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Expendable Warriors: The Battle of Khe Sanh and the Vietnam War
192 pages, Unknown Binding
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June 6, 2022
The preface to this book underscores Bruce B.G. Clarke's experience in strategic and tactical analysis, so I expected his account to focus on the tactical aspect of defending Khe Sanh. However, he has actually written a first-person combat memoir that is vivid and detailed, and also not lacking in insightfulness on a certain important topic.
In Vietnam, Clarke was an Army captain and district adviser, who coordinated the defense of the village of Khe Sanh when the Communists attacked on January 21, 1968. His account focuses on the first day of the long battle that would not end until July, but his main goal is as much to describe what it was like to fight at Khe Sanh as to bring attention to the fact that this famous battle became a disaster because there was no unity of command. The Army and the Marines not only openly disagreed about tactics and strategy, but also pursued fundamentally different goals. The Marines had prepared themselves for an intensive battle, which General Westmoreland had promised them, and they wanted the advisers out of the way. The Army advisers' mission was to care for the Bru Montagnards, the tribe of warriors who had proved to be extremely loyal to the Americans, so the advisors did not want to abandon the village. When Khe Sanh was attacked, they expected the Marines to provide relief. The Marines, for their part, believed that the village was impossible to defend and instead of providing help, ordered the advisers to be evacuated to the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Clarke argues that this was huge mistake and had a strong demoralizing effect on the Army forces and the Bru, who had fought alongside him and experienced the happiness of initial victory before the Marines turned the tide in favor of the North Vietnamese attackers by demanding that they abandon their positions.
I like the compassion Clarke has for the Bru. The majority of Khe Sanh participants were dismissive of the tribe warriors, but Clarke genuinely respected and cared for them. He and his small advisory team, consisting of four men, had spent eight months advising the Bru. How their story went is not widely known, and it makes Clarke's anger at the Marines understandable. The Bru were not allowed to board the helicopters for evacuation to the Combat Base. Although they had fought alongside the Americans with strength, bravery, and determination, they were denied the freedom for which they had fought. The Marines and the soldiers were airlifted from Khe Sanh. The Bru were left to face the enemy alone. Clarke chose to stay with them. In an extraordinary act of courage and leadership, he walked out of the village with the remaining 150 Vietnamese and Bru fighters and led them to safety, to the Combat Base five kilometers away.
Back then he could not have known that the North Vietnamese attack he and his men had repulsed was just the beginning and the Khe Sanh Combat Base would be besieged for months to come. Looking at the battle retrospectively, though, he argues that Khe Sanh would not have turned into such a debacle had the village not been abandoned. As he explains, the lack of unity and understanding between the Army and the Marine Corps also led to secrecy that often prevented vital intelligence from reaching whom it needed to. For instance, the Marines had known for months that there would be a major attack in the area of Khe Sanh, although they assumed the the North Vietnamese would assault Camp Carroll. This information was not shared with the Army advisers. As the author points out, not knowing that there was going to be a major attack in the area was almost catastrophic for the members of the advisory team. Had they not improved their defenses, they would have been surprised by the Communists, which could have had a lethal outcome because the advisers had neither rehearsed their relief plan, nor stocked enough ammunition and water. Not to mention that unity of effort and a reduction in secrecy would have allowed the Army and the Marines to attack the enemy earlier and possibly avoid the siege.
A major shortcoming of Clarke's work is the absence of a biography and footnotes. While he does mention that his account is oral history, sources are what make a non-fiction work credible. The absence of footnotes can confuse readers previously unfamiliar with the history of the battle of Khe Sanh.
EXPENDABLE WARRIORS is, before everything else, a combat memoir. Clarke is successful in conveying how the battle tasted, smelled, and sounded, but I decided not to address this aspect in detail because his work, while well-written, does not stand out from the many other combat memoirs. This book is notable for the author's analysis of the complicated Army-Marine relationship and the negative effects it had on the American war effort. I also enjoyed that it provided information about the Black Cats, the elite South Vietnamese unit that performed a great variety of missions, proving that the South Vietnamese were a force to be reckoned with, but are not often mentioned.
In Vietnam, Clarke was an Army captain and district adviser, who coordinated the defense of the village of Khe Sanh when the Communists attacked on January 21, 1968. His account focuses on the first day of the long battle that would not end until July, but his main goal is as much to describe what it was like to fight at Khe Sanh as to bring attention to the fact that this famous battle became a disaster because there was no unity of command. The Army and the Marines not only openly disagreed about tactics and strategy, but also pursued fundamentally different goals. The Marines had prepared themselves for an intensive battle, which General Westmoreland had promised them, and they wanted the advisers out of the way. The Army advisers' mission was to care for the Bru Montagnards, the tribe of warriors who had proved to be extremely loyal to the Americans, so the advisors did not want to abandon the village. When Khe Sanh was attacked, they expected the Marines to provide relief. The Marines, for their part, believed that the village was impossible to defend and instead of providing help, ordered the advisers to be evacuated to the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Clarke argues that this was huge mistake and had a strong demoralizing effect on the Army forces and the Bru, who had fought alongside him and experienced the happiness of initial victory before the Marines turned the tide in favor of the North Vietnamese attackers by demanding that they abandon their positions.
I like the compassion Clarke has for the Bru. The majority of Khe Sanh participants were dismissive of the tribe warriors, but Clarke genuinely respected and cared for them. He and his small advisory team, consisting of four men, had spent eight months advising the Bru. How their story went is not widely known, and it makes Clarke's anger at the Marines understandable. The Bru were not allowed to board the helicopters for evacuation to the Combat Base. Although they had fought alongside the Americans with strength, bravery, and determination, they were denied the freedom for which they had fought. The Marines and the soldiers were airlifted from Khe Sanh. The Bru were left to face the enemy alone. Clarke chose to stay with them. In an extraordinary act of courage and leadership, he walked out of the village with the remaining 150 Vietnamese and Bru fighters and led them to safety, to the Combat Base five kilometers away.
Back then he could not have known that the North Vietnamese attack he and his men had repulsed was just the beginning and the Khe Sanh Combat Base would be besieged for months to come. Looking at the battle retrospectively, though, he argues that Khe Sanh would not have turned into such a debacle had the village not been abandoned. As he explains, the lack of unity and understanding between the Army and the Marine Corps also led to secrecy that often prevented vital intelligence from reaching whom it needed to. For instance, the Marines had known for months that there would be a major attack in the area of Khe Sanh, although they assumed the the North Vietnamese would assault Camp Carroll. This information was not shared with the Army advisers. As the author points out, not knowing that there was going to be a major attack in the area was almost catastrophic for the members of the advisory team. Had they not improved their defenses, they would have been surprised by the Communists, which could have had a lethal outcome because the advisers had neither rehearsed their relief plan, nor stocked enough ammunition and water. Not to mention that unity of effort and a reduction in secrecy would have allowed the Army and the Marines to attack the enemy earlier and possibly avoid the siege.
A major shortcoming of Clarke's work is the absence of a biography and footnotes. While he does mention that his account is oral history, sources are what make a non-fiction work credible. The absence of footnotes can confuse readers previously unfamiliar with the history of the battle of Khe Sanh.
EXPENDABLE WARRIORS is, before everything else, a combat memoir. Clarke is successful in conveying how the battle tasted, smelled, and sounded, but I decided not to address this aspect in detail because his work, while well-written, does not stand out from the many other combat memoirs. This book is notable for the author's analysis of the complicated Army-Marine relationship and the negative effects it had on the American war effort. I also enjoyed that it provided information about the Black Cats, the elite South Vietnamese unit that performed a great variety of missions, proving that the South Vietnamese were a force to be reckoned with, but are not often mentioned.
Displaying 1 of 1 review