The alarming, untold story of Citigroup—one of the largest financial institutions in the world—from its founding in 1812 to its role in the 2008 financial crisis, and the many near-death experiences in between.
During the 2008 financial crisis, we were told that Citi was a victim of events beyond its control—the larger financial panic, unforeseen economic disruptions and a perfect storm of credit expansion and private greed. To save the economy and keep the bank afloat, the government provided huge infusions of cash through multiple bailouts that frustrated and angered the American public.
But, as Wall Street Journal writer James Freeman and financial expert Vern McKinley reveal, the 2008 crisis was just one of many disasters Citi has experienced since its founding more than two hundred years ago. In Borrowed Time they reveal Citi’s disturbing history of instability and government support. It’s a story that neither Citi nor Washington wants told.
Citi has long been tied to the federal government in a relationship that has benefited both. From its earliest years, its well-connected leadership—most of its initial stockholders had owned stock in the Bank of the United States—took massive risks that led to crisis. But thanks to a rescue by private investors, including John Jacob Astor, the bank survived throughout the nineteenth century.
This is just the tip of the iceberg. The scale of the financial panic of 2008 was hardly unprecedented. As Borrowed Time shows, crisis and outright disasters have been surprisingly common during the century of government-protected banking—especially at Citi.
In order to understand Freeman's history of CITI - one needs only to recount the founding of the bank after the First Bank of the United States expired. The original incorporators funded the bank using pledged stock (which means that their direct financial commitment to the new enterprise was $0).
Freeman does a superb job of describing the growth and missteps of this largest of US banks. In the epilogue he recounts the numerous bailouts that CITI has gotten over its history (the most recent being in the 2008 mortgage dump). CITI has also, since the turn of the 20th Century had a couple of CEOs who had no experience in banking. HE does a good job of explaining how CITI has often been a revolving door for government executives including people like Timothy Geithner, who admitted that he was woefully unprepared for his job at the NY Fed, then Treasury, then CITI.
The author does some good discussion on the concept which keeps places like CITI committing these acts of impropriety - Too big to fail. For my money I would have let the miscreants fall. It would have been painful but it probably would have reduced the propensity for executives like those from CITI (who accessed federal dollars six or seven times in the last hundred years) thinking that their ultimate guarantor was you and me.
A masterfully written work by two Wall Street Journal authors. Gives insight into the U.S. (and, by extension, the world) monetary system in an examination of the key role played by a New York bank (now known as "CitiBank").
Interesting read for anyone trying to understand the whole "too big to fail" thing that justifies government bailouts of the country's (world's) largest banks.
A fascinating account of the history of Citigroup. I particularly liked the focus of the book on citi’s earlier years , and its less focus on the recent financial crisis , sets this book apart. Worth a read
This book can be summed up in two sentences: In the 19th Century, Citibank was a good bank. In the 20th Century, Citibank was a bad bank.
James Freeman goes through the history of Citibank of when it was first founded as the City Bank of New York in 1812 to the current state after it merged and became Citigroup. I found the first half of the book more enlightening. The author went through what was happening in 19th century America to add context to the decisions that Citibank made. It was interesting to see how this bank thrived during financial panics in the 1800's since it was considered a safe haven for people to park their money. This was accomplished by having plenty of reserve capital on hand to weather the down turns in the markets.
As the century changed and the management style of Citibank became more comfortable with risk, the author's intentions seemed to have changed. The front half of the book felt informative to understand where this bank came from. In the latter half, James Freeman seemed to be trying to point a finger at Citibank and lay blame on them for our modern financial and economic woes. While there is plenty of evidence of the poor choices they made and unnecessary risks that were taken, the author's criticisms never seemed to hit home. Instead of having the sense Citibank is truly at fault (which the title seems to indicate), Freeman's arguments left me feeling that this situation is more complicated.
When I put the book down at the end, I felt unsatisfied. I have a better understanding of the shift in Citibank's management over time, but there is a lot of information missing in this book to help me put everything into context. Perhaps an avid reader of the Wall Street Journal who has been following the financial world of the late 20th and early 21st century would have been able to connect all the dots.
Unless James Freeman is writing about a topic that I am extremely interested in, I don't think I will be keeping him on my radar.
This is a brisk, enjoyable look at 200 years of Citigroup, which started as City Bank of New York in 1812, soon after the First Bank of the United States ended. City was originally something of a substitute for that bank, with 50% of the shares subscribed by First Bank shareholders. Samuel Osgood, first postmaster general of the US, led the bank after it got through the Clinton-machine chartering process, just two day sbefore the start of the War of 1812. But the bank was also something of an also-ran, amounting to just 3 percent of even the New York banking market by the 1830s. Soon after the Panic of 1837, the bank got merchant Moses Taylor as a director, but even from that position he began to lead it, becoming president in 1856. He was a fan of "ready money" and kept the bank at around 20 percent capitalization until the 1870s, but also grew it substantially. Unlike other banks, deposits tended to grow at City turning panics, due to its perceived safety. It was James Stillman, a Texas railroad baron, who turned the bank into a colossus and the biggest bank in the country by 1894, partially through his connections with William Rockefeller and therefore Standard Oil. It soon also became the largest depository of government funds.
The modern story, of how "Sunshine Charlie" Mitchell led the bank into securities in the 1910s and '20s, which led to the Glass-Steagall Act, and of how in the postwar period Walter Wriston turned the bank into a "supermarket of finance" with positions in every significant country in the world in the 1980s, and how his protege, John Reed, an operations genius with little to know knowledge of banking itself, merged it with Travelers Group in 1998, is better known, but it is told here well. On the whole, this book serves as a good introduction to Citi and to the history of American banking.
An even handed account of City Bank’s history and how they have advanced into the ranks of the “too big to fail” group of industries which is really just another nail in the coffin of the traditional free market. After living through the 2008 financial collapse, it is interesting to see that most of the government bailout was targeted to save wealthy investors as opposed to the man in the street. What is even more alarming is the Fed’s policy of ditching the results of bank inspections after 30 years of making sure that no one sees them insures that no one will ever learn from the failures of the past. This needs immediate review by the government as well as the appraisal of how do we eliminate any institution from being too big not to suffer from their own actions.
This gives the book a reason to be different its approach. It is a book made to compare the past with the present. It is made to on the fixation of how did 2008 Citi was bank that evolved over time and in the process lose itself. Banks role has changed over the past century. Bail out is failing institution has become related to the role of the nation state. Big business are integral part of the nation that they cannot fail even if they do. Citi was not build by failure, but it seems that time had gone the best out of this institution. The story of this bank is excellent read on the evolution of the banking in the US. I consider this my introduction
An interesting history of Citi and American banking starting soon after the U.S. revolution. The bank has continually exemplified the pitfalls of moral hazard in financial institutions from the earliest days of its founding. That said, the author occasionally intrudes upon well-researched facts with a distinct and unnecessary ‘point of view’ expressed through assertions that are ‘a bridge too far’ beyond the facts as they are presented to be taken seriously.
A comprehensive look at the roller coaster history of Citi from its earliest years to the 2008 crisis. Readers are given insight into the bank’s growth, as well as risky practices. At its centre is its longstanding relationship with government.
If you like banking, this is the bank for you. If you just hate Citibank, eh, maybe not, because there’s a ton of banking terminology that I found hard to grasp in a quick read.
I found this book lying around my apartment building to be donated.
What a mistake.
This book was probably my first exposure to finance and all of the financial crises. The history of the banking industry in the United States is eye-opening and mind-boggling. The changes surrounding Citibank are even more unbelievable. I am shocked at how Citi used to bail out the government and other banks in the 18th and 19th century. Now, they get bailed out by the taxpayer.
My rating is harsh because the authors missed the truth that was right in front of them. The US Government bails out Citi repeatedly not just because its collapse would vitiate the US economy but rather because the US Government can not function without Citi. In other words, this is not a parasitic relationship, but a symbiotic one. Citi is an indispensable sinew in running the American global empire. Without Citi, the troops don't get paid, the embassies don't function, the CIA can't bribe anyone and the American multinationals can't move money around. The authors focus heavily on lending risk, but it is the matchless reach of Citi's payments network that makes it irreplaceable. And it's no coincidence that Citi's relentless growth started at the same time as the American empire left North America and went out into the world.
You could break Citi up entirely and the payments business would eventually move to JP Morgan. And we'd find out if the problem is structural or cultural after Dimon retires.
Otherwise, it's a very good book. The authors did excellent work in highlighting the revolving door with Washington, the regular regulatory capture of their examiners (finding the examination reports from the 1920s was a coup) and are eminently fair in their judgment of the many Citi leaders over time. They also get bonus points for pointing out that the exile of Sandy Weill by Eliot Spitzer might have been the removal of the last brake on Citi's risk-taking - Sandy seldom gets proper respect for his risk-aversion.
There are a few minor mistakes - they don't mention the merger with International Banking Corp in 1918 even while they hammer the international expansion and they quote a Wriston passage that puts Sparrows Point in the wrong state!
Have read James Freeman is the WSJ a bunch so gave his book a try. A decent read. The beginning is a long history of Citi, which is both boring and probably not completely necessary. The last three chapters are the best part as the financial crisis of 2008 comes into view. It’s mind boggling how much money they needed and how little those in charge knew about what their collapse might mean. No one seems to have tried to model out what their collapse would be. One hopes that coming out of all this people have learned from the reckless behaviors Citi exemplified. That said, it’s crazy how poor some of the CEOs in charge of the bank were. An interesting read for finance lovers, but can breeze through the beginning.
As an insolvency lawyer, I found this book fascinating! The stories of distressed companies often follow a similar script: a rapid period of growth, ill-advised risk taking, followed by excessive borrowings to fill the hole in the balance sheet. This book offered a different perspective of insolvency when it came to regulating a huge bank like Citi, which is so interconnected to many other parts of the financial web, that it often leads to regulatory capture. I found to be insightful and well-researched and will recommend this for anyone interested in insolvency!