Military history often highlights successes and suggests a sense of inevitability about victory, but there is so much that can be gleaned from considering failures. Study these crucibles of history to gain a better understanding of why a civilization took - or didn't take - a particular path. Full of dramatic reversals of fortune and colorful characters, this course examines some of the world's most notable examples of military misfortune, from the humiliating destruction of a Roman army at Carrhae in 53 BC to the tragic landings at Gallipoli in World War I. Success and failure, as you'll learn, are two sides of the same coin.
These 24 lectures reveal how the trajectory of history hangs in the balance of individual battles; even a single person's actions in a particular moment have made drastic and irreversible impacts. From ancient Greece through global war during the first half of the 20th century, you'll delve into infamous conflicts such as the Charge of the Light Brigade and the Battle of Little Bighorn as well as lesser-known battles.
How could an army equipped with cannon be wiped out by Zulu warriors wielding spears and outdated firearms? How could armored French knights be vulnerable to the crude weapons of a band of Flemish shopkeepers? Why would a savvy Chinese general fall victim to a tactic he had previously used himself? Unpredictable twists of fate abound, demonstrating that when it comes to war, there are no givens. Sheer numbers, superior weaponry, and skilled leadership are never a guarantee of success.
Take a fascinating journey through some of the most gloriously inglorious wartime encounters. Along the way, you'll get to know some of the most legendary characters in world history.
Don't ignore your experts. They're experts for a reason. Make sure your intelligence is good - and that you listen to it. See previous point. Don't change plans at the last second. Don't assign who is in charge of carrying out said plans at random. Don't let politics dictate a plan. Make sure you take into account the terrain you'll be fighting on. Make sure to check the weather. And, of course, never get involved in a land war in Asia.
A solid selection of military blunders, how they happened, what went wrong and how to avoid them in the future. You've got Market Garden, Gallipoli, Little Big Horn and several others. I like that they weren't all Euro/American-centric.
Given the topic, this could have been more engaging, but there's still lots of good info here.
Part of the Great Courses lectures, this “book” covers about 20 or so military battles that involved one or more people making at least one really stupid decisions, leading to major loss of life for the side that expected to win. Most often the disaster was a result of arrogance or hubris. Other factors were failure to adapt (to technology or terrain) or poor communication. There is a little bit of analysis, but mostly it’s just true stories of things going very wrong.
It’s pretty interesting and covers battles from all over the world, presented in mostly chronological order. The professor has an odd speaking style, though. Besides pronouncing debacle like DEB-a-cul and using decimated in the wrong military sense, he pauses at every other word, worse than William Shatner. So I think it would be easier to read than to listen to, but that’s not an option.
Language: Clean Sexual Content: Some references to body parts, prostitution, etc. Violence/Gore: War and battles described with injuries but not very graphic Harm to Animals: Harm to Children: Other (Triggers): ["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>["br"]>
This was a bit disappointing. Gregory S. Aldrete's other Great Course History Of The Ancient World: A Global Perspective was incredibly well done; so much so that I thought I would greatly enjoy this course. But there are two main problems with it. First, there are not general life lessons they teach, but rather military lessons they teach. I was very much hoping these lessons would be connected to the broader world, and they very easily could have, but it really was just confined to military lessons. Second, besides the first blunder and maybe a few others, most of these blunders weren't discussed with a theme or general sense of the problem before the details were given. Thus, most of this lecture series was wading through details about a particular conflict to get to the part about why it was considered a blunder. As someone without much knowledge of historical battles, I would have found a general theme to really help tell the story. Another problem with this series, though likely more a moot point for its target audience, is that it assumes basic military knowledge, which I lacked. For the most part, I was able to use context clues to figure out what specifically he was discussing, but there were times when it was a stretch.
If this is a subject that interests you, I do recommend this book. I didn't find Aldrete as engaging as I did in his other course, but I suppose it could have been entirely the subject matter. I do think history and military buffs will find this interesting, but as someone who is neither, I just barely enjoyed it.
A true supplement to any World History class, Aldrete's course plunges through over 20 different global battles and walks us through each one, its cultural significance, and the key factor, or blunder, that caused a loss (more often total disaster and often ended that war) for the losing side. Aldrete defines a "blunder" as a loss that could have been prevented.
These blunders vary, but in the final chapter after this great journey through military history, Aldrete sums up the four key reasons: Failure of planning, leadership, execution, or adaptation. Each battle is a failure of one of these: Cao Cao's lack of planning and adaptation at Red Cliffs, Katsuyuri's lack of planning and execution of his new firearms at the hands of Nobunaga at Nagashino, the terrible leadership of the Crusades and the shocking change of leadership of Alexander the Great when he plunged headfirst - with no army at his back - off the wall of Mallians and into a swarm of his enemies.
Each tale is full of wonder and for someone who is not a history teacher or major but does have an interest in military strategy, this was a real treat. I imagine there are discover-able tidbits even for the most savvy historian. Even in business, the failures are directly transferable to the boardroom. If you can handle Sun Tsu talking about mountain snakes, you can certainly glean something from these lessons learned.
Heartily recommend for anyone interested in history, military, strategy, or business.
