Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar: A Neo-Aristotelian Mereology

by Ross D Inman

Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar explicates and defends a novel neo-Aristotelian account of the structure of material objects. While there have been numerous treatments of properties, laws, causation, and modality in the neo-Aristotelian metaphysics literature, this book is one of the first full-length treatments of wholes and their parts. Another aim of the book is to further develop the newly revived area concerning the question of fundamental mereology, the question of whether wholes are metaphysically prior to their parts or vice versa. Inman develops a fundamental mereology with a grounding-based conception of the structure and unity of substances at its core, what he calls substantial priority, one that distinctively allows for the fundamentality of ordinary, medium-sized composite objects. He offers both empirical and philosophical considerations against the view that the parts of every composite object are metaphysically prior, in particular the view that ascribes ontological pride of place to the smallest microphysical parts of composite objects, which currently dominates debates in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. Ultimately, he demonstrates that substantial priority is well-motivated in virtue of its offering a unified solution to a host of metaphysical problems involving material objects.

318 pages, Kindle Edition

Published December 14, 2017

Reviews

[Elena · Rating 1 out of 5]

Not a serious academic text. Pretty confident it has an agenda.

quote:
> “A central aim of this book is to carve out space for a heretofore neglected fundamental mereology, one that countenances fundamental intermediate coposite objects, and attempt to show that such a view is defensible in light of recent views to the contrary"

where: “views to the contrary“ is doing a lot of editorial heavy lifting.

quote:
> “Conspicuously absent from recent discussions of fuundamental mereology, then, is an explication and defense of the tenability of ascribing metaphysical fundamentality to at least some of the intermediate composite objects corresponding to ordinary, macrophysical composite objects like people, trees, and tigers.“

I was made suspicious by “Monism”.

This book is a defense of “Monism”. Have even the most superficial look at the author and it should be obvious what that means in his case.

Don't believe that this text should be taken seriously and disappointed in myself for wasting my time. Would give it zero if I could.