophy was Anderson able to understand Absolutism as a transitionary phase in Europe, where he could bring theoretical clarity to a dump of historical facts.

Absolutism in Europe – the transition from a pyramidal, parcellized system of power to the massively centralized power wielded by the European monarchs in the 18th century, in what we could consider the first modern states - itself was not a homogenous block: Anderson makes a rough distinction between Western Absolutism (Spanish, French, English, and Swedish) and Eastern Absolutism (Prussian, Polish, Austrian, Russian). Why he doesn’t discuss Dutch absolutism, the intermediate step between Spanish commercial expansion and English foundation of capitalism, is not specified and remains a mystery to me.

In the West, the Absolutist states were not the product of a new equilibrium between the bourgeoisie and the feudal aristocracy. They were a “redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination”. True, the Absolute monarchies introduced permanent bureaucracy, standing armies, national taxation, a codified laws, which all seem capitalist. But this doesn’t mean that the state represented capitalist interests. Instead, Absolutism represented the interests of the nobility. As commodity production spread and money rents replaced serfdom, the class power of feudal lords was directly at stake on the level of the village. Therefore, politico-legal coercion over the masses was transmitted to a national level and given to the almighty Monarch, who’s main goal was to surpress peasant and plebeian masses as their social order disintegrated. At the same time, Absolutist power freed the hands of the landlords as well: as they transmitted political power to the Monarch, they emancipated themselves from the economic constraints of feudal ties. Handing over particularist privileges wasn’t done without a fight: noble revolts against the Absolutist state were everywhere, but they never succeeded, as the State and its feudal aristocrats were tied together. At last, Western Absolutism had to check and incorporate mercantile capital from the cities. Absolutism thus functioned as the transitionary phase to capitalism, where the political continuity of feudal rule realigned with the advent of capitalism, initiating the first phase of separating the political from the economic. At its historical end was the bourgeois revolution, which would end the monarch’s rule and introduce the capitalist state.

In the East, Absolutism emerged from a different class matrix. Here, Absolutism functioned as the political movement that could consolidate feudalism in a context where the rural masses had relative freedom from exploitation because of the low density of human life. If exploitation did not outbalance the fruits of economic interdependence, you could escape class domination by just moving away. It limited Eastern aristocratic class power. Feudal nobility thus gave away political power to the monarch in exchange for a solid economic domination over the peasants, later called the "second serfdom".

But why did this movement occur just as Western Absolutism grew? Here, we need to incorporate the international dimensions of Absolutism. In economic terms, its ideology necessarily grew into mercantilism: a zero-sum game of international exchange, where political power rests upon economic dominance, which enables feudal lords to finance their militaristic needs. Their militaristic urges were feudal, however. The feudal nobility was first and foremost a warrior class, because expansion of political and economic domination could only occur on the zero-sum boardgame of territorial conquest. The international agenda of Western Absolutism was thus preeminently bellicist, as they pushed through the interests of a feudal – not a capitalist – ruling class (this does not imply that capitalist elites are necessarily peaceful, of course).

The East felt the efficiency of Absolutist feudal militaristic expansion via the swords of the Swedish armies. As they conquered whole areas up until Ukraine, they brought Western dynamics to the East. If they wanted to resist Absolutist efficiency, they needed to imitate them and push back. And that’s what they did, if the national context allowed them to do so. The most successful examples were Prussia (particularly successful in using state machinery to militarize) and Russia, the least successful Austria and Poland. As Anderson summarizes: “the uneven development of feudalism obliged them to match the state structures of the West before they had reached any comparable stage of economic transition towards capitalism.” According to Anderson, the Absolutist states in Eastern Europe lived longer too. While they were dethroned by bourgeois revolutions in the West early on, the Austrian one was only carved up by capitalist-imperial powers in 1918, while the Russian one was overthrown by a socialist revolution in 1917. Throughout the nineteenth century, Absolutist states in the East were confronted with a new threat: capitalist-imperialist states of the West.