~~~~ Ch3: Carrhae: The Parthian Shot Of the more than 40k Romans who had marched into Mesopotamia, 20k now lay dead, 10k more were captured, and fewer than 10k broken survivors returned to Syria. This was one of Rome's greatest military disasters. The removal of Crassus from the (First) Triumvirate paved the way for a showdown between Pompeii and Caesar - and in the aftermath of that, we saw the overthrow of the Roman Republic. This struggle for power was ultimately won by Julius Caesar - of course, he himself then fell to assassin's daggers a few years later on the ides of march. Their victory at Carrhae also firmly established Parthia as Rome's main rival and effectively curbed further Roman expansion for a while.
The Battle of Carrhae illustrates a number of lessons. First, it's a classic example of how a strategy or tool works well in one situation could be entirely unsuited to a different context. In this case, the heavy infantry of the Roman legions that had been invincible on so many battlefields against different formations of infantry - when they were placed in the open desert, they were completely unable to deal with a swift enemy mounted on horseback practicing hit and run missile warfare. Similarly, Crassus' behavior provides a cautionary example demonstrating that one should respect one's limitations and should stick to what you are good at. Crassus was a superlative politician and businessman, but he was at best a mediocre general. Additionally, his overconfidence led him to make a number of crucial errors, including neglecting to bring sufficient cavalry and archers of his own. He spurned an ally's aid. He failed to properly scout out an enemy and terrain. And, he didn't listen to experienced advisors. Repeatedly he allowed his eagerness for battle to lead him right into traps.
Ch4: Red Cliffs: Cao Cao's Bad Day There is no doubt that Cao Cao was a ruthless and ambition man but he was also a savvy politician. He was an able administrator whose policies and reforms benefited many in China. And he was a renowned and influential poet. Among his talents, Cao Cao was a clever general. He even wrote several quite well regarded trestices on military strategy and theory. By the time of the Battle of Red Cliffs, he had already amassed a long record of victorious campaigns. On that day, however, his army suffered a disastrous and embarrassing defeat that permanently ended his dreams of consolidating all of China under his personal control. The effects of his uncharacteristic loss at Red Cliffs were significant as the failure of his attempt at unification had the result of precipitating the chaotic and violent era of political fragmentation which has become known as the Three Kingdoms period of Chinese history.
"The wine is poured and it is time to sing! For how long is the life of a man? We may compare it to the dew at dawn. So many days are sadly now passed. A noble heart can brave such melancholy but it is hard to ignore anxious thoughts. How should we relieve our stress except with the wine of Du Kang?" - Cao Cao poetry
Ch5: Barbarian Gate: Adrianople 35 senior officers and 2/3 of the Roman army also perished on the battlefield and this made it one of the worst military disasters in all of Roman history. 3 decades after the Battle of Adrianople another Gothic army under the command of King Alorec would sack the city of Rome itself and within another 70 years, the Western Roman Empire would fall. While the West soon collapsed, the Eastern Roman Empire would continue for centuries more, eventually becoming known as the Byzantine Empire.
As psychological traumatic these defeats undoubtedly were to the Romans, the empire survived largely intact although each reverse may have served to curb further Roman expansion.
Ch6: Fourth Crusade: Byzantium ...The Fourth Crusade, which in the 14th century, had gone terribly astray from its professed mission of resting control of the Holy Lands from their Muslim rulers. Instead it had brutally and treacherously attacked and looted the city of Constantinople. Constantinople was a supposed ally of the Crusaders and it was the seat of the Greek Orthodox branch of Christianity. On that day in 2001, John Paul sorrowfully described this event as "the disasterous sack of the imperial city of Constantinople - which was for so long the bastion of Christianity in the East. It is tragic that the assailants turned against their own brothers in the faith."
"There never was a greater crime against humanity than the Fourth Crusade."- Renowned medieval historian Steven Rumpsener. While some have since argued that the reality is more complex this sentiment has been shared by many others and it's hard to say much that is positive about the actions of the Fourth Crusade or that anyone involved acted well. It's story provides a cautionary example of unintended consequences and how easily temptations and human frailties can cause even the most well meaning plans to go terribly astray. Innocent III initiated the Crusade with the goals of capturing the Holy Lands and enhancing his reputation. But it ended up rampaging through Christiandom and leaving behind one of the blackest legacies of any military expedition. Perhaps even worse, by sacking Constantinople, the Crusaders effectively stabbed in the back the fortress that had been protecting the borders of Europe for centuries. Little wonder that even at a distance from the incident by 800 years, Pope John Paul II still felt compelled to issue his apology.
Ch8: Courtrai: Knights v Shopkeepers Courtrai illustrates the by now familiar errors of overconfidence and not taking the terrain into account. But it also demonstrates the dangers of failing to adapt to change. The French held fixedly to a concept of warfare that had become outdated and they had paid the ultimate price for that rigid thinking. Adaptability and being able to recognize paradigm shifts are important virtues in almost any field of endeavor - and the lack of those qualities directly led to those 500 golden spurs being nailed to the wall of a church in Flanders.
Ch9: Nagashino - Swords to a Gunfight Throughout history, the failure to adapt to change has often resulted in fatal mistakes. Both of the opposing armies at Nagashino possessed guns. It is not therefore a case of one army gaining a new technology which the other lacked, but only one commander figured out how to deploy the guns to maximum effect. The battle thus illustrates the important point that it is not enough to simply have a new or cutting edge technology - one has to use it effectively as well.
In acknowledgement of the importance that he attached to the matchlock Ashigaru in his battle plan, Oda Nobunaga assigned his best and most experienced officers to oversee them. This was a very interesting decision because the Ashigaru were regarded of being of much lower status than the elite Samurai. Therefore, to put his best men in command of them was extremely atypical. But it reflects Oda's innovative personality and his ability to think pragmatically rather than being blinded by social conventions.
The real winner of this whole conflict turned out to be Tokugawa Ieyasu who had deftly moved into the power vacuum and hugely expanded his territory. Having become one of the most powerful men in Japan, he climbed from success to success eventually achieving the ultimately goal of uniting the country under his sole domination and declaring himself Shogun in 1603.
The Battle of Nagashino had a profound effect on future Japanese warfare. From that point on, it became standard for armies to include large contingents of match-baring Ashigaru - perhaps numbering up to 1/3 of the total. Fortifications also took up greater importance after everyone had witnessed the usefulness of Oda's palisades. Oda's overwhelming victory at Nagashino could be attributed to his ability to embrace a new technology as well as the flexibility of mind that allowed him to adapt his strategy and to take account both of that technology's strengths and weaknesses. In contrast, Katsuyuri also had matchlock men, but he scattered them throughout his army so they had little impact and could not realize their full potential. Additionally, Oda was able to learn from previous experiences and apply those lessons in the next battle. Thus, when the Ikko-Ikki used guns effectively against him, he later imitated those methods against Katsuyuri - and he also remembered the importance of keeping his gunpowder dry.
Ch10: Cartagena: High Walls, Short Ladders As an aside, one of Edward Vernon's most lasting contributions to British naval history is the practice of serving sailors a daily ration of rum combined with water and lime or lemon juice, and this is a mixture known as grog, is attributed to him. While alcohol had long been served to sailors, the addition of the citrus was meant to reduce scurvy. Although, the exact mechanism for how this occurred was not understood at the time. This concoction was introduced by Vernon in 1740 and it became standard throughout the navy thereafter. Vernon habitually wore a cloak made of grogrom cloth which led to his nickname of "Old Grog" - and from this is where the name for the famous drink arrived.
The entire story of the Attack on Cartagena stands out as an astonishing sequence of errors and stupidity. Above all, Venon's and Wentworth's failure to cooperate demonstrates the dangers of placing one's personal feelings above the good of the group as well as the essential need for teamwork and mutual support when different branches of an armed service are called upon to work together.
Two interesting footnotes to this campaign both involve George Washington. First is that George's brother Lawrence was among Admiral Vernon's supporters. We know this because when Lawrence returned to Virginia and happened to inherit an estate there, he named it Mt. Vernon in honor of his former commander. When in turn George inherited the property, he kept the name. Secondly, when George was just a teenager, Lawrence used his British naval connections to arrange for George to be enlisted in the royal navy as a midshipman. However, George's mother objected so strenuously to this plan, that it was cancelled. One can only imagine how different all of subsequent history might have been if George had left America and pursued a career as a British naval officer rather than becoming a leader of the American Revolution.
Ch13: Burns led a mission to visit Dost Mohammad in Kabul. Sensitive to the restrictions of his Islamic hosts, he recorded that when asked if he ate pork he outwardly pretended to be utterly repulsed by the idea. But he later confessed to a very different perspective writing: "God forgive me for this deception for I am very fond of bacon and my mouth waters as I write the word."
Ch15: Greasy Grass: Custer's Last Stand Custer had a knack for ingratiating himself with his superiors and he rose quickly through the ranks. He was fearless and he proved to be a naturally gifted calvary commander. These qualities - coupled with his energy and boundless ambition - helped him to become the youngest general in the entire army by his mid-twenties.
Ch16: Isandlwana: 25000 Zulus Undetected
An entire army of seasoned Redcoats accompanied by cannon and rocket artillery was wiped out by a hoard of near-naked Zulu warriors wielding spears, clubs, and a smattering of outdated firearms. It ranks among the greatest single day losses of British troops all the way from the Napoleonic wars all the war to WWI and it stunned the complacent Victorians to their core.
Ch18: Colenso: The Second Boer War The pre-battle mood of the Boers is summed up of the advise given from one grisled old Boer to his companions: "Trust in God, lie low, and don't wast ammunition."
In a history written soon after the war, the British performance at Colenso was characterized as: "Bad in its conception, worse in its execution, worst of all in its abandonment". Total British casualties were 1,127 killed, wounded, missing, or captured. On the Boer side, there were fewer than 50 casualties. Due to poor scouting, outdated tactics, and errors of judgement made by the British commanders, it had been a thorough debacle. Barely a month later, the British would suffer another embarrassing and costly disaster at the Battle of Spion-Kop. Redvers Bullers reputation was now so low that his critics derisively punned on his name calling him "Reverse Buller". The three defeats of Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso, all of which occurred in the space of just six days were a huge shock for the British. This period was forever after in England referred to as "Black Week"
The Boer War plainly demonstrated that one era of military tactics was over and the conflict foreshadowed many of the techniques that would feature in 20th century warfare. The obsolescence of these old methods was most clearly evident at the Battle of Colenso where the boneheaded determination of the British commanders to use outdated tactics resulted in an attack that was completely ineffectual and turned what should have been a battle into little more than target practice for the Boers.
A 30 year old native of India volunteered to carry the wounded from battle: Mohandas Ghandi.
Ch19: Tannenburg
The elated German commanders had to select a name for their victory when reporting it and Ludendorf decided to call it the Battle of Tannenberg. The small village of Tannenberg was indeed nearby, but the real reason this name was chosen was for symbolic purposes. This was because 500 years earlier, the Germanic Tuetonic Knights had been beaten by a Polish-Lithuanian coalition at the Battle of Tannenberg in 1410. That event had marked the end of Medieval German expansion to the east and was remembered in Germany as one of the catastrophic defeats in all of their history. Therefore, by giving the victorious 1914 battle the same name, Ludendorf was symbolically avenging and wiping clean the disgrace of the earlier debacle.
If they had captured Paris, the Germans might very well have won WWI and the entire course of the 20th century might have been radically different. In any event, Tannenberg was a brilliant victory for the Germans and amply rewarded the daring of Hoffman, Hindenburg and Ludendorf. But it was equally made possible by the many errors committed by the Russians.
Ch20: Gallipoli: Churchill Dooms Alliance
The theme that ran throughout the Allied planning of the attack was a widespread and rather arrogant assumption that the defending Turkish troops were cowardly and that they would be easily overcome or would simply run away when the Allied troops advanced upon them. As it turns out, the Turks would prove extremely tenacious and brave. Churchill's entire scheme had been founded on such flawed presuppositions. Everyone seems to have believed that the the Turks would meekly surrender at the mere sight of a British squadron offshore despite the fact that there were quite formidable defenses surrounding the city of Constantinople.
Even in his distant post aboard the Queen Elizabeth, Hamilton recognized the opportunity being presented and twice he sent messages to the local commander "suggesting" that he commit more troops to the zone. Fatally, however, Hamilton phrased these in his usual tentative manner asking "Would you like to get some more troops ashore? If so, Trawler's available." A less polite but more dynamic commander would unequivocally order his subordinate to immediately exploit the lack of Turkish resistance. Instead, Hamilton's meek message was simply ignored and the chance was irretrievably lost.
Ch24: Great Blunders, Four Paths to Failure
1. Failures of planning 2. Failures of leadership 3. Failures of execution 4. Failures of adaptation
Solid framework for avoiding business and military blunders alike. - Know your limits. - Know your opponent. - Learn from the past. - Don't allow ambiguity in execution. - Plan well, know the terrain, and have a backup plan. - Trust the information you're given. - Adapt to change.
I don't feel fair rating this title, as it was rather a mismatch of reader and subject. I don't know why I bought it--I should be aware be now of my rather intense apathy towards battles/descriptions of battles/analyses of battles . . . I simply don't have the interest for such discussion. I'm sure it was a worthy series, but for me I was mostly waiting for it to be done, punctuated by some, "Hmmmmm . . . interesting tidbit--try to remember that one, Rahni!" and then my mind would slip again and I'd struggle to refocus. Sigh.
We typically hear the phrase, “remember the dead,” during memorial events of great victory or great tragedy. Yet Dr. Aldrete explores the wisdom of remembering that phrase for great failures. For there is wisdom in the instances when death arises from manmade mistakes. In this Great Course Series, Dr. Aldrete categorizes military failures into four classes: (1) Planning, (2) Leadership, (3) Execution, and (4) Adaptation. Here are the subjects he covered:
Petersburg: Union Digs Its Own Grave-1864 Syracuse: Athens's Second Front-413 B.C. Carrhae: The Parthian Shot-53 B.C. Red Cliffs: Cao Cao's Bad Day-208 A.D. Barbarian Gate: Adrianople-378, Pliska-811 Fourth Crusade: Byzantium Betrayed-1204 Kalka River: Genghis Khan's General-1223 Courtrai: Knights versus Shopkeepers-1302 Nagashino: Taking Swords to a Gunfight-1575 Cartagena: High Walls, Short Ladders-1741 Culloden: The Bonnie Prince Blunders-1746 Russia: Napoleon Retreats in the Snow-1812 Afghanistan: Khyber Pass Death Trap-1842 Crimea: Charge of the Light Brigade-1854 Greasy Grass: Custer's Last Stand-1876 Isandlwana: 25,000 Zulus Undetected-1879 Adwa: Italy's Fiasco in Ethiopia-1896 Colenso: The Second Boer War-1899 Tannenberg: Ineptitude in the East-1914 Gallipoli: Churchill Dooms Allied Assault-1915 World War II: Royal Navy Goes Down-1941-42 Dieppe Raid: Catastrophe on the Beach-1942 Operation Market Garden: A Bridge Too Far-1944 The Great Blunders: Four Paths to Failure
I found the more famous military failures far more interesting and relevant than the ancient battles. This preference has more to do with the benefit of having more foundational knowledge to draw upon rather than shortcomings from Dr. Aldrete’s presentations. History is better to explore in depth, and these lectures are best as an appetizer. Yet for individuals who want a sampling to help shape future reading or lovers of history who want a different look at the history they already know, this lecture series is a wonderfully interesting option for exploration. Here are some of my thoughts:
Carrhae: The Parthian Shot-53 B.C. This surprising loss by Rome to the Parthians occurred during a period of Roman decline. It led to the end of the First Triumvirate—shares leadership by Julius Caesar, Pompey, and Marcus Licinius Crassus. Crassus’s defeat in the dessert at Carrhae illustrates why reason is so important. Crassus ignored the counsel from experienced advisors. His rejection of their wisdom was rejection of reason as he succumbed to passion and pride. Leaders will inevitably have instances when it’s necessary to override counsel. Yet it should be based on reason and not merely individual experience or desires. The Roman soldiers under Crassus were mighty under typical Roman terrain. But it was ineffectual in the dessert against nimble opposition with deep supplies to replenish themselves in dessert conditions. Had Crassus listened to counsel, he could have avoided defeat.
Barbarian Gate: Adrianople-378, Pliska-811 The Battle of Adrianople is credited as the starting point for the Roman Empire Eastern Empire’s (Byzantine Empire) loss of its Western Roman Empire, and it occurred in 378 AD between Rome and the gothic tribes known as the Thervings and the Greutungs. With both battles, Rome failed to enfold immigrant groups who had been marginal allies. The effect was uprising and military loss. The empire survived both fights, but both likely prevented empire expansion.
Kalka River – Genghis Khan’s General Temüjin, now known as Genghis Khan, was born in 1162. His unique strength was to advance leaders for their talent instead of blood. This strength granted the opportunity to join the Mongol tribes into one power. In the Battle of Kalka River, Temüjin’s General, Subutai, defeated the mighty Kingdom of Georgia. This lecture was a helpful primer on Genghis Kahn and his life is one of the subjects I intend to study more in the future.
Courtrai: Knights versus Shopkeepers-1302 For those who are interested, Barbara Tuchman covered this battle with excellent storytelling in A Distant Mirror. The fight took place after French King Phillip IV took control of the Flemish region by ousting the Count of Flanders, the citizens of Bruges, Flanders massacred the French imports. After the massacre, the peasants knew King Phillip IV would send a huge contingent of armored knights to overpower the peasants. The commerce guilds banded together in defense to equip the militia and Flemish nobles. The latter group had perhaps 50-60 knights. The total fighters were similar in number but the French were all professional fighters.
One lesson from this upset victory for the shopkeepers is that technology can disrupt the expected order. There’s a need to be aware of and understand when new technology arrives. The shopkeepers used specially created weapons to counter the knights’ strengths. The knights failed to adapt, which caused their doom. This battle—known popularly as the Battle if the Golden Spurs—helped lead to the creation of Belgium and the Netherlands.
Cartagena, Colombia: High Walls, Short Ladders-1741 Mt. Vernon is named after the admiral— Edward Vernon—from this war when George Washington’s older brother, Lawrence, fought under the admiral’s command. When Lawrence returned to Virginia, Vernon became the namesake for his land.
Culloden: The Bonnie Prince Blunders-1746 Charles Edward Stuart—son of King James—was the displaced claimant to the British throne, held by King George II. King George’s family originated in Hanover Germany, which is what prompted the claims of illegitimacy. The Stuarts—a Scottish family—had once been on the throne and resided in France during the Jacobite (supporters of the displaced King James) rebellion. Prince Charles’s plan was to establish a foothold in Scotland and draw in more clans to fight England. His failed rebellion at Culloden set the British monarchy as it is today.
Afghanistan: Khyber Pass Death Trap-1842 This example from Afghanistan is yet another example of a world power attempting to displace a sitting ruler for a different leader who was indebted to the conniving power. This action by Great Britain was despite the sitting ruler being pro-British. It’s perhaps a reminder that diplomacy cannot be expedited. If you want to develop allies, it takes work and time. 1842 may be one of the early modern examples of puppet leaders, but it’s one that has been replicated without success over and again. If ever there was a historical lesson to learn, shoehorning a hand-selected person into leadership for another country has a poor likelihood of success.
Crimea: Charge of the Light Brigade-1854 This lecture amused me largely because it brought back memories British Literature and Tennyson’s “Charge of the Light Brigade.” Three interesting notes: (1) This conflict was the first European war photographed and covered live by telegraph; (2) it’s also the war that made Florence Nightingale famous; and (3) it was the first war that used tactical rail as part of the fighting.
Greasy Grass: Custer's Last Stand-1876 This battle—with Crazy Horse at the helm—was really a Pyrrhic Victory. The death of Custer and his men outraged the nation and ushered in the end of the Native American way of life.
Isandlwana: 25,000 Zulus Undetected-1879 The Zulus typically fought nearly naked and practiced a goal of encirclement. The British scouts found small groups of Zulus but failed to find the main Zulu army. As such, Commander Frederick Chelmsford did not properly fortify his camp. The battle had a similar effect as the Battle of Little Bighorn. The British found the defeat jarring and redoubled efforts to crush the Zulus.
Adwa: Italy's Fiasco in Ethiopia-1896 Adwa was the only African nation to thwart European colonization.
The Great Blunders: Four Paths to Failure Military Historian, John Keegan, “all battles are in some degree...disasters.” When thinking of death and destruction, this assessment is true. Yet for military ventures, there is nearly always a distinct winner and loser without a clearly obvious blunder. Accordingly, Dr. Aldrete looks at the critical element of avoidability. A true military blunder means that someone has to act or fail to act in a manner that should have been avoided based on failing that should have been obvious.
As suggested above, this lecture series is a bit too brief for my preference, but it serves well for people who want a sampling of the subjects. I appreciate the different angle available in “History’s Great Military Blunders,” and Dr. Aldrete offers helpful introductions into the battles. For those who enjoy more breadth than depth, this series provides a good option.
After getting through the lectures in this set, I couldn’t help feeling underwhelmed on multiple levels. To start with, the selection of studied ‘cases’ is uninspired, predictable and disappointingly Western Europe-centric.
Perhaps more importantly, I’m not at all convinced about criteria used by the good professor in his selection of ‘blunders’. Breakdown in at least one of the four areas identified by professor Aldrete as critical points of failure is usually the explanation for failure of pretty much every single military disaster I can think of. Indeed, I claim that somebody, somewhere doing something which from perspective of time will strike everyone as incredibly stupid is almost a requirement for a large scale military failure to take place (hindsight clarifies problems in almost magical ways!). So why are ‘case studies’ in this lecture set blunders, but Salamis, Crecy, Ulm, Sedan, Case Yellow, Stalingrad, Dien Bien Phu and countless other are not? I honestly fail to see the distinction.
Furthermore, I disagree with the good professor that some of the cases he analyzes can even be regarded as blunders. Sack of Constantinople can certainly be regarded as a 'dick move' from historical perspective, but it really made perfectly good sense to the Western leaders at the time. Adrianople? Sure, it was great defeat at the most inopportune moment, but it was pure dumb luck that Gothic cavalry turned out where and when it did. Russia 1812? I'm pretty sure Nappie thought of it as 'just another day at the office' and he had no reason to think otherwise after regularly spanking Europe's ancient regimes for more than a decade. He prepared for it better than anyone else would have in his era, his plan and expectations were sound, the execution as good as was expected. Basically, he did everything the way he used to several times before... the difference was that this time he lost, big time.
Last but not least, I can’t help but observe that our dear professor on at least one occasion falls into the trap of repeating a ‘myth’ used to explain a ‘disaster’ – many of gun batteries at Singapore had 360 degrees covering arcs and could fire in direction of mainland. The actual problem consisted of the fact that ammunition for those guns was mainly armor-piercing and not high-explosive. Agreed, it's a small detail, but the fact that this old wife's tale is retold in one of the lectures throws a small shadow over course's factual content.
Overall, in my personal opinion, this course set doesn't really make much sense. It goes through a somewhat random selection of military operations, which (as they often do) resulted in very negative outcome for one of engaged parties. Yes, most of those negative outcomes could probably have been avoided with better planning, leadership or insight into existing conditions. And if you ask me, same thing can probably be said about pretty much every battle or military operation ever fought.
Great narrator, it’s a bit like small episodes of the hardcore history podcast. Learned a lot, sometimes hard to grasp how completely moronic some commanders send thousands of troops to their unnecessary death.
Though this was a perfectly-enjoyable historical read, I have to agree with the reviewer that stated the lessons taught are difficult to extend outside a military context. The categories of failures are too broad to be actionable: failures of planning, failures of execution, failures of leadership, and failures of adaptation. Critical shortfalls in one situation (such as indecisiveness) may be virtues in another (such as well-founded caution and restraint). While I agree that these blunders were failures of a devastating kind, I find it difficult to take the specific actions that led to failure and abstract them to simple rules for life. Of course, there are heuristics that apply to almost all military conflicts: do not start a war unless absolutely necessary, never open a battle on multiple fronts if you can avoid it, never underestimate your enemy, never divide your force into too many parts, and perhaps most importantly, never invade Afghanistan.
That said, there are two broad observations I gleaned from this material. The first is that battles should only be fought if there is a very clear and compelling strategic intent. As Clausewitz said, "War is the continuation of politics by other means." If there is no clear objective, political or otherwise, then war should never be undertaken.
The other, and perhaps broader observation, is that ineffective teams often lead to failure. We tend to focus on individuals in history, but in reality war (along with many other complex endeavors) are the work of teams of individuals who much cooperate to achieve shared goals. Many, though not all, of the failures described in this book started by describing animosity, competition, or a lack of coordination between different members of teams, and this lack of cohesion led to failure. This is not to say that members of a team have to like each. But as with Lincoln's team of rivals, they have to be unified in common purpose and strategy to thrive. This stood out to me as one of the central lessons of the battles described, and the one most obviously applicable to life beyond war.
Blunder, (n): a gross error or mistake resulting usually from stupidity, ignorance, or carelessness. Synonyms: bobble, boo-boo, boob [British], brick, clanger [British], clinker, error, fault, flub, fluff, fumble, gaff, gaffe, goof, inaccuracy, lapse, miscue, misstep, mistake, oversight, screwup, slip, slipup, stumble, trip. We all blunder...whether it's that bad throw from third base, or talking politics in a...well...anywhere. But, most of us recover with a red face, perhaps, and usually a 'no harm done' shrug of the shoulders. However, when there's a 'clanger' (see above) on the military field of battle, where many lives hang in the balance it becomes the most important thing imaginable...not only to the participants (and their families), but to entire countries, and, of course, to historians. The most clear-spoken and well organized Prof Gregory S. Aldrete is one of those historians, and in his (this) survey course he presents examples of (only) some of the clearest examples of 'slipups' in historic battles...some we all know, some are not. Some changed history (but wait history can't be changed)...maybe some redirected the course of history (Grant's tactics in the U S Civil War, notably at Petersburg), some just refined tactics (Dieppe...how many remembered that one?). All Aldrete's example can be boiled down into four significant causes for these 'fumbles': Poor planning, poor communication, poor interpersonal skills and abilities (leadership) ('boob' comes to mind), and poor adaptation (know when to quit ...
“Forward, the Light Brigade!” Was there a man dismayed? Not though the soldier knew Someone had blundered.") (from Tennyson's poem "The Charge of the Light Brigade"
I'll say! The lectures are well-prepared, informative and entertaining. Are they the only military blunders in history?...sadly, no. But they get the message across. Maybe if we just thought about it a bit more, there might be a better way. Recommended, but surrender less with a coupon during a very good sale.
Aldrete's explanations for military blunders she be required reading for all military officers in their formal training. In the Air Force we learn about the "successes" of air power from World War I, to World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War I, and Gulf War II. A cadet, or an officer, would have to go out of their way to study any US failures to employ the Air Force appropriately, of which there are certainly plenty, or even where another country failed.
Aldrete's model of a military blunder is sound and should be explored further by military historians, scholars, and practitioners. War games should be tailored to address these factors (poor leadership, unclear objectives, lack of resources, new ways of employing technology, etc.) to see if the plan still makes sense. Indeed, with military blunders stretching from several hundred years BCE to World War II, we can be certain that we will see many more in the coming decades.
I wish that Aldrete had provided a more robust model for examining military failure and provided more contemporary examples from conflicts after World War II. It is easy to look back hundreds and thousands of years to pull examples that have been studied by dozens, if not hundreds, of scholars, but these lectures are a missed opportunity to encourage the current generation to think deeply about more recent failures. Aldrete could have also briefly described how the factors that contribute to a failed military operation can also contribute to a failed operation at any level of warfare, or even in other lines of work. These weaknesses are minor though and should be seen as a challenge for the listener to come up with their own ideas.
Someone's great victory is another's great blunder, and this series of lectures is about some of the bad ones. Professor Aldrete capably and eloquently describes some of history's worst military mistakes that took a not-so-bad situation and turned it into a full and compete defeat. The stories range from old to one's in WWII.
The stories are compelling and go a long way beyond the general history's X lost a battle to Y. They tell of the people and events and reasons for defeat, they also tell of the fateful decisions and actions that made defeat certain.
Prof. Aldrete talks about problems in planning, leadership, execution, and adaptation and the battles and campaigns he describes are great examples from Napoleon lingering way too long in Moscow to the British trying to go against the Boers in tight old style formation that were not suited for the environment or to face their enemy's modern Mausers.
There are lessons to be learned here about every aspect and potentially used in one's own life, and the stories are interesting. What draws my attention most is that the blunderers are to a large extent experienced and achieved generals who got too comfortable with their knowledge and their abilities until they faced decisions in a changing world and lost their way. Makes one question the issue of experience and how it applies even more precariously today when the world is changing not every decade but every few months.
I really think this book is one of the best among "Great Courses" series, as good as "Modern Political Tradition". This is first from audible and then it appears in Amazon video. When I scrolled down the list of the 24 episodes, I saw "Battle of Red Cliff", which I know very well, having read "Romance of The Three Kingdoms" many times. My curiosity largely lies in the fact that I wonder if there's any alternative view on this historical event, which has been romanticized too much in my opinion that many facts have been twisted. Unfortunately Professor Aldrete only touched the surface of the battle and the source of his information is mostly from legends and fictions. He has no other choice since he can only get information through these sources.
Other battles are more interesting. The first one, digging a tunnel and stuffing it with dynamite, in Petersburg is particularly fascinating, since there are digging, dynamite, crater involved. The battle between the Romans and the Parthians at Carrhae is well presented too, although I think the battle with Carthage who used elephants would probably be more to my liking.
I realized that I am not particularly interested in the battles, but rather I am more interested in people's characters, background information, historical contexts, analysis of failures, details of weapons etc. The episode of "Knights versus Shopkeepers" is the best with all those supporting information being lively.
History's Great Military Blunders and the Lessons They Teach by Gregory S. Aldrete is an interesting set of lectures. We open with an illustrative example of a military blunder, and then we walk through 22 other examples of blunders and catastrophes. Then, during the conclusion, Aldrete puts together four characteristics of the types of things that lead to failure which we can learn from the cases he explores. The case selection is impressive, starting from distant past and walking to the present with a wide range of territories and regions where the battles take place. Most are European, but you get the impression that Aldrete was at least trying - and went out of his way to include perhaps the most famous somewhat fictionalized blunder of the three kingdoms and among the most famous battles of the Sengoku (sort of) period. These are all to the good. The first act of each case provides the background, the second sets up the actors and their plans, the third is the blunder, and the fourth is a judgment on the entire scenario. This is a nice approach, and Aldrete is excellent at what he does. What I might have preferred was a greater through-line. I get the impression that Aldrete probably would be best really exploring a particular war or campaign, getting into the heads of each relevant player the best he could, and then carrying it to the finish line over multiple lectures. The current format, while good, seems to constrain things a bit.
Hubris, stupidity, or just bad luck. It doesn't matter when you lose.
Another great class from the Great Courses. This time is an in depth look at 24 different blunders made by different militaries/leaders from ancient history to more recent times.
Whether its mistakes made by Roman commanders, or British Army officers in India it doesn't matter. Bad leaders get moved up the ranks and cause the result you expect. Often times without permanent injury to their own career (barring people like Custer of course).
Each 30 minute lecture is an excellent overview of a specific event. The details of each blunder is precise, and Dr. Aldrete gives a lot of support and explanation of the surrounding circumstances. There were a few blunders I knew about, and a lot I didn't.
He presents an intriguing class, with a well worded, well performed voice, without being too distracting. I enjoyed the whole thing. I definitely recommend this great course, and I also am pretty sure I recommend Dr. Gregory Aldrete, at least for historical courses.
Without a doubt, one can learn a lot from blunders of any kind. Nowhere is the cost a blunder higher than perhaps in a war situation. While there is some discussion on "lessons", the course is clearly about what the professor views as biggest "military blunders" rather than on the lessons. The so-called lessons at the end of every chapter are unhelpfully brief and as a result, sound largely like the commonplace wise words we hear from everyone everywhere.
