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A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II
This comprehensive examination of the Second World War looks at grand strategy and diplomacy, as opposed to the gritty details of the combat experience. A World at Arms is written in a matter-of-fact tone, so don't expect a poetic narrative. Despite this, no other historian has presented such a sweeping overview. Weinberg performs the important task of reminding his readers in the West that much of the fighting--and perhaps the most decisive parts--was done in the East, between the Germans and the Russians. American readers, for their part, may appreciate Weinberg's treatment of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who is portrayed as a courageous wartime leader. This book is an essential part of any library on the Second World War.
1178 pages, Hardcover
First published January 10, 1994
193 people are currently reading
3455 people want to read
About the author
Gerhard L. Weinberg
42 books32 followersGerhard Ludwig Weinberg is a German-born American diplomatic and military historian noted for his studies in the history of World War II. Weinberg currently is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor Emeritus of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has been a member of the history faculty at UNC-Chapel Hill since 1974
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 90 reviews
September 10, 2012
A World At Arms is a masterful scholarly work. At nearly 1,000 pages, it takes on the War in all its nuances. From a geographical viewpoint, it deals with events in countries not normally referenced in most works; i.e. Brazil and India. This single volume book also deals with all aspects of this global war including politics, finance, manufacturing, construction, medicine, military strategy and combat operations.
It is an ambitious endeavor, which covers up its very few warts with a deep and interesting treatment of the subject. This book is not for the novice just learning about World War II but rather for the accomplished student for whom this book fills in many of the blanks and unanswered questions of other less ambitious works.
The author certainly has strong opinions on some subjects (like the British and German general officers) and doesn't shrink from expressing those opinions but it would be impossible for any historian to remain totally objective in a book this size. I did not find this distracting or objectionable, perhaps because I agreed with most of them.
It is an ambitious endeavor, which covers up its very few warts with a deep and interesting treatment of the subject. This book is not for the novice just learning about World War II but rather for the accomplished student for whom this book fills in many of the blanks and unanswered questions of other less ambitious works.
The author certainly has strong opinions on some subjects (like the British and German general officers) and doesn't shrink from expressing those opinions but it would be impossible for any historian to remain totally objective in a book this size. I did not find this distracting or objectionable, perhaps because I agreed with most of them.
December 26, 2012
Offering up a single-volume history of WW2 is a daunting task that has sunk many a would-be historian. Do you focus on diplomacy, niche yourself to cover naval battles of the Southwest Pacific, or limit yourself to cartoon images of the ultimate graphic novel? Weinberg took the unusual approach of going big and broad. There's no real history of the Nazi party, Japanese bushido, or the Holocaust here. Instead, he uses a thousand-some-odd pages to discuss how the war looked from every odd corner of the Earth.
As a result, we get the history of coups in Romania and Hungary, of the discussion of Madagascar as a possible Jewish concentration camp, of the grueling battles in northern Burma and Annam provinces in India. Weinberg treats the war as a global phenomenon, and gives us a view from the emerging nations of the Third World, and from the smaller nations of Europe.
Obviously, this means there is no detailed discussion of diplomacy or battle strategy, but we do get an integrated view of how political expectations and technology evolved in the period between the wars, to give a sense of how the last gasp of authoritarian imperialism came close to overtaking the planet, but was nevertheless discredited from the get-go. For the most part, Weinberg does his job well.
I am giving this five stars because the task seemed so impossible while the end result is satisfying, but that does not mean the book is free of faults. Weinberg is the type of historian-geek who loves to enumerate everything, and sometimes gives us numbers within numbers - three reasons the Danes felt they had to cave in to the Nazis, with four causes listed for the second of those reasons, etc. etc. If you try to read this book in a disinterested moment, you might get lost if the outline was not scrawled across a blackboard somewhere.
Still, this is a classic "big picture" work - not merely for trying to understand the Axis powers and the allied response, but for grasping how the former colonies responded to the creation of the United Nations, how new weapon technologies allowed a blanket-bombing philosophy that almost amounted to a "genocide by consensus" (not just nuclear weapons, but the strategic bombing of Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo). Those who want to adamantly say "Never again" had better understand how evil makes itself manifest on the planet. Despite his scholarly tone, Weinberg is unafraid of using a word like "evil" when it is appropriate to do so.
As a result, we get the history of coups in Romania and Hungary, of the discussion of Madagascar as a possible Jewish concentration camp, of the grueling battles in northern Burma and Annam provinces in India. Weinberg treats the war as a global phenomenon, and gives us a view from the emerging nations of the Third World, and from the smaller nations of Europe.
Obviously, this means there is no detailed discussion of diplomacy or battle strategy, but we do get an integrated view of how political expectations and technology evolved in the period between the wars, to give a sense of how the last gasp of authoritarian imperialism came close to overtaking the planet, but was nevertheless discredited from the get-go. For the most part, Weinberg does his job well.
I am giving this five stars because the task seemed so impossible while the end result is satisfying, but that does not mean the book is free of faults. Weinberg is the type of historian-geek who loves to enumerate everything, and sometimes gives us numbers within numbers - three reasons the Danes felt they had to cave in to the Nazis, with four causes listed for the second of those reasons, etc. etc. If you try to read this book in a disinterested moment, you might get lost if the outline was not scrawled across a blackboard somewhere.
Still, this is a classic "big picture" work - not merely for trying to understand the Axis powers and the allied response, but for grasping how the former colonies responded to the creation of the United Nations, how new weapon technologies allowed a blanket-bombing philosophy that almost amounted to a "genocide by consensus" (not just nuclear weapons, but the strategic bombing of Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo). Those who want to adamantly say "Never again" had better understand how evil makes itself manifest on the planet. Despite his scholarly tone, Weinberg is unafraid of using a word like "evil" when it is appropriate to do so.
