At an unsettled time for liberal democracy, with global eruptions of authoritarian and arbitrary rule, here is one of the first full-fledged philosophical accounts of what makes governments legitimate.
What makes a government legitimate? The dominant view is that public officials have the right to rule us, even if they are unfair or unfit, as long as they gain power through procedures traceable to the consent of the governed. In this rigorous and timely study, Arthur Isak Applbaum argues that adherence to procedure is not enough: even a properly chosen government does not rule legitimately if it fails to protect basic rights, to treat its citizens as political equals, or to act coherently.
How are we to reconcile every person’s entitlement to freedom with the necessity of coercive law? Applbaum’s answer is that a government legitimately governs its citizens only if the government is a free group agent constituted by free citizens. To be a such a group agent, a government must uphold three principles. The liberty principle, requiring that the basic rights of citizens be secured, is necessary to protect against inhumanity, a tyranny in practice. The equality principle, requiring that citizens have equal say in selecting who governs, is necessary to protect against despotism, a tyranny in title. The agency principle, requiring that a government’s actions reflect its decisions and its decisions reflect its reasons, is necessary to protect against wantonism, a tyranny of unreason.
Today, Applbaum writes, the greatest threat to the established democracies is neither inhumanity nor despotism but wantonism, the domination of citizens by incoherent, inconstant, and incontinent rulers. A government that cannot govern itself cannot legitimately govern others.
Arthur Isak Applbaum is Adams Professor of Democratic Values at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, where he chairs the Democracy, Politics, and Institutions faculty. He also directs the undergraduate fellowship program of Harvard’s Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics. Applbaum is the author of Ethics for Adversaries, an appraisal of the morality of roles in public and professional life.
This books makes the compelling case for treating the question of legitimacy as distinct from the more familiar question of justice (or what Rawls has called the virtue of a well ordered society). Applbaum understands “the modern puzzle of legitimacy as the reconciliation of collective rule with individual freedom.” Unfortunately, I found much of the book tedious and academic, perhaps because it was quite conceptual and I don’t have much buy into debates in jurisprudence. Nevertheless, chapter 5 introduces an illuminating schema for thinking about legitimate government and laws. The chapter is titled ‘The Three Tyrannies’. It outlines three ways that a ruler can make illegitimate law. The first two are familiar: laws that undermine individual rights (even if decided by a majority) and laws that are made without the participation of the subjects of those laws (even if the law-maker otherwise produces good laws) are tyrannical. The third tyranny that Applbaum outlines is perhaps the most interesting element the book. A society that is ruled by incoherent and irrational decision-making is a tyranny of unreason or what Applbaum calls a group wanton (following Frankfurt’s famous discussion of personhood). He gives the example of a society that resolves to determine “the value of π by equally weighted random lottery” (p.154). Not only is π not the kind of thing that is determined by a procedure that gives citizens equal say, but a random lottery is not the kind of procedure that is conducive to a coherent and reason-responsive decision maker. Applbaum considers wantonism to be the biggest threat to modern democracies (and unsurprisingly holds a place in the books subtitle). In comparison to other things I have read, I found found Jeremy Waldron’s discussion of parliamentary legitimacy slightly more illuminating and more enjoyable to read. For example, in his essay “Principles of Legislation” he discusses “the principle of deliberation and the duty of responsiveness to deliberation” which explicates a similar idea to group wantonism in more familiar terms.