With each blunder given the same course-length, the descriptions often appear artifically altered to suit the chapter time. This is an unavoidable shortcoming for anything serialized into fixed length episodes, but the Professor could have used multiple chapters for some of the more complex situations and combined the less important ones.
Every listener will also have views on the blunders selected, but the good side is that almost everyone is likely to walk away learning about numerous important historical events about which they may have never heard before.
Good overview of important historical battles which were failures, including the context of those battles and reasonable analysis of what went wrong and why. Largely puts failures into a few major categories (failure to learn from events and failure to adapt to new technology being the two broadest categories). My favorite part was actually the quotes from contemporary experts on the failures, which tended to be far more pithy than more recent analyses. A particularly sad part was using the three failed campaigns in Afghanistan as an example, leaving it to the reader today to see exactly the same lessons in our current fourth failed campaign.
The speaker has annoying Shatneresque pacing and delivery, but listening at 2.5-3x eliminates this. It would be a much better course as a video presentation with images and maps of the battles, but audio only worked pretty well (and let me listen while driving.)
This course is an interesting survey of battles, great and now so well known. By the conclusion of the course, however, it becomes apparent that almost any battle could have been chosen for this array of strategies, failed or successful. The loser in any battle may be said to have committed one blunder or another. While not every battle has a winner or loser, most do. Even in battles which result in a stand off may contain serious blunders, which robbed the victor of his triumph.
It should also be noted that not all of the battles necessarilyi identifies a blunder, nor demonstrates a lesson to be learned by those in the future. The main lesson is usually the need for accurate and complete information. Many of the "blunders" are errors resulting from faulty or incomplete information adversely impacting the decision process.
Still, it is an interesting collection of battles and the analyses of the causes of success or failure which are worth studying.
Prof. Aldrete gives an excellent summary of the reason for failure: poor planning, poor leadership, poor execution, and poor ability to adapt. He starts out with the Union’s failure at the Battle of the Crater, and then proceeds chronologically through the grossest military blunders through WWII. Even the greatest of generals had their limits—arrogance and contempt for one’s enemy led to some of the more depressing loss of life. How some leaders led men to their deaths because of personal feuds with fellow leaders or their subordinates is most heinous. Good big picture view of military strategy and execution gone wrong. As Prof. Aldrete states in his conclusion, the biggest failures came from not learning from history, as some of the greatest mistakes are made repeatedly over the centuries.
It was entertaining, the Germans have this great word schadenfreude and this book has a lot of that.
The lessons got a little like a Scooby Doo episode, oh, planning. Communication. Leadership. Got it. That's also not a bad thing because that tells me that blunders as a collective can be avoided because they come from the same place...
The ones that have stuck with me are; - The Chinese general Cao Cao who got cocky because he's always been good at land based operations, burning ships, red cliffs, game over - The South African Boers shooting the k@k out of the British Empire at Colenso - The Zulu's stabbing the k@k out of the British Empire at Isandlwana
What makes this book interesting is that it flips on its head how we generally look at military battles. After all, each of these terrible blunders resulted in an amazing victory for the other side in the battle. But Aldrete is looking for lessons in how not to blow tremendous military advantages and so he examines the totally avoidable mistakes that often lead to dismal failure. Over confidence, hostility within a chain of command, failures of intelligence, unclear orders—it’s a fascinating look at the other side of a lot of battles you’re probably already familiar with, plus a few you may well have never heard of yet.
I quite liked the stories that were told. Some were familiar some new to me. The lessons learned are not that surprising and seem rather obvious. Nevertheless one has to observe that similar errors are made all throughout history. And to therefore be careful in assesing own plans and views onto the world to try not to fall into similar pits as predecessors had, although this seems to be a hopeless endevour. In the last lecture the professor made a very important remark: all qualities that made someone good when pocessing them can also lead to demise. Being rash instead of bold is equaly bad as being cowardice. Finding the right balance of traits suiting the situation is a hard and never ending task.
The lecturer was pretty hard to follow, but when I paid attention, the lecture series was wonderful. I learned about these crazy military blunders that I couldn’t believe happened. Human error is crazy, some generals are too egotistical to be allowed to lead, intelligence is faulty, and sometimes the battle was lost for want of a nail. These military blunders are hilarious and offer a lesson to learn from, but at the same time, I feel sad that I’m living in a world where blunders like this happen and cost lives, especially when the blunders were made by otherwise great generals. Makes me a bit misanthropic.
Aldrete gives us an interesting view at separate military failings over the course of human history. Each separate failure is interesting in its own right and Aldrete manages to categorize them into separate "types" of failure that are pretty sensible in my opinion.
A recommendation for fans and students of military history, it is after all very focused on just that topic, which might leave it lacking for those who don't carry that interest.
Regardless, I wholeheartedly recommend it, Aldrete is a good narrator too, so that's a nice bonus.
One (potential) but of evidence to demonstrate how well someone knows the material is how concisely they can convey the relevant information. I have studied in detail some of these battles and Professor Aldrete does a brilliant job encapsulating the key elements while maintaining an excellent and cohesive story without getting lost in detail but providing enough to make his a thoroughly enjoyable lecture series. One of my favorites!
This is pretty good, and at 30 minutes per example/battle you're not bogged down as a casual listener. With a few exceptions, these are taken from campaigns you've probably heard of if you consume a little bit of history here and there. Bonus, the lecturer takes the opportunity to put some commonly used phrases and references in context ("bridge too far," cardigan, balaclava...).