White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 1919 - 1920 and The Miracle on the Vistula

by Norman Davies

In White Eagle, Red Star, distinguished historian Norman Davies gives us a full account of the Polish-Soviet War, with its dramatic climax in August 1920 when the Red Army—sure of victory and pledged to carry the Revolution across Europe —was crushed by a devastating Polish attack. Since known as “The Miracle of the Vistula,” it remains one of the most crucial conflicts of the Western world. Drawing on both Polish and Russian sources, Norman Davies shows how this war was a pivotal event in the course of European history.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Poland, Russia, European History, Military History, Russian History

336 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1972

About the author

Ivor Norman Richard Davies FBA, FRHistS is a leading English historian of Welsh descent, noted for his publications on the history of Europe, Poland, and the United Kingdom. From 1971, Davies taught Polish history at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) of the University of London, where he was professor from 1985 to 1996. Currently, he is Supernumary Fellow at Wolfson College, Oxford. Throughout his career, Davies has lectured in many countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, China, Poland, and in most of the rest of Europe as well.

The work which established Davies' reputation in the English-speaking world was God's Playground (1981), a comprehensive overview of Polish history. In Poland, the book was published officially only after the fall of communism. In 2000, Davies' Polish publishers Znak published a collection of his essays and articles under the title Smok wawelski nad Tamizą ("The Wawel Dragon on the Thames"). It is not available in English.

In 1984, Davies published Heart of Europe, a briefer history of Poland. Interestingly, the chapters are arranged in reverse chronological order. In the 1990s, Davies published Europe: A History (1996) and The Isles: A History (1999), about Europe and the islands of Great Britain and Ireland, respectively. Each book is a narrative interlarded with numerous sidepanel discussions of microtopics. In 2002, at the suggestion of the city's mayor, Bogdan Zdrojewski, Davies and his former research assistant, Roger Moorhouse, co-wrote a history of Wrocław / Breslau, a Silesian city. Titled Microcosm: Portrait of a Central European City, the book was published simultaneously in English, Polish, German and Czech. Davies also writes essays and articles for the mass media. Among others, he has worked for the BBC as well as British and American magazines and newspapers, such as The Times, The New York Review of Books and The Independent. In Poland, his articles appeared in the liberal Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny. Davies' book Rising '44. The Battle for Warsaw describes the Warsaw Uprising. It was followed by Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory (2006). In 2008 Davies participated in the documentary film "The Soviet Story"

Some historians, most vocally Lucy Dawidowicz and Abraham Brumberg, object to Davies' historical treatment of the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Poland. They accuse him of minimizing historic antisemitism, and of promoting a view that accounts of the Holocaust in international historiography largely overlook the suffering of non-Jewish Poles. Davies’s supporters contend that he gives due attention to the genocide and war crimes perpetrated by both Hitler and Stalin on Polish Jews and non-Jews. Davies himself argues that "Holocaust scholars need have no fears that rational comparisons might threaten that uniqueness. Quite the opposite." and that "...one needs to re-construct mentally the fuller picture in order to comprehend the true enormity of Poland’s wartime cataclysm, and then to say with absolute conviction ‘Never Again’." In 1986, Dawidowicz’s criticism of Davies’ historical treatment of the Holocaust was cited as a factor in a controversy at Stanford University in which Davies was denied a tenured faculty position for alleged "scientific flaws". Davies sued the university for breach of contract and defamation of character, but in 1989 the court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction in an academic matter.

Davies holds a number of honorary titles and memberships, including honorary doctorates from the universities of the Jagiellonian University (since 2003), Lublin, Gdańsk and Warsaw (since 2007), memberships in the Polish Academy of Learning (PAU) and the Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europaea, and fellowships of the British Academy and the Royal Historical Society. Davies received an honorary DLitt degree from his alma mater the University of Sussex. Davies is also an honorary

Reviews

[Ray · Rating 3 out of 5]

Competent telling of the Russo-Polish war of 1919/20. A little too much military detail and poor maps let it down somewhat in my view. It reads and feels like a graduate thesis rather than a book for the general reader.

Plucky Poland gives the Red Army a bloody nose in a strange war that both sides blunder into and flail about in. A war of sweeping advance, strategic overreach and dramatic retreat, featuring the last major cavalry exchanges on European soil. A battle for survival for Poland, one that had to be won - and was. Victory saved Poland for a generation, yet led to the dictatorship of Pilsudski and engendered an inflated sense of security.

Poland was left alone to manage whilst the French and British looked the other way, all the time making vague noises of encouragement. A kind of rehearsal for 1939 in a way. A different and tragic result that time though. (less)

[C.E. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Remember, pepole, POLAND WAS POWERFUL FOR CENTURIES and even after and during partitions and world wars, POLAND saved Western Europe. (From Tatars, Turks, and in 1920, Lenin's global ambitions.) Just saying;-)

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm doing a presentation on this war for my tenth-grade European history class, and this book proved very helpful. I didn't know beans about this war, and only came across it in some reference book.

This is a reasonably well-written book that teases out a forgotten but interesting chapter of 20th century history. The author's prose is robust, and he takes pains to quote from primary sources. I also like his weaving the writings of Isaac Babel into the narrative, as I believe that it brings a sense of color that helps moves things along.

The book is not limited to a Polish viewpoint. Instead, it takes pains to show the Russian point of view as well as that of the Entente. The reference points in English and French politics are particularly revealing. The Battle of Warsaw is strongly downplayed by the author, who holds that the Polish victory was more a fact of Tukhachevskii and Budyenny outrunning their supply lines than anything Pilsudski contrived. It does put to rest the tired belief that General Weygand was the "architect" of the Polish triumph -- his role was a complete fabrication and it is duly exposed as such.

The only things that would have made this book better include information from the USSR that is now available (and wasn't when this book debuted in 1972). I think there is much to be mined from that source which would clear up many of the mysteries that persist. Additionally (and I can't stress this enough), history writers (particularly UK history writers) have to stop assuming that the average reader has an idiomatic grasp of the French language. My schoolboy French is enough to puzzle out the meaning, but for those who don't 'parlez' they can't even get the benefit of a footnote with the English text. If I wanted to read it in French, I would have bought a French translation.

Even so, there's failures.On page 265 the author writes "To paraphrase Gibbon, the interpretation of dialectical materialism is now taught at the schools of Cracow, Prague and Berlin, whose pupils demonstrate to a classless society the sanctity and truth of the revelations of Marx, Engels and Lenin.The battle of Warsaw, far from redeeming an era, did not so much as save a generation."

Well, never there was the existance,of a classless society, in any time or place of human history.Socialism is far more full of class differences than any capitalism.In 1985, the life was beter in a "Banana republic" such as Panama, than in still existing Soviet Union.This book was writen, when the "Iron Courtain" was still existing, but since 1989, the eastern Europe's reality is another thing.

Also, was the Soviets' true intention in waging war on Poland to eventually attack Germany and spread the Revolution westwards? The Bolsheviks' peasant army did not have the capability for such an invasion. That's why they were so quick to make peace with Poland, even though it cost them a foothold in Galicia, which (in Lenin's own words), could "have opened up a straight road of revolution...to Czechoslovakia and Hungary." Lenin actually believed that Pilsudski's Poland had been built up by the Western powers as a tool against Russia.

The maps of this book are all weak. All of them are in Black & white.

The last problem of this book doesn't shows the American, British and German support to Soviet Union.The Warburgs, Rockefellers,etc. were at Lenin's side at that times.When focusing the fact, that this war didn't liberate Ukraine, this book simple forgotten, that the small Poland was basically alone, in this war, while the massive and big Soviet Union had some of the most rich and powerfull eugenicists people in the world at his side.Many of them americans, such as Rockefeller.The Soviet support to Nazis in Germany and the result of this decision, is also forgotten in this book.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good, well-written (if unfortunately slightly out-of-date) history of the Polish-Soviet 1919-1922 war.

The book's main failing lies in not providing enough background information about peripherally mentioned - yet crucial - figures such as Peter Wrangel, Semeon Petlura, etc.) It is, however, well researched, its conclusions are solidly backed up, and the maps, photographs and other supporting materials allow the reader to easily keep an overview of an otherwise obscure and ill-documented conflict.

[Alexandru · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read White Eagle, Red Star very quickly because it was such a captivating book. The story of the Polish-Soviet war of 1919-1920 is not as well known as it should be. The war covered huge swaths of land and featured quick movements of the fronts from one side to the other.

Norman Davies is a specialist in Polish history and his storytelling talent is evident in this early work which dates from the 1970s. The military details of battles, divisions and armies are all there but they are combined with eye witness accounts and stories from battles which make for a compelling read. There are heroic cavalry charges alongside battles featuring tanks and airplanes.

Although I was aware of most of the events of this war there was still quite a lot of interesting facts that I learned from it. Especially when it comes to the diplomatic game of post-War Europe. Contrary to popular opinion, the Entente represented by France and Britain were not too interested in helping Poland. They were exhausted after the war and after the failed Allied intervention in the Russian Civil war. David Lloyd George, the British PM, wanted to try and normalise relations with Soviet Russia and initiate trade with them.

When Poland attacked East in 1920 the Entente did not help in any way and even tried to stop them. However, the larger then life Pilsudski proceeded without any Allied help. This continued even during the battle of Warsaw when the Allies sent very little help. For many years it was believed that the French general Weygand organised the Polish defence, however this was revealed to be false. In Weygand's words this was a Polish victory.

This book makes me wish there were more books like this covering the various other post-War conflicts.

[Czarny Pies · Rating 4 out of 5]

White Eagle, Red Star is one of four books written by Norman Davies thathave dramatically altered the way Westerners and Poles have come to view the history of Poland. (The other three are God's Playground, Rising 44 and Microcosm.) This succinct volume tells how Josef Pilsudki recreated Poland after 125 years in which it had been partitioned between Austria, Germany and Russia,. He then defended it against a communist invasion from Russia.

Pilsudski is venerated in Poland as the founder of the modern state. In the west he has been accorded scant respect and wrongly accused of many sins that he was entirely innocent of. Pilsudki was born into a minor noble family in was now part of Lithuania. He started his career as a communist where he showed a great deal of skill providing funds for the Russian communist party by robbing trains. Unfortunately he was close enough to Lenin's brother that when an assassination attempt was made on the Tsar, Pilsudski was sentenced to five years of internment in Siberia.

After his internment, Pilsudski organized a regiment that fought int he Austrian army on the Eastern Front. Pilsudski was no longer a communist by this point but he retained resolutely socialist and atheistic ideas all his life which was quite unusual for a Polish nobleman. Pilsudski had come to the conclusion that a common front of Poles from the entire political spectrum was needed to recreate Poland. When Austria surrendered, Germany asked him to swear allegiance to the Kaiser and join the fight against Russia. When Pilsudsk refused, he was jailed. However, he was released several months later when Germany surrendered. In a startling manoeuvre he persuaded the Germans to give him the weapons from their arsenal in the city where he was jailed. The Germans agreed and within days Pilsudki had an army with which to carve out a state in the territories of the three occupying powers that had just fallen.

Pilsudski had seized most of the Ukraine before the Russians counter-attacked in early 1920. The Russians wanted to first subdue Poland and then continue driving West so as to link up with the communists who had begun insurrections in Germany. However, in August 1920 the Russians were stopped at Warsaw in a battle that the Poles refer to as the Miracle on the Vistula. Pilsudski than launched a counteroffensive which in turn stalled in the Ukraine. At this point, the Russians and Poles signed a treaty to end their war and which settled their boundaries until WWII.

In this remarkable book, Davies demolishes several mythes about Pilsudki notably:

-1-Myth #1: Pilsudski as a fascist. The reality was that Pilsudski did rule as a autocrat but his political agenda was socialist. He staunchly defended Poland's Jewish population through-out his life.
-2- Myth #2: Pilsudski was pro-German. The reality was that Pilsudski believed that in the long term, Russia was a bigger threat to Poland's independence than Germany and thus he made opportunistic deals with the Germans.
-3- Myth #3 Pilsudski was an irresponsible adventurer. The truth is that Pilsudski was opportunistic and very lucky that the regimes of all three powers occupying Poland fell at the same time. In his campaigns, Pilsudki commanded in a very competent fashion never taking greater risks that the relative strengths of his army and the Russian army warranted.
-4- Myth #4 - The French volunteer officers who served with the Poles at the Battle of Warsaw were responsible for the Poliish Victory. In fact, De Gaulle Weygand and the other French volunteers never made any such claim for themselves and lauded Pilsudski as the mastermind of the Victory.
-5- Myth #5 -The revival of Polish State was the result of Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of the self-determination of nations. The reality is Treaty of Versailles did not allocate any territory to Poland that was not being occupied by Pilsudki's army. In fact, under the Treaty of Versailles the Poles were forced to conduct a referendum in Silesia which ultimately forced them to return most of Silesia to Germany.

In Davies view, Poland was recreated solely because Pilsudski and his soldiers successfully fought for it. They got no significant help and much hostility from the West.

White Eagle, Red Star is an absolutely essential book for anyone wishing to understand today's Poland and is a great read for World I history buffs.

[Cian · Rating 4 out of 5]

White Eagle – Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 1919-20 by Norman Davies

“An energetic conduct of war strengthens the national character; by contrast wars conducted over a long time and lamely entail the greatest material losses and moral damage,” wrote Colonel Blume some years after the Franco-Prussian War. A sentiment that is especially telling of the war in question.

White Eagle – Red Star is an excellent piece not just on the Polish-Soviet War but on the conflation of war-time conceptualisation itself with a stern overhead review of both the art of historiography itself and its impact upon modern and immediate perspectives of the conflict.
Simultaneously dispelling the historiographical myths construed by Soviet and Polish scholars – the illusion of dominant Entente support for the Poles and the Miracle on the Vistula fable respectively. With the first fabrication being used to justify Soviet insurrection into Europe in the vain hope that a collective European Imperialism, which did not include the Polish Republic by any stretch of the imagination, would crumple from within by proletariat revolutions that would rise to welcome the invasion. And the second as a political tool used by Pilsudski’s political and various other internal rivals to discredit his achievement in favour of divination and the power of Gods as the bastion of Christendom.

But as Davies rightly points, even if such favour had been extended to the Poles in their most desperate hour, who else but Pilsudski could be his appropriate agent? For the victory chiefly lay with Pilsudski and his ability to mobilise the morale of the newly formed Polish Republic with the substantial logistical and administrative support abilities of his two primary ministers – Kazimierz Sosnkowski and Wladyslaw Sikorski.

From a geopolitical and strategic standpoint, the book is invaluable. A must read for any students of warfare or the relationship between political and battlefield realities. Stratagem never played so crucial a role in a duel between such unprepared military entities – where little yet was standardised to a sufficient of strategic reliability. Excellent operational-tactical maps are included to ease the difficulties of the topography and multi-faceted terminology and names that may prove unwieldy to English readers.

As rightly stated warfare in the borderlands had a quality all of its own. From the melt-water flood hazards to the endless plains framed by boundless horizons of the borderlands of modern Ukraine and Belarus. Rivers formed the only line of defence and even these conditions varied wildly from season to season. And of course, these geographical positions quickly shaped the nature of its campaigns. Cavalry, mounted hussars, flank attacks, artillery posts, machine-gun nests and an ever elusive, changing and transparently vague frontline.
In many senses the terrain dictated most of the war as one of scouts and skirmishers with Pilsudski’s ‘strategy of the wolf’ adeptly encapsulating a kind of war in which mass offensives carried scant advantage. In fact, they were generally disastrous due to the vastness of the front line. Vantage points and settlement had to be taken with lighting fast action and subsequent reaction. Speed, mobility and the horse were once again following the catastrophes of WWI across the continent, the vital components of military success. The last cavalry to cavalry engagement was fought in this war and a reading of such a book as this may give those interested in the follies of WWI a perspective of how the mindsets of such wars fought first in 1914-16 had made especial sense for such a long period of human history. Speed and mobility had been key components to victory in Europe since the era of the mounted knight after all.
The books tactical vantage point with special regard to the Soviet First Cavalry Army the Konarmiya battalion reaping across the borderlands as the Cossacks of old was fascinating. And I believe that Davis used the appropriate quantity of literary allusions to illustrate the conflict. The accounts of Isaak Babel were most exceptional. Having fought in the war his was perhaps the most effective say in regards to the realities on the ground.

Furthermore Davies’ analysis of the inward schisms of the perspective forces leading and competing with the primary parties – along with most importantly examining the prejudices of both sides, are perhaps his greatest contributions to the historiography of this oft-over looked, greatly reduced or exaggerated series of conflicts. The escalation and pinnacles of the war are difficult to understand for someone living outside of the related regions that much is clear. But Davies diminishes this burden of historical imprecision and popular biases (especially on the parts of the Soviet and Allied scholarships as the Poles themselves would be rarely granted a voice on the subject outside their own countries in the decades to follow) and presents one of the earliest versions of the truth of said history as written in English.

Perspective is extraordinarily well presented here. With the contextual essences of the Soviet soldiery at this time examined in a stark and bloody contrast with the Polish legionaries demonstrating just how uniquely and completely different the two ideological sides were besides the fact that they were both fledgling states. One ancient, proud and recently resurrected and the other bold, ambitious and in dire straits embroiled as they were in the Civil War. The scrambles of both ‘the first socialist state in history’ and the recently emerged entity of the Polish State from the folds of a three-way partition a hundred and eleven years old are examined in close detail and conjunction.
Neither side took any account of the aspirations of the other. Both were misrepresented by their opponents and the wider European context which nursed the wars development as benefited them. It was neither the insignificant borderland contest nor the tell-tale turning point in human history. But it was an enormously significant and unique engagement which set the stage for much of the political and geopolitical climate to come, particularly within the future USSR as Lenin and the Politburo were forced to drastically alter their agendas and means of operations.
Such were the levels of hyperbole, misinformation and outright lies that twisted the realities of the involved individuals, factions and regional collectives in The Polish-Soviet War that the truth was mythicised not just for readers and historians today but for the very people who lived through the events!
Strategically too, it was an extraordinary feat. Eternally underrated and dismissed by the Allies. And when it was acknowledged, it was seen as an Entente gain outside of Poland. For both the Allies and the Soviets, this version of events suited perfectly.
What is perhaps most important about this book is its ability to tell the truth about Poland’s conduct in the war and their significance not just here in history but those conflicts prior, future and especially in World War II. In terms of historiography ‘British writers carelessly follow(ed) the prejudices of Russians. Thus in 1919 when the Polish-Soviet War was vital only to Poland they pretend(ed) it did not really exist; in 1920 when it became vital to Russia also they suddenly discover an outbreak.’ Eternally underrated, ridiculed and politically neutered by their respective ‘Allied’ nations (Britain and France) Poland was an opposed on both sides of the conflict with the Soviets themselves of course hoping to default and discredit Russia’s age old nemesis at every possible juncture.

Therefore, Davies dispelling of numerous such misconceptions and errors in historical writing are perhaps his greatest contribution here to the indignities of the war. For example, the Rada Obrony Panstwa as voted in by the Sejm (the Polish government) to ‘provide a framework for that essential unity purpose which Poland’s normal governmental machinery could not have engendered’ lasted only three months and was not the arch0type dictatorial hand played by Pilsudski and his ministers as so often claimed by their opponents
It was always Pilsudski’s last great war – his personality and political conduct unraveling in peace times. A sad irony that he was destined to die much too early for the greatest conflict of all WW2 when his country needed his steely indestructibility more than ever.

Regardless this book does story an elaborate and far-reaching conflict. One which is brushed over by the Allies as incidental – the Soviets as an uncredited lesson in defeat – and by the Poles themselves when they found themselves severed from their history with the eventual Soviet occupation and Ally betrayal and abandonment of them to that fate in World War II.
The conflict is too often forgotten or falsified purposely or not the discredit is the same. The war was a major precursor to the fate of Europe in the 1920s and beyond. A bold engagement in the uncertainty of post-Imperial Europe where chaos reigned upon the unstable footing of a scrambling and ill-fated series of new orders within the dark continent of Europe. I cannot fault this book on any point. It is no page turner and is quite dense but for someone interested in the war it is an impeccable secondary source. As Davies offers criticism of every side with an unprejudiced scope that places the conflict in its rightful arena in history.

[Stanisław Wilczyński · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mam mieszane uczucia po przeczytaniu tej książki. Z jednej strony na swoje czasy musiała być fenomenalna i zrobiła świetną robotę w odczarowywaniu błędnego spojrzenia krajów Europy Zachodniej na całą wojnę. Dowiedziałem się mnóstwa ciekawych informacji, skąd się ten konflikt wziął, kto właściwie był winny wybuchu, jaka była sytuacja Polski na innych granicach (i jakie właściwie one były w 1919 i 1920), podejściu ententy i przede wszystkim Lloyda Georga i całkowitej ignorancji wysłanników Wielkiej Brytanii w Polsce, czy fatalnej opinii o Piłsudskim za granicą. Bardzo dobry był obraz sytuacji w Rosji i podejścia Lenina do konfliktu na tle rozwoju wypadków w wojnie domowej. Zabrakło mi jednak trochę większej dyskusji nad skutkami wojny przede wszystkim dla sytuacji wewnętrznej Polski i Ukrainy. Dużym problemem było to, że we wstępie do nowego wydania sam autor pisze, że od 1972 (pierwszego wydania) pojawiły się nowe informacje nt. roli wywiadu polskiego i Ukrainy, jednak autor z nieznanego mi powodu nie zdecydował się wprowadzić korekty do swojej pracy, pomimo lepszej wiedzy. Miałem wrażenie, że we wstępie stwierdził "A nie chcę mi się jest ok jak jest". Plusik za przyznanie się i choć krótkie opisanie nowych informacji. Mimo wszystko, polecam, najbardziej kompletna praca o wojnie 1919-1920 z jaką miałem do czynienia

[Kieran · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very well-written and comprehensive history of the Polish-Soviet War. Perhaps the most interesting facts presented are less about the military operations themselves, but the circumstances and views from outside Soviet and Polish command staffs. Largely, how much the Polish-Soviet War affected the other power players of Europe and their own calculations.

However, as a work of military history, it is excellent. Other literature on the subject, at the time, was plagued with reductive conclusions or outright propaganda on the conflict itself. Davies succeeds in providing a balanced overview of the conflict itself and the thinking and motivations behind Polish and Soviet leadership.

[Matthew Dambro · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent doctoral dissertation written in the early 1970s by the now top Polish historian writing in English. It has all the problems of a dissertation but one can see even at that early stage the strength of Davies as a writer and historian. He dissects the events and personalities and examines them under a microscope. One should have some background in the time period because Davies assumes a great deal knowledge on the part of the reader. This is a wonderful book about Polish heritage and sacrifice.

[Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mimo upłynięcia sporego czasu, wielu zmian polityczno-demograficznych książka napisana bardzo rzetelnie. Zwłaszcza w dzisiejszych czasach i wojny na Ukrainie. Można powiedzieć że gdzieś już to widzieliśmy.

[Lukasz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Orzel Bialy Czerwona Gwiazda


Jakis czas temu objerzalem film Jerzego Hoffmana "1920 Bitwa Warszawska". Z okazji Swieta Niepodleglosci w mediach bylo tez sporo artykulow o Pilsudskim. To sprawilo, ze siegnalem po ksiazke Normana Daviesa "Orzel Bialy, Czerwona Gwiazda". I dobrze, ze siegnalem po ta ksiazke. Wiedzy historycznej na temat Bitwy Warszawskiej i Pilsudskiego nie mozna do konca czerpac z filmu Jerzego Hoffmana oraz z krotkich artykulow pojawiajacych sie w prasie oraz w portalach internetowych. Po przeczytaniu ksiazki Daviesa uswiadomilem sobie, ze to co przedstawia film oraz to co pisza media to tylko wybiurcze przedstawienie pewnych faktow. Zeby kompleksowo zrozumiec kontekst wydarzen roku 1920 trzeba zaglebic sie w powazniejsza lektura, jaka jest ksiazka Normana Daviesa.

Norman Davies jest wybitnym pisarzem, historykiem. Zbadal dosc szczegolowo tematyke wojny polsko-sowieckiej roku 1919-1920. Czesciowo obala mit cudu nad Wisla. Wojna polsko-sowiecka to o wiele wiecej niz jedna bitwa pod Warszawa. To walki zaczepne majace miejsce w roku 1919. To Bitwa Nad Niemniem. To bledne zalozenia Sowietow na temat gotowosci rewolucyjnej klasy robotniczo-chlopskiej w Polsce. I tak dalej, i tak dalej....

W skrocie chcialem podsumowac dla mnie najwazniejsze wnioski z tej lektury.

Kresy po I Wojnie Swiatowej.

Tuz po Wielkiej Wojnie obszar miedzy Rosja a Polska byl okupowany i administrowany przez wojska niemieckie. Po upadku frontu zachodniego i kapitulacji Niemiec wojska niemieckie zaczely sie wycofywac z obszarow przez siebie okupowanych. Zaczela powstawac proznia. Tereny dzisiejszej Litwy, Bialorusi, Ukrainy byly okupowane przez armie niemiecka. Po jej wycofaniu ta ziemia stala sie niczyja. Ciekawostka jest. ze wiele osad wiejskich zaczelo organizowac wlasna administracje. Na porzadku dziennym po pierwszej wojnie swiatowej bylo powstawanie malych panstewek na tych terenach. W 1918-1919 w Rosji panowala jeszcze wojna domowa. Rzady Bolszwikow byly niepewne. JEdnak Bolszewikom zalezalo na podporzadkowaniu sobie terenow opuszczanych przez wojska niemieckie. Niepodlegla Polska probowala rowniez odnalezsc sie w tej sytuacji, przejac tereny kresow, ustalic wschodnia granice Rzeczpospolitej, wprowadzic wlasna administracje na tych terenach. Takie wlasnie bylo preludium wojny polsko-bolszewickiej.


Kresy

Teatrem wojennym wojny polsko-sowieckiej byly kresy. W 1795 Polska przestala istniec. Stopniowo przez zabory kresy trafily w ostiemnastym wieku stawaly sie czescia carskiej Rosji. Po uzyskaniu niepodleglosci w 1918 Polska odnalazla sie w nowej rzeczywistosci. Sytuacja kresow byla nastepujaca. Historycznie tereny te byly zwiazane z Polska. Nalezaly do Polski przed rozbiorami. Po uzyskaniu niepodleglosci, byly to tereny rolnicze. Praktycznie nie zamieszkale przez Polakow. Ludnosc miejscowa, Ukraincy, Bialorusini, Litwini, Zydzi dazyli do samostanowienia. Warszawa byla dosc odlegla dla mieszkancow kresow. Wsrod Polakow magnateria prowadzila lobbing za wlaczeniem tych terenow do Polski. Czesc sceny politycznej z sentymentem patrzyla na kresy i marzyla o potedze teryterialnej jaka byla Rzeczpospolita przedrozbiorowa. Jednak z praktycznego punktu widzenia utrzymanie tych terenow bylo trudne. Bolszewizm byl dosc atrakycjna ideologia i ludnosc miejscowa kresow byla dosc podatna. Lenin i politbiuro bylo tego swiadome. Chcialo wykorzstac ta sytuacje, i wspieralo powstawanie republic socjalistycznach, Ukrainskiej Republiki Socjalistycznej oraz LitBielu - Litewsko-Bialoruskiej Republiki Socjalistycznej. Kresy jako teatr wojenny nie sa najlepszym terenem. Jest to teren rowninny, bez zadnych naturalnych barier w postaci gor. Rzeki stanowia jedyne przeszkody naturalne dla wojska. Klimat nie jest sprzajacy do walk w zimie i na wiosne, podczas roztopow. Sytuacja topograficzna i klimatyczna kresow jest dosc znaczaca jesli chodzi i prowadzenie wojny. Bolszewicy, jak i Pisudski wraz ze sztabem polskeij armii byli tego swiadomi.


Poczatek wojny

Hitorycy prowadza dyskusje na temat poczatku wojny. Jedno jest bezsprzeczne. Wojna polsko-bolszewicka rozpoczela sie w 1919 roku. Armia Polska dokonala ofensywy i zdobyla Kijow. Armia bolszewicka byla dosc slaba. Uderzenie ofesywne nie sprawilo armii polskiej wielich problemow. Pilsudski oderzyl w armie bolszewicka jako pierwszy uprzedzajac atak ze strony boleszwikow. Juz w 1919 wydawalo sie, ze inwazja bolszewicka jest tylko kwestia czasu. Davies wyjasnia kwestie poczatku wojny. Przedstawia dosc konkretne argumenty na to, ze ofensywa polska w roku 1919 byla poczatkiem wojny polsko-bolszewickiej i byla wykonana w duchu, ze "najlepsza obrona jest atak".

Postawa aliantow

Postawa aliantow jest w dosc szczegolowy sposob opisana przez Daviesa. Jako historyk brytyjski, Dabies mial mozliwosc przeanalizowania dokumentow brytyjskich dotyczacych wojny polsko-bolszewickiej. Alianci pozostawili Polske sama sobie. W dosc neiwielkim stopniu wspierali Polske. Dyplomatyczna pomoc Polsce praktycznie nie istniala. Brytyjskiemu premierowi Lordowi Lloydowi bardziej zalezalo na wymianie handlowej z Rosja sowiecka niz na wspieraniu Polski w trudzie wojennym przeciwko armi bolszewickiej. Jedynie minister wojny, Winston Churchil wstawial sie od czasu do czasu za Polska. Pomoc aliancka dla Polski konczyla sie na pozyczkach udzielanych Polsce, za ktore Polska i kupowala bron od pozyczajacych. Na przyklad Amerykanie zbili dosc dobry interes. Udzielili Polsce pozyczki na wykupienie wlasnych rezerw uzbrojenia jakie pozostawili w Europie po zakonczeniu Pierwszej Wojny Swiatowej. Rezerwy tej byly tak czy tak bezuzyteczne dla Amerykanow.

Dyplomacja

Prowadzenie dypomiacji podczas wojny polsko-bolszewickiej utrudnial fakt, ze Pilsudski nie byl ulubiona postacia wsrod aliantow. Nie wzbudzal u nich sympatii. Dodatkowo w kluczowym momencie wojny premierem zostal Wincenty Witos, ktory przyjmowal dyplomatow alianckich w ubiorze chlopskim. Mysle, ze w takich warunkach alianci na pewno powaznie nie brali Polakow. Pilsudski byl dosc bunczuczny, uwazany przez aliantow za radykala rewolucjoniste. Pod koniec ksiazki Norman Davies w ciekawy sposob wprowadza dygresje na temat Wladyslawa Sikorskiego. Zginal on na Giblartarze w niewyjasnionych okolicznosciach. Nie byl rowniez lubiany przez aliantow. Reprezentowal podobny styl prowadzenia polityki i dyplomacji co Pilsudski. Byl w pewnych kwetiach nieugiety i bunczyczny, tak jak Pilsudski podczas wojny polsko-bolszewickiej. Tak jak Sikroski byl niweygodni w latach drugiej wojny swiatowej dla aliantow, tak samo niewygodny byl Pilsudski dla aliantow podczas wojny polsko-bolsuewickiej. Jest to ciekawa dygresja Normana Daviesa. Mysle, ze dosc trafna. Potwierdza fakt, ze zbyt wielka radykalnosc polskiej polityki nie pomaga w relacjach z aliantami.

Granice Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej

Po uzyskaniu niepodleglosci w 1918 granice Rzeczpospolitej nie byly z gory ustalone. Wielkopolska musiala wlaczyc o przynalenosc do Polski. Gorny Slask byl rejonem spornym, gdzie wojska alianckie nadzorowaly plebiscyty. Slask Cieszynski byl teatrem potyczek pomiedzy wojskiem czechoslowackim i polskim. Tereny Mazur i Warmii mialy zostac objete plebiscytem. Wreszcie granica wschodnia Polski w ogole byla niejasna. Kluczowe miasta na wschodzie, Wilno i Lwow, w duzej mierze zamieszkane przez Polakow znajdowaly sie w dosc niepewnej sytuacji. Litwini dazyli o przylaczenie Wilna do Litwy. Lwow byl swego rodzaju polska enklawa we wschodniej Galicji. Wiejskie tereny wokol Lwowa byly przeciez zamieszkana przez ludnosc ukrainska. Tak naprawde w 1918 roku tereny zamieszkiwane przez ludnosc eticznie polska byly dosc male. Pomyslnie ukonczona wojna polsko-blszewicka przyczynila sie do ustalenia granic drugiej Rzeczpospolitej. Po przeczytaniu ksiazki Daviesa lepiej zrozumialem mechanizm powstawania granic drugiej Rzeczpospolitej. Dodatkowo, w momencie kiedy wazyly sie losy Wielkopolskie i jej przynaleznosci do Polski, kiedy wazyly sie losy Gornego Slaska i Zaolzia, uwaga w Warszawie, uwaga Pilsudskiego byla przykuta do wojny polsko-bolszewickiej. Wielkopolska, Slask, Zaolzie byly drugorzednymi sprawami dla Pilsudksiego.

Wielonarodowosc Rzeczpospolitej

Ksiazka uswiadomila mi po raz kolejny, jak wielonarodowym krajem byla Druga Rzeczpospolita. Sukces Pilsudskiego w wojnie polsko-bolszewickiej byl mozliwy dzieki otwartosci, tolerancji wobec innych narodow. Pilsudski wiedzial, ze Polska czysto etniczna nie mialaby szans w starciu z bolszewicka Rosja. Prowadzil politeke otwartosci, tolerancji wobec innych kultur i narodowosci. Byl swiadomy tego, ze tylko otwarta Polska, gdzie przedstawiciele najrozniejszych narodowosci i kultur beda sie czuli dobrze, moze odniesc sukces w starciu z bolszewicka Rosja. W pewnym moemncie ksiazki Norman Davies cytuje odzew Pilsudskiego do ludnosci. Odzew Pilsudskiego zacytowany przez Daviesa jest zaadresowany nie tylko do etnicznych Polakow, lecz do wszystkich mieszkancow terenow Rzeczpospolitej i terenow przylegajacych do Rzeczspospolitej. Celem Pilsudskiego bylo stworzenie wielonarodowej Polski. Bo tylko wielonarodowa Polska mogla byc silna Polska.

Sprawa Wilna.

Sptawa Wilna o tyle jest ciekawa, gdyz jest to rodzinne miasto Pilsudskiego. Ale nie tylko. Inny Polak, walczacy po stronie Sowietow, Feliks Dzierzynski tez byl blisko zwiazany z Wilnem. Sowietom zalezalo bardzo na Wilnie. Pilsudski koniecznie chcial wlaczyc Wilno do Rzeczpospolitej. Nie bylo to latwe. Bolszweiccy proletariusze litwescy i bialoruscy stworzyli wlasna Republike Socjalistyczna LitBiel. Nacjonalisci Litwescy darzyli do przejecia Wilna. Wilno wieloktornie w latach 1918-1920 zmienialo wladze. Davie wspomina, ze w tym okresie czasu przez Wilno przewinelo sie 8 roznych administracji. Sytuacja Wilna o tyle byla napieta ze w pazdziernika 1920, kiedy bylo jasne, ze bolszewicy zostali pokonani, nie byla jasna czy Wilno bedzie w ostatecznosci nalezec do Polski. Pilsudski musial dzialac dosc ostroznie. Alianci i Liga Narodow nie byla przychylna Pilsudskiemu i w zasadzie pojawialy sie glosy krytyczne w spawie przynaleznosci Wilna do Polski. W efekcie niesuordynacji generala Zelichowskiego, kroty wywolal tzw. Bunt Zelichowskiego, i zajal swoim odzdzialem wojska Wilno, udalo sie doprowadzic ostatecznie do opanaowania Wilna poprzez administracje Polska. Nastepnie wydarzenia w sferze politycznej i dyplomatycznej tak sie potoczyly, ze Wilno uznane zostalo sa polskie.

Wewnetrzna sytuacja w kraju

Sytuacja gospodarcza Polski byla katastrofalna. Przemysl byl dosc niewydolny. Zaklady niewyplacaly pensji robotnikom. Scena polityczna Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej byla dosc urozmaicona. W sejmie dzialalo wiele partii politycznych nie mogacych dojsc do porozumienia. Grozba inwazji sowieckiej doprowadzila do zgody narodowej. Moze za wyjatkiem obozu Narodowej Demokracji, ktora wycofala sie do Poznania i czekala na upadek wojsk Pilsudskiego. Dla mnie osobiscie niesamowita ciekawostka przytoczona przez Daviesa jest to, ze oboz Narodowo-Demokratyczny, ktory wycofal sie w efekcie inwazji sowietow na Polsce do Poznania, czekal az rzad Polski, na czele z Pilsudskim updanie w efekcie zdobycia Warszawy przez Sowietow, i zwroci sie z prosba o azyl do Poznaniakow, Narodowych Demokratow tam przebywajacych. Po zwyciestwie w roku 1920-1921 zycie w krajow zaczelo powracac do normy. Wiele problemow pozostalo, gospodarka byla niewydolna, ludzie nie mieli pracy. Sytuacja zaczela przerastac Pilsudskiego. Stad chyba postanowil wycofac sie z polityki, zdawajac sobie sprawe z tego, ze jest lepszym przywodca wojskowym, wojennynm, niz politkiem potrafiacym zarzadzac panstwem w czasach pokoju.


Kampania sowiecka roku 1920 jako mechanizm amajacy na celu rozsprzestrzenienie sie rewolucji bolszewickiej na Europe

Lenin wraz z obozem go otaczajacym nalezal do rewolucjonistow miedzynarodowych. W tym tez duchu sowieci wyruszyli na wojne z Polska. Polityka sowietow polegala na szerzeniu rewolucji miedzynarodowej. Porazka sowietow pokazala, ze zle oszacowali realiow w Polsce, w Europie. Robotnik, chlop w Polsce nie byl zapalonym rewolucjonista, nie chcial przylaczyc sie do rewolucji bolszewickiej, mimo, ze jego sytuacja nie byla zbyt dobra. Bolszewicy, Lenin nie docenil patriotyzmu polskiego, nie rozumial tego, ze narod polslki wiele ucierpial pod zabore rosyjskim i nikt w Polsce nie zamierzal przylaczac sie do bolszewikow, do ich rewolucji miedzynarodowej. DAvies przytacza sluszna uwage. Reperkusja porazki sowietow w wojnie polsko-bolszewickiej byla korekta wladzy w sowieckiej w ich polityce ekspansyjnej. Skryzadlo miedzynarodowe zostalo wyparte przez autorytarnych bolszewikow, takich jak Stalin ktorzy nie wierzyli w dobrowolna rewolucje innych narodow europejskich i zdawali sobie sprawe z tego, ze jedynie sila jest mozliwe wprowadzenie porzadku sowieckiego w innych krajach. Zreszta sytuacja na Ukrainie, wielki glod, jest tego najlepszym przykladem. Wprowadzanie sila porzadku bolszewickiego stalo sie glownym nurtem. Lenin slepo wierzyl, ze inwazja bolszewicka na Polsce bedzie iskra ktora spowoduje wielki wybuch rewolucyjny wsrod robotnikow i chlopow polskich.



Specyfika wojny. Rola nowinek (czolgi, samoloty, wozy pancerne). Blitzkrieg. Problemy z uzbrojeniem, zaopatrzeniem.

Davies w ksiazce poswieca tez troche miejsca na omowienie wojny z punktu widzenia czysto militarnego. Jazda konna odegrala na przyklad dosc wazna role w tej wojnie. Byla to bodajze ostania wojna w Europie gdzie jednostki kawalerii mialy znaczaca role w zwyciestwie. Obrazy starc kawaleryjnych byly ostanimi podczas tej wojny jakie Europa widziala w swojej historii. Wojna polsko-bolszewicka byla tez wojna gdzie testowano koncepcje blitzkriegu. Po stronie polskiej w skormny spoob, ale nie bez znaczenia, uzywano czolgow, opancerzonych wozow oraz samolotow. Niewielkie ilosci tego nowoczesnego uzbrojenia jak na tamte czasy w pewnym stopniu daly przewage militarna Polakom i na pewno w jakims stopniu przyczynily sie do zwyciestwa.


Pozycja Pilsudskiego jako niekwestionowanego wodza.

Zwyciestwo Polsi umocnilo pozycje Pilsudksiego. Jego pozycja jako wodza byla niekwestionowana. Jednak wycofal on sie z zycia politycznego. Reperkusja wojny polsko-sowieckiej, podkreslona pod kiniec ksiazki przez Daviesa bylo to, ze Pilsudski powrocil jako wodz narodu polskiego w 1926 roku podczas puczu majowego. Ciekawostka bylo to, ze wielu generalow, podlegajacych w czasie wojny polsko-bolszewickiej bezposrednio pod Pilsudskiego, walczylo podczas Puczu Majowego w 1926 po drugiej stronie barykady, przeciwko Pilsudskiemu. Natomiast, oficerowie srednioego szczebla, pulkownicy, ktorzy walczyli wojsku polskim podczas wojny polsko-bolszewickiej darzyla do puczu Majowego i zwerocila sie do Pilsudskiego o przywodctwo w puczu. To wlasnie dzieki oficerowie sredniego szczebla z lat 1919-1920 byli autorami sanacji i puczu majowego.

[Robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

A short but jam-packed history of the 1919-1920 Polish Soviet war, covering military, diplomatic, political, & historiographical aspects. The style is sometimes dated, but the book is a very quick read. I picked up this book because it was cited in the Wikipedia article about the 1919-1920 Polish-Soviet war. I was curious if there are parallels between then & the Russian-Ukrainian war & also I wondered how it was that horse cavalry played such a major role in a war that took place right after the First World War, which is widely seen as the end of horse cavalry in warfare. The latter question is answered pretty well in the 1st 50 pages (the distances involved in the war, & shortages of modern weapons such as artillery & even bullets on both sides). The book took longer to answer the 1st question (the answer is “not really”), which is unsurprising considering that it was written 50 years before the question could be asked. White Eagle Red Star has a lot of commentary on the state of historical memory of the Polish-Soviet War, taking issue with both Soviet & Polish “apologists”, & with other western European historians & commentators. Reading this makes me want to read more about the Russian Revolution, & especially about the Ukrainian Anarchists, who got a brief mention on page 119. Also made me want to check out Isaac Babel's writing. I like the Polish pronunciation guide at the beginning; maybe I’ll copy it for future reference.

[Rayrumtum · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the history of a little known war between the new Soviet state and the first free Poland state in several centuries. Unlike WWI in the West, this was a war of movement rather than static trench warfare. This was a peculiar war in which there were still huge cavalry engagement between Poles and Russians. Ironically tanks and aircraft were also involved in the fighting.
Often times many assume the post WWI map of Europe was purely the result of the Versailles Treaty, but there were many ongoing smaller wars in Eastern Europe by these new born states that changed truth on the ground and adjusted boundaries. For example, had this war ended 6 months earlier than it did, Vilnius would have been a Polish town instead of the capital of Lithuania.

This book was particularly strong handling the diplomatic aspects of the war between Russia and Poland, but it also added insights about how the French and British played diplomatically. Their support for Poland was not unequivocal. Also, the author's strategic analysis was insightful, but he was confusing on the tactical /operational aspects.

The author concludes that had Poland lost the war, that would have greatly affected future history of Europe as Russia would have rolled over Europe. I think that is a bit of a stretch as the Russians weary from war needed to consolidate within the former Russian hinterland. This book was published in 1972 so he might have found differently if written after the collapse of the USSR.

[Bill V · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm really not all that impressed with this book. However, it also happens to be the only book that I know of that deals with the entire Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921 which makes it by default a must have book for anyone who wants to know about it. The writing is somewhat dry.
One thing many history authors like to do is use a French term here and there without explaining what the term means. I've read and looked up enough of these terms over the years to understand them whenever I see them. Mr. Davies takes it to a different level though. He'll occasionally use entire French sentences and not bother to give the reader a translation. It happened enough that after a while, I would just skip over them.
Among all military history books I've read this ranks in the lower third but since the book is so unique I feel a need to have a copy of it because there is no alternative.
I am editing this review to note that since writing the review, I've read another title on this subject called Warsaw 1920 by Adam Zamoyski. While not ideal, it is a better read than White Eagle Red Star.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well written and balanced history of the Polish Russian war of 1919-20. Davies' presents the conflict clearly while establishing the political and social context of post WWI Eastern Europe, Russia going through its Civil War, the rebirth of Poland, the interests and limited influence of the Western Allies in regard to Communism, and the objectives of International Communism. While the results of this war changed the Communist view of international revolution it was merely the first step toward Polish independence which took another 70 years.

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

Norman Davies' White Eagle, Red Star is still the definitive work on the Polish-Soviet War and it shows: expertly researched and well-written, Davies covers every angle of the war, from the Polish side to the Soviets and the reactions to the Poles' victory in Western Europe and Germany. A little-known period of history is brought to life, and with it, the consequences of that Miracle on the Vistula for all of Europe. As A. J. P. Taylor wrote in the book's forward, this book "is a permanent contribution to historical knowledge and international understanding."

[Steven Raszewski · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a fascinating political, diplomatic and grand military strategy history of a time period, as they say, Americans and the West know way too little about. And the truth be told Great Britain and France were no friends of Poland.

[Monty Milne · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent account of a fascinating conflict. Isaac Babel’s superb “Red Cavalry” piqued my interest, and Davies does not disappoint. It was a strange conflict, looking both backwards and forwards: perhaps the last war where great sweeping masses of cavalry were of decisive importance, and a surprisingly fluid war of movement coming so soon after the end of trench warfare in World War One. The horse, the armoured train, and the aeroplane were all significant. Only the last of these really pointed to the future.

The “Miracle on the Vistula” which pretty much ended the war was a significant Polish victory. It was nicely planned, fortunately timed, and well executed. It also owed a lot of its success to Soviet mistakes: Tukhachevsky, for all his flair, is shown to have been something of a reckless gambler. The “Miracle” owed nothing to the French General Weygand, despite the propaganda at the time: he was an irrelevance, and Davies trashes his reputation. Stalin’s role was shifty and duplicitous: no surprises there. Pilsudski remains an enigma. Davies is even handed, although one’s sympathies tend to be with the Poles (had I had the misfortune to be living on the battlefield at the time, I would rather be mistreated by the Poles for not being an ethnic Pole than murdered by the Reds for being a class enemy).

Had the Reds taken Warsaw, would the Revolution have rolled on westwards until it reached the Atlantic? Certainly, the opportunistic nature of the gangster regime in Moscow had the notion that if a door yielded to pressure, wrench it open and keep going until eventually a door is slammed in your face – but there was just no way they were facing a succession of easily-opened doors, and after the Vistula battles they quickly realised it, signed a treaty, and settled down to the dismal task of destroying their own people. The Polish claim to have saved Europe from Bolshevism thus needs qualification: if the Poles hadn’t stopped them, the Bolsheviks would have tried to carry on, but the reality of the circumstances were such that this was never a realistic prospect.

This book was first written in the 1970’s and I suspect there must be a lot of information which came to light in Russia and Poland after the fall of Communism. It would be interesting to know if Professor Davies would want to revise any of his judgements now that a wider range of source material is available. A revised edition (with better maps) would easily get five stars.

[Aleksander Nowinski · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mija sto lat od końca wojny polsko-bolszewickiej, więc postanowiłem nieco bardziej zgłębić temat. Obawiałem się że praca młodego (wtedy) angielskiego historyka, stworzona w nieco mniej niż rok raczej nie będzie zbyt szczegółowa, ale po przeczytaniu stwierdzam szczerze: to jest absolutna rewelacja. Książka z jednej strony bardzo rozbudowana, ale dalece nie nudna. Co więcej jest sporo map, które pozwalają wzrokowcom mojego typu w miarę łatwo zrozumieć przebieg zdarzeń. Jest bardzo rozbudowana, zarówno o tło historyczne jak i szerszą perspektywę europejską. Jest tu zarówno sam opis działań militarnych, jak i bardzo szczegółowe opisy sytuacji politycznej, dyplomatycznej a także (w miarę potrzeb) gospodarczej. Pozwala to znacznie lepiej zrozumieć decyzje obu stron w różnych chwilach konfliktu, będące wypadkową sytuacji nie tylko militarnej ale również bieżących problemów obu bardzo młodych państw.

Dla polskiego czytelnika szczególną wartością jest dobre przedstawienie tego, co działo się na zachodzie Europy, gierek Loyda Georga i problemów wewnętrznych Francji, które o mało nie kosztowały nas niepodległości. To, jak traktowano Polskę, jak realizowano własne (czasem źle przemyślane) cele naszym kosztem, pozwala lepiej zrozumieć jak dziś wygląda geopolityka, co tak naprawdę dzieje się np. w Libii i dlaczego. Cenna lekcja dla wiecznie idealistycznych Polaków, chętnie rzucających się jako pierwsi do bitki za wolność waszą i (jeśli starczy sił i szczęścia) to może naszą.

Dodatkowo interesująca jest przedmowa, w której autor odnosi się do słabo u nas znanych problemów z proradziecką wizją historii szeroko rozpropagowaną na zachodnich uczelniach. W tej wersji historii dyskretnie zamieciono pod dywan wszystkie wydarzenia z roku 1919, wynikłe z wycofania się Niemców, a wojnę przedstawiono jako skutek podstępnego uderzenia Piłsudzkiego na Kijów. Jest to o tyle ciekawe, że jeszcze dziś można znaleźć również w Polsce niedouczonych krzykaczy powtarzających tą tezę.

No i po prostu dobrze się czyta.

A i spojler: wygraliśmy.

[Rob Prince · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another Davis masterpiece... at first view, it sounds so esoteric - a war between the young Soviet Union and the young Poland in 1920, that is, just after WW1 ended. It was a period of extraordinary turmoil in what were referred to as "the border areas" between what had formerlly been the Russian Empire, Prussia and Austria-Hungary. As the Russia and Austro-Hungarian empires collapsed and Prussia - now transformed into Germany - took a beating at Versailles a whole new constellation of nations emerged in their place...

The struggles - wars actually between so many of the players - the soon-to-be USSR, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania etc were complicated and for the most part short lived affairs, with one exception - the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920. It was a war that would - by the time it ended - both define the limits of the expansion of Communism west into Europe - the door slammed in Poland - as well as general parameters - both geographic and ethnic - of modern Poland. For different reasons, neither the Poles nor the Soviets paid much attention to that war. Davis' research suggests it was a key moment in European history.

Again, I read this to learn more about my ancestors who hailed from "the Pale" - that region of the Russian empire into which the Jews were herded and largely confined. It was the instability of that region I wanted to know more about. Take for example one of Davis' descriptions: at one point, it appeared that the Soviets were about to storm Warsaw. In the end they didn't, repelled by the military genius of Pilsudski (who in many ways reminds me of his opponent, Lenin, in that war).

Anyway Warsaw is threatened and the Poles living there are pretty much nonplussed, going about their business as if nothing was happening, at least that is how it is described by foreign commentators at the time. It makes more sense when Davis comments that over the past few years previously that Warsaw, during World War 1 had changed hands 16 (I think that is the number he quoted) times! And so it was with Bialystok, Grodno from whence my grandparents hailed.

This book alone would have established Norman Davies as a major historian of 20th century European history even if he hadn't followed up with his two volume history of Poland "God's Playground."

[Fred Dameron · Rating 3 out of 5]

Davies has written a good history of a time that has been ignored by both the East and the West. This book is neutral as far as the actual history political, foreign, and military is concerned but definitely has a Polish edge to it. Mostly seen in place names which take the Polish spelling over the conventional Western spelling of the Cyrillic names. This leads to a lot of reoffering to the end maps to orient yourself to where the military action is taking place. It is a fair book on the post war aftermath but the conclusions in the last chapter have been shown to be inaccurate. This will always be a problem when reading sources that are 40 years old.

If you are a Russian history fan, especially a person who subscribes to Sun Tzu's maxim, "Know your enemy as you know your self and you will never be defeated" then this is a must read. If you believe that Russia is still our enemy then understanding why Lenin did what he did and why Stalin acted the way he acted; then the Russian Polish War is more than just another episode in the history of the Revolution. And if the Russian Polish war is more than just another attempt by the West to end the Revolution this war needs to understood. It's repercussions are still felt today in the way the Kremlin thinks and the Polish war still influences the actions of the kremlin even in 2017.

[Evan Þ. · Rating 4 out of 5]

After World War I and toward the end of the Russian Civil War, the brand-new Polish and Soviet states fell into war with each other.  Their mutual border was clearly unsettled, neither trusted the other, ethnic tensions among the ethnically-mixed population were high amid the anarchy, and the Soviet government was heady on thoughts of world-sweeping Communist revolution.

The initial Polish invasion of the Ukraine failed, Davies argues, because Poland intended it as nothing more than a decoy to gain time. The subsequent Soviet invasion of Poland, Davies argues, failed on the doorstep of Warsaw not by a miracle of fighting but by a miracle of repositioning - the Polish army moved to attack the Soviet flank faster than they'd thought possible.  But just as significantly, contrary to the Soviet army's expectations, they weren't welcomed in by Communist revolution.

I came out of this agreeing with Davies this war should be talked about more.  It demonstrated that there wasn't going to be a world revolution, and thus sparked a great repositioning of Communist ideology.  And also, it gave the Polish state the unstable core idea that helped lead to the instability of interwar Eastern Europe.

[Alex Stern · Rating 4 out of 5]

For a topic that is rarely discussed, the story told about the Polish-Soviet War within these pages is truly fascinating, relying on an effective combination of the key military and political history. Not only does the author show how World War I left many unanswered questions for the newly-formed nations of Eastern Europe and how those questions led to total chaos among different peoples, but then proceeds to explain how the lessons of this conflict would leave a lasting impression on Poland, the Soviet Union, and the Allies in the subsequent years.

[Brian Mikołajczyk · Rating 5 out of 5]

The history of one of the forgotten wars of Europe, the Polish-Soviet War, where the Poles fended off the Soviets immediately after World War I and thus preventing the spread of communism westward (for the time being).
Russian military blunders coupled with Marshal Piłsudski's prowess and cunning allowed the Poles to fight the Soviets back from the gates of Warsaw back into the heart of Russia.
Davies tells an incredible story from all aspects of the war; a great read!

[Konrad Szuminski · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have been meaning to read this book for a long time. As a Pole, the Polish-Soviet War and the miracle at the Vistula means a huge amount, just 3 years on from recovering our nation, we were able to prevent it's destruction. Davies provides a balanced argument between the Polish and the Soviet side and the narrative is insightful and enjoyable to read.

[Alistair Robinson · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Polish-Soviet war is a lesser known postscript to the First World War, the author has written extensively on Polish history so this book is well researched and provides a good overview of the conflict. The main issue is that it is just dull, the maps are hard to make out and all in all there us little to hold the attention here. Not recommended.

[Eric · Rating 4 out of 5]

Normand Davis does and excellent job of giving the chaotic and confusing history of the Polish Soviet war a cohesive narrative. Lots of information and facts that I really did not know before. Gives excellent insight into post WWI and pre WWII Europe.

[Jonah Lo · Rating 4 out of 5]

An informative and entertaining enough romp that gives you all you need to know about the Polish-Soviet War. Unfortunately the maps do desperately need work and as a result, the descriptions of troop movements can become very arcane very quickly.

[Titus · Rating 5 out of 5]

A well written, detailed and unbiased account of the Polish-Soviet war. Norman Davies makes excellent notations and includes excerpts of several documents and telegrams that really give the reader a sense of the people and decisions involved. Highly recommend.