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Transforming War
Always at War: Organizational Culture in Strategic Air Command, 1946-62
Always at War is the story of Strategic Air Command (SAC) during the early decades of the Cold War. More than a simple history, it describes how an organization dominated by experienced World War II airmen developed a unique culture that thrives to this day.
Strategic Air Command was created because of the Air Force's internal beliefs, but the organization evolved as it responded to the external environment created by the Cold War. In the aftermath of World War II and the creation of an independent air service, the Air Force formed SAC because of a belief in the military potential of strategic bombing centralized under one commander. As the Cold War intensified, so did SAC's mission.
In order to prepare SAC's "warriors" to daily fight an enemy they did not see, as well as to handle the world's most dangerous arsenal, the command, led by General Curtis LeMay, emphasized security, personal responsibility, and competition among the command. Its resources, political influence, and manning grew as did its "culture" until reaching its peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis. SAC became synonymous with the Cold War and its culture forever changed the Air Force as well as those who served.
Strategic Air Command was created because of the Air Force's internal beliefs, but the organization evolved as it responded to the external environment created by the Cold War. In the aftermath of World War II and the creation of an independent air service, the Air Force formed SAC because of a belief in the military potential of strategic bombing centralized under one commander. As the Cold War intensified, so did SAC's mission.
In order to prepare SAC's "warriors" to daily fight an enemy they did not see, as well as to handle the world's most dangerous arsenal, the command, led by General Curtis LeMay, emphasized security, personal responsibility, and competition among the command. Its resources, political influence, and manning grew as did its "culture" until reaching its peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis. SAC became synonymous with the Cold War and its culture forever changed the Air Force as well as those who served.
- GenresMilitary History
296 pages, Hardcover
Published April 15, 2018
6 people are currently reading
68 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
July 17, 2024
That this book wound up on the TBR list about five years ago was due to wanting a better explanation of why General George Kenney was a failure as the first commander of the Strategic Air Command. That it's only now that I've read it is a commentary on having found a satisfactory answer to my main question, and this monograph seemed a little less necessary.
Be that as it may, the main reason to read this work is to get a better sense of what the Air Force mind looks like, as Deaile takes you from the creation of the "pilot" as a military occupational specialty, what the experience of actual strategic bombing in World War II did to USAF leadership expectations, and how Curtis Le May, an indispensable man, did turn SAC into a force ready to go to war almost instantaneously. What lifts this above being just a staff history is that Deaile is very concerned about what this experience meant to the flyers, and their families; Deaile no doubt speaks from the heart on this having been a career bomber pilot.
In the end, SAC's hair-trigger operational profile was not sustainable, at least not on the scale that Le May envisioned, but Deaile does make a good argument that the classic SAC image had real substance to it; the Cuban Missile Crisis probably being the high-water mark.
Downsides to this book? The introduction really does read like an unreconstructed doctoral thesis, and one wonders if you're going to be subjected to 200-plus pages of such dragginess; such is not the case though.
Actual rating: more like 3.5; though one leaves with the sense that the sum is greater than the parts.
Be that as it may, the main reason to read this work is to get a better sense of what the Air Force mind looks like, as Deaile takes you from the creation of the "pilot" as a military occupational specialty, what the experience of actual strategic bombing in World War II did to USAF leadership expectations, and how Curtis Le May, an indispensable man, did turn SAC into a force ready to go to war almost instantaneously. What lifts this above being just a staff history is that Deaile is very concerned about what this experience meant to the flyers, and their families; Deaile no doubt speaks from the heart on this having been a career bomber pilot.
In the end, SAC's hair-trigger operational profile was not sustainable, at least not on the scale that Le May envisioned, but Deaile does make a good argument that the classic SAC image had real substance to it; the Cuban Missile Crisis probably being the high-water mark.
Downsides to this book? The introduction really does read like an unreconstructed doctoral thesis, and one wonders if you're going to be subjected to 200-plus pages of such dragginess; such is not the case though.
Actual rating: more like 3.5; though one leaves with the sense that the sum is greater than the parts.
August 20, 2022
Clear, organized history of the SAC culture. Wish there was more ICBM love (only a couple pages at the end), but there are definitely best practices and lessons learned for today's steeley-eyed warriors.
September 19, 2019
A great book, providing a detailed study of the cultural underpinnings of the US Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC) during its first 15 years. The author uses SAC as the focus for his thesis concerning the critical importance of leadership in establishing a military organization’s culture and thus influencing its material and doctrinal development. The background of SAC’s leaders, steeped in the philosophy of strategic bombing and with the shared experience of WWII’s bombing campaigns, is provided. Also presented as a scene setter is the unique mission entrusted to SAC, to provide a world-wide and sufficient strike capability without having to delay for a buildup of trained forces and usable equipment. The end result was General Curtis LeMay’s “always at war” philosophy and the organization he successfully created to effectively carry out the assigned mission. Many aspects of that organization are discussed, to include a very strict compliance with written procedures, the use of regular and abundant inspections/tests of individual & unit readiness for combat, and the various means used to promote an “always at war” mindset. Though the thesis is well argued, it too obviously cherry picks a specific person and a moment in time to make its point. SAC during the Cuban Missile Crisis was certainly ready to meet its objective, but mostly because of LeMay’s extremely long presence as its commander and the abundance of resources provided. The author himself makes reference to these factors at multiple points throughout the book. Nonetheless, the benefits and pitfalls of LeMay’s approach are made very clear. Certainly the organization maintained the desired high level of proficiency, but the human and material cost is well documented throughout the narrative. A great book for those wanting to study the elements of military organizations. Highly recommended for anyone wanting to know more about LeMay’s always ready objective and how he met that goal.
February 16, 2019
I recommend this book for the specialist--not the general--reader. It will be invaluable for former, nostalgic members of the Strategic Air Command, dealing with the everyday life of those on "alert service" during the Cold War. It will interest students of military history, the life of Curtis E. LeMay, and nuclear weapons, as well as scholars in the area of organizational culture and bureaucratic politics. It is exceptionally well-written, without the jargon one usually expects from academic literature. I liked it a lot.
The title refers to the change in attitudes among national leaders and the U.S. military following World War II. With the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range heavy bombers, the United States could not afford to "prepare for war" but considered itself actually at war with the Soviet Union. The threat of surprise nuclear attack required a response time of minutes, not days and certainly not weeks or months. Nuclear war response time was fifteen minutes: airmen lived within walking distance of their aircraft and missileers sat in silos, keys ready to launch. Before solid-fuel rockets, liquid-fueled missiles (Atlas, Titan) required eleven minutes to prepare for launch. With the development of solid-fueled rockets (Minuteman), response time was reduced to seconds.
This level of readiness had profound effects on U.S. policy regarding nuclear weapons. For one thing, it meant surrendering custody of the actual weapons from civilian authorities to military leaders. Reliability replaced safety as a guiding philosophy. Consequently, nuclear mishaps became more commonplace and worrisome to national command authorities. Under LeMay's direction, SAC attempted to place all strategic nuclear weapons under a single military command, answerable only to the president. His ambitions failed largely because of bureaucratic politics, e.g., the U.S. Navy's nuclear submarine ambitions.
LeMay preferred long-range bombers to missiles because the former were accurate, reliable, and recallable. His successor at SAC, Thomas Power, by contrast, favored intercontinental missiles. The change in emphasis diminished the authority of pilots while increasing that of missileers. SAC never recovered from this change in authority and by the late 1980s, SAC, previously a model of American technological innovation and power, was essentially eliminated.
Deaile makes the point that SAC was a victim of its own success. Nuclear war was never waged during the Cold War, thanks mostly to the two countries' strategic capabilities and the Strategic Air Command in particular. Once the Cold War ended, George H.W. Bush effectively ordered American strategic forces to stand down. Today, the United States retains awesome strategic capabilities, and America's long-range bombers--armed with conventional weapons--remain an important part of our global military capabilities, but the days of "alert" readiness are probably gone forever. We have reemphasized safety over reliability and are back to days or weeks of preparation, not minutes and certainly not seconds.
