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The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914: How Faulty Reconnaissance Exposed the Weakness of the Schlieffen Plan
If wars were wagered on like pro sports or horse races, the Germany military in August 1914 would have been a clear front-runner, with a century-long record of impressive victories and a general staff the envy of its rivals. Germany's overall failure in the first year of World War I was surprising and remains a frequent subject of analysis, mostly focused on deficiencies in strategy and policy. But there were institutional weaknesses as well. This book examines the structural failures that frustrated the Germans in the war's crucial initial campaign, the invasion of Belgium. Too much routine in planning, command and execution led to groupthink, inflexibility and to an overconfident belief that nothing could go too terribly wrong. As a result, decisive operation became dicey, with consequences that Germany's military could not overcome in four long years.
225 pages, Paperback
Published May 21, 2019
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About the author
Dennis E. Showalter
41 books29 followersA specialist in German military history, Dennis E. Showalter was professor emeritus of history at Colorado College. He was president of the American Society for Military History from 1997 to 2001 and an advising fellow of the Barsanti Military History Center at the University of North Texas.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
December 22, 2020
"Perhaps you misunderstood my orders? Perhaps I did not make myself clear. Well, sir... this must be made *very* clear. You, sir, with your cavalry, are the eyes of this army. Without your cavalry, we are made blind. That has already happened once. It must never, *never* happen again.
Robert E. Lee to Jeb Stuart in the movie"Gettysburg" (1993)
Most books on 1914 hover on the same plane. A minimum lip service must be paid to Archie Duke who shot an ostrich because he was hungry & the July crisis lurking in Europe's embassies until it spills over onto the front page. Once the German troop trains rush over the bridge at Cologne every 10 minutes, battle is joined with a certain sterility, as if reading from the Schlieffen Denkschrift.
Holger H. Herwig put the swashbuckle into the arrows over the map of Belgium; he gave us the fight. Now Showalter & Robinson (who has experience as a U.S. divisional staff officer) give us the ... fumble.
They take their time to review the historiography of the German war planning, from Ritter to Zuber, coming to the conclusion that the Plan surely existed & was implemented, warts and all.
The Schlieffen plan was far from perfect, but a generation of General Staff officers had succumbed to a self-fulfilling mindset, blinded to its defects. Moltke the Younger, along with Kitchener one of the few commanders to envision a long war, added a major complication by removing the passage through the Maastricht salient, funneling his right wing into the road arteries atop which sat the fortresses of Liège.
The attack on Liège began with an untrained night attack, gained momentum thanks to 'average' 21 cm mortars & only at the end brought forth the Bertas (or Skodas). All this in no small part to sudden changes in command between the core units of the wing, the army corps.
Similar shifts write the story of the faillure of reconaissance, the domain of the cavalry and a mere 5 airships. Eyes of the army, veil of the opponent, first grappler of Auftragungstaktik, the mounted army was mentally stuck in the massed charge of 1870 than its counterpart on foot (which, under the stress of battle, reverted to shoulder-to-shoulder attacks onto machine-guns). Halen, for all its propaganda exaggeration, cost First & Second Army a percentage of scouts it could scarcely afford.
Some friction can be laid at the feet of primitive radio technology & the slow speed by courrier which carried observations back to multi-level staff officers, but this was made worse by the sheer shortage of these famous red-striped trousers, as well as a shortage of communication between them within the boundaries of the wire(less).
The net results are astonishing. The BEF was a ghostly presence until the evening before Mons, situated at Lille or Maubauge. The Belgian Army, Clausewitzian target of its German opponent once the roads through Liège were open, was able to retreat to Antwerp with an open right flank.
Blame the cavalry. And blame the deficiencies of the Schlieffen plan.
The war could've been won on August 23rd, Cannae-style. Perhaps.
Robert E. Lee to Jeb Stuart in the movie"Gettysburg" (1993)
Most books on 1914 hover on the same plane. A minimum lip service must be paid to Archie Duke who shot an ostrich because he was hungry & the July crisis lurking in Europe's embassies until it spills over onto the front page. Once the German troop trains rush over the bridge at Cologne every 10 minutes, battle is joined with a certain sterility, as if reading from the Schlieffen Denkschrift.
Holger H. Herwig put the swashbuckle into the arrows over the map of Belgium; he gave us the fight. Now Showalter & Robinson (who has experience as a U.S. divisional staff officer) give us the ... fumble.
They take their time to review the historiography of the German war planning, from Ritter to Zuber, coming to the conclusion that the Plan surely existed & was implemented, warts and all.
The Schlieffen plan was far from perfect, but a generation of General Staff officers had succumbed to a self-fulfilling mindset, blinded to its defects. Moltke the Younger, along with Kitchener one of the few commanders to envision a long war, added a major complication by removing the passage through the Maastricht salient, funneling his right wing into the road arteries atop which sat the fortresses of Liège.
The attack on Liège began with an untrained night attack, gained momentum thanks to 'average' 21 cm mortars & only at the end brought forth the Bertas (or Skodas). All this in no small part to sudden changes in command between the core units of the wing, the army corps.
Similar shifts write the story of the faillure of reconaissance, the domain of the cavalry and a mere 5 airships. Eyes of the army, veil of the opponent, first grappler of Auftragungstaktik, the mounted army was mentally stuck in the massed charge of 1870 than its counterpart on foot (which, under the stress of battle, reverted to shoulder-to-shoulder attacks onto machine-guns). Halen, for all its propaganda exaggeration, cost First & Second Army a percentage of scouts it could scarcely afford.
Some friction can be laid at the feet of primitive radio technology & the slow speed by courrier which carried observations back to multi-level staff officers, but this was made worse by the sheer shortage of these famous red-striped trousers, as well as a shortage of communication between them within the boundaries of the wire(less).
The net results are astonishing. The BEF was a ghostly presence until the evening before Mons, situated at Lille or Maubauge. The Belgian Army, Clausewitzian target of its German opponent once the roads through Liège were open, was able to retreat to Antwerp with an open right flank.
Blame the cavalry. And blame the deficiencies of the Schlieffen plan.
The war could've been won on August 23rd, Cannae-style. Perhaps.
May 12, 2024
If the opening campaigns of the First World War are an interest of yours, here is a slim volume that will warm the cockles of your heart. The Schlieffen Plan, as you all know, was Imperial Germany's blueprint for winning a two-front war in Europe by 1) concentrating 7/8ths of its army in the west and 2) concentrating most of that force for a march through neutral Belgium in order to outflank, envelop and destroy the French and British forces in northern France before the Russian's numerical superiority could make itself felt in the east. We all know that the plan failed, but, according to the authors, the reasons for this are not (as conventional wisdom supposes) the dispatching of 2 corps to East Prussia or the by-passing of Paris by Von Kluck's 1st Army but rather the poor planning and lack of resources for the all-important reconnaissance missions to find the vital flank of the Entente forces. Another problem faced by the Germans was how to clear and pass through the "Liege gap" between the Dutch Maastricht appendage and the Ardennes. This task was greatly complicated by GGS chief Von Moltke's decision to respect Dutch neutrality, forcing the Germans to pass their right-flank armies through the gap in tandem, thereby slowing the assault on the Belgian forts around Liege. These factors prevented the Germans from 1) keeping the Belgian army from retreating to the fortress of Antwerp and 2) locating the BEF in good time to enable its destruction by envelopment. It seems almost unbelievable but the German General Staff, an organization of almost legendary quality and precision, did not make arrangements to ensure these problems could be dealt with in the field. There were also serious issues with the two types of units needed for reconnaissance: cavalry (a type of military force that had reached obsolescence) and aircraft (a very new technology with significant limitations), including huge gaps in the ability of both these types of units to communicate what they had seen to higher headquarters. I admit that I was surprised to learn that no arrangements had been made to supply the German cavalry divisions with fodder beyond what they themselves could carry with them, which was a day's worth. Thereafter, the divisions were supposed to feed their roughly 5500 horses (per division) with what they found growing on the land, while they were advancing into the most urbanized region in Europe. Add to all this the usual frictions and fogs of war, and one can see why Moltke's version of Schlieffen's ideas weren't successful. The authors deal with all of these issues in a surprisingly fluid narrative and the copious maps are helpful.An important addition to our knowledge of the early battles of the Great War.
December 11, 2024
Very detailed military analysis on why the Germans came close but missed the mark in their attempt to outflank the French and British in the opening stages of WWI.
Very factual, not an easy read. But if you have Google Earth handy you can at least keep up with the advances.
Good book!
Very factual, not an easy read. But if you have Google Earth handy you can at least keep up with the advances.
Good book!
June 28, 2020
So I think this book will become a project. I'll explain.
The book is detailed, organized and well researched. It offers maod to show progress. Use them.
The effort to enter France via Belgium in 1914 was marred by all manor of chaos, mistakes, and infighting. The same effort in 1939 was stunningly effective.
In turung this book into an exploratory war game, and playing the 1939 parralel after it I feel a real understanding can be gained.
Anyway, read this book. It deepens a real understanding of the war. And is very good.
The book is detailed, organized and well researched. It offers maod to show progress. Use them.
The effort to enter France via Belgium in 1914 was marred by all manor of chaos, mistakes, and infighting. The same effort in 1939 was stunningly effective.
In turung this book into an exploratory war game, and playing the 1939 parralel after it I feel a real understanding can be gained.
Anyway, read this book. It deepens a real understanding of the war. And is very good.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews