Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse

Modern War Studies

by Richard L. DiNardo

It seemed that whenever Mussolini acted on his own, it was bad news for Hitler. Indeed, the Fuhrer's relations with his Axis partners were fraught with an almost total lack of coordination. Compared to the Allies, the coalition was hardly an alliance at all. Focusing on Germany's military relations with Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland, Richard DiNardo unearths a wealth of information that reveals how the Axis coalition largely undermined Hitler's objectives from the Eastern Front to the Balkans, Mediterranean, and North Africa. DiNardo argues that the Axis military alliance was doomed from the beginning by a lack of common war aims, the absence of a unified command structure, and each nation's fundamental mistrust of the others. Germany was disinclined to make the kinds of compromises that successful wartime partnerships demanded and, because Hitler insisted on separate pacts with each nation, Italy and Finland often found themselves conducting counterproductive parallel wars on their own.DiNardo's detailed assessments of ground, naval, and air operations reveal precisely why the Axis allies were so dysfunctional as a collective force, sometimes for seemingly mundane but vital reasons-a shortage of interpreters, for example. His analysis covers coalition warfare at every level, demonstrating that some military services were better at working with their allies than others, while also pointing to rare successes, such as Rommel's effective coordination with Italian forces in North Africa. In the end, while some individual Axis units fought with distinction—if not on a par with the vaunted Wehrmacht—and helped Germany achieve some of its military aims, the coalition's overall military performance was riddled with disappointments. Breaking new ground, DiNardo's work enlarges our understanding of Germany's defeat while at the same time offering a timely reminder of the challenges presented by coalition warfare.

Genres: History, World War II

462 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 19, 2005

About the author

Richard L. DiNardo is professor of national security affairs, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Reviews

[Dimitri · Rating 4 out of 5]

The subtitle says it all: the Axis are a study in the failure of coalition warfare.

The lack of common goals between Germany & Japan is a well-known basic aspect of this. The European & Pacific fronts were fought separately, in spite of ambitious prospects to meet at Suez from Africa & India. A smaller version, a link-up from Egypt & the Caucasus between Rommel & Army Group South, was less impossible than hindsight made it seem.

DiNardo starts with an admirable chapter on unified Germany's meagre experience at coalition warfare between 1864 & 1918, especially the absence of the type of unified command which the Entente achieved in the last year of the war. Hitler followed in this mold with his penchant for bilateral agreements - exactly the way he used to play out party subordinates & the different services of the German armed forces against eachother.

Hungary & Romania were the easiest players in this game, thanks to their competing territorial designs on Transsylvania. The story of their military exploits must be found elsewhere, the contributions of Slovakia & Bulgaria were too small to mention*.

Mussolini was overly ambitious in its contribution to Barbarossa and beyond, eventually fielding an Italian Eight Army that overstretched his resources even more than his other Roman designs**. His Alpine meetings with Hitler, or between their respective representatives, get the center of attention as an example of how poor Axis cooperation was.

The same goes for the material assistance lent by the German war industry. "Chained to a Corpse" was a phrase which can be effortlessly transplanted from the Isonzo to...frankly, each Axis junior partner as none of them had a decent anti-tank gun for example, while their strategic value was meant to strengthen the German forces. Unless they did: on those occassions when they had a proper answer to British armour, the Bersaglieri gave a well enough account of themselves to earn German praise. The same goes for the Romanian defences at Ploesti.

That's the gist of things. Hitler picked weak Allies which needed more support than they could give.
He was incapable of cooperating efficiently with them...but don't think that's a reason to skip this book! I enjoyed every minute of it. The destination is foregone but the journey is written well, full of rivets about the lesser Axis' experience of war that fit neatly into "the experience of battle in Russia" and my beloved history of Eastern Europe.



*Hungary in World War II: Caught in the Cauldron by Deborah S. Cornelius
Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941-1945 by Mark Axworthy
**Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War by MacGregor Knox

[Ryan · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting discussion of Germany’s failure to embrace coalition warfare. Given the nationalism and arrogance cultivated by the Nazis this failure is perhaps unsurprising, but maybe not predestined. Mark Mazower’s book, “Hitlers Empire”, discusses the German scramble to plan for a Nazi Europe after the victory over France in 1940 and points out the Germans who tried to think in pan-European terms (Werner Best, Carl Schmitt, etc). There doesn’t seem to have been many German military leaders who embraced this type of thinking. Although Rommel comes off as moderately successful leading the Italians under his command, most of the other German officers complain about the performance of Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian troops, especially in 1942.

In a fundamental sense, it often seems like the main obstacle to German collaboration with the Italians and the Romanians was the language barrier. Few officers in the axis armies knew German and Italian or German and Romanian so in the field units often had a very difficult time working together. The Hungarians, on the other hand, had many German speakers because of their former status in the Hapsburg empire, and German was commonly taught as a second language in Finland, so for these armies this was less of an issue.

All of the non German axis partners appear to have suffered from grossly exaggerated expectations in regard to German aid. In particular, the Germans promised the Hungarians and the Romanians large numbers of tanks and AT guns that were never delivered. In the field, desperate German units would steal good equipment from their allies if they were in need. In view of the well known problems with the German war economy, especially the difficulties they had keeping up with the demands of their own army, it is remarkable that these promises were made at all. One solution to this problem would have been to allow allied states to produce superior German equipment themselves, but the Germans usually wanted to charge a high price for sharing their blueprints.

Unlike the Allies, the Germans managed all their diplomatic and military relationships in a bilateral fashion. There was never a meeting of all the axis states to coordinate strategy and Italy and Finland generally expected to fight a “parallel war” at Germany’s side. This is remarkable when you think about the close collaboration of the senior Anglo-American leadership and their joint military operations. Of course, they had the advantage of being able to argue with each other in the same language.

As other works have pointed out, Germany really had no business fighting a long war against a coalition of great powers. Their failure to coordinate effectively with the few allies they had adds further weight to this idea.

[Brian · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is meant to be a military analysis of the World War II axis however it comes off as an excellent diplomatic history. It shows that Germany has never been able to grasp the concepts of coalition warfare and its do it alone strategy was always going to be its undoing. The first part of the book looks at the history of German warfare before World War II. The analysis with regards to Operation Barbarossa is deeply flawed. The assertion that Russia was the primary target of Germany's desires is wrong. The evidence shows a greater tendency towards Britain than Russia. Also the analysis of Japan's role in the coalition is something that deserves further looking into. I think the author dismisses it too quickly.

Despite those flaws this really does provide a comprehensive look at how the Axis functioned and especially the role of the minor powers like Romania and Hungary. It is very easy to see that while Germany nominally had control each of these Axis powers was able to contribute in their own way. The end of the Axis comes with the battle of Stalingrad and the demolition of the Axis forces as well as the failures in North Africa. The lack of Axis supplies was a tremendous problem and one that was not going to be overcome without early strategic victories. When these were not made the loss became inevitable. This book is a very clear military analysis and accomplishes a lot in 200 pages. Despite the few flaws mentioned I highly recommend the book.