At the end, Anderson counterposes the European experience with some non-European histories. He contrasts with the Ottoman Empire to discern the feudal mode of production from other pre-capitalist modes of productions. He then discusses Japan in the conclusion as a feudal region too, which had mostly the same structure as European feudalism. However, the question then remains why European feudalism evolved into capitalism, while Japan only adopted capitalist social relations when it was confronted with capitalist-imperialist powers in the 19th century. According to Anderson, this is because a similar structure does not mean there was a similar genesis of their feudalism. The European classical period that preceded feudalism sprung up during the Renaissance and gave it the unique cocktail that evolved into capitalism. Here, my knowledge of dialectics is insufficient to really get the point. At last, he spends 100 pages on the concept of the “Asiatic mode of production” in one of the two notes at the back, in which the main point is that Asian history is too diverse to use such a orientalist concept.

[Malcolm · Rating 4 out of 5]

Whereas in Passages From Antiquity to Feudalism Perry Anderson challenged and unsettled historians’ usual periodisation marking the ancient world from the first half of the 2nd millennium after Christ, in Lineages of the Absolutist State he challenges our ways of making sense of the middle part of that millennium. The key point here, for me, is the case that absolutism (usually seen epitomised in Louis XIV – l’etat, c’est moi) was both distinct from and ruled on behalf of the aristocracy, and could only take on its Louis XIV form when sovereignty/ownership was both hierarchical and discontinuous and disparate. He continues the model of the predecessor (Lineages) by marking key differences between Europe east and west of the Elbe, and nails down the argument that the fundamental difference between feudalism and absolutism in the east and west lies in the western melding of Roman and Germanic social forms as the Roman Empire broke apart. The book is now 36 years old, and re-reading it 25 years after I first did has reminded me that it is a profound intervention into our understanding European history. Of course, there is much to dispute at an empirical level (we’d be bad historians if after nearly 4 decades the data Anderson uses was unchallenged) but the shape of the argument and the rigorous Marxist framework brought to bear is refreshing (oddly) and inspiring.

The book ends with two long ‘notes’ – one looking at Japanese feudalism, and one exploring the ‘Asiatic mode of production’. It is at times hard to remember that the notion of an Asiatic mode is a recent interpretive development from Marx’s work, and is a label that we only began to use widely in the 1960s. Anderson’s notes doubts that there is an Asiatic mode (in the singular), and in this sense it is a useful partner to Umberto Melotti’s excellent Marx and the Third World (1972/1977) which reconfigures the crude ‘Marxist’ model of linear development (a product of the Soviet school of political economic education) to argue for a much more complex set of developmental paths from the primitive commune to contemporary socio-political forms. Given its availability (in Italian) before this book was published, it is a shame that Anderson has not made any reference to Melotti’s case: between them they lay the bases of any full discussion of political-social-economic development and remain, to my mind, essential reading.

[Murray · Rating 4 out of 5]

Lineages of the Absolutist State is the second part to Perry Anderson’s comparative sociological history of Europe from antiquity to the beginning of the modern era. Lineages is an exceptional history; firstly for its scope, and secondly, for its analysis.

Anderson weaves an engrossing narrative and analysis of the rise and fall of Europe’s major Absolutist states. Following which he ties this masterful history to its preceding volume, 'the prologue,’ into a 30-page conclusion that espouses a convincing and sophisticated argument for the unique experience of Europe's evolution of the capitalist mode of production from the combination of antiquity and feudal societies, expressed, in part, by the chapter of Absolutism. This final analysis is situated in a rewarding and unique comparison of European’s two millennia of political-economic evolution to the Ottoman and Japanese experiences.

[lyell bark · Rating 5 out of 5]

if you want some "cool" historical materialism i have the book for you. it's this book.

i wish anderson would sometimes translate some of his more obscure latin forumlations of feudal law tho. i'm a fat idiot lunkhead ffs.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

Treasure trove I'll be mining quotes from for a while.

[Pete Dolack · Rating 5 out of 5]

Justifiably considered a classic work, Lineages of the Absolutist State is an extraordinary survey of the countries of pre-capitalist Europe as well as some major Asian tributary states, with chapters dedicated to each of several countries, along with regional overviews. Here we find solid theories as to why the "second serfdom" arose in Eastern Europe when serfdom had already died in Western Europe, and that the rise of the "absolutist state" constituted a way for feudal states to keep peasants subjugated despite the transition of peasant dues from services and a large portion of their harvests to money payments.

The author argues that the absolutist state was a political instrument of a threatened nobility, not an arbitrator between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, and that is represented a new form of feudalism. To demonstrate this, the book takes us through the development of several countries. The incessant wars, the resulting uneven military developments and the endless grasping of the aristocracy for more land, more privileges and more power are all deployed to discuss the development of these countries. Particularly of interest was the discussion of Prussia, where the theory of uneven and combined development is used to show how a backward, rural fringe of the Germanic lands came to be the dominant, industrializing driver behind German unification.

Discussions of the Ottoman Empire, India and Japan keep this from being a Eurocentric work, although feudalism was a European phenomenon and thus a study of it necessarily concentrates on that continent's history. But the Ottoman Empire and other Asian empires certainly had an impact on European development. This is a comprehensive study, although it is missing the United Provinces (the present-day Netherlands) and China is discussed only briefly in a final chapter. That the United Provinces did not have an absolutist monarchy could be cited as a reason for its exclusion, but then there is a chapter on England, which also did not have an absolutist monarchy. Had those two omissions not been the case, the book would have been even stronger but, nonetheless, this is an outstanding book that should be read by any serious student of history.

[Matthías Ólafsson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Brilliant and highly insightful. It was a bit back-heavy with the chapters on Asia, which I felt were superfluous; especially since—for some unexplained and incomprehensible reason—Anderson omits Danish absolutism from the study, which I feel is a glaring oversight. In 17th-century Copenhagen you have the clearest expression of absolutism by a European prince ruling over a forming conglomerate state where land use was at a highly interesting intersection between 'East' and 'West'.

[Georgette · Rating 5 out of 5]

The thesis that absolutism is a feudal (which I'll follow Samir Amin in saying is a peripheral form of the tributary mode of production) form of state is absolutely vital. The contention that commutations to money-rent are, in themselves, capitalist relations of production in agriculture is incompatible with Marx's theory of ground-rent (and is contraindicated by Marx himself in the discussion of the transition from rent-in-kind to money-rent and in his classification in a similar vein of sharecropping as an 'intermediate form') which requires the application of capital to the land (and the concentration of lans to money-rent are, in themselves, capitalist relations of production in agriculture is incompatible with Marx's theory of ground-rent (and is contraindicated by Marx himself in the discussion of the transition from rent-in-kind to money-rent and in his classification in a similar vein of sharecropping as an 'intermediate form') which requires the application of capital to the land (and the concentration of landed property as a 'barrier' to the application of capitalism) since it is a derivative of surplus profit. It is hence impossible in conditions of peasant production or petty commodity production on the land.
The sections on the class basis of absolutism and specifically its character as an implicit response to peasant/serf struggle against the nobility are excellent. I also think he is entirely correct in attributing an important role to the threat of the rise of absolutism in the West on the genesis of absolutism in Eastern Europe. The historical contention that it was largely Swedish campaigns in Poland, Russia and Eastern Germany that gave rise is also in my assessment a correct judgement.
In connection with this, the observation that warfare is the principal (rather ded property as a 'barrier' to the application of capitalism) since it is a derivative of surplus profit. It is hence impossible in conditions of peasant production or petty commodity production on the land.
The sections on the class basis of absolutism and specifically its character as an implicit response to peasant/serf struggle against the nobility are excellent. I also think he is entirely correct in attributing an important role to the threat of the rise of absolutism in the West on the genesis of absolutism in Eastern Europe. The historical contention that it was largely Swedish campaigns in Poland, Russia and Eastern Germany that gave rise is also in my assessment a correct judgement.
In connection with this, the observation that warfare is the principal (rather than as in capitalism simply a means) means by which feudal nobilities compete with one another (since there is little stimulus and indeed even comparatively little opportunity to 'invest' in the productivity of agriculture, the individual fortunes of dynasties can largely only be buttressed and expanded by the acquisition of new land [and with it new labour, whether it is enserfed or not] through warfare; plunder also comes into this to an extent and the acquisition of liquid wealth can be important in this regard) is also extremely apposite.
The historical sections are good, give a good sense of the conditions on which the dynastic success of various states was based and contributes to a good understanding of the character of the absolutist system of states that developed in Europe from the end of the Middle Age through to 1789. Some of the material, however, seems quite disconnected and there is comparatively little knotting together of economic, military, dynastic, secret diplomatic etc. observations except at quite an abstract level. This is potentially due to the limited scope and objectives of this study but it certainly indicates directions in which this thesis can be taken. In a similar vein some fairly important states are entirely omitted (Portugal, Saxony, Denmark) and these could potentially provide some more illuminating material for further analysis. The material on the development of Swedish absolutism is particularly illuminating and brings into relief the truncated development of the Swedish social formation from one that still had a large pre-feudal sector in the 15th century to an absolutist, 'late-feudal' state in the 17th. This, I think, is of particular note when viewed from the angle of the theory of uneven development and this could be broadened in a little analysis to resist temptations towards viewing absolutism as a strictly chronological period and instead as a feudal state form. Samir Amin's comments on absolutism as a development that in some sense mirrors the central tributary states in Byzantium/The Middle East, India and China is probably relevant in this regard.
My only severe criticism is that the role of commerce, banking and the acquisition of colonies (the section on Spain's reliance on the import of treasure and the export of subsistence commodities to the Americas is acute, as is the analysis of the effects of this on the economy of the Spanish dynastic state; otherwise there is almost no mention of the acquisition of other colonies: The First French Empire [particularly important would be to analyse the social order in New France] and Virginia) is treat somewhat offhandedly. This can perhaps be account for the need for a vigorous defence of the feudal theory of absolutism in the face of trenchant opposition but it is also quite plain to me that absolutism, at least, played some role in the preparation of conditions for the bourgeois revolution (as it preceded such revolutions in every single instance of the 'classical' type of bourgeois revolution, including arguably in Japan [where the Tokugawa shogunate would be a similar concentration of feudal power in the defence of the pre-capitalist Japanese nobility]).

[Ferhat Culfaz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Challenging read, but rewarding and very rich. Excellent comparative history of the transition of feudalism to an absolutist state in England, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Prussia, Russia, Poland, Austria and Ottoman Empires; bonus material with Japan. A total history in the Braudel sense looking at the politics, economics, sociology and geography aspects. Excellent for reference in the future.

[Under_rubble · Rating 5 out of 5]

When I was looking for a solid history of Europe three years ago, I wish somebody had handed me a copy of this. But the untranslated terms are annoying at times.

[Julio The Fox · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perry, Perry, quite contrary, my learned friend.
Concatenation is a big word in the universe of Perry Anderson. That is how he described the Arab Spring of 2011, to my delight and the dismay of Western leftists, most of whom did not know what the term meant. Concatenation is also the key to understanding the origins of the state in Europe, a project Anderson began with PASSAGES FROM ANTIQUITY and was meant to furnish enough material for a tetralogy leaning into modern times. The absolutist state, from England to Russia, was the first form the state took to protect the interests of the capitalist class while still upholding feudal landowners. You read that right; not the aristocracy but the nascent and fledging bourgeoisie came a-calling for political patronage. Why was this arrangement, the holy trinity of monarchy-aristocracy-early capitalists successful in Western Europe and not East; nowhere else save imperial Japan? Perry's controversial thesis is that the West held in its hands another Holy Family. The Roman Empire bequeathed the Western zone a set of laws dating back to antiquity and protecting property rights, a role model for the state the barbarians found useful (See Charlemagne and his Frankish empire), and the Catholic Church to preserve learning and pose as a counterweight to the state. This concatenation of pre-feudal politics, feudalism in the countryside, and embryonic capitalism in the cities, particularly the ports on the Atlantic, all presided over by a state juggling multiple class interests proved irreplicable outside of a few realms, with France and England sounding the high note. In the East none of this held, with Russia exemplifying the opposite trend viz. a state unchecked by laws or a strong Orthodox Church, enserfing the peasantry and stifling private property in favor of "reasons of state". Is this why Russia is still outside of Europe today? Mutatis mutandis was equally true of the Ottoman Empire, Poland, and Spain; all failed experiments in absolutism. Anderson is breaking with rigid Marxist notions of the state serving one class as its "executive committee" while maintaining a historical materialist outlook that prizes the mode of production reigning supreme, but only ultimately. Food for much thought and debate. For a direct attack (authors love those) on the Perry Anderson thesis see THE EUROPEAN MIRACLE by Eric Lionel Jones.
P.S. Personal Service: The last time I spoke with Perry I asked him if he was working on volume III of his magnum opus on the state. "Third and fourth" he replied. Alas, it was not to be. His critics have suggested it is due to our author having "made a giant mistake" in his take on the fonts of Western capitalism and politics. Perhaps. I'm content to let sleeping giants lie.

[Albert Ananyan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Anderson identifies the Black Death as the pivotal event that put Europe’s feudal order into crisis. The plague’s devastation weakened serfdom and empowered the peasantry, leaving the nobility scrambling to preserve its dominance. To neutralize this threat, the aristocracy relinquished its coercive power in exchange for the creation of an absolutist state with a standing army that would (A) suppress peasant rebellions and (B) secure territorial gains (as feudalism was based on a zero-sum game and thus war was its essential mode).

The absolutist monarchies that emerged in the aftermath were not the dawn of modernity but the last defense of feudalism. Beneath their modern façades of armies, bureaucracies, and royal courts lay an archaic core: the centralization of power served, above all, to safeguard aristocratic privilege. What appeared as progress was, in many ways, a strategy of survival.

The book traces this “upward displacement of coercion” from the manor to the monarch with impressive clarity. Yet its principal limitation lies in its complete disregard for the question of political legitimacy. Anderson treats the absolutist state almost exclusively as an instrument of class domination, overlooking why people, including the nobility, accepted one monarch over another. If coercion alone explained obedience, why would a French landlord not be content under a Spanish king who guaranteed his property? In reality, aristocrats defended their monarchs with striking fervor, revealing that absolutism was sustained not only by coercion but also by nascent forms of national identity (I would love to read what Perry’s brother, Benedict Anderson, thought of the book).

Anderson’s critique of the “Asiatic Mode of Production” is one of the most insightful parts of the book. He argues that it is a flawed concept that wrongly groups distinct societies together. Yet I wonder whether “absolutism” itself can withstand the same methodological critique that Anderson so effectively directed at the AMP. To account for variations within Europe, Anderson introduces an East–West division and uses descriptive terms like “strong” and “weak.” The problem is that these labels may not sufficiently capture the vast differences between states. For instance, the historical trajectory of England (absolutism failed and gave rise to constitutionalism) differs radically from that of Russia (a hyper-centralized and durable monarchy that produced a “second serfdom”). One might ask whether Anderson’s “strong” versus “weak” categorization is adequate, or whether these cases differ so fundamentally that they should be treated as qualitatively distinct concepts.

[Murray Katkin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Literally perfect. It changed my life and I feel like I understand the course of human history so much better. One critic did point out that the role of the bourgeoisie is somewhat marginal as a result of Anderson’s systematic sweep of late feudal/early modern society. The work both fills a gap (the significance of the absolutist state and its appraisal from a Marxist perspective) and opens a new one: what was the nature of non-European modes of production? The question really leads one to investigate the nature of human history, and specifically THE question (why did europe develop capitalism?) in such an intelligent manner. The book is extremely well sourced, well written (if not occasionally verbose), and overall interesting aside from being extremely informative. I expected a dry theoretical appraisal of absolutism but ended up being absolutely immersed in the sinews of the late-feudal nobility. The book’s structure consists of essays dealing with individual absolutisms in the west of Europe, then the east, the ottoman social formation, and finally a conclusion with two “notes” (boy are they long!) on non-European modes of production. Anderson situates absolutism and emergent capitalism within the nexus of specifically European history but in such a way that the non-European world is not treated with condescension. The dialectics of feudal sovereignty led to the rise of capital, a fact unique to Europe.

The only aspect I found lacking in the book was the conclusion insofar as it narrowly dealt with the significance of absolutism in history while speaking little about capitalism, but this is not at all Perry Anderson’s fault: he intended to complete the trilogy but clearly will not (unless he manages to complete his magnum opus on the emergence of the bourgeoisie in the last years of his life, inshallah!). The book is perfect and I think it’s my favorite work of history now. Cannot recommend enough. Life changing and magistral.


Well done Perry!

[Peter Harrison · Rating 4 out of 5]

A useful assessment of the development of absolutism as a period in the transition to capitalism.

Anderson's thesis is that absolutism represents a final attempt by the feudal state to maintain a grip over the mechanisms of power in the face of a growing shift in the economy towards capitalism, thereby retaining the control of the aristocracy over the distribution of surplus.

Anderson's other theme is an empirical approach to the description of history. Over the course of the book he deconstructs Marx's theory of an "Asiatic" mode of production, concluding by the end that this theory should be discarded as the product of a lack of evidence about the economics of the world beyond Europe. Anderson makes the case for a Marxist history that is grounded in evidence while still being based on a materialist theory of development.

This requires the acceptance of an interaction between the economy and the cultural and political development of a society. This is in contrast to the vulgar Marxist view that sees a clear line between an economic 'base' and a superficial, determined, 'superstructure'. In reality the truth is far more nuanced than this. The two interact, as Marx's less theoretical journalistic work makes clear and require an intelligent interaction between theory and empirical evidence to reach the truth rather than an assumption that on mechanistically determines the other.

In short an interesting survey useful for developing a part of Marx's written theory that has been clear superseded, while acknowledging the basis provided by historical materialist thinking for the analysis of historical development.

[Didier "Dirac Ghost" Gaulin · Rating 2 out of 5]

Lineages of the absolutist state is a Marxian/post Marxian analysis of the phenomena of absolutism, mainly, in the European context. The many fallacies of Marxian theories of history are very apparent here, such as the ''obvious historical contradictions'' leading to what seems to be an Hegelian automatization of history, pure lines of historical linearity generated by those so called contradictions that history produces, apparently, all the time, and will lead us, allegedly, towards this great communist point of convergence. The linear understanding of economic evolution is sometimes contradicted by facts of history (just like Gordon Tullock notice in Autocracy, most countries in the world never had a feudal system, most countries were simply, autocratic from the get go), such as Italy's city state system that never led to an absolutist state, or the sudden change from monarchical autocracy to absolutism in Sweden, but Anderson never seem to focus on those specific failures of the theory. The author is actually a good writer, clear in his writing and does offer a few insightful details on the relationship between the autocratic ruler and the aristocracy/oligopoly of the time. A few quality references are to be found and this would be an interesting read for those curious about the mechanics and the ideology behind Marxian revisionist historicism.

[James F · Rating 5 out of 5]

Last month I read Anderson’s Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, of which this is a continuation. It is considered one of the best modern Marxist surveys of the period, giving an economic explanation of the historical developments. The book takes us from the crisis of the feudal mode of production and describes the rise of the absolutist states which followed it. Like the previous book, it begins with a general survey and then examines each of the major countries, divided into Western and Eastern Europe, and emphasizes the differences in the history as well as the similarities. There is also a chapter on the “House of Islam”, primarily the Ottoman Empire. I learned a lot from this. The book ends with two “Notes”, one on Japanese feudalism and how it was both similar and different from feudalism in the West, and one, the longest single chapter in the book, on the concept of “the Asiatic mode of production”, which he argues should be abandoned. This is from a theoretical point of view the most interesting part of the book; it also contains a fairly detailed comparison of the Islamic countries with Imperial China.

I would recommend both volumes to anyone with an interest in history.

[Jacob Winter · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best history texts I've read. It's a long one, but Anderson defines and illustrated a period of history in Europe and Asia of complete absolutist state rule perfectly, using a Marxist analysis to understand the passages from feudalism (and other similar Asiatic systems of production) to absolutist rule, how it impacted the international system, how it laid the foundations for what came after absolutism and how absolutism varied in all its cases. His notes at the end, on Japanese Shogunate feudalism and the "Asiatic mode of production" in how it relates to old historiographies of "oriental despotism" are also very valuable.

[Hector · Rating 5 out of 5]

Gran capacidad sintética e interpretativa de este historiador marxista. Pocas fechas y nombres propios, se centra más bien en las estructuras socioeconómicas y en los grandes procesos históricos. "Transiciones de la Antigüedad al Feudalismo" y "El Estado absolutista", imprescindibles para comprender los grandes procesos de la historia europea: la crisis del esclavismo clásico, la génesis del feudalismo y la consolidación del capitalismo.

[James Wentworth · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perry Anderson is a brilliant scholar. I read this book for the first time about 35 years ago. I bought myself a new copy for Christmas.

The book is a survey of European State formation, arising out of feudalism on the Continent. The predecessor state to the modern one is a missing piece in most surveys of history; the book repaired this. It is magnificent.

[John Hess · Rating 5 out of 5]

An intriguing and quite original spin on the conventional historical materialist account of the development of the various modes of production. Anderson does a very poor job of synthesizing down and really telling you what you need to know, but there's a lot there for those willing to look.

[Lemon Tuk · Rating 5 out of 5]

Un trabajo bien complicado de síntesis y a su vez de análisis pormenorizado de una de las formas de organización política que más ajenas me eran. Especialmente fan de la comparativa respecto a grandes civilizaciones contemporáneas como la otomana o la nipona.

[Differengenera · Rating 4 out of 5]

read the sections about the class character of the Henrician / Elizabethian state apparatus (demilitarised, dilettantish, insular, willfully ignorant of international developments and their relative marginality) and tell me he isn't just talking about England under Wilson

[Yoruichi · Rating 4 out of 5]

The writing style is quite arrid and you must have no gaps in the history of the eurasian world to fully grasp the book. Hence, one star less, but the content is interesting.

[Fabricio Ricciarelli · Rating 5 out of 5]

É uma pena um livro tão grande se apoiar em uma teoria furada, mas ainda sim é um livro bom.

[Pablo Borda · Rating 5 out of 5]

Gran obra del materialismo histórico y un aporte central a la comprensión del feudalismo histórico.

[Tobi ﾄﾋﾞ · Rating 4 out of 5]

very tough read, jam packed and bloody useful though.

[Ibrahim · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fundamental to understanding how and why the past 4 centuries have shaped up the way they have and the added essays on the asian mode of production and japan are goated

[candelina · Rating 4 out of 5]

love to go back in history