From Napoleon's revolutionary campaigns to the way insurgency, terrorism, and nuclear weaponry have defined the nature of warfare in the 21st century, the results of military strategy have changed the course of history. These 24 thought-provoking lectures give you an inside look at both the content and historical context of the world's greatest war strategists.
From the triremes and hoplites of ancient Greece to the Special Forces in 21st-century Afghanistan, strategy is the process by which political objectives are translated into military action - using the means at a nation's disposal to compel an enemy to bend to its political will.
In this concise and rigorous survey, Professor Wilson introduces: Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War; Sun Tzu's famous The Art of War; Machiavelli's strategy for a republic with a citizen-army; Jomini, Clausewitz, and the Napoleonic revolution in warfare; the development of naval strategy and the rise of airpower; Mao Tse-tung, David Galula, and Roger Trinquier's reflections on insurgency and counterinsurgency and their influence on the U.S. Army's Field Manual 3-24; Just-war theory, from Thucydides' Melian Dialogue to Operation Iraqi Freedom; nuclear war, terrorism, and other strategic challenges for the 21st century.
You'll come away from this course with new insight that will allow you to take an informed, active interest in political and military debates - which ultimately will determine the course of our nation.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this course are those of the professor and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Andrew R. Wilson is the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies. Professor Wilson has lectured at military colleges and civilian universities across the United States and around the world.
This series of lectures covers many writers and thinkers on the subject of strategy in war and International relations. Ideas presented by people like Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Jomini, Clausewitz, Mao Tse-tung, and a bunch of others are discussed here. I wish I could say this wasn’t dry and dull for long stretches but, unfortunately for me, it was. Maybe it’s because many of the ideas presented here are not really new to me since I have already read widely in this area.
I won’t say there are no takeaways here. I think every book and series of lectures will have some nuggets that a person can toss onto the pile. I think, as well, if you're the right kind of person this will be much more relevant and fascinating to you.
For me, it didn’t help that he kept referring to Bush-era neocons as examples of people making use of classical strategies. Maybe this is more about when these lectures were produced than the fact that he takes those guys super seriously. Back when they were getting ready to invade Iraq based on bogus evidence of weapons of mass destruction and a pretended connection to 9/11, even plain old me knew what was most likely going to happen as a result of getting bogged down in a land war in Asia. (Princess Bride reference there) If I knew better, why on earth didn’t they? Then again, maybe they did know. Perhaps, as the situation continued to deteriorate in Iraq, Cheney and his buddies cried all the way to the bank.
Anyway, if the subject of strategy on a grand scale interests you, you might enjoy these lectures more than I did. Based on some of the other reviews and ratings, lots of people did.
Masters of War is an outstanding course from every which angle. The subject is fascinating and not widely covered in other courses. The pace is just right. Prof Wilson does not have his topics bound by the chapter time limit of thirty minutes. He seems to be able to have enough to say, and no more or less, for every subject.
Most importantly, the course adheres to its theme. There are no needless historic diversions because they provide good tales. Thinkers are clearly people who elaborated on their strategic thinking rather than successful or known generals of war whose strategic thinking is interpreted through the actions they may have taken. The Professor does not hesitate in providing a critical analysis of various lines of thoughts explained in the course. This genuine analysis is based on the actual examples of these tactics' applications (intended or unintended), as well as through thought experiments and counterfactuals. The lecturer does not hesitate - with solid reasoning - taking up good strategic thoughts provided by generally-vilified personalities like Mao nor trash the hallowed actions of favourites like Alexander or Napolean.
The course is extremely well-structured. There is a lot to learn as one moves from the infantry-based battles to the modern naval and nuclear warfares. The professor shows us deployments of precise planning in events as non-war like as the Cold War, guerrilla wars, insurgencies/counter-insurgencies, terrorism/counter-terrorism, and even roles played by completely random factors.
An engaging lecture on how humans have thought about conquering one another over the course of 3000 years. My biggest fear going into this lecture was Wilson would be overly prescriptive with strategic concepts. I was pleased to see while he did give thinkers like Jomini their due, he is careful to show how a rigid adherence to any one school of strategy is doomed to failure.
I particularly appreciated his breakdown of thinkers like Thucydides and Clausewitz. Even thought I was already familiar with both of these writers, he cogently broke down why both of them are so enduring today. The dark horse thinker of the course for me was Mao. While Wilson makes it clear he doesn't endorse any of his results, he made the convincing case why any insurgent of the 21st century is either pulling from or responding to Mao in some way.
I would recommend this lecture to anyone curious about the history of conflict, or wants to know about how humans have created an art to besting one another.
This is the kind of series that makes me a wild fan of The Great Courses. Exceptional presentation of well curated knowledge, that progresses in a way the allows you to grow with the subject. The Great Courses do not disappoint. This particular topic is one I'm randomly feverish about, so hearing a master cover this territory was a delight. I finally understand why I should care about Sun Tzu. I have more appreciation for Jomini, and more importantly, I understand why my lack of jominian understanding is a typical symptom. I gained new tools for understanding terrorism and counterterrorism (timely) and a more nuanced perspective on the arguments for and against "just war" theory. The section on naval strategy was familiar territory, but always a fun refresher. And since I haven't explored nuclear strategic theory at all, this was a great primer. I will listen to this series again.
This Great Courses series offers brief overview of the thoughts of many of those great military minds you’ve doubtless heard of but don’t really know anything about—Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Jomini, Clausewitz, and more. These are men who built the foundations of strategic thinking in the military world and its interweaving with political thinking. It’s a fascinating discussion made more so as author, Andrew Wilson, adds into the conversation the advances in warfare—steam navies, air power, nuclear weapons, terrorism—that forced strategic thinkers to evolve their views. As an added bonus, he covers not only some of the major battles of history—Midway, the Peloponnesian War, Napoleon’s Campaigns—but a number of smaller but equally fascinating military actions such as the War for Irish Independence and the Algerian War for Independence. If you’ve an interest in the development of strategic thinking in the military, I think you’ll find this an engrossing overview.
I did not finish this one. I made to lecture 10, and then decided to cut my losses. I find military history and strategy very interesting, but really didn't like the delivery, and content of this course. Professor Wilson's teaching style exemplifies everything I don't like in a teacher. He oftens goes off on rambling tangents; like spending an inordinate amount of time describing the respective political and social climates of the books he is supposed to be telling you about. I don't want to know about the climate of Sun Tzu's China, I want to know about his book, The Art of War... 1 star.
I was completely intrigued by this course. It is the perfect combination of history, theory and contemporary application. It gave me a very different perspective on the wars in my lifetime.
This was my first time being introduced to ALL of the strategists and background history, so I felt that perhaps I could’ve used a little bit more detail at times - although to be fair, I’d have benefitted from some note-taking and perhaps re-listening to the material.
The topic of strategy, especially the military and how it is applied in war, is new to me. This course did succeed in providing me an overview of many different areas of war, theorists and examples from history. This all contributed to my greater understanding. However, I was a bit lost in the lecture a just war. What confused me was when it mention that the US military had engaged in a just war in Iraq and that POWs where treated with respect. I would have been interested to see how the lecturer would have consolidated this point of view in relation to the Abu Gharib prison incident or the gang rape and murder of 14 year old Abeer Al Janabi and other crimes.
This is not about war or even great generals. This is a book about the writers of the great books on war, some of whom were generals, but many of whom were not (which I was surprised to discover). It covers the major schools of thought about war and how they have changed, beginning with ancient Greek wars and Sun Tzu's Chinese dynasty wars to naval battles, nuclear war theory and the modern challenges of anti-terrorism.
It's a survey, so you just dip your toe in each area, but if you're interested in history or strategy, this is probably interesting to you.
This video and text offers a broad history of noteworthy military strategists throughout the ages and provides examples of these theories put in action. However, I found applying Jus ad Bellum to Operation Iraqi Freedom was a bit farcical. Bush called it a preemptive strike because Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, and perhaps he wanted to put a bow on it by calling it a war of just cause. Anyway, my one bone to pick, but basically a good course.
Enticing set of succinct lectures by an instructor clearly on point and passionate about his chosen subject, supplying interested readers or listeners with a good supply of intellectual energy pellets of thought about tricky & complex themes of strategy in war.
Wilson begins with Thucydides and the Peloponnesian war up to and including the recent American wars in the Middle East.
His series of succinct and fascinating lectures show how the study of history can augment the limits of personal experience and perspective in pragmatic ways that shed light on this wide-ranging, complex and all encompassing subject.
A lean, muscular, clear work wrapped in up in pithiness, incorporating unique elan and engrossing style, without much padding at all.
The course goes through a number of now standard books on strategy (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Thucydides are the most known of the bunch, though he throws in a couple others). I suppose I just didn't find the course too engaging -- such strategy books often seem much better suited to discussions, where a particular campaign (by say Napolean or Alexander of Macedon) are analyzed in the different lights of these strategies. He did do some of this in the course, but the power of a theory comes from its ability to predict real outcomes. So, it would've been more interested had he walked through just a selection of campaigns to contrasts the predicted outcomes from these different strategies.
Very interesting overview of military history and the driving questions of strategy. Marred quite a bit by the extensive uncritical application to the single most strategically unsound war the US has ever embarked on, the so-called “Global War on Terrorism” (characterized by a refusal to define political goals, a refusal to define the enemy (fighting instead various proxies), and a decades-spanning refusal to adapt to its obvious failure).
A bad angel sat upon my shoulder throughout this, whispering variations of the subversive thought that all these theories about warfare are made up post hoc, to explain specific and random human situations in theoretical terms, but which theories are seldom truly applicable in general, and which then require the articulation of additional or alternate theories.
I don’t really believe that bad angel, but still, I have my doubts. Like Mao’s three phases of revolution seemed purpose-built to describe what happened in the context of China and WWII.
I was struck by a discussion point involving the first Gulf war, where a certain theorist named Gordon was worried that air power was being diverted from its strategic purpose, as he saw it. Fighting armies is irrelevant, he thought. Use air power to take out the leadership. Hearing that, I thought, "wow. Here we are, a hundred years after the first military use of airplanes, and still arguing about how they ought to be used." In the end, and I believe this is one big take-away that the authors throw down at the end of this overview – in the end, “It Depends.”
It always depends on the circumstances, whether a given theoretical formulation is going to be a useful guide. I guess it helps civilian and military planners to have various theoretical frameworks to choose from. Certainly it must help to have understood the circumstances and outcomes of past conflicts. But I look through this material in vain for examples of theory successfully applied in advance.
A startling idea: Samuel Adams was basically a terrorist. It would have been good to hear a more thorough development of this idea in the context of how it could inform the War on Terror. It was disappointing to have this treated as a throwaway.
This series of lectures, then, will serve mainly as a way to get you more interested in certain historical episodes, and to prompt further reading. Conversely, I think the target audience is one consisting of those who have already done the required course readings.
This is a uniquely military perspective on strategy. Some usual suspects - Thucydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu are present, but also more recent military strategy masters are covered. The coverage is pretty shallow, which might be understandable given the format of Great Courses, still it seems that most lectures are pretty light on insight and it was often difficult for me to understand what useful tidbits I got from listening to the lecturer for 30 minutes on a particular topic. It seems that the military view on strategy is pretty limited - the way modern military is set up is to execute orders given by civilian government. As to what those orders are, why they are the way they are - is not important, good military will just execute the given tasks with the best of its ability. As to the traditional military strategy as such - what are some clever ways how military can defeat the enemy, especially given the odds not in your favor - surprisingly only Jomini and maybe counterinsurgency authors seem to treat it with enough detail and any usefulness. Everybody else doesn't get into the practical side of war. Of course, such practical treatise might get stale fast.
So, given the limitations - on the one side, of military being careful not to doubt the legitimacy of orders and pure war mechanics being relegated to the tactics of war, we are left with a thin slice of "military strategy" - ensuring that aims are clearly defined, the rules of engagement are just and justified and the civil authority is engaged as a controlling body. This made me think that what the lectures leave out - namely, how and why modern civil governments really go to war (to be fair, this is somewhat covered by the lecture on just war, but not nearly deep enough) or how and why wars are won - were actually the most interesting bits.
Still, the lectures work as a short set of teasers on the classic materials. I've added several authors covered by Dr. Wilson to my reading list.
If we are to claim with a straight face that the American officer corps is the most educated and self-reflective ever (jerkoff motion, eye roll), we must also examine the quality of that education - and if I were an enemy of the United States using this course to evaluate that, I would not be worried.
There are many points on which this embarrassment of a Great Course can be criticized, but I will only mention one: the use of Operation Iraqi Freedom as the illustrative example of just war theory.
Wilson matches the Bush administration's rhetoric with the theory, but fails to address the reality as a counterpoint. Talking for 30 minutes about OIF without acknowledging the fact that the American administration lied, that the execution of the war was botched, and that torture and civil breakdown were parts of the American strategy, is brazen dereliction of duty.
This might seem a little unfair, because I'm writing this in 2024 from among the ruins of the American Empire, but I remember 2013 perfectly well. There were people explaining that Afghanistan was a failure (indeed, this prediction was first, and accurately, made on 12 Sep 2001), that Iraq had been irreparably botched (Fiasco was published in 2006), and that overthrowing the government of Libya was a dumbfuck idea (just google), and he ignores them. If your ideas can't make basic predictions, your ideas are bad, and if the Duffel Blog has more incisive strategic commentary than you as a strategic theorist, then you should probably resign.
I've never been into reading about war and famous battles, even though I had friends growing up into that stuff. Though perhaps this will be my gateway drug into fulfilling the stereotype of old men reading about WWII and going on and on about 'the greatest generation,' now that I'm on the high side of forty. This lecture series was interesting, and was really well-made in that it kept me engaged and informed even though I came in with basically no real knowledge. It also spanned very ancient history right up to the present at the time (mid-2010s), and did an impressive job of applying principles from ancient Greece and China and the Napoleonic era and WWII and the cold war to modern day issues like terrorism. There were also a few lectures on the history of terrorism (e.g., Ireland, Algeria) which were absolutely fascinating and of course unfortunately still relevant today. Really good, especially if you don't know anything about the topic. Put another way, exactly the kind of excellent quality you'd expect from the Teaching Company.
Professor Wilson teaches at the US Naval War College and this is one of the courses he teaches there. It includes 24 half hour lectures that start with Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War all the way through to modern day and our war with terror. He includes strategists like Sun Tzu, Machievelli, Clausewitz, Mao Tse-tung, and Gen. David Petraeus. I especially liked his lectures on the Algerian War between he natives and France that took place in 1954-1962. France eventually lost this war and Prof. Wilson uses this as an example of what not to do in the war we are fighting in Iraq. He also talks about Michael Collins the Sinn Fein leader as a terrorist who was brilliant enough to take on the United Kingdom and win. Winston Churchill brokered the peace treaty with Collins. Sometimes it may be necessary to work for compromise with terrorists. I found these lectures enlightening and extremely relevant today. I checked this out from my local library.
I'm writing just to voice an objection. Nearing the completion of the series and while you were informing me of 'seven criteria for a just war' I rejected that 'There must be a reasonable chance of success.' I do not believe that the idea of pursuing justice should ever require any hope of succes. Quite the opposite. That said, you've also instructed me on the liquid and evolving meaning of so many of these philosphical constructs. And that even these are just the current evolving norms to fit an ever changing tactical envirorment. Rules of engagement. And the fact I had all these thoughts, are just testomony on how the analysis of this particular overview of military history is going to change the way I view everything forever.
As a retired Army officer who served in the early 1970s, I very much appreciated the opportunity to peek into a classroom at the U.S. Naval War College course on strategy and policy taught by a Harvard graduate. Dr. Wilson looks holistically at conflict from strategic standpoint, offering insights and analysis from Sun Tzu to Petraeus. He wisely distinguishes between strategy and tactics, battles and war, and lessons derived from both winning and losing. These classes will help provide perspective in one’s study of military history and in evaluating conflict in today’s world. I came away feeling very positive about training in critical thinking received by our senior military leaders. Plus, I came away with some ways to enhance my own vocational advancement.
I listened to this over our trip, so I zoned out much of it. A couple things: 1. Vietnam's issue was not that the political leadership was too involved with the military, but that they were not involved on the strategic level and did not challenge military leaders on these points. 2. Your political, strategic and tactical thinking must flow out of each other appropriately. Bad things happen when these become misaligned. 3. Just War Theory is no longer relevant now that we are in the Trump Era.
An overview of strategic thought and thinkers from the earliest histories to today. The attempt is to separate strategy from operational and tactical maneuvers. For example the discussion on Pearl Harbor is about its great operational success vs its terrible strategic impact. In addition the main theoretical thinkers like Mahan and Clausewitz as well a number of lesser know authors are examined. Popularity, impact, strengths and weaknesses as well error are all brought in focus.
I felt that this is just a list acknowledging known great historic strategic thinkers were great strategists. 'yeah, this or that general was a brilliant strategist. He was quoted as saying this pithy saying." There's not much meat here. These lectures almost feel like an pitch for a book about great historic strategists. I suppose what i got out of this book is that there were strategists in wars and some of them were good it it.
Read this as someone with no military background (other than war movies). But I like strategic thinking and was hoping to learn/appreciate strategies. But I didn't get much from this. A few gems. I found that there was discussion of a number of specific cases and I had trouble "seeing the forest through the trees". Lecture series would have been much better, if at the end of each lecture, there was a 1 minute summary of key points for that lecture.
Overview of the greatest military theorists - Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan, and so on. Interestingly, many of these theorists were losers in their career, probably that made them more reflective. Mahan will probably be very relevant in the current US administration's way of thinking.