August 24, 2016
The most illuminating single volume history of WWII, and one of the very best books on the war, period. It has incisive insights that reemerge in other great books on the war, such as Adam Tooze's the Wages of Destruction: the ultimately futile and vastly destructive and genocidal attempt of a middling power, such as Germany was, to challenge the changing global balance of power vis a vis the US (and USSR). It spends time on fronts and issues that were frequently ignored at the time when the book was first published, especially as relates to the Eastern front as well as other less known areas of the conflict. Political, diplomatic, economic as well as military matters are weaved into one seamless tapestry. You read about the great battles of the war, and then learn about the critical battles that were not waged, such as the would have been conquest of Madagascar by the Japanese that never was. One learns about the industrial might harnessed by the allies in service of the war effort, and realizes the untenable position of the axis powers.
An exercise typical of Weinberg, and one of my very favorite sections of the book, relates to his analysis of the Russian counterattack in the titanic 1941 battle of Moscow, perhaps the most decisive moment of the entire war. He takes the impatient reader on a long detour that details the political and diplomatic background of that culminating event, before finally turning to the unfolding attack itself. This exercise, repeated in different forms throughout the book, impresses on the reader the global nature of the conflict. The fact is that the military and political leaderships of the respective countries saw it as such: a global conflict, with events in one theater of war impacting others in real time.
For the military enthusiasts, this is not a tactical military history of the war, although the military struggles are naturally addressed and do form the center of gravity of the narrative. Such readers would be better served by books that deal with military events in individual theaters of conflict. For those seeking a deeper understanding of the war, the rationale for its unfolding events and the inevitability of its outcome, they can hardly be better served by another tome on the subject. Very highly recommended.
An exercise typical of Weinberg, and one of my very favorite sections of the book, relates to his analysis of the Russian counterattack in the titanic 1941 battle of Moscow, perhaps the most decisive moment of the entire war. He takes the impatient reader on a long detour that details the political and diplomatic background of that culminating event, before finally turning to the unfolding attack itself. This exercise, repeated in different forms throughout the book, impresses on the reader the global nature of the conflict. The fact is that the military and political leaderships of the respective countries saw it as such: a global conflict, with events in one theater of war impacting others in real time.
For the military enthusiasts, this is not a tactical military history of the war, although the military struggles are naturally addressed and do form the center of gravity of the narrative. Such readers would be better served by books that deal with military events in individual theaters of conflict. For those seeking a deeper understanding of the war, the rationale for its unfolding events and the inevitability of its outcome, they can hardly be better served by another tome on the subject. Very highly recommended.
December 5, 2016
This is supposed to be a classic treatment, but I only ground through about half of it before I gave up. Just too dry, and somehow you don't get a feel for events. I'm liking the "Inferno" book much better.
March 2, 2012
This is an incredibly thorough, global look at the entire timeline of World War II, from what led to the war through its conclusion.
There are several things which are really excellent about this book. The first is that the author looks through tremendous volumes of (often primary) source material to discuss the reasons that actors made decisions--that is, based on what they did or didn't know at the time their decisions were made. In particular, he focuses on how Stalin's understanding of Hitler as a capitalist affected Stalin's early policy decisions, and how Japanese and American views of each other, particularly in the early months of the conflict in the Pacific theater, tremendously shaped political and military choices those nations made.
The second thing which really makes this a book worth reading is the thoroughness of the author's background reading and footnotes. It is a treasure trove for the reader who is looking for additional sources.
Finally, although it's quite long, the book is very enjoyable to read. It is distinctly academic in tone, but written engagingly enough that interested non-historians (like me) and students of any major with an interest in the subject matter will not find themselves overwhelmed.
-Megan O'Neill
There are several things which are really excellent about this book. The first is that the author looks through tremendous volumes of (often primary) source material to discuss the reasons that actors made decisions--that is, based on what they did or didn't know at the time their decisions were made. In particular, he focuses on how Stalin's understanding of Hitler as a capitalist affected Stalin's early policy decisions, and how Japanese and American views of each other, particularly in the early months of the conflict in the Pacific theater, tremendously shaped political and military choices those nations made.
The second thing which really makes this a book worth reading is the thoroughness of the author's background reading and footnotes. It is a treasure trove for the reader who is looking for additional sources.
Finally, although it's quite long, the book is very enjoyable to read. It is distinctly academic in tone, but written engagingly enough that interested non-historians (like me) and students of any major with an interest in the subject matter will not find themselves overwhelmed.
-Megan O'Neill
April 30, 2008
Reading the old edition, not the new one. Superb ability to reflect the global nature of WWII and illustrate the way various theatres affected other ones. Not an in-depth military history (will have to read Lidell Hart for that) but very strong as a diplomatic history and as an economic one (at least to the extent necessary to provide understanding of diplomatic motivations.) Does not hide from the issue of atrocities and genocide, and skilfully weaves them into the overall narrative. Devotes a lot of attention to the home front, which is appropriate. Stresses ideoligical motivations of Hitler without much debate regarding them, which is the main disappointment, along with a fairly one-dimensional portrayal of FDR.
July 2, 2020
possibly deserves the 4/5 but the market of world war II literature is saturated... with classics. take Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945 5/5, The German War: A Nation Under Arms 4/5, The Third Reich at War 4/5, The Second World War 4/5. spend your hard earned brass on these...
Weinberg's tome is lengthy. it is, to a slight degree, marred by multiple constant in-paragraph reference "and this will be discussed further shortly". style was fine, work was competent, but really the only problem is that it's in a class of aces... I guess I should give it the 4/5 but there's also the desire to keep the top scores for the true top reads.
comprehensive. covered both fronts.
Weinberg's tome is lengthy. it is, to a slight degree, marred by multiple constant in-paragraph reference "and this will be discussed further shortly". style was fine, work was competent, but really the only problem is that it's in a class of aces... I guess I should give it the 4/5 but there's also the desire to keep the top scores for the true top reads.
comprehensive. covered both fronts.
February 10, 2023
Finally dusted this beast off and dove into it nearly 20 years after it was the textbook for my college World War II class. At times a bit dry, I do have to compliment Weinberg for fitting an overview of World War II into a single (heavy) volume. I've always found it relatively easy to find books on any specific topic in World War II - dads in recliners everywhere produce a near insatiable demand for that kind of content - but it's proven elusive to find a single volume overview of the conflict that puts everything in context. Weinberg succeeds here, masterfully so.
While this book touches on everything you would expect an overview of World War II to hit (Barbarossa! Stalingrad! Overlord!), where it really stood out to me was in discussing the involvement of the peripheral nations in the war - Finland, Sweden, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Portugal, Spain are all rarely discussed in World War II history, but Weinberg found the right balance of depth to hit on the less discussed topics/theaters and still move the narrative along. Out of the millions (billions?) of pages written about World War II, there's no way 900 pages can fit everything, but Weinberg does about as good a job as you could possibly ask.
While this book touches on everything you would expect an overview of World War II to hit (Barbarossa! Stalingrad! Overlord!), where it really stood out to me was in discussing the involvement of the peripheral nations in the war - Finland, Sweden, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Portugal, Spain are all rarely discussed in World War II history, but Weinberg found the right balance of depth to hit on the less discussed topics/theaters and still move the narrative along. Out of the millions (billions?) of pages written about World War II, there's no way 900 pages can fit everything, but Weinberg does about as good a job as you could possibly ask.
May 18, 2012
Over 1,000 pages and around 100 footnotes per chapter, one of the experts in English who writes on German foreign policy and German diplomatic history wrote this book. A juggernaut of academic work produced this book that could be easily weaponized by dropping it one someone; yes it is large! Do not fear its size, only is erudition, and the excellent connections it makes between diverse theaters. Now, it is weak on operations, tactical and the military analytically areas; however, one cannot accomplish all things. Its analysis of world politics and foreign policy is well worth it. This is one of the books any serious student should read. For those beginning their study it will catch them up quickly.
November 19, 2023
This book seemed like a good overview back when I was in college, but now that I've closely studied World War II I'm just revolted by the numerous errors, poor understanding of the battles, and juvenile opinions. It’s painfully obvious the places where he didn’t do any fact checking and just blindly accepted the statements of ill-informed or dishonest sources. I'll just list my complaints for the battles that I'm most familiar with—a thorough fact checking of this book would be too painful.
First off, he chose to use some culturally insensitive nomenclature: "British" to mean the United Kingdom and all members of the Commonwealth; "English" to mean all of the United Kingdom; and “Holland” to mean all of the Netherlands. In the index he defiantly thumbs his nose at propriety by writing “Netherlands, see Holland”.
Page 130: He lists the usual secondary and fake reasons for the Panzer halt before Dunkirk: need for tank repairs, swampy terrain, and wanting to use the Luftwaffe alone. He does not give the primary reason: Rundstedt ordered the halt to allow the infantry to close up with the Panzers, and then let the halt drag on too long due to a power struggle between him and Hitler on one side and Halder, von Brauchitsch, and the Panzer generals on the other. Alistair Horne had this figured out in 1969, so Weinberg’s explanation was at least 25 years out of date.
Page 210: He gets in some juvenile Italian bashing. "[Graziani] was still contemplating either his navel or the sand dunes when the British struck" in their December 1940 Operation Compass. If Weinberg had put some effort into studying this campaign he would have known that Graziani was waiting for the completion of a water pipeline and coast road improvements before resuming the offensive. Weinberg has a double standard and doesn’t ridicule Auchinleck for taking several months to prepare for Operation Crusader in 1941.
Page 217: The British did not send paratroops to Crete in December 1940, they sent No. 50 Commando.
Page 222: In the 1994 edition he claimed that the British sent 3 “British” divisions to Greece: 2 Australian and 1 from New Zealand. In reality, only one Australian division was sent. He tried to fix it in the 2005 edition but still cocked it up, saying that 3 British divisions were sent: 1 Australian and 1 from New Zealand.
Page 228: The Germans at Crete tried to capture three airfields, not two. The Crete battle was three independent sub-battles so it would have been impossible for him to have made this error if he had read more than just a CliffsNotes summary.
Page 232: Rommel’s dash to the wire in Operation Crusader came before the Africa Corps attacked the New Zealand Division, not after.
Page 233: He unfairly condemns the Germans for abandoning the frontier garrison in the retreat from Operation Crusader. The facts are that it was unsafe for ships to use Bardia for an evacuation, and the garrison lacked the transport to be able to break out by land. By holding out until January 17, 1942, the garrison lengthened the British supply lines and weakened their pursuit. If the garrison had not held out, the British pursuit might have been strong enough to pull off a second Beda Fomm encirclement. The garrison’s sacrifice was not in vain.
Page 351: He makes it sound like in August 1942 Auchinleck was planning to abandon Egypt, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia if Rommel attacked again. After Montgomery made those claims in his 1958 book, he was forced to issue a retraction in the 1960 paperback edition. Weinberg was therefore 34 years out of date on this subject!
Page 415: He claims that in the Soviet July 1942 retreat during Case Blue, their units either retreated coherently or at least could be pulled together again. But by my count, 48% of the divisions were effectively destroyed. Weinberg does have the excuse of writing before the Russians opened their archives, but he should have waffled on this issue rather than uncritically parroting the Soviet propaganda.
Page 452: He condemns the Soviet pursuit to the south of Stalingrad as being slow in the weeks before Operation Winter Storm. But that wasn’t a pursuit, it was the formation of an outer encirclement line. You can legitimately criticize it for being weak, but not for being slow.
6th Panzer Division was not understrength for Winter Storm. It was fresh off the train after being rebuilt in France.
Pages 455-456: He misidentifies the Soviet Fronts attacking in January 1943. The 2nd Army, Hungarians, and Italian Alpini were hit by Voronezh Front, not Southwest Front. And Army Group Don was no longer fighting Stalingrad Front: it had been renamed Southern Front on January 1.
Page 458: He perpetuates the myth that the Waffen SS was favored over the regular army in delivery of weapons.
Page 599: The SS-LAH Division was sent to northern Italy, not central, in the fall of 1943.
Page 600: He gets in a gratuitous attack on Montgomery’s performance in Italy. There are plenty of things to criticize Monty for, so there’s really no need for this distortion. The context is that 5th Army had invaded Italy at Salerno and was having a rough time. Weinberg ignorantly thinks that 8th Army in the toe of Italy would have been able to help 5th Army if not for Monty’s malicious pettiness. Weinberg’s words are, “Now he missed the opportunity to recover high standing with the Americans by deliberately pausing after his unopposed landing instead of dashing northwards. Alexander would and could not interfere with Montgomery’s tactical dispositions; and Brooke, who was the great advocate of both the invasion of Italy and Montgomery as a key figure in it, neither explained to his protégé why the Italian campaign was so important nor sent a rocket to him even while sighing into his diary that the Salerno landing ‘is doomed.’ Montgomery never had such a chance again. Newspaper correspondents could drive up the Italian roads toward Naples, but the 8th Army rested on its laurels as their American and British comrades died on the Salerno beaches."
Weinberg either never bothered to read the relevant part of the British official history or chose to distort the history to support his vendetta. Alexander’s plan was for two divisions from 8th Army to advance only as far as Catanzaro, which was 1/3 of the 300 road miles to Salerno. For that reason, 8th Army was given only a minimal number of ships and trucks. It could not build up quickly and on the day of the Salerno invasion it was still not even up to the “light” scale of truck transport. I consider it likely that the light scale of transport meant that the infantry had to walk. That would explain why Monty allowed rest days to sit on their “laurels”. The German demolitions had been so thorough that 8th Army ran out of bridging material after advancing only 100 road miles. Logistical difficulties and the rugged terrain thus made it impossible for 8th Army to dash northwards. In 1949, Alexander admitted that in hindsight 8th Army could not have moved any faster than it did.
It’s insulting to our intelligence to expect us to believe that Monty did not know why the Italian campaign was important. He arguably had a better understanding of the situation than Eisenhower, Alexander, and Clark because only Monty realized during planning that sending 8th Army into the toe of Italy was a stupid waste of resources that had no hope of pinning down any Germans.
Regarding the newspaper correspondents’ publicity stunt, they stopped when they got to the Salerno beachhead. They did not and could not go all the way to Naples, and only a dilettante would believe that their stunt could have been replicated by a force large enough to make a difference at Salerno.
Pages 603-604: He falsely claims that the Allied invasion of Sicily caused the Germans to transfer multiple divisions from both Army Group Center and Army Group South to Italy. In reality, only the SS-LAH division was sent. The Germans kept a central reserve for contingencies like this.
Page 661: The British 10th Corps in Italy was to the west of the Americans, not to the east. He got the rivers that they were crossing correct, which means that he probably never looked at a map and just copied text from his source and assumed that all the British divisions were in the eastern portion of the line.
Next he gets in a cheap shot at Clark regarding the Anzio invasion. Like Monty, there’s a lot to criticize him for so there’s no need to be unfair. Weinberg calls his leadership “incompetent” for passing up an unspecified “opportunity created by the initial surprise”. Amateurs who’ve never wargamed Anzio proclaim from their armchairs that the Allies could have captured Rome and cut off the supply route for the Germans at Cassino. Then through magical thinking they believe this would have caused the Germans to panic and retreat north. No, this is the Germans we’re talking about here: Churchill’s gimmicky plans didn’t work on them. It would have just left the invasion force strung out and vulnerable to annihilation. By forming a perimeter and avoiding annihilation, the Allies achieved the best possible results considering the paltry resources that had been allocated. Churchill had forced the Allies to send a corps to do the job of an army and created a no-win situation, so the blame lies with him, not with Clark.
First off, he chose to use some culturally insensitive nomenclature: "British" to mean the United Kingdom and all members of the Commonwealth; "English" to mean all of the United Kingdom; and “Holland” to mean all of the Netherlands. In the index he defiantly thumbs his nose at propriety by writing “Netherlands, see Holland”.
Page 130: He lists the usual secondary and fake reasons for the Panzer halt before Dunkirk: need for tank repairs, swampy terrain, and wanting to use the Luftwaffe alone. He does not give the primary reason: Rundstedt ordered the halt to allow the infantry to close up with the Panzers, and then let the halt drag on too long due to a power struggle between him and Hitler on one side and Halder, von Brauchitsch, and the Panzer generals on the other. Alistair Horne had this figured out in 1969, so Weinberg’s explanation was at least 25 years out of date.
Page 210: He gets in some juvenile Italian bashing. "[Graziani] was still contemplating either his navel or the sand dunes when the British struck" in their December 1940 Operation Compass. If Weinberg had put some effort into studying this campaign he would have known that Graziani was waiting for the completion of a water pipeline and coast road improvements before resuming the offensive. Weinberg has a double standard and doesn’t ridicule Auchinleck for taking several months to prepare for Operation Crusader in 1941.
Page 217: The British did not send paratroops to Crete in December 1940, they sent No. 50 Commando.
Page 222: In the 1994 edition he claimed that the British sent 3 “British” divisions to Greece: 2 Australian and 1 from New Zealand. In reality, only one Australian division was sent. He tried to fix it in the 2005 edition but still cocked it up, saying that 3 British divisions were sent: 1 Australian and 1 from New Zealand.