The title refers to the change in attitudes among national leaders and the U.S. military following World War II. With the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range heavy bombers, the United States could not afford to "prepare for war" but considered itself actually at war with the Soviet Union. The threat of surprise nuclear attack required a response time of minutes, not days and certainly not weeks or months. Nuclear war response time was fifteen minutes: airmen lived within walking distance of their aircraft and missileers sat in silos, keys ready to launch. Before solid-fuel rockets, liquid-fueled missiles (Atlas, Titan) required eleven minutes to prepare for launch. With the development of solid-fueled rockets (Minuteman), response time was reduced to seconds.
This level of readiness had profound effects on U.S. policy regarding nuclear weapons. For one thing, it meant surrendering custody of the actual weapons from civilian authorities to military leaders. Reliability replaced safety as a guiding philosophy. Consequently, nuclear mishaps became more commonplace and worrisome to national command authorities. Under LeMay's direction, SAC attempted to place all strategic nuclear weapons under a single military command, answerable only to the president. His ambitions failed largely because of bureaucratic politics, e.g., the U.S. Navy's nuclear submarine ambitions.
LeMay preferred long-range bombers to missiles because the former were accurate, reliable, and recallable. His successor at SAC, Thomas Power, by contrast, favored intercontinental missiles. The change in emphasis diminished the authority of pilots while increasing that of missileers. SAC never recovered from this change in authority and by the late 1980s, SAC, previously a model of American technological innovation and power, was essentially eliminated.
Deaile makes the point that SAC was a victim of its own success. Nuclear war was never waged during the Cold War, thanks mostly to the two countries' strategic capabilities and the Strategic Air Command in particular. Once the Cold War ended, George H.W. Bush effectively ordered American strategic forces to stand down. Today, the United States retains awesome strategic capabilities, and America's long-range bombers--armed with conventional weapons--remain an important part of our global military capabilities, but the days of "alert" readiness are probably gone forever. We have reemphasized safety over reliability and are back to days or weeks of preparation, not minutes and certainly not seconds.
April 24, 2018
Both a history of the organization and a biography of LeMay’s tenure as a commander. An absolute must read for those interested in the history of the USAF.
May 30, 2022
“The purpose of this book is to define those elements that constituted SAC’s organizational culture and explore the circumstances that brought them to fruition.” Furthermore, the command of strategic assets—bombers, then tankers, than adding missiles—under one commander helped solidify and shape the new Air Force coming out of WWII and into the first couple of decades of the Cold War. Leaders shaped this culture by sheer will and it was Curtis LeMay who played the central role in growing/forming SAC. From recreational aspects like family housing, rod & gun clubs, auto hobby shops and the like, to binning competitions, spot promotions, standardization and evaluation and alert—among many other facets of the SAC experience—senior leadership established the no-fail mentality for wielding the powerful and growing US nuclear arsenal into a capable deterrent ready for action within moment’s notice. This culture endures to this day, and interestingly, two manifestations of it still exist in the use of the B-52 and KC-135 aircraft that came into the inventory in the 1950s and will be operational into 2040 or so. Having served in SAC myself upon entering the operational Air Force, I really enjoyed this in depth and accurate look at the culture and the formative influences, while it also told me a bit about why I am the way I am, even though I am now retired from the USAF!
July 31, 2020
As a former SAC warrior, I thought this book would be interesting, in spite of having the words “organizational culture” in its title. I was not disappointed. Although my time in SAC came a decade later, I enjoyed reading this book as it brought back a lot of memories. About halfway through the book, I was watching the movie Strategic Air Command, with Jimmy Stewart, and thinking “wow, this movie is spot on with what I have been reading!” Then I soon came to the chapter which discussed that it was LeMay’s idea for the movie and he was the technical advisor. He wanted it made to educate the American public about SAC and its mission. Very good book!
September 27, 2018
Great book with lots of new facts on SAC. I was part of SAC as a B-52 pilot and have read a lot of Cold War history and still learned a lot from this book.
February 2, 2019
One of the most interesting books I have read in a while. If you want to understand the culture of the USAF, you need to start here.
March 4, 2022
Amazing.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews