An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent

by John Henry Newman, Nicholas Lash (Introduction)

This classic of Christian apologetics seeks to persuade the skeptic that there are good reasons to believe in God even though it is impossible to understand the Deity fully. First written over a century ago, the Grammar of Assent speaks as powerfully to us today as it did to its first readers. Because of the informal, non-technical character of Newman's work, it still retains its immediacy as an invaluable guide to the nature of religious belief. An introduction by Nicholas Lash reviews the background of the Grammar, highlights its principal themes, and evaluates its philosophical originality.

Genres: Philosophy, Theology, Religion, Christianity, Nonfiction, Catholic, Victorian

406 pages, Paperback

First published February 12, 1870

About the author

Saint John Henry Cardinal Newman was an important figure in the religious history of England in the 19th century. He was known nationally by the mid-1830s.
Originally an evangelical Oxford University academic and priest in the Church of England, Newman then became drawn to the high-church tradition of Anglicanism. He became known as a leader of, and an able polemicist for, the Oxford Movement, an influential and controversial grouping of Anglicans who wished to return to the Church of England many Catholic beliefs and liturgical rituals from before the English Reformation. In this the movement had some success. However, in 1845 Newman, joined by some but not all of his followers, left the Church of England and his teaching post at Oxford University and was received into the Catholic Church. He was quickly ordained as a priest and continued as an influential religious leader, based in Birmingham. In 1879, he was created a cardinal by Pope Leo XIII in recognition of his services to the cause of the Catholic Church in England. He was instrumental in the founding of the Catholic University of Ireland, which evolved into University College Dublin, today the largest university in Ireland.

Newman was beatified by Pope Benedict XVI on 19 September 2010 during his visit to the United Kingdom. He was then canonised by Pope Francis on 13 October 2019.

Newman was also a literary figure of note: his major writings including the Tracts for the Times (1833–1841), his autobiography Apologia Pro Vita Sua (1865–66), the Grammar of Assent (1870), and the poem The Dream of Gerontius (1865),[6] which was set to music in 1900 by Edward Elgar. He wrote the popular hymns "Lead, Kindly Light" and "Praise to the Holiest in the Height" (taken from Gerontius).

Reviews

[Sarah Myers · Rating 5 out of 5]

If there was any one person I could point to as the biggest influence on my decision to become Catholic, that person would probably be John Henry Newman...which wouldn't be terribly unusual--lots of other people point to him. ;P But everything he writes is spiritually and intellectually vigorous, historically grounded, and just downright profound. This book was no exception.

A Grammar of Assent is an extended epistemological analysis of what it means to give assent to a proposition, especially religious assent in the life of a Christian, and deals with issues of certitude and infallibility. Interestingly, Newman does not seem to draw much on the Scholastics, and some of his ideas of epistemology and his critique of causation are more reminiscent of Locke and Hume (though he also disagrees with both of those in the course of the book).

Though it is heavier reading than Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Newman's more personal biography, this book is not really complicated to read. It does require careful attention to the course of a prolonged argument, with many long discussions of the terms Newman employs, but it is definitely worth it.

[Manuel Alfonseca · Rating 3 out of 5]

ENGLISH: Interesting book, although a little arid. The best part is the last chapter, an apology of Christianity. And I have found several interesting quotes:

In chapter V Newman says this: When it is said that we cannot see God, this is undeniable; but in what sense have we a discernment of His creatures, of the individual beings that surround us?... Thus the life and writings of Cicero, or Dr.Johnson... leave upon us certain impressions of the intellectual and moral character of each of them... This made me think that we are, with respect to dead authors, somewhat in the same situation as with respect to God: we can't see them, we have access only to their works. This is not what Newman says explicitly, but I think it's implicit in this chapter. On the other hand, Newman does not mention the experience of God's presence that some people experiment. This is another way of our discernment of God that we can't experiment with respect to dead authors.

In this same chapter, Newman anticipated the argument for God's existence developed by C.S. Lewis in "Mere Christianity." I don't know whether Lewis had read this book by Newman, or whether he came to the same conclusion independently, but both base their arguments on the existence of the conscience of good and evil.

In Chapter VIII-2, speaking about informal inference, he gives as an example the eccentric theory by Jean Hardouin (1646-1729), who asserted that most of the master works of Greece and Rome (with the exception of Homer, Herodotus, Cicero, and a few others), such as Virgil's Aeneid, the Histories of Livy and Tacitus, the Odes of Horace, and the works of Terentius, had been forged by medieval monks of the 13th century. Newman's analysis of this "inference" and the reasons alleged is quite interesting.

In Chapter X-2 he says this: Light is a quality of matter, as truth is of Christianity; but light is not recognized by the blind, and there are those who do not recognize truth, from the fault, not of truth, but of themselves. I cannot convert men, when I ask for assumptions which they refuse to grant to me; and without assumptions no one can prove anything about anything.

ESPAÑOL: Un libro interesante, aunque un poco árido. Lo mejor es el último capítulo, una apología del cristianismo. Y he entresacado varias citas muy interesantes:

En el capítulo V Newman dice esto: Cuando se dice que no podemos ver a Dios, esto es innegable; pero ¿en qué sentido podemos discernir a sus criaturas, a los seres individuales que nos rodean?... Así la vida y los escritos de Cicerón, o del doctor Johnson... nos dejan ciertas impresiones del carácter intelectual y moral de cada uno... Esto me hizo pensar que estamos, con respecto a los autores muertos, hasta cierto punto en la misma situación que con respecto a Dios: no podemos verlos, sólo tenemos acceso a sus obras. Newman no lo dice explícitamente, pero creo que está implícito en este capítulo. Por otro lado, Newman no menciona la experiencia de la presencia de Dios que experimentan algunas personas. Esta es otra forma de discernimiento de Dios que no podemos experimentar con respecto a los autores muertos.

En el mismo capítulo, Newman anticipó el argumento a favor de la existencia de Dios desarrollado por C.S. Lewis en "Mero Cristianismo". No sé si Lewis habría leído este libro de Newman, o si llegó independientemente a la misma conclusión, pero ambos basan sus argumentos en la existencia de la conciencia del bien y del mal.

En el Capítulo VIII-2, hablando de la inferencia informal, pone como ejemplo la excéntrica teoría de Jean Hardouin (1646-1729), quien afirmó que la mayor parte de las obras maestras de Grecia y Roma (con la excepción de Homero, Heródoto, Cicerón, y unos pocos más), como la Eneida de Virgilio, las Historias de Livio y Tácito, las Odas de Horacio y las obras de Terencio, habrían sido falsificadas por monjes medievales del siglo XIII. Es muy interesante el análisis que hace Newman de esta "inferencia" y de las razones que alega Hardouin.

En el capítulo X-2 dice lo siguiente: La luz es una cualidad de la materia, como la verdad lo es del cristianismo; pero los ciegos no reconocen la luz, y hay quienes no reconocen la verdad, no por culpa de la verdad, sino de ellos mismos. No es posible convertir a alguien, si le pido puntos de partida que se niega a concederme; y sin puntos de partida nadie puede demostrar nada de nada.

[Gonzo · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Catholic Church is in a worse place than she ever has been in her 2,000 years on earth. Cardinal Burke is of this opinion, as should be any reasonably perceptive Catholic. The bishops are cowards, a large segment of priests are heretics, and a majority of the "Catholic" laity combines these traits with rancid hedonism. The Mass, which was once celebrated with equal fervor in Peoria as it was in Rome, has been degraded, and the rituals which constituted some of the highest peaks of Western Civilization have been replaced by trifles. Show me an honest Catholic, Horatio, and I'll wear him in my heart's core.

Cardinal Newman, of course, is one of these great Catholics. Beatified but not yet made a saint, Cardinal Newman is maybe the most excellent of Catholic intellectuals of the post-1789 nightmare. In his learning, he is lofty; in his prose, he is beautiful; but like all great Catholic thinkers (and this is what separates Catholic thinkers from their secular counterparts), he is a pillar. His intellect takes him (and us) to the loftiest of intellectual heights, yet stays firmly planted on the ground of human experience. Like the greatest of all Catholic intellectuals, St. Thomas Aquinas, Cardinal Newman allows himself to strive towards the sky, yet never forgets his primary purposes are on the ground. A theology which spends all its time in the spires of the cathedral cannot achieve its most important purpose, which is to inspire the hearts of the congregation within it. If St. Thomas was the saint of common sense (to borrow from Chesterton), Newman makes a good claim to be his minor heir. Grammar of Assent, though written in modest prose, is an attempt to solve a philosophical problem just as difficult as the one St. Thomas faced in his his struggle to create a satisfying theory of Being.

Here, Cardinal Newman struggles with the problem of knowing, namely, how can a man be sure of any fact at all? Rote logic, as Locke tells us, can lead us to a kind of probabilistic certainty which allows us to get by in our day-to-day lives. But, if we are being honest as logical creatures, we can never be truly certain of anything. We cannot "carry our assent above the evidence that a proposition is true;" therefore, all truth is only so truthful as our senses are sensitive . We may be 99% sure of something, but insofar that our senses and perceptions are defective, we can never be truly sure of anything.

Of course, this outlook destroys absolute surety and any rational basis for faith. If Locke's outlook is true, all of religion becomes nothing but a probability curve. If Locke is right, only a fool can truly say he is sure of anything. The Nicene Creed becomes "I am 87% sure that there is one God, Father of the Almighty...." Clearly no true religious opinion can last long with this outlook; surely no martyr should be so foolish to give his life to a cause where there is even 1% chance of error. Ninety-nine percent surety, after all, is much closer to zero than one-hundred when one is about to be fed to hungry lions. Either some kind of certitude exists, or the Church cannot.

The greatest problem with Locke's opinion is that it is belied by human nature. All of us possess a power of judging and concluding and ultimately deciding some propositions are true. Cardinal Newman calls this our “illative sense.” It is our inner faculty for deciding which of our faculties is best employed in a given situation. It is a kind of super-regulator, guiding all the other smaller regulators in our intellects—our emotions, our intuition, our logic—into a regime where we are able to actually perceive the world as it is, not for the end of knowing the world itself, but simply for the need of existing. If one’s emotions lead one beyond his logic, the fall is not long in coming. Our illative sense precedes formal education, logic, and real sensation.

Why must we accept this illative sense as legitimate? Yes, the illative sense as Cardinal Newman describes it is the linchpin of man’s reasoning faculties. But who cares? Who made man’s senses the measure of things? Truthfully, Cardinal Newman must just shrug this off. As the Cardinal admits, he begins not with abstract theories but with man’s psychology, which informs us of real certitude and truth. The most compelling response to Locke is, after all, that certitude exists. Every cognizant human has knows this. And if man’s psychology is faulty here, there is no reason to presume his logic at any other stage of analysis is not equally faulty. If man cannot be assured of knowing his own thoughts, he cannot be sure of knowing anything. We are informed of this point not only as logicians, but also Christians. God became man, and this is all the difference. What Christian can dare to say that man can be no measure of things? That this vessel of ours, as imperfect as it might seem, is nonetheless an adequate one for perceiving the universe? Christ's incarnation tells us that man can be used as a starting point to wisdom; his path to Calvary and the Resurrection tells a similar tale.

But let’s leave the nitty-gritty of Cardinal Newman’s arguments aside for a moment—Cardinal Newman’s arguments are best made by Cardinal Newman. What struck me while reading is how well the current crises of the Church are explained by Grammar of Assent, and how inexorably poor philosophy can lead to foolish action.

The fault of Vatican II is the venerable Council’s inability to distinguish between what Cardinal Newman calls Real Assent and Notional Assent. Real Assent arises when we believe in something that requires no further action on our part. We declare that the book in front of us has words printed in it, or that the sky is blue—simple facts which are complete as facts in our simple assertions of them. Notional assents are those which are not so self-evident, and require an additional level of analysis. We may wholly believe that “God’s love is infinite” while not truly being able to fathom what infinity constitutes—certainly not the way we know what blue is when describing the sky. That God’s love is infinite and the sky is blue are both true propositions to any Christian. But even the most devout Christian must admit that one truth is more immediate to him than the other. The sky is blue because of our immediate senses; God’s love is infinite is something informed by logic, experience, and our senses, but does not have the immediacy of a hot flame or a blue sky.

The Vatican II Council shifted much emphasis in the Church away from truths that require Real Assent to those which require Notional Assent. We know nothing in Vatican II changed the most important feature of the Mass, which is the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. But the liturgical abuses which followed Vatican II diminished the outward signs of this great mystery. A church-goer’s Notional Assent is as easily given now as before, but his Real Assent to the proposition that Christ is bodily present in a piece of bread is much diminished. The bishops during Vatican II were largely correct in a theological sense; where they failed was in accounting for human psychology. And in so doing, they lost many of the faithful, whose beliefs, unmoored from real and present perception, slipped into speculations, into doubt, into atheism, and into hellfire.


If only Cardinal Newman had been there. If only he had been able to tell them the proper role man’s psychology should play in worshipping God. Christ appeared as man in order to liberate them from sin, but also to confirm that man’s prison—his body and senses—were in themselves something almost divine. The post-Vatican II regime, with is smashed communion rails, emasculated liturgy, and grotesquely plain architecture all suggest that man’s senses—and his ability for Real Assent—are somehow less important than his Notional Assent. Hogwash! But the Council set itself upon the lofty and purely theological, and acted surprised when mere mortals shied away beneath their feet.

Grammar of Assent fits in as a wonderful cornerstone to the body of Catholic philosophy. Apologia Pro Vita Sua struck me a better critique of Anglicanism than a justification for Catholicism. Surely there was a subtle mind at work, but the mind did not seem employed to its best use in that work. Cardinal Newman uses his full powers in Grammar of Assent. I look forward to reading more of his works. The saints earn their sainthood through godliness and heroic acts, and live with us as if they were friends, in true communion with us. Cardinal Newman’s great work rises to this high ecstasy, to the point where one is no longer his reader or his student, but his loved one and his friend.

[Michael Joosten · Rating 5 out of 5]

I won't deny that Newman's writing, though ever clear, is anything other than slow-going, packed as it is with serious, thoroughly-covered thought. Even as a philosopher, it is true, at times he simply blocks off avenues of investigation as being assumed for the sake of his argument and the philospher-reader simply has to take his word for it in continuing on to the points Newman wishes to make.

But the points he makes are worth it; or I at least found them so. It was the first, cover-to-cover philosophical read I managed since finishing my B.A. and it kept me to the course eagerly.

[Matthew · Rating 5 out of 5]

Any review of this book is going to be deficient in some way. Bernard Lonergan allegedly read it 20 times before venturing his opinion. Having only read it once, this is necessarily an incomplete summary of the book’s richness and density.

The word “Essay” is a rather modest description of a book which runs to 320 pages in my copy and based on the page number references in the Notes at the end would have had about 490 pages in the first edition layout. I would call it a Treatise, not only on Assent but on Inference, the examination of which takes up a good portion of the work. I assume Newman had his reasons for naming it as he did.

His writing style is exquisite - Victorian English flowing lavishly from his pen, wrapping itself around each new idea expressed, probing every facet of the points put forth in a way that is both painstakingly meticulous and beautiful. It is a slow read, both because the ideas need careful consideration and the language needs to be savoured.

The work is divided into two parts: the first deals with Assent and Apprehension and the second with Assent and Inference. Here is a brief (and necessarily inadequate) summary of the main points:

Assent and Apprehension:

Chapter 1: Modes of Holding and Apprehending Propositions

Newman starts by drawing distinctions. There are three ways of enunciating and holding propositions: i) a proposition enunciated as a Question and held by an act of Doubt; ii) a proposition enunciated as a Conclusion and held by an act of Inference; iii) a proposition enunciated as an Assertion and held by an act of Assent. These three distinct modes are entirely independent. To disbelieve (or dissent) is to assent to the contrary of a proposition.

Newman focuses on Assent and Inference. Assent is unconditional, Inference is conditional, as it implies the assumption of premisses.

Propositions can be divided into notional propositions (terms that are “abstract, general, and non-existing”, e.g. Man is an animal) and real propositions (terms that are “external to us, unit and individual”, e.g. the earth goes round the sun). Similarly these propositions can be apprehended with either notional or real apprehension and assented to with either notional or real assent.

Chapter 2: Assent Considered as Apprehensive

The act of Assent itself is unconditional, but presupposes the condition of a previous inference in favour of the proposition and an apprehension of its terms.

“Yet there is a way, in which the child can give an indirect assent even to a proposition, in which he understood neither subject nor predicate. He cannot indeed in that case assent to the proposition itself, but he can assent to its truth.” i.e. he can only assert proposition X, but he can assent to the proposition “X is True”, “for here is a predicate which he sufficiently apprehends, what is inapprehensible in the proposition being confined to the subject.”

Assent is complete and absolute, but can have a greater or lesser force depending on the quality of the apprehension of the terms.

Chapter 3: The Apprehension of Propositions

Real apprehension - any information presented to us through our bodily senses, or our mental sensations. By “mental sensations” he means memory, which “has to do with individual things and nothing that is not individual”, and an inventive faculty that allows us to compose new images based on descriptions, though we had never experienced the composition with our five senses.

Notional apprehension - general concepts as abstracted from individual things. This can occur even in the recounting of an event or description of a thing, where the words only convey general notions, as in stereotypes for example.

Real apprehension can lead to a keener assent than a notional apprehension, but Newman insists that Assent in itself is absolute and not affected by the character of the associated Apprehension.

Chapter 4: Notional and Real Assent

Notional Assents come in five types:
Profession: very feeble and superficial; little more than assertions
Credence: things we take for granted and have no doubt about
Opinion: deliberate assent independent of premisses, to a proposition as probably true
Presumption: assent to first principles of a line of reasoning, (specifically, that all things are caused by an effective will)
Speculation: the contemplation of mental operations and their results, as in mathematical investigations or legal judgments.

Real Assent is directed towards individual things. Notional Assent can be converted to Real Assent by application of the general to the particular.

Assent, in itself, does not lead to action, but Real Assent can affect our conduct while Notional Assent does not.

Chapter 5: Apprehension and Assent In the Matter of Religion

To give a Real Assent to a dogma is an act of religion; to give a notional assent is an act of theology.

Conscience informs our likes/dislikes of someone’s actions; Taste informs our likes/dislikes of someone’s clothes, for example.

“Conscience is a connecting principle between the creature and his Creator; and the firmest hold of theological truths is gained by habits of personal religion.”

Example of the Trinity - nine propositions. Can be assented to notionally (theology) all together, but can be assented to really (religion) when taken individually.

A Catholic is bound to give a real assent that what the Catholic Church teaches is true, “including all particular assents, notional and real”, “progressing from one apprehension of it to another according to his opportunities of doing so.”

Assent and Inference
Chapter 6: Assent Considered As Unconditional

Paradox: Assent follows on inference, yet inference is conditional on premisses while assent is unconditional.

Simple Assent: Contra Locke, assent is always absolute and never partial. Locke correlates assent with inference, but Newman considers them entirely distinct.

Complex Assent: An assent may be held without simultaneous recognition of the grounds for the assent, but then after further acts of inference the assent may be renewed or reinforced - a reflexive assent to a previous assent, e.g. Great Britain is an island.

Chapter 7: Certitude

Simple Assent is material or interpretative certitude - simple, unexamined act based for example on authority; Complex (Reflex) Assent is true Certitude, an assent to the notional proposition that the simple assent is true.

“Assents may and do change; certitudes endure. This is why religion demands more than an assent to its truth; it requires a certitude, or at least an assent which is convertible into certitude on demand.”

Certitude is directed at individual propositions and does not imply acts of infallibility.

“Certitude is a deliberate assent given expressly after reasoning. If then my certitude is unfounded, it is the reasoning that is in fault, not my assent to it… Errors in reasoning are lessons and warnings, not to give up reasoning, but to reason with greater caution.”

Certitude is indefectible, but it is not always obvious what the underlying proposition held with certitude is. Conclusions are often derived from prejudices and probabilities, which are subject to change; nevertheless the underlying certitude, if it be certitude, remains unchanged, e.g. when people convert religions.

Chapter 8: Inference

Formal inference: a line of reasoning that can be reduced to symbols, e.g. geometry, algebra, calculus, logical syllogisms etc

Verbal argumentation, or logic applied to concrete things, is “loose at both ends”. Inference is best suited to notions, but casting a real object to a notional proposition requires assuming first principles which may be disputed. Similarly, the conclusion of an inference is notional, and when applied to a concrete thing introduces probability, as every individual thing has its own nature that can at best be approximated by notions.

Informal inference: a cumulation of such independent probabilities that leads to certitude in concrete matters. It doesn’t supersede formal inference, but deals with real things instead of abstract; it is implicit, not deliberate or directed; it is still conditional on the premisses of all the constituent probabilities. e.g. Great Britain is an island, I will die one day, etc. (Worth re-reading this section for the examples).

Natural inference: the most natural mode of reasoning is not from proposition to proposition but a divination of things all at once. The ratiocinative faculty is actually a collection of analogous faculties, each with its own province. In individuals some may be united, leading to extraordinary competences, e.g. in strategy, mathematics, art etc.

Chapter 9: The Illative Sense

Inferring from experience leads only to probabilities, so how can anything be known for certain? Via the Illative Sense, the perfection of the ratiocinative faculty.

“Certitude is a mental state; certainty is a quality of propositions.”

We are compelled to approach the search for knowledge from our human condition, thinking, reflecting, judging - “there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony born to truth by the mind itself”. It is God who teaches us all things through our nature, varying according to the subject matter.

The Illative Sense is analogous to Aristotle’s phronesis - directing the mind in matters of morality, taste, etc. Indeed every virtue or talent has its own proper phronesis.

The exercise of the illative sense is the same always - reasoning proceeds always as far as possible by the logic of language and supplemented by the more “elastic logic of thought”.

The illative sense is attached to definite subject matters - may be more perfected in one department than another.

There is no ultimate test of truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the Illative Sense that gives them its sanction.

The exercise of the illative sense can lead to varying and often contradictory conclusions, depending on the first principles applied to a problem, which vary among interlocutors.

Chapter 10: Inference and Assent in the Matter of Religion

In religious inquiry everyone speaks for himself - what strikes another as true will inform their own personal quest.

Christianity is an addition to natural religion and does not supersede or contradict it.

Three channels of natural religion: the mind (Conscience), the voice of mankind (the universal experience of man’s insufficiency and sinfulness in the most primitive societies) and the course of the world (commonalities of religious expression in different societies throughout history in response to the evils of the world brought about by man’s fallenness).

[Bradley L. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Guaranteed enlightenment if you read this piece of tedium seriously. You’ll come away with less hair on your head, but more shelves in your brain.

“…no man will be a martyr for a syllogism.”

“…as it takes an artist’s eye to determine what lines and shades make a countenance look young or old, amiable, thoughtful, angry or conceited, the principle of discrimination being in each case real, but implicit;—so is the mind unequal to a complete analysis of the motives which carry it on to a particular conclusion, and is swayed and determined by a body of proof, which it recognizes only as a body, and not in its constituent parts.” (p.233)

[Marc · Rating 2 out of 5]

A reminder to all that as human beings living life day to day, and especially in the area of religious faith, empirical rationalism is not the best way to talk about knowledge. In non-scientific knowledge, we come to asset through thinking concretely, inductively, and moving from concrete wholes to concrete wholes. We create abstractions from these concrete experiences that guide us, but do not substitute for aspects of existential knowledge. Religion is certainly part of that experience and religious knowledge is more than rational assent, it involves the whole person. Although the language and presentation of this book is dated, its core message is essential to understanding the value of multiperspectival knowledge and the fact that religious assent means more than just believing words and doctrines.

[Jessica]

My read-through of this made me wonder why I was reading it through, but a subsequent gloss of my annotations rather redeemed the brain-drain, of sorts. My, was it a slog at times! I picked this up because, well, it’s an enigmatic title, and I persevered in expectation of the revelatory culminating moment, that capstone passage of illuminating insight – which, if you’re curious, never really arrived. The Grammar isn’t a logical treatise – quite; it isn’t the work of a grammarian – sort of. The fact of the matter is that I’m still unsure why Newman called it what he did, because even excepting an early passage wherein he distinguishes the grammarian from the philosopher in subtle support of the latter, his focus departs and rather dissuades from the word-orientation of what he calls notional reasoning, whether apprehensive or assenting (is it wrong to simply dub this nominalism, especially since Newman basically invokes realism?). For Newman, the emphasis isn’t even so much on reason as it is on mind. Thought is aligned with the real, concrete, particular, and, most importantly, the personal, whereas language coincides with abstractions and forms. Things are (p)raised above words, despite Newman’s noble aloofness from value judgments, and the imagination and memory, unintuitive as this perhaps sounds, actually channel the vitality of sense experience. There was a strong current of vitalism here, on that note, which I found particularly potent as an insistence on the lived, operative faculty of belief, as of mind and identity in general. To add to the complexity, in case Newman’s reckoning with reason/emotion, logic/intellect, theology/religion weren’t challenging enough, his thorough-going individualism occasionally gave me significant pause. A sentence like this, for instance, “It is his [man’s] gift to be the creator of his own sufficiency; and to be emphatically self-made,” reads very arresting in the context of Newman’s anti-rationalism and his crusade against the “civilized religion” of philosophy inherited from Enlightenment Deism. It’s a bit as if one needs a God as retributive and a faith as categorically imperative as Newman’s to offset the supremacy of the individual mind, an observation I’ve made about Newman’s body of thought that, like enough else about his legacy, continues to hold my attention.

[William · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was at times a difficult read, as Newman develops the process of how we reason and assent to various propositions. I had never thought about that process in any real detail. The distinction between having a proposition, reasoning about it and then assenting to it involves many layers and indeed can be very difficult to parse. Arriving at certitude is not the logical process of a syllogism. For instance, Newman talks of three Protestants, one becomes a Catholic, a second a Unitarian, and a third an unbeliever: how is this? (p.198) To take the third case, Newman expounds: "The third gradually subsided into infidelity, because he started with the Protestant dogma, cherished in the depths of his nature, that a priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity of the Gospel. First, then, he would protest against the sacrifice of the Mass; next he gave up baptismal regeneration, and the sacramental principle; then he asked himself whether dogmas were not a restraint on Christian liberty as well as sacraments; then came the question, what after all was the use of teachers of religion? why should any one stand between him and his Maker? ...Each of the three men started with just one certitude, as he would have himself professed, had he examined himself narrowly; and he carried it out and carried it with him into a new system of belief" (p. 199)

If that short bit doesn't wow you, then you won't enjoy this book. If it does, happy feasting on this intellectual tour-de-force!

[Fr. Zachary Galante · Rating 4 out of 5]

As far as Newman’s search for the process of belief goes, this book was Newman’s crowning achievement. It’s a hard read. Essentially a work dedicated to the inner works on the mind (what we may call epistemology) in how it comes to understand things to be true. Within this whole system, Newman writes about the illative sense and the nature of converging probabilities leading to concrete proof in things unseen. Naturally this gives ample evidence for how one comes to belief in God and to be certain of that belief. I read this great book for my term paper. I recommend for all who are interested in the question of how belief actually happens and how that process is different than other forms of reasoning.

[Peter Asper · Rating 5 out of 5]

I had heard about this essay before, but when I started reading I was surprised by how long and detailed it is. Newman pulls out all the stops in his investigation of assent and certitude not as philosophers think they should be but rather as they actually occur within human minds. I recommend this to anyone interested in philosophy, especially anyone who enjoyed reading the Brittish Empiricists.

[Szymon Bialkowski · Rating 3 out of 5]

I really want to understand this book, I really do and I think I’ve tried, I just don’t think I’m a good enough reader for it or this is just a bad-work.

It’s books like these that make me lose hope in finding truth for the grand ideas like religion and morality.

[Mark F. Griffith · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great book! About Catholic thought but also grammar and the idea of what everyone should know.

[Monica Zebold-Bell]

This was for my "Great Works" book club. I tried, but couldn't.

[Mike · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Do not all charms fly at the mere touch of cold philosophy ?" Keats

[Jeff Miller · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not the easiest book to read, but really worthwhile. Blessed Cardinal Newman writes on the ways we come to knowledge and how we assent. He discusses the various levels up to certitude and this book in the day and age of so much moral relativism in regards to our ability to know the truth is a perfect remedy. The breakdown of our knowledge to notational and real makes some important distinctions that we should all be aware of. Especially as it regards faith and growing in faith. The subject of the conscience is also integral in parts of the book showing again how great a teacher he is on conscience.

I've thought on this subject a little bit in relation to faith and the distinctions between intellectual knowledge of the faith and a deeper real knowledge of it. When I heard Fr. Barron on a CD set discussing Cardinal Newman and this book I knew it was one to read.

It also amazes me the intellect of Cardinal Newman. What a great man. I've read most of his major works and my respect for him only builds. I will be very surprised if he is not named a Doctor of the Church at some point.

[Shep · Rating 4 out of 5]

Newman does not usually write theological / philosophical works, his writings typically being either pastoral or "controversialist." This is one of the few exceptions. His epistemic theory here is indebted to Locke, though he does not agree with him on all points. It is also indebted to the Patristics and their allegoresis. His discussion of the illative sense is perhaps the most valuable and talked about section of the book, relevant to current discussions of ecumenism, theological postmodernism, and radical orthodoxy. Newman is an eloquent writer whose works are nonetheless a bit of a mixed bag - those not prepared for his Patristic-esque writing style may be frustrated by his subtleties, inconsistencies, and paradoxical statements highlighting the mystery of theology and theological knowledge. Nevertheless, while the book may be a bit uninteresting to the layman, as a theological work it is worth reading and reflecting upon.

[L. M. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Newman was at the peak of his mental powers in this dense and complex study of how we come to assent (or "believe") in propositions. The book may be seen as an attempt to bring together and expand on his scattered thoughts about the relationship between faith and reason. There are wonderful passages of prose here, too, among the best of his that I have read. And I particularly loved his concluding claim that revelation is the fulfillment of natural religion, which is its anticipation.

[Sean · Rating 4 out of 5]

A deeply sophisticated examination of orthodox Catholic religious epistemology. Newman mastery of the English language makes for an extremely enjoyable read, however, also allows him to more easily overstep his logical limits.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Written by someone who has been called the greatest writer in English in the 19th century, poured out from his transition from Anglicanism to Catholicism, a remarkable work. I read this very early and did not appreciate it. I should reread it!

[Sarah Schieffer Riehl · Rating 5 out of 5]

though i've read only part of it, this is one of the most-used texts in my mental toolbox.

[Erika · Rating 5 out of 5]

in preparation for a course at l'école cathédrale bought in Oxford 2008

2013 just in time for understanding the assent to certitude

[Fredbook · Rating 5 out of 5]

A bit of a slog due to the nineteenth century’s penchant for page-long sentences, but otherwise Newman’s writing on an important topic is clear, interesting, and helpful.

[Kelly · Rating 5 out of 5]

I award this book 5 out of 5 stars because the website won't allow 10 out of 5.