Page 228: The Germans at Crete tried to capture three airfields, not two. The Crete battle was three independent sub-battles so it would have been impossible for him to have made this error if he had read more than just a CliffsNotes summary.
Page 232: Rommel’s dash to the wire in Operation Crusader came before the Africa Corps attacked the New Zealand Division, not after.
Page 233: He unfairly condemns the Germans for abandoning the frontier garrison in the retreat from Operation Crusader. The facts are that it was unsafe for ships to use Bardia for an evacuation, and the garrison lacked the transport to be able to break out by land. By holding out until January 17, 1942, the garrison lengthened the British supply lines and weakened their pursuit. If the garrison had not held out, the British pursuit might have been strong enough to pull off a second Beda Fomm encirclement. The garrison’s sacrifice was not in vain.
Page 351: He makes it sound like in August 1942 Auchinleck was planning to abandon Egypt, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia if Rommel attacked again. After Montgomery made those claims in his 1958 book, he was forced to issue a retraction in the 1960 paperback edition. Weinberg was therefore 34 years out of date on this subject!
Page 415: He claims that in the Soviet July 1942 retreat during Case Blue, their units either retreated coherently or at least could be pulled together again. But by my count, 48% of the divisions were effectively destroyed. Weinberg does have the excuse of writing before the Russians opened their archives, but he should have waffled on this issue rather than uncritically parroting the Soviet propaganda.
Page 452: He condemns the Soviet pursuit to the south of Stalingrad as being slow in the weeks before Operation Winter Storm. But that wasn’t a pursuit, it was the formation of an outer encirclement line. You can legitimately criticize it for being weak, but not for being slow.
6th Panzer Division was not understrength for Winter Storm. It was fresh off the train after being rebuilt in France.
Pages 455-456: He misidentifies the Soviet Fronts attacking in January 1943. The 2nd Army, Hungarians, and Italian Alpini were hit by Voronezh Front, not Southwest Front. And Army Group Don was no longer fighting Stalingrad Front: it had been renamed Southern Front on January 1.
Page 458: He perpetuates the myth that the Waffen SS was favored over the regular army in delivery of weapons.
Page 599: The SS-LAH Division was sent to northern Italy, not central, in the fall of 1943.
Page 600: He gets in a gratuitous attack on Montgomery’s performance in Italy. There are plenty of things to criticize Monty for, so there’s really no need for this distortion. The context is that 5th Army had invaded Italy at Salerno and was having a rough time. Weinberg ignorantly thinks that 8th Army in the toe of Italy would have been able to help 5th Army if not for Monty’s malicious pettiness. Weinberg’s words are, “Now he missed the opportunity to recover high standing with the Americans by deliberately pausing after his unopposed landing instead of dashing northwards. Alexander would and could not interfere with Montgomery’s tactical dispositions; and Brooke, who was the great advocate of both the invasion of Italy and Montgomery as a key figure in it, neither explained to his protégé why the Italian campaign was so important nor sent a rocket to him even while sighing into his diary that the Salerno landing ‘is doomed.’ Montgomery never had such a chance again. Newspaper correspondents could drive up the Italian roads toward Naples, but the 8th Army rested on its laurels as their American and British comrades died on the Salerno beaches."
Weinberg either never bothered to read the relevant part of the British official history or chose to distort the history to support his vendetta. Alexander’s plan was for two divisions from 8th Army to advance only as far as Catanzaro, which was 1/3 of the 300 road miles to Salerno. For that reason, 8th Army was given only a minimal number of ships and trucks. It could not build up quickly and on the day of the Salerno invasion it was still not even up to the “light” scale of truck transport. I consider it likely that the light scale of transport meant that the infantry had to walk. That would explain why Monty allowed rest days to sit on their “laurels”. The German demolitions had been so thorough that 8th Army ran out of bridging material after advancing only 100 road miles. Logistical difficulties and the rugged terrain thus made it impossible for 8th Army to dash northwards. In 1949, Alexander admitted that in hindsight 8th Army could not have moved any faster than it did.
It’s insulting to our intelligence to expect us to believe that Monty did not know why the Italian campaign was important. He arguably had a better understanding of the situation than Eisenhower, Alexander, and Clark because only Monty realized during planning that sending 8th Army into the toe of Italy was a stupid waste of resources that had no hope of pinning down any Germans.
Regarding the newspaper correspondents’ publicity stunt, they stopped when they got to the Salerno beachhead. They did not and could not go all the way to Naples, and only a dilettante would believe that their stunt could have been replicated by a force large enough to make a difference at Salerno.
Pages 603-604: He falsely claims that the Allied invasion of Sicily caused the Germans to transfer multiple divisions from both Army Group Center and Army Group South to Italy. In reality, only the SS-LAH division was sent. The Germans kept a central reserve for contingencies like this.
Page 661: The British 10th Corps in Italy was to the west of the Americans, not to the east. He got the rivers that they were crossing correct, which means that he probably never looked at a map and just copied text from his source and assumed that all the British divisions were in the eastern portion of the line.
Next he gets in a cheap shot at Clark regarding the Anzio invasion. Like Monty, there’s a lot to criticize him for so there’s no need to be unfair. Weinberg calls his leadership “incompetent” for passing up an unspecified “opportunity created by the initial surprise”. Amateurs who’ve never wargamed Anzio proclaim from their armchairs that the Allies could have captured Rome and cut off the supply route for the Germans at Cassino. Then through magical thinking they believe this would have caused the Germans to panic and retreat north. No, this is the Germans we’re talking about here: Churchill’s gimmicky plans didn’t work on them. It would have just left the invasion force strung out and vulnerable to annihilation. By forming a perimeter and avoiding annihilation, the Allies achieved the best possible results considering the paltry resources that had been allocated. Churchill had forced the Allies to send a corps to do the job of an army and created a no-win situation, so the blame lies with him, not with Clark.
May 10, 2025
Perhaps the best book about the war that I ever read (see my read list to see I have read voraciously about it, the product of my father being a veteran of the war). His approach, looking at the war over time rather than by battle or even theater, contributes to an understanding of critical decisions, of the effect of simultaneous events, and of the cumulative effect of the previous years of war on the combatants and world as a whole that no other volume does. Though it is long, it would be a marvelous introduction to the war to a reader who wants to read one book rather than a dozen to learn of the war. And for one who has read many books about the war, reading this will provide synthesis of their previous knowledge of the war.
September 4, 2010
An interesting dissection of the political and military drama of WWII, with its focus more sharply on the political. I found the most interesting aspect of the book to be its careful analysis of the periphery combatants including Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, etc., their motivations, desires, and, ultimately, disasters. At the outset, I had hoped the book would focus more closely on the strategic and tactical aspects of the military engagements but Weinberg rarely delves into those issues. All in all, a good, single-volume, general history of WWII. It is, however, not the only book one must read to appreciate the full scope of the conflict, its causes, effects, and conduct.
May 9, 2019
I was considering what to say about this book. What comes after magisterial? What is more comprehensive and exhaustive than comprehensive and exhaustive.
In close to fifty years of reading history, especially military history, I have never felt such a sense of awe at the scholarship in a book. Not only is the scholarship sound, the inferences and conclusions are nuanced and subtle while remaining clear and cogent. The book is not just well-written but elegantly written.
We all sometimes joke about wanting to give more than five stars in a review, this is the first book I can recall which actually deserves it.
In close to fifty years of reading history, especially military history, I have never felt such a sense of awe at the scholarship in a book. Not only is the scholarship sound, the inferences and conclusions are nuanced and subtle while remaining clear and cogent. The book is not just well-written but elegantly written.
We all sometimes joke about wanting to give more than five stars in a review, this is the first book I can recall which actually deserves it.
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September 13, 2015This look at the Second World War is the counter balance to John Keegan's the Second World War. Weinberg looks at the war from a very political and economic standpoint. Living up to the title, Weinberg spends a considerable amount of time looking at various theaters and not just the European and Pacific theaters. The book is heavily footnoted, and well researched. The writing can be a little dry and hard to follow as Weinberg tends to jump from topic to topic. But if you can overcome that it was one of the best histories of the Second World War from a global perspective.
December 22, 2023
Review from darrengoossens.wordpress.com.
This book is subtitled 'a global history of World War II', and with the main matter stretching to 920 pages, it certainly has a go at it. On the whole, I would describe the book as interesting, thoughtful and thorough. If we consider its subtitle, I would say that it is perhaps not quite as global as may have been the original intent -- but how could the book have been kept to a publishable length if it were otherwise? Inevitably it focuses on the main combatants, with thumbnail sketches of what is going on in the more peripheral places.
Perhaps inevitably -- living as I do in Australia -- this strikes me. Australia occupies maybe a couple of pages of the 920. Say 0.2%. The rest is implicit; like when the North African fighting is mentioned, Aussies were there, but the author cannot be expected to always note this.
The book focuses on the big picture. How did the Allies come to agree on a 'Europe first' approach? How did the western powers manage to work with a soviet Russia that had, before the Germans turned on it, invaded Poland and provided the raw materials that powered the Nazi assault on France and fueled the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain? A Russia that withheld information, spied on the Americans and the British, and then demanded they send thousands of planes and trucks? No matter what Stalin demanded of the West, it was sanctified by the millions of Russian dead; no matter how hard he was to work with, no-one could say the Russians were not making remarkable sacrifices. And of course, the West worried that Russia might make a separate peace -- something that, in truth, Hitler's ideology rendered extremely unlikely. These sorts of considerations form the meat of the book. There is a little about technology, a little about espionage, quite a lot about signals intelligence (which was hugely important, as the book makes clear) and a lot about why the various leaders did what they did (as far as can be known).
The book is on the whole highly successful. It is unafraid to make judgements on leaders. Roosevelt comes out well, Churchill as less objective but fundamentally sound, Stalin as strong and effective but very difficult to work with. Montgomery comes out badly, King and Marshall well, and Eisenhower comes out well too; better than, say, the egomaniacal MacArthur.
The biggest military operations are described in a little detail -- enough to then back up analysis of how they affected the broader position, or why they justified the recall of a general, for example. The overall ebb and flow of fronts is more the book's style. And then we get an interpolated chapter describing, for example, the home front, or the evolution of key weapons (jets, radar, atom bombs, rockets, that sort of thing).
The book makes it clear that as the war went on the Red Army was not only large, it was also good, something not all histories admit. It pays close attention to deals made over borders and suchlike, and shows how these things had repercussions after the war and up to today.
I would not say the prose is elegant. It is effective enough, but at times I had to reread a sentence or two. There are no pictures apart from a useful set of maps in the back. It is a book that knows what it is about -- understanding the big picture, not minutia. You could almost call it a political history of the war (rather than a military hitory), and as such it is an excellent summary for the reader who is not going to go to primary sources. The author is not afraid to synthesise the material and make his own judgements, and on the whole, from what I know, they are generally interesting and most likely perceptive.
If what you want is what the book aims to deliver, it comes thoroughly recommended.
June 10, 2017
Ambitious in scope, lacking in heart
In A World At Arms, Weinberg certainly accomplishes his objective to write a truly global history of World War II. This book is ambitiously broad in scope, and is novel in illuminating theaters of the war that are often passed over or ignored in the context of the most major events and developments. While adequately covering the epic conflict at the Eastern Front and the Allied battle against the Axis in North Africa and subsequently Western Europe, there is also due attention paid to developments in, for example, Latin America, China, Nazi vassal states in Eastern Europe and India, which are often left on the periphery of war narratives, if referenced at all. I confess that before reading this work, despite having read a great deal of World War II history, I was surprised to read of Brazilian and Mexican expeditionary forces sent to Europe and the Pacific, respectively, while I learned more than I had in other works of political and military developments in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.
It is challenging to comprehensively narrate such a broad scope in less than 1,000 pages, and so at times Weinberg's coverage of certain developments appears cursory at best. Weinberg also gives a factual account, and the dryness of the text will fail to enthuse even the most avid WWII enthusiasts. Personalities are replaced by dispassionate descriptions of key decisions and events as they took place between nation states acting under logically thought out rationalizations for their role in the conflict. Nonetheless, the work deserves credit for being a well researched and concise history of a war which truly spanned the globe and deserves to be understood in that context.
In A World At Arms, Weinberg certainly accomplishes his objective to write a truly global history of World War II. This book is ambitiously broad in scope, and is novel in illuminating theaters of the war that are often passed over or ignored in the context of the most major events and developments. While adequately covering the epic conflict at the Eastern Front and the Allied battle against the Axis in North Africa and subsequently Western Europe, there is also due attention paid to developments in, for example, Latin America, China, Nazi vassal states in Eastern Europe and India, which are often left on the periphery of war narratives, if referenced at all. I confess that before reading this work, despite having read a great deal of World War II history, I was surprised to read of Brazilian and Mexican expeditionary forces sent to Europe and the Pacific, respectively, while I learned more than I had in other works of political and military developments in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.
It is challenging to comprehensively narrate such a broad scope in less than 1,000 pages, and so at times Weinberg's coverage of certain developments appears cursory at best. Weinberg also gives a factual account, and the dryness of the text will fail to enthuse even the most avid WWII enthusiasts. Personalities are replaced by dispassionate descriptions of key decisions and events as they took place between nation states acting under logically thought out rationalizations for their role in the conflict. Nonetheless, the work deserves credit for being a well researched and concise history of a war which truly spanned the globe and deserves to be understood in that context.
May 9, 2025
Gerhard Weinberg’s A World at Arms is an ambitious and perhaps the most richly documented single-volume history of World War II from a global perspective. Written by a distinguished German-American military historian, the book presents the conflict as a truly global phenomenon, emphasizing the interconnections between different theaters of war and the strategic calculations of those in power. Rather than offering a strictly chronological or battle-driven account, Weinberg structures his narrative around major developments in diplomacy, logistics, and political decision-making, maintaining analytical coherence throughout. The book is grounded in extensive archival research—summarized in a detailed bibliographic essay—especially from Western sources. (However, this bias results in a comparatively abbreviated treatment of the Eastern Front.)
Weinberg focuses on the “why” of the conflict, including the rationale behind major wartime decisions rather than the operational “how” of battlefield tactics. He explores the war’s many fronts—land, sea, and air—as well as less visible but vital dimensions such as espionage, code-breaking, resource allocation, and diplomatic maneuvering. His dissection of diplomatic negotiations and inter-allied relations is robust, illuminating the logic behind major turning points in the conflict. Weinberg also gives notable space to neutral nations and peripheral regions including Scandinavia, the Balkans, Southeast Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, underscoring how even distant territories were drawn into the vortex of global war.
Weinberg’s epic work stands as a monumental synthesis—sweeping in scope, rigorous in documentation, and indispensable for serious students of World War II.
Weinberg focuses on the “why” of the conflict, including the rationale behind major wartime decisions rather than the operational “how” of battlefield tactics. He explores the war’s many fronts—land, sea, and air—as well as less visible but vital dimensions such as espionage, code-breaking, resource allocation, and diplomatic maneuvering. His dissection of diplomatic negotiations and inter-allied relations is robust, illuminating the logic behind major turning points in the conflict. Weinberg also gives notable space to neutral nations and peripheral regions including Scandinavia, the Balkans, Southeast Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, underscoring how even distant territories were drawn into the vortex of global war.
Weinberg’s epic work stands as a monumental synthesis—sweeping in scope, rigorous in documentation, and indispensable for serious students of World War II.
March 15, 2023
Wow. What an undertaking; this was an extremely impressive if a little tedious book to read (hence the four rather than five stars). The scope and ambition if this book is pretty much unparalleled as far as I know. If you want a comprehensive history of the Second World War all in one place, look no further. Pretty much every aspect of the war has been covered in some capacity in this book, which I think deserves praise in itself: a LOT happened, of course.
I would have liked to see more attention given to the war in China; I think it’s often overlooked, and the relationship between the Nationalists and the Communists could have been explored more. I also think the book should’ve started in 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the Japanese invasion of China - I did not buy Weinberg’s justification for starting in 1939.
Altogether I think I learnt quite a bit; it’s hard for me to isolate exactly what (especially as I essentially stopped reading the book for over 8 months before picking it up again in February). The biggest drawback was that it was very dense and a little dry at times, but that’s just what it is. I personally prefer more flavoursome, human histories, but that wasn’t the aim here. In the end I think it’s an interesting and successful overview of WWII, and I’m glad I slogged through it in the end. If anything, the sense of achievement putting down a book of that size (with over 200 pages of bibliographic notes which is INSANE and a testament for how well researched this book is).
I would have liked to see more attention given to the war in China; I think it’s often overlooked, and the relationship between the Nationalists and the Communists could have been explored more. I also think the book should’ve started in 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the Japanese invasion of China - I did not buy Weinberg’s justification for starting in 1939.
Altogether I think I learnt quite a bit; it’s hard for me to isolate exactly what (especially as I essentially stopped reading the book for over 8 months before picking it up again in February). The biggest drawback was that it was very dense and a little dry at times, but that’s just what it is. I personally prefer more flavoursome, human histories, but that wasn’t the aim here. In the end I think it’s an interesting and successful overview of WWII, and I’m glad I slogged through it in the end. If anything, the sense of achievement putting down a book of that size (with over 200 pages of bibliographic notes which is INSANE and a testament for how well researched this book is).
December 1, 2020
A first rate piece of scholarship and an excellent condensation of six years of diplomatic and military command history into ~900 pages of narrative text.
A World At Arms filled in several gaps in my knowledge, particularly of the war between the Allies and Japan. The importance of places such as Port Moresby and Rabaul was finally made clear to me.
The bibliographic essay and notes are first rate. The book is definitely a keeper, and will be my key reference point on the war as I dig into details in the future.
So, why not 5 stars? Because the included maps (never mentioned in the text) lack detail and do not aid the narrative. And most importantly, because the writing style is fitting for a scholarly monograph (which the book is), but tough going for the general reader.
For example, the following sentence from page 772 of the 2005 edition:
"As if these direct effects of the bombing offensive, which greatly reduced the number of submarines that could be produced and delayed the delivery of those actually produced, were not enough, there was the even more dramatic indirect effect."
This is a paragraph closer, apparently intended as a transition to the next paragraph. But the entire next paragraph must be read before the 'indirect effect' can be understood.
Sentences like this crop up every few pages. Which makes the book impossible for me to recommend without reservations. And 'recommend without reservations' is my 5 star standard.
A World At Arms filled in several gaps in my knowledge, particularly of the war between the Allies and Japan. The importance of places such as Port Moresby and Rabaul was finally made clear to me.
The bibliographic essay and notes are first rate. The book is definitely a keeper, and will be my key reference point on the war as I dig into details in the future.
So, why not 5 stars? Because the included maps (never mentioned in the text) lack detail and do not aid the narrative. And most importantly, because the writing style is fitting for a scholarly monograph (which the book is), but tough going for the general reader.
For example, the following sentence from page 772 of the 2005 edition:
"As if these direct effects of the bombing offensive, which greatly reduced the number of submarines that could be produced and delayed the delivery of those actually produced, were not enough, there was the even more dramatic indirect effect."
This is a paragraph closer, apparently intended as a transition to the next paragraph. But the entire next paragraph must be read before the 'indirect effect' can be understood.
Sentences like this crop up every few pages. Which makes the book impossible for me to recommend without reservations. And 'recommend without reservations' is my 5 star standard.
September 1, 2025
I'd been looking for a good comprehensive one-volume overview of World War II and this seemed to be one of the most well-regarded books about it. Oddly enough, the professor works/ed at the university right by my house even though our paths have never crossed (I'm not a history major so not surprising, but I imagine he didn't have to teach much after writing this). It certainly gave me a lot of new insights about how fragile the alliances were (even the U.S. and U.K.) and how mercenary some countries could be about switching sides when it suited them. But maybe the most important thing that this book put into perspective for me is that no matter how not great things are right now, they were assuredly worse when regard for human life seemed to be at its lowest point. I hope this hasn't been forgotten.
July 6, 2022
Très bon livre sur le Deuxième Guerre mondiale. La première publication date de 1994 donc au niveau de certaines informations sur l'URSS c'est pas très à jour, mais dans l'ensemble l'oeuvre est très complète et l'auteur écrit de façon très pédagogue. En plus de mettre en lumière une panoblies de scénarios militaires très précis, l'auteur fait bien comprendre l'atmosphère au sein des gouvernements alliés ou des pays de l'Axe. Ce livre ne demande pas des connaissances préalables, mais celles-ci pourraient faciliter une meilleure compréhension.
May 13, 2023
Pros: Marvelous portrayal of the interactivity of events in WWII across the globe--how what was happening in Japan affected Stalin, Hitler and US. Amazingly insightful and concise summary of how Pearl Harbor was a strategic and tactical disaster.
Cons: On just about every page there a whopper of a sentence that one has to try to untangle, b/c it's so convoluted and confusing. He goes deeply into the weeds about the minor allies, I could have done without that. Wait! I did without it by skimming past it.
Cons: On just about every page there a whopper of a sentence that one has to try to untangle, b/c it's so convoluted and confusing. He goes deeply into the weeds about the minor allies, I could have done without that. Wait! I did without it by skimming past it.
February 9, 2017
Very good. Very clear. The writing is smooth and without the clunkiness of so much scholarly work. This is essential for the student of World War II and will not only greatly improve knowledge but also understanding of the military side of things. The author has no ax to grind, no agenda to forward. He simply provides an excellent historical source.
October 1, 2019
The book is massive and a slog to get through. Took two months of small bites to read it. I rate it high because of the impressive scholarship behind it, the stunning scope of what it covers, and the periodic insights proffered by the author. It is hardly a “page turner” and not for the novice to undertake. However reading this very long and often dry study is worth the journey.
August 21, 2025
Mi-figue mi-raisin! Quand il écrit de la diplomatie il y a du bon et du mauvais mais quand il parle de la science il n'a aucune idée. Et ses opinions sont assez mauvaises, parce que c'est une question des USA bons et tous les autres pays mauvais. Souvent il écrit que quelque chose est mauvaise et donne aucune preuve.
January 11, 2019
A thorough political and diplomatic history of World War II; descriptions of the actual fighting are truncated. Definitely not a book you can read for fun and you have to bring some knowledge of World War II to the table.
considering
October 11, 2017Recomendado como crónica general en Europa en Guerra.
February 6, 2019
A hot cup of coffee, blanket over me and I'm curled up reading this right here. Great book about the second great war!
January 11, 2021
Great book, loved strategic insights and inter-connectedness of events all around the globe. A bit difficult to work through, quite a scholarly work.
August 26, 2021
A masterpiece for World war -2. The author provides information without deviating from the facts.
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