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The Caucasus: An Introduction
This new edition of The Caucasus is a thorough update of an essential guide that has introduced thousands of readers to a complex region. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the break-away territories that have tried to split away from them constitute one of the most diverse and challenging regions on earth, impressing the visitor with their multi-layered history and ethnic complexity. Over the last few years, the South Caucasus region has captured international attention again because of disputes between the West and Russia, its unresolved conflicts, and its role as an energy transport corridor to Europe. The Caucasus gives the reader a historical overview and an authoritative guide to the three conflicts that have blighted the region. Thomas de Waal tells the story of the "Five-Day War" between Georgia and Russia and recent political upheavals in all three countries. He also finds time to tell the reader about Georgian wine, Baku jazz and how the coast of Abkhazia was known as
"Soviet Florida." Short, stimulating and rich in detail, The Caucasus is the perfect guide to this fascinating and little-understood region.
"Soviet Florida." Short, stimulating and rich in detail, The Caucasus is the perfect guide to this fascinating and little-understood region.
310 pages, Hardcover
First published August 11, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 91 reviews
October 28, 2021
Despite being an informative book, I'm a bit dissapointed. The title "The Caucasus: An Introduction" is misleading as the focus of the book lies on an analysis of the modern (political) history of the three nation states Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, while giving slim to none attention to the many other nationalities inhabiting the region or its culture(s).
While I don't regret reading it, I wouldn't recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the culture or ancient history of the Caucasus. Are you looking for a book which explains the political power dynamics of the modern Caucasus, though? Then this is the book for you.
While I don't regret reading it, I wouldn't recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the culture or ancient history of the Caucasus. Are you looking for a book which explains the political power dynamics of the modern Caucasus, though? Then this is the book for you.
May 12, 2019
From Abkhazia to Zangezur
The mighty range of the Caucasus mountains runs between the Black Sea and the Caspian. For millennia numerous peoples took refuge in its fastnesses, to the north and to the south. Others inhabited the valleys and plains. De Waal’s book covers only those who lived on the south side, the people who today live in the modern nations of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Though those three nations may be dominated by the eponymous groups, there are many others—for example, Abkhaz, Ajarians, Ossetians, Lezgin, Kurds, and Svans. After a quick general history, the book turns to the development and political history of the three modern states---during Tsarist times; in that brief period between 1917 and 1921 when three weak, disorganized states emerged and were overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks; under Communism; and finally after the end of the Soviet Union.
If you read newspapers or serious news magazines over the last 30 years, you no doubt ran across articles dealing with all these countries and their multitude of quarrels---among themselves and with their neighbors, Russia, Turkey and Iran. Names like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhichevan, Ajaria, Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze, Ter-Petrosian, Kocharian, Aliev and a lot of others that don’t fly off the tongues of Westerners flew across the pages and often disappeared with no trace. Owing to the fickle attention spans of Euro-American news media, you probably were left wondering at times. What the _______ is going on? You did not, without some independent research, find out. For an antidote to this lack of knowledge, I advise you to get hold of this excellent book. It is extremely well-written, avoids national bias, and covers the ground in such a way that you’ll feel that at last you have some idea of the politics and problems of the South Caucasus. The author, a British journalist, obviously knows the area well. In addition to the reportage on the wars, the political struggles, and overall problems, he provides numerous riffs on such subjects as Lermontov (famous 19th century Russian writer), Rustaveli Avenue (the Ginza of Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital), how Georgian was Stalin?, Baku jazz, Shusha (the old capital of Nagorno-Karabakh), the Greeks of Abkhazia, and many other, perhaps esoteric, but highly interesting subjects. Several good maps are included.
The mighty range of the Caucasus mountains runs between the Black Sea and the Caspian. For millennia numerous peoples took refuge in its fastnesses, to the north and to the south. Others inhabited the valleys and plains. De Waal’s book covers only those who lived on the south side, the people who today live in the modern nations of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Though those three nations may be dominated by the eponymous groups, there are many others—for example, Abkhaz, Ajarians, Ossetians, Lezgin, Kurds, and Svans. After a quick general history, the book turns to the development and political history of the three modern states---during Tsarist times; in that brief period between 1917 and 1921 when three weak, disorganized states emerged and were overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks; under Communism; and finally after the end of the Soviet Union.
If you read newspapers or serious news magazines over the last 30 years, you no doubt ran across articles dealing with all these countries and their multitude of quarrels---among themselves and with their neighbors, Russia, Turkey and Iran. Names like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhichevan, Ajaria, Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze, Ter-Petrosian, Kocharian, Aliev and a lot of others that don’t fly off the tongues of Westerners flew across the pages and often disappeared with no trace. Owing to the fickle attention spans of Euro-American news media, you probably were left wondering at times. What the _______ is going on? You did not, without some independent research, find out. For an antidote to this lack of knowledge, I advise you to get hold of this excellent book. It is extremely well-written, avoids national bias, and covers the ground in such a way that you’ll feel that at last you have some idea of the politics and problems of the South Caucasus. The author, a British journalist, obviously knows the area well. In addition to the reportage on the wars, the political struggles, and overall problems, he provides numerous riffs on such subjects as Lermontov (famous 19th century Russian writer), Rustaveli Avenue (the Ginza of Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital), how Georgian was Stalin?, Baku jazz, Shusha (the old capital of Nagorno-Karabakh), the Greeks of Abkhazia, and many other, perhaps esoteric, but highly interesting subjects. Several good maps are included.
October 8, 2019
Striking the perfect blend between attention to detail and readability for anyone but experts in this fascinating region, this is THE book to pick up before heading to what is increasingly becoming a popular tourist destination. Technically, this book only covers the Southern Caucasus and it is a bit thin on Azerbaijan but this doesn’t detract from the high quality writing and depth of information provided that include events right up to the invasion of Georgia by Russia (which were brought about in no small part by actions undertaken by Georgia). Very highly recommended.
March 9, 2021
Was it informative? Yes. But it was confusing how the author set up sections so that there was a lot of it not in chronological order; trying to keep up with who was in power when was difficult. Glad I gave it a read nonetheless.
May 18, 2016
This 260-page book is intended to provide a broad overview of the history, culture and politics of the South Caucasus (not the whole Caucasus, despite the title!) and is written by journalist Thomas de Waal, who spent time as a reporter in the region and has since gone on to become something of a popular expert.
The first half of the book provides basic cultural and geographical background and a fairly straightforward narrative history up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, aimed primarily at people with little prior knowledge of the region. I imagine this would be perfect for someone who wants a good historical and cultural background before going travelling in the area. However if, like me, you have already spent some time in the region and are well acquainted with Russian/Soviet history, you’ll find a handful of interesting factoids scattered among otherwise generally familiar material. Rather than assuming knowledge of Soviet history and focussing on specifically Caucasian factors, Russian and Soviet history are told anew from a Caucasian perspective (Russian imperial expansion, korenizatsiia, collectivization, post-Stalin liberalization, etc). Grey boxes dotted throughout the book provide digressions into diverse topics ranging from Baku jazz and Georgian wine to personal profiles on Stalin and Lermontov and an explanation of the history of the term genocide.
In the opinion of a very casual reader, the book’s second half might be where it all gets a bit too involved. However, for me the second half is where things got interesting and I started to actually learn some new information, with de Waal writing in much greater detail than beforehand. This part of the book deals first and foremost with the region’s ethnic conflicts, with 33 pages dedicated to Nagorno-Karabakh, 10 pages to South Ossetia in the 1990s, 19 pages to Abkhazia in 1990s and then a further 28 pages on Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 2000s (focussing on the 2008 Russo-Georgian War). These sections were, without a doubt, the most interesting element of the book for me, and it is clear that this is de Waal’s area of expertise. Unfortunately, aside from an interesting and informative 19-page chapter on Azerbaijani energy politics, de Waal grossly neglects everything else that has happened in the South Caucasus since the end of the USSR. A scant 9 pages give a quick outline of Georgian political developments from 1992 to 2005, with a focus on the Rose Revolution – clearly intended primarily as background to help understand the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – and a mere 2 pages deal with Adjara. Nothing whatsoever is written about politics or society in independent Armenia, other than what comes up when talking about Nagorno-Karabakh, and, similarly, nothing is written about independent Azerbaijan that isn’t related to Nagorno-Karabakh or energy.
It should be noted that throughout the book the writing is clear, engaging and even exciting (though there are a surprising number of typos) and that the text is supplemented by excellent maps, provided exactly when they’re needed, and a few photographs to help bring events to life. I can also say with a sigh of relief that the book is completely free of any self-indulgent travelogue-style passages. Furthermore, it seems very even-handed in its treatment of events and does not lean towards or against any particular side. Moreover, it commendably steers well clear of any “ancient hatreds” or “clash of civilizations” explanation of events.
However, it is very clear that de Waal is a journalist and not an academic: while his knowledge of events seems thorough, he is weak on analysis and does little to elucidate causes of events other than superficially. His prognoses and suggestions for the future are particularly lame and woolly, boiling down to little more than “everyone needs to understand each others’ points of view and to compromise” and “I hope they all learn to get along” (not actual quotes). Furthermore, citations are few and far between and when present more often refer either to general histories or to newspaper articles than to academic works that could provide deeper insight. This has important in two senses: firstly it is annoying for readers like myself who use the bibliographies of general works as a source of suggestions for further reading; secondly, and more importantly, it calls into question just how well-researched and reliable the work actually is. I personally lack the expertise to judge this for myself, though praise from respected academics Ronald Grigor Suny and Charles King suggest that these doubts may be unfounded.
In conclusion, while providing some interesting reading (especially for people with no prior knowledge of Caucasian, Russian or Soviet history) and avoiding the pitfalls of bias and trite culture-based explanations of conflict, this work does not really succeed in providing a balanced introduction to the region. De Waal does a decent job of summarizing the events that brought the South Caucasus to Western headlines in the 1990s and 2000s, but does not do much to go beyond this, providing scant coverage of events beyond the radar of international media and little in the way of analysis. A more accurate, if infinitely less attractive, title for this work could be Accounts of the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia Conflicts and a Bit of Background (Plus a Chapter on Azerbaijani Energy Politics).
The first half of the book provides basic cultural and geographical background and a fairly straightforward narrative history up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, aimed primarily at people with little prior knowledge of the region. I imagine this would be perfect for someone who wants a good historical and cultural background before going travelling in the area. However if, like me, you have already spent some time in the region and are well acquainted with Russian/Soviet history, you’ll find a handful of interesting factoids scattered among otherwise generally familiar material. Rather than assuming knowledge of Soviet history and focussing on specifically Caucasian factors, Russian and Soviet history are told anew from a Caucasian perspective (Russian imperial expansion, korenizatsiia, collectivization, post-Stalin liberalization, etc). Grey boxes dotted throughout the book provide digressions into diverse topics ranging from Baku jazz and Georgian wine to personal profiles on Stalin and Lermontov and an explanation of the history of the term genocide.
In the opinion of a very casual reader, the book’s second half might be where it all gets a bit too involved. However, for me the second half is where things got interesting and I started to actually learn some new information, with de Waal writing in much greater detail than beforehand. This part of the book deals first and foremost with the region’s ethnic conflicts, with 33 pages dedicated to Nagorno-Karabakh, 10 pages to South Ossetia in the 1990s, 19 pages to Abkhazia in 1990s and then a further 28 pages on Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 2000s (focussing on the 2008 Russo-Georgian War). These sections were, without a doubt, the most interesting element of the book for me, and it is clear that this is de Waal’s area of expertise. Unfortunately, aside from an interesting and informative 19-page chapter on Azerbaijani energy politics, de Waal grossly neglects everything else that has happened in the South Caucasus since the end of the USSR. A scant 9 pages give a quick outline of Georgian political developments from 1992 to 2005, with a focus on the Rose Revolution – clearly intended primarily as background to help understand the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – and a mere 2 pages deal with Adjara. Nothing whatsoever is written about politics or society in independent Armenia, other than what comes up when talking about Nagorno-Karabakh, and, similarly, nothing is written about independent Azerbaijan that isn’t related to Nagorno-Karabakh or energy.
It should be noted that throughout the book the writing is clear, engaging and even exciting (though there are a surprising number of typos) and that the text is supplemented by excellent maps, provided exactly when they’re needed, and a few photographs to help bring events to life. I can also say with a sigh of relief that the book is completely free of any self-indulgent travelogue-style passages. Furthermore, it seems very even-handed in its treatment of events and does not lean towards or against any particular side. Moreover, it commendably steers well clear of any “ancient hatreds” or “clash of civilizations” explanation of events.
However, it is very clear that de Waal is a journalist and not an academic: while his knowledge of events seems thorough, he is weak on analysis and does little to elucidate causes of events other than superficially. His prognoses and suggestions for the future are particularly lame and woolly, boiling down to little more than “everyone needs to understand each others’ points of view and to compromise” and “I hope they all learn to get along” (not actual quotes). Furthermore, citations are few and far between and when present more often refer either to general histories or to newspaper articles than to academic works that could provide deeper insight. This has important in two senses: firstly it is annoying for readers like myself who use the bibliographies of general works as a source of suggestions for further reading; secondly, and more importantly, it calls into question just how well-researched and reliable the work actually is. I personally lack the expertise to judge this for myself, though praise from respected academics Ronald Grigor Suny and Charles King suggest that these doubts may be unfounded.
In conclusion, while providing some interesting reading (especially for people with no prior knowledge of Caucasian, Russian or Soviet history) and avoiding the pitfalls of bias and trite culture-based explanations of conflict, this work does not really succeed in providing a balanced introduction to the region. De Waal does a decent job of summarizing the events that brought the South Caucasus to Western headlines in the 1990s and 2000s, but does not do much to go beyond this, providing scant coverage of events beyond the radar of international media and little in the way of analysis. A more accurate, if infinitely less attractive, title for this work could be Accounts of the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia Conflicts and a Bit of Background (Plus a Chapter on Azerbaijani Energy Politics).
November 17, 2010
I bought this book via a recommendation in The Economist. As a warning, if you find the geography, history, and culture of the Balkans, Western Africa, or Central Asia are complex, convoluted, and beyond Byzantine to the point of cultural insanity, then this is the book for you. The primary counries are Georgia (birthplace of Stalin), Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Inhabited since paleolithic times, there are so many ethnic groups, languages, religions, wars, disputes, uprisings, and killings that the mind grows numb after a few chapters. This is the part of the world where the word genocide (Turks killing Armenians) was first used. I will admit to having a better understanding of the region and the ongoing disputes and nationalistic movements, even wars, i.e. Georgia-Russia. It is a place of impressive national beauty and the Winter Olympics are to be held in Sochi, Russia, but I do not plan to visit without body armor. Also, many of the names are indecipherable. The book reads like a textbook and represents a considerable amount of scholarship, but it is not light reading.
August 21, 2015
As an introductory text, this one is just dandy, but don't expect an overwhelming amount of detail save for the most salient issues. Fortunately, these are handled well and with a nice, refreshing distance: no one comes out unscathed when de Waal addresses such issues as the 2008 August War and the eminently retarded war over Nagorny-Karabakh. These events and the issue of Caspian-Caucasus natural resources form the bulk of the book and that's good. There's relevant backstories for each of the three countries and their minority populations to boot, not as much as I'd like to have, but, that's okay.
January 28, 2018
A fascinating look at societies based in the region staking Europe and Asia. I've always been fascinated by Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia (mainly because of the scripts of the latter two) and de Waal does a great job of outlining their histories over the past 200 years, covering the Ottoman Empire, Persian involvement, Russian conquest, and Sovietisation of the area.
February 18, 2015
For a country that was one of the first to break away from the Soviet Union in 1989, Georgia has certainly had breakaway problems of its own. Three regions with significant enclaves of ethnic minorities--Abkhaz, Ossetians, and Muslim Ajaris--were autonomous at the turn of the 21st Century. Wars had been fought to restore Georgian control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s. Ajaria, wedged between the Black Sea and Turkey in the country's southwest, lived free and easy, dominated by an incompetent dictator but in no hurry to raise a fuss.
But in 2003, the "Rose Revolution" swept the former Communist, Eduard Shevardnadze out of power. He was replaced by a pro-western, American-educated (Columbia) president who waged an ardent war against corruption and turned the lights on (as described at the end of Christina Nichol's clever novel, Waiting for the Electricity).
He also changed the flag of Georgia to reflect the colors and flag of his party, the National Movement (it wasn't an invention: the flag had been used in Tbilisi during the 14th Century). Gone was the red & blue "Soviet Sunshine" flag of the past 80 years (De Waal, 195).
Mikhail Saakashvili was a Georgian whirlwind. The changes during his nine-year time in power are truly mind-boggling to consider.
But it is clear that among the great things Saakashvili hoped to do for Georgia, restoring Abkhazia and South Ossetia to full Georgian control was a priority. To do this, he would have to stand up to Russia's Vladmir Putin.
What Saakashvili needed, to use a sports metaphor, was a strong defense. What he got instead was a perky cheerleader in the person of U.S. President George W. Bush.
When I land in Tbilisi in four weeks, I will travel from the airport to my hotel along the "George. W. Bush Highway." The highway commemorates an historic visit by the president on May 10, 2005, just 18 months after the Rose Revolution had thrust Saakashvili into power.
It is interesting to read the New York Times article on Bush's visit to Georgia, in light of what happened three years later. "The path of freedom you have chosen is not easy but you will not travel it alone," Bush had said (De Waal, 223).
'Earlier in the day,' the Times reported, 'at a joint news conference with Mr. Saakashvili in the Parliament building, Mr. Bush embraced the Georgian president's plan for the enclaves to become autonomous and self-governing, but not independent. He noted with approval that Mr. Saakashvili wanted the country "to remain intact."'
Moreover, Georgia had another card that it hoped would bring American support. It had signed up to be a member of the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq.
By 2007, Georgia was America's second-strongest ally in Iraq, its 2,000 soldiers behind only Britain's in strength. The New York Times reported:
As the United States is searching for allies, so is Georgia, a country that aspires to NATO membership as a security guarantee against a resurgent, oil-enriched Russia.
"As soldiers here, we help the American soldiers," Corporal Georgi Zedguidze said, peering out past the sun-scorched checkpoint he was guarding at a bridge over the Tigris River. "Then America as a country will help our country."
It was a false hope.
On August 7, 2008, in a carefully coordinated assault, Georgian forces began shelling targets in South Ossetia. The world was taken by surprise. Both Putin and Bush were in Beijing for the opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games. The response from Russia was swift; that of America was nonexistent.
By 4:00 the next afternoon, Russian tanks moved into South Ossetia and Russian planes began bombing targets in Georgia, but August 12, Saakashvili had sued for peace on favorable terms for both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were both recognized by Russia as independent states just two weeks later. Today, Russia is the only nation that recognizes their sovereignty. To the rest of the world, they are--to borrow a phrase from a BBC Documentary series--"Places that Don't Exist."
President Obama chose a more clear message for Georgia when he took power in 2009. He immediately pushed for a "reset" of relations with Russia (a policy which hasn't been successful, considering recent events in Ukraine). While Obama traveled to Moscow, Joe Biden visited Georgia in July of 2009. He was more parsimonious with praise, more specific in his recommendations to Georgian policy vis a vis its breakaway republics:
'Biden also made plain that in terms of Georgia's breakaway regions, ' TIME magazine reported. '"There is no military option to reintegration ... Only a peaceful and prosperous Georgia has the prospect of restoring [its] territorial integrity by showing those in Abkhazia and South Ossetia a Georgia where they can be free and their communities can flourish."'
The bottom line as it seems to me, is that Georgia finds itself out in No Man's Land at the moment: unwilling to return to Russia's suffocating embrace, its love for America and the West unrequited.
Saakashvili's party was thrown out of power in 2013, replaced by a party called, "Georgian Dream," and led by the country's richest man, Bidzina Ivanishvili. The rapid historical developments of 2004-08 have been replaced by a retrenchment.
What does this bode for the people I will meet on my trip there? What will they expect from me? While I'm looking forward to teaching and learning from the people I meet there, I hope I don't have to get into politics.
I understand more now about how complicated things are for Georgia--and the way my own country has both helped and harmed the lives of people there.
But in 2003, the "Rose Revolution" swept the former Communist, Eduard Shevardnadze out of power. He was replaced by a pro-western, American-educated (Columbia) president who waged an ardent war against corruption and turned the lights on (as described at the end of Christina Nichol's clever novel, Waiting for the Electricity).
He also changed the flag of Georgia to reflect the colors and flag of his party, the National Movement (it wasn't an invention: the flag had been used in Tbilisi during the 14th Century). Gone was the red & blue "Soviet Sunshine" flag of the past 80 years (De Waal, 195).
Mikhail Saakashvili was a Georgian whirlwind. The changes during his nine-year time in power are truly mind-boggling to consider.
But it is clear that among the great things Saakashvili hoped to do for Georgia, restoring Abkhazia and South Ossetia to full Georgian control was a priority. To do this, he would have to stand up to Russia's Vladmir Putin.
What Saakashvili needed, to use a sports metaphor, was a strong defense. What he got instead was a perky cheerleader in the person of U.S. President George W. Bush.
When I land in Tbilisi in four weeks, I will travel from the airport to my hotel along the "George. W. Bush Highway." The highway commemorates an historic visit by the president on May 10, 2005, just 18 months after the Rose Revolution had thrust Saakashvili into power.
It is interesting to read the New York Times article on Bush's visit to Georgia, in light of what happened three years later. "The path of freedom you have chosen is not easy but you will not travel it alone," Bush had said (De Waal, 223).
'Earlier in the day,' the Times reported, 'at a joint news conference with Mr. Saakashvili in the Parliament building, Mr. Bush embraced the Georgian president's plan for the enclaves to become autonomous and self-governing, but not independent. He noted with approval that Mr. Saakashvili wanted the country "to remain intact."'
Moreover, Georgia had another card that it hoped would bring American support. It had signed up to be a member of the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq.
By 2007, Georgia was America's second-strongest ally in Iraq, its 2,000 soldiers behind only Britain's in strength. The New York Times reported:
As the United States is searching for allies, so is Georgia, a country that aspires to NATO membership as a security guarantee against a resurgent, oil-enriched Russia.
"As soldiers here, we help the American soldiers," Corporal Georgi Zedguidze said, peering out past the sun-scorched checkpoint he was guarding at a bridge over the Tigris River. "Then America as a country will help our country."
It was a false hope.
On August 7, 2008, in a carefully coordinated assault, Georgian forces began shelling targets in South Ossetia. The world was taken by surprise. Both Putin and Bush were in Beijing for the opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games. The response from Russia was swift; that of America was nonexistent.
By 4:00 the next afternoon, Russian tanks moved into South Ossetia and Russian planes began bombing targets in Georgia, but August 12, Saakashvili had sued for peace on favorable terms for both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were both recognized by Russia as independent states just two weeks later. Today, Russia is the only nation that recognizes their sovereignty. To the rest of the world, they are--to borrow a phrase from a BBC Documentary series--"Places that Don't Exist."
President Obama chose a more clear message for Georgia when he took power in 2009. He immediately pushed for a "reset" of relations with Russia (a policy which hasn't been successful, considering recent events in Ukraine). While Obama traveled to Moscow, Joe Biden visited Georgia in July of 2009. He was more parsimonious with praise, more specific in his recommendations to Georgian policy vis a vis its breakaway republics:
'Biden also made plain that in terms of Georgia's breakaway regions, ' TIME magazine reported. '"There is no military option to reintegration ... Only a peaceful and prosperous Georgia has the prospect of restoring [its] territorial integrity by showing those in Abkhazia and South Ossetia a Georgia where they can be free and their communities can flourish."'
The bottom line as it seems to me, is that Georgia finds itself out in No Man's Land at the moment: unwilling to return to Russia's suffocating embrace, its love for America and the West unrequited.
Saakashvili's party was thrown out of power in 2013, replaced by a party called, "Georgian Dream," and led by the country's richest man, Bidzina Ivanishvili. The rapid historical developments of 2004-08 have been replaced by a retrenchment.
What does this bode for the people I will meet on my trip there? What will they expect from me? While I'm looking forward to teaching and learning from the people I meet there, I hope I don't have to get into politics.
I understand more now about how complicated things are for Georgia--and the way my own country has both helped and harmed the lives of people there.
July 19, 2012
Good background on a part of the world that is interesting but little known. I found it a bit of a challenge to keep everything straight, since there are three countries and several disputed regions involved, but most of that was my issue and not the fault of the author. The book provided a great overview of the main developmental history and events in the region. As such, it lives up to the "An Introduction" part of the title. The modern information was particularly interesting to me, especially the interactions with Russia and the role of the West.
On a side note, this was one of the more poorly edited books I've read in a long time. I found numerous typos and other editing oversights. They didn't ruin the book, but I had a hard enough time keeping track of the various places and players without an awkward sentence or misspelling further distracting me.
All in all, a recommended read for anyone interested in the region. Not a page-turner by any means, but that really wasn't the point of this book.
On a side note, this was one of the more poorly edited books I've read in a long time. I found numerous typos and other editing oversights. They didn't ruin the book, but I had a hard enough time keeping track of the various places and players without an awkward sentence or misspelling further distracting me.
All in all, a recommended read for anyone interested in the region. Not a page-turner by any means, but that really wasn't the point of this book.
September 29, 2017
A good general overview of the Caucasus...I started reading this before a trip to Georgia and Armenia, but sadly only finished after we got home. Regardless, from what I read pre-trip, the book adequately prepared me for a better understanding of historical places and figures, as well as the social and political events that lead to modern independence.
As a fan of the rise and fall of the Soviet Union, the book provided good detail of the impact the region had, covering Stalin's birth and the rise of the Bolsheviks to the uprisings in Tbilisi that helped initiate the unraveling of the Soviet Union - seeing these places in person was pretty amazing, too.
I can't say the book is a "page turner", but if you are interested in the Caucasus, ex-Soviet republics, or are planning a trip to the region and want a bit more than just a travel book, I would recommend this book.
As a fan of the rise and fall of the Soviet Union, the book provided good detail of the impact the region had, covering Stalin's birth and the rise of the Bolsheviks to the uprisings in Tbilisi that helped initiate the unraveling of the Soviet Union - seeing these places in person was pretty amazing, too.
I can't say the book is a "page turner", but if you are interested in the Caucasus, ex-Soviet republics, or are planning a trip to the region and want a bit more than just a travel book, I would recommend this book.
October 5, 2018
Despite the misleading title (the book focuses on South Caucasus exclusively), this is a pretty good historical and geopolitical primer when it comes to Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia right up to Russian invasion to Georgia in 2008. It certainly gives some interesting knowledge, but don't expect that it will tell you much new or profound in terms of mentality and culture in that fascinating region. It also focuses too much on geopolitics at points (important as they are), which puts the local people and culture out of the picture. Armenia could also get more attention, as Azerbaijan and especially Georgia seem to get much more focus. Worth a read if you don't know much about the South Caucasus, though.
September 11, 2015
I would say it is a fine book for a reader or a researcher of history of the Caucasus region. The author Thomas de Waal covers mainly the issues related since late 1980s, or fall of the Soviet Union, till present day situation. The war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh region is discussed in a non-thorough manner, I shall say. Readers are encouraged to move on to "Black Garden"* by the same author, if they would like to learn about the war over disputed regions between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
*There are two editions of the same book by Thomas de Wall.
*There are two editions of the same book by Thomas de Wall.
October 11, 2017
A short, comprehensive history of a beautiful, culturally rich and diverse region- a borderline in many ways between Europe and Asia, Christians and Muslims, ancient and modern states. De Waal presents the complexity of the intractable conflicts of the region without any attempt at simplification. A recent visit to Georgia made me stand in awe at the endurance of the Caucasian spirit and survival of great traditions, through all the suffering meted out to the people of this land through repeated power struggles. A must read for anyone who wishes to understand the recent history of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
April 17, 2013
While the title is THE CAUCUSES, one finds out almost immediately that the book is limited to the South Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. It has very little information on the North Caucasus: Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia which were my primary interests. It is written primarily as a research text without narrative flow. Therefore, one can pick and choose the parts of interest easily and forego others.
June 6, 2017
Vuoi per un'invidiabile posizione strategica, vuoi a causa di una fortuita presenza di risorse naturali ambite da mezzo mondo, la regione caucasica ha coinvolto le potenze economico-politiche come poche altre aree geografiche. E' una storia ricca però anche di odio etnico ed intolleranza culturale. Nonostante tutto ciò, vibra in quei popoli il fuoco sacro della cultura e della civiltà. Resiliente.
December 26, 2022
https://fromtheheartofeurope.eu/the-caucasus-an-introduction-by-thomas-de-waal/
I have known Tom de Waal for many years, going back to my own intense Caucasus engagement in 2003-06 and again in 2012. He is lambasted by Armenian activists for being too pro-Azeri, and by Azerbaijani activists for being too Armenian, and by all sides in Georgia for favouring their opponents. I think he is generally right. I had been looking forward to this book for ages and attended its Brussels launch in 2019; my memory is that we went for a very nice dinner afterwards.
To get the obvious point out of the way, unfortunately one of the core sections of the book now needs to be updated after the Nagorno-Karabakh war of late 2020. This occasioned one of the few points of disagreement between us, and I actually wrote to de Waal to say that I thought the “both-sides” narrative which was prevalent in the early weeks of the 2020 conflict was obscuring the important fact that Azerbaijan was winning.
But I don’t think he can be faulted for not seeing precisely into the future when writing the book. In any case, he, and I, and many others, had been warning of the likelihood of a bloody denouement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for many years (here’s me and Damien Helly in 2004, and me and Sabine Freizer in Russian in 2006). In 2004 the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan told me to my face that they were saving up their profits from fossil fuels in order to upgrade their armed forces to drive Armenia out of their territory by force, and if he was saying that to me, he was saying it to a lot of other people. This was not a difficult war to predict.
So, could the conflicts in the region have been averted or mitigated? I get the gloomy feeling from de Waal’s narrative that the forces of political gravity generally favoured violent conflict. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought hard-line nationalists to power in all three countries, and eliminated the political habits and institutions that might have channeled the energy of disagreement away from the precipice of war. I found his analysis of the 2008 South Ossetia conflict particularly interesting, as it happened after my first round of Caucasus engagement. His view (in crude summary) is that Saakashvili decided to pick a fight quite early on, and the Russians decided to give it to him.
It’s fair to say that international engagement with the conflict has often been less than vigorous. It seemed to me grimly appropriate that the OSCE mechanism to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, co-chaired by the USA, Russia and France, was named after a conference that never actually took place. But I know individual officials who have made great efforts, and in any case it’s easy to think of better-known conflicts where huge investment of time and energy in international mediation has failed to pay off.
Anyway, recent developments aside, de Waal’s book is a warmly engaging look at the three South Caucasus countries – Georgia (including South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjara), Armenia and Azerbaijan (including Nagorno-Karabakh) – in their historical context between Russia, Turkey and Iran, with the Russia relationship being the most important for all three cases. (Though other powers got involved too – Azerbaijan was briefly a British protectorate, with democratic elections, women’s suffrage and proportional representation in 1918-1920.) He concentrates on the political history, but also explores the rich literature of all of the region, and touches on the cuisine as well (I personally love Georgian cooking). He argues that the important regional context has been lost, with the independence of the three states inevitably making them look inwards rather than at their neighbours. It’s a good and informative read.
I have known Tom de Waal for many years, going back to my own intense Caucasus engagement in 2003-06 and again in 2012. He is lambasted by Armenian activists for being too pro-Azeri, and by Azerbaijani activists for being too Armenian, and by all sides in Georgia for favouring their opponents. I think he is generally right. I had been looking forward to this book for ages and attended its Brussels launch in 2019; my memory is that we went for a very nice dinner afterwards.
To get the obvious point out of the way, unfortunately one of the core sections of the book now needs to be updated after the Nagorno-Karabakh war of late 2020. This occasioned one of the few points of disagreement between us, and I actually wrote to de Waal to say that I thought the “both-sides” narrative which was prevalent in the early weeks of the 2020 conflict was obscuring the important fact that Azerbaijan was winning.
But I don’t think he can be faulted for not seeing precisely into the future when writing the book. In any case, he, and I, and many others, had been warning of the likelihood of a bloody denouement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for many years (here’s me and Damien Helly in 2004, and me and Sabine Freizer in Russian in 2006). In 2004 the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan told me to my face that they were saving up their profits from fossil fuels in order to upgrade their armed forces to drive Armenia out of their territory by force, and if he was saying that to me, he was saying it to a lot of other people. This was not a difficult war to predict.
So, could the conflicts in the region have been averted or mitigated? I get the gloomy feeling from de Waal’s narrative that the forces of political gravity generally favoured violent conflict. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought hard-line nationalists to power in all three countries, and eliminated the political habits and institutions that might have channeled the energy of disagreement away from the precipice of war. I found his analysis of the 2008 South Ossetia conflict particularly interesting, as it happened after my first round of Caucasus engagement. His view (in crude summary) is that Saakashvili decided to pick a fight quite early on, and the Russians decided to give it to him.
It’s fair to say that international engagement with the conflict has often been less than vigorous. It seemed to me grimly appropriate that the OSCE mechanism to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, co-chaired by the USA, Russia and France, was named after a conference that never actually took place. But I know individual officials who have made great efforts, and in any case it’s easy to think of better-known conflicts where huge investment of time and energy in international mediation has failed to pay off.
Anyway, recent developments aside, de Waal’s book is a warmly engaging look at the three South Caucasus countries – Georgia (including South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjara), Armenia and Azerbaijan (including Nagorno-Karabakh) – in their historical context between Russia, Turkey and Iran, with the Russia relationship being the most important for all three cases. (Though other powers got involved too – Azerbaijan was briefly a British protectorate, with democratic elections, women’s suffrage and proportional representation in 1918-1920.) He concentrates on the political history, but also explores the rich literature of all of the region, and touches on the cuisine as well (I personally love Georgian cooking). He argues that the important regional context has been lost, with the independence of the three states inevitably making them look inwards rather than at their neighbours. It’s a good and informative read.
August 25, 2019
In a quick guide to recent history in the Caucasus, the author is strong on the complicated territorial disputes in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia while he also exposes the simplistic way Eurasian politics is painted in the western media. Georgia’s former president, the populist Mikheil Saakashvili was generally feted in the West as a man who stood up to Russia but actually comes across as something of a blundering fool, while he also ordered the first shots to be fired in the 2008 war, an invitation to bear arms that Vladimir Putin was never going to ignore. The book also include an excellent chapter on oil and pipeline geopolitics.
Where it falls down is any claims to comprehensiveness. The narrative sweeps through and only pauses to deal with major events prior to the 1990s – so there is a good section on the Armenian Genocide but coverage elsewhere is cursory. It also only covers the south Caucasus so Chechnya, crucially, is only mentioned in passing. Lastly, the action stops in 2009 so the book is now not up to date. Still, it's a very clear book that provides an excellent potted introduction to some important events.
Where it falls down is any claims to comprehensiveness. The narrative sweeps through and only pauses to deal with major events prior to the 1990s – so there is a good section on the Armenian Genocide but coverage elsewhere is cursory. It also only covers the south Caucasus so Chechnya, crucially, is only mentioned in passing. Lastly, the action stops in 2009 so the book is now not up to date. Still, it's a very clear book that provides an excellent potted introduction to some important events.
May 12, 2023
The 2010 book is a well written history of this pivotal, but often poorly understood region. Its negative aspect is the publication date. So much has happened in the decade plus since this history hit the bookshelves that the reader must consult more recent works to complete the story.
The author does an admirable job of analyzing the histories of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia from the 19th century through the collapse of the Ottoman Empire/the fall of the Romanovs, the Soviet conquest, and the eventual collapse of Moscow’s control in the closing decade of the 20th century. In particular, the section on the territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is extremely informative.
The author does an admirable job of analyzing the histories of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia from the 19th century through the collapse of the Ottoman Empire/the fall of the Romanovs, the Soviet conquest, and the eventual collapse of Moscow’s control in the closing decade of the 20th century. In particular, the section on the territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is extremely informative.
January 17, 2023
Both well-researched and approachable to anyone unfamiliar with the region, De Waal’s work is easily the best book on the Caucasus and is a must-read for anyone looking for a comprehensive read on the historic, cultural, and political developments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
December 8, 2024
Fantastic overview of the region with the perfect amount of depth. Most recent version is from 2018 and is thus a little outdated in regards to the recent developments in Nagorno-karabakh. Otherwise, a great book for lovers of history and politics!
January 27, 2020
Essential reading for anyone interested in the Caucasus, and for such a short book a surprisingly good overview. Some of the statements, analyses, and perspectives in this book will probably be strongly disliked by certain people in the region itself, but overall I found De Waal's arguments balanced and sensible.
Read
June 18, 2024I originally picked up this book to prepare for travel to the region, but I ended up greatly benefiting from learning about the sad story of the Armenians, which serves as a cautionary tale for Jews, including a diaspora-nation state split, the divide on a historical and cultural focus versus focussing on occupied territories, and the state's pursuit of militarism and occupation over functional governance or any type of strategy. Ultimately, the Armenians lost out in every meaningful way, which made me feel pessimistic about what may lie ahead for the Jews.
However, this pessimism was then superseded by reading the rest of the book and reflecting on how most states in the world are dysfunctional, failing in significant ways, and caught up in needless ethnic tensions. Despite these challenges, they are still places where people live more or less okay.
However, this pessimism was then superseded by reading the rest of the book and reflecting on how most states in the world are dysfunctional, failing in significant ways, and caught up in needless ethnic tensions. Despite these challenges, they are still places where people live more or less okay.
June 18, 2024
[This is a review of the 2nd edition of this book, published 2019]
This is an excellent intro to the modern history and politics of the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, including the two statelets that broke away from Georgia in the post-Soviet era, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. All these countries were part of the Soviet Union until it disintegrated up in 1991.
For centuries, the region has had the misfortune of being squeezed between three empires: Russia, Iran and the Ottoman empire (today reduced to Turkey). Since all three sought influence or conquest in the region, the result was regular bouts of conflict. Today, two of those three outside players have largely receded from playing major roles, leaving only Russia to actively meddle from time to time as it suits the whims of Vladimir Putin.
The Caucasians themselves, being divided into many intermixed ethnic groups, religions and geographically isolated regions due to mountain regions, have contributed their own fair share of wars with one another, even without outside parties.
When they weren't being invaded, these groups mostly lived in a reasonable state of peace, but there was never a shortage of psychopaths and megalomaniacs to upset the balance and tumble the region into bloody fratricidal warfare once again. The latest spasm of violence was just in September 2023, a short-lived resumption of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan that resulted in the end of the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and the mass flight of the population to Armenia proper.
The thumbnail sketch of the author's portrayal of the three countries:
* Azerbaijan is a classic example of the resource curse, being a small country with a significant supply of oil and gas fields, though a modest player on the global energy scene. As with so many such resource-rich countries, it is a kleptocracy with a small, corrupt, secular elite, governed by the same family, the Alievs, for over half a century. They rule over a relatively poor, mixed population of Sunni and Shia Muslims. The elite squander the country's wealth on themselves and their friends, prestige projects such as hotels and stadiums, and the military. Since they spent the years from 1988 onwards in a military showdown with Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, they have used their military a lot. They finally stamped out the enclave in the fall of 2023, unleashing the region's newest wave of ethnic cleansing as the refugees fled to Armenia. That marked the end of several centuries of Armenian presence in Azerbaijan, from long before there even was an Azerbaijan.
* Armenia has been cursed with its own bad leaders in modern times, obsessively focused on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and at odds with their neighbors to both east and west, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Today the country is quite ethnically homogeneous, but there are many more Armenians outside the country (in western Europe, North America, Russia ...) than within it. In recent years, the country had looked mainly to Russia as its protector, but in the end the Russians peacekeepers stood idly by as Azerbaijan swiftly won the latest war. Putin remained true to his shifty character. Besides, he was a little distracted by his own continuing military fiasco in Ukraine at the time.
* Georgia is the closest of the three countries to being a reasonably prosperous Western state, but is considerably shrunken since Putin decided to support the separatist autonomous regions that were nominally part of the country. In 2008, after Georgian troops unwisely attacked South Ossetia, the fiction of Georgian authority was broken in a pair of short, sharp military conflicts with Russia and its separatist allies that left South Ossetia and Abkhazia independent and largely free of ethnic Georgians, who fled back to Georgia. As usual, it was ugly, but far less so than the years-long, brutal wars of the 1990s.
In the wake of all this, the South Caucasus today is a far less ethnically mixed place than it was when the Soviet Empire imploded over three decades ago, with the major ethnic groups now concentrated in their own countries. And, a reasonable measure of democracy prevails at least in Armenia and Georgia if not in Azerbaijan, which may now be the region's wild card.
All in all, this is a great book to read before traveling to the region if you like to travel with eyes open and a much better historical perspective on how the region came to be what it is today.
This is an excellent intro to the modern history and politics of the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, including the two statelets that broke away from Georgia in the post-Soviet era, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. All these countries were part of the Soviet Union until it disintegrated up in 1991.
For centuries, the region has had the misfortune of being squeezed between three empires: Russia, Iran and the Ottoman empire (today reduced to Turkey). Since all three sought influence or conquest in the region, the result was regular bouts of conflict. Today, two of those three outside players have largely receded from playing major roles, leaving only Russia to actively meddle from time to time as it suits the whims of Vladimir Putin.
The Caucasians themselves, being divided into many intermixed ethnic groups, religions and geographically isolated regions due to mountain regions, have contributed their own fair share of wars with one another, even without outside parties.
When they weren't being invaded, these groups mostly lived in a reasonable state of peace, but there was never a shortage of psychopaths and megalomaniacs to upset the balance and tumble the region into bloody fratricidal warfare once again. The latest spasm of violence was just in September 2023, a short-lived resumption of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan that resulted in the end of the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and the mass flight of the population to Armenia proper.
The thumbnail sketch of the author's portrayal of the three countries:
* Azerbaijan is a classic example of the resource curse, being a small country with a significant supply of oil and gas fields, though a modest player on the global energy scene. As with so many such resource-rich countries, it is a kleptocracy with a small, corrupt, secular elite, governed by the same family, the Alievs, for over half a century. They rule over a relatively poor, mixed population of Sunni and Shia Muslims. The elite squander the country's wealth on themselves and their friends, prestige projects such as hotels and stadiums, and the military. Since they spent the years from 1988 onwards in a military showdown with Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, they have used their military a lot. They finally stamped out the enclave in the fall of 2023, unleashing the region's newest wave of ethnic cleansing as the refugees fled to Armenia. That marked the end of several centuries of Armenian presence in Azerbaijan, from long before there even was an Azerbaijan.
* Armenia has been cursed with its own bad leaders in modern times, obsessively focused on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and at odds with their neighbors to both east and west, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Today the country is quite ethnically homogeneous, but there are many more Armenians outside the country (in western Europe, North America, Russia ...) than within it. In recent years, the country had looked mainly to Russia as its protector, but in the end the Russians peacekeepers stood idly by as Azerbaijan swiftly won the latest war. Putin remained true to his shifty character. Besides, he was a little distracted by his own continuing military fiasco in Ukraine at the time.
* Georgia is the closest of the three countries to being a reasonably prosperous Western state, but is considerably shrunken since Putin decided to support the separatist autonomous regions that were nominally part of the country. In 2008, after Georgian troops unwisely attacked South Ossetia, the fiction of Georgian authority was broken in a pair of short, sharp military conflicts with Russia and its separatist allies that left South Ossetia and Abkhazia independent and largely free of ethnic Georgians, who fled back to Georgia. As usual, it was ugly, but far less so than the years-long, brutal wars of the 1990s.
In the wake of all this, the South Caucasus today is a far less ethnically mixed place than it was when the Soviet Empire imploded over three decades ago, with the major ethnic groups now concentrated in their own countries. And, a reasonable measure of democracy prevails at least in Armenia and Georgia if not in Azerbaijan, which may now be the region's wild card.
All in all, this is a great book to read before traveling to the region if you like to travel with eyes open and a much better historical perspective on how the region came to be what it is today.
July 6, 2014
A useful introduction for those with only a passing familiarity with the region's history and ongoing conflicts, de Waal does a better job of describing the past then providing any kind of meaningful analysis for the future. Essentially, de Waal argues that the outside world (the EU, primarily) should try to understand the region's long, convoluted but incredibly intertwined history in order to help defuse its ongoing conflicts (the book concludes shortly after the 2008 Georgia-Russia war) even though the book is replete with examples of how external influence is a major contributing force behind said strife. I guess the easiest way for me to describe my thoughts on de Waal's analysis is "ivory tower-ish"--the kind of stuff one gets in academia--which is surprising given that the author clearly has earned his stripes travelling through the region.
In sum: read this book as a history primer and you can't go wrong, but look elsewhere for in-depth analysis or predictions for the future.
In sum: read this book as a history primer and you can't go wrong, but look elsewhere for in-depth analysis or predictions for the future.
January 3, 2012
De Waal has a very readable, engaging style which is key if you're going to cover 110 years of very convoluted history. It focuses on the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) which is a bit of a shame but ultimately necessary to keep it short and as readable as it is. Lots of fun nuggets (Stalin didn't go to his mother's funeral!) and good threads of history. Some detail is necessarily removed, but not enough to get really frustrating.
I'm sure some people are going to accuse it of bias because, well, that's what people do. But I found it remarkably even-handed in a place where it's nearly impossible to be even-handed. It's a great refresher for those who need to get up to speed because they're focused on the 1920's Caucasus (read: me) and a great introduction for people who are afraid of stumbling into an insanely fascinating region without any foreknowledge.
I'm sure some people are going to accuse it of bias because, well, that's what people do. But I found it remarkably even-handed in a place where it's nearly impossible to be even-handed. It's a great refresher for those who need to get up to speed because they're focused on the 1920's Caucasus (read: me) and a great introduction for people who are afraid of stumbling into an insanely fascinating region without any foreknowledge.
December 16, 2012
Though 'The Caucasus: An Introduction' gives a readable and reasonably detailed analysis of Georgia's conflicts and contemporary political dynamics, de Waal does not discuss any of the other tragedies that have taken place in the Caucasus across the last two decades in any real detail. This is a disappointing book considering the quality of his other studies of the region. Both chapters dedicated to discussing the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the wake of Soviet collapse fail to get to the heart of the issue, and neither offers a solid analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh question. Newcomers to the subject may find this an interesting starting point, but for those hoping to really understand the Caucasus I suggest looking elsewhere.
June 24, 2019
A concise and detailed outlook at a very complex region. De Waal manages to cover a lot of ground within a couple hundred pages. The book itself is divided into neatly organised sections that can essentially be read independently, with an overview of the geography and history at the front and then chapters detailing Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, as well as one on the politics of oil and gas. It is mostly concerned with contemporary events, heavily focused on post-Soviet affairs, but does include some important historic details, as well as a decent overview of the Soviet era for each republic. Its also worth noting that this only covers the South Caucasus, and as such does not fully examine regions like Chechnya or anything else in the Russian side of the mountains.
June 12, 2012
Excellent, if slim, introduction to the complexities of South Caucasian complexity (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, plus Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorny Karabakh, and that other bit of Azerbaijan...) Totally without travelogue chitchat and sentimental cultural excesses; thoroughly readable and quite enthralling ancient and recent history, built (in the latter stages) around a couple of major issues. Particularly detailed on Caspian oil and Georgian struggles with breakaway republics... perhaps a wee bit quick on ancient history but of course the balance, in such a book, needs to be with the recent complications.
Basically, I am a lot clearer, and dying to go there.
Basically, I am a lot clearer, and dying to go there.
July 13, 2016
de Waal's book on the Caucasus is very informative. The book focuses on South Caucasus which includes the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (as opposed to North Caucasus, which includes Chechnya and Dagestan). The area has been controlled by most recently by Czarist Russian and the Soviet Union.
The book discusses the history of the region, but focuses mainly on events after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and newly formed governments of the three countries (and their contested territories). Although at times I found this book confusing (mainly because the region is confusing), it is a good introduction.
The book discusses the history of the region, but focuses mainly on events after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and newly formed governments of the three countries (and their contested territories). Although at times I found this book confusing (mainly because the region is confusing), it is a good introduction.
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