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Osprey Campaign #331
Smolensk 1943: The Red Army's Relentless Advance
Smolensk 1943 focuses on a major offensive that is virtually unknown in the West. With the German defeat at Kursk, the Soviet Stavka (high command) ordered the Western and Kalinin Fronts to launch Operation Suvorov in order to liberate the important city of Smolensk. The Germans had held this city for two years and Heeresgruppe Mitte's (Army Group Centre) 4. Armee had heavily fortified the region. The Soviet offensive began in August 1943 and quickly realized that the German defenses were exceedingly tough and that the Western Front had not prepared adequately for an extended offensive. Consequently, the Soviets were forced to pause their offensive after only two weeks, replenish their combat forces, and then begin again.
The German 4. Armee was commanded by Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, one of the Wehrmacht's top defensive experts. Although badly outnumbered, Heinrici's army gamely held off two Soviet fronts for seven weeks. Eventually, the 4. Armee's front was finally broken and Smolensk was liberated on 25 September 1943. However, the Western Front was too exhausted to pursue Heinrici's defeated army, which retreated to the fortified cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev; the 4. Armee would hold these cities until the destruction of Army Group Centre in June 1944.
The German 4. Armee was commanded by Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, one of the Wehrmacht's top defensive experts. Although badly outnumbered, Heinrici's army gamely held off two Soviet fronts for seven weeks. Eventually, the 4. Armee's front was finally broken and Smolensk was liberated on 25 September 1943. However, the Western Front was too exhausted to pursue Heinrici's defeated army, which retreated to the fortified cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev; the 4. Armee would hold these cities until the destruction of Army Group Centre in June 1944.
96 pages, Paperback
Published January 22, 2019
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30 people want to read
About the author
Robert Forczyk
58 books73 followersRobert Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
August 26, 2024
Another 5 star book from Dr. Forcyck
Any review of this book would have to start out by mentioning that is part of Osprey Publishing's "Campaign Series". Books in this series are relatively short, at only about 90 pages of length (typically and very roughly, a third or so consisting of illustrations such as maps and contemporaneous photographs). Hence if one is looking for an academic tome on the subject, this is not it. Despite not being such, however, it still does a very good job (given the limitations imposed by the "Campaign" series) and fills an important gap in the literature (there is little to be found on this campaign and most of what has been written about this time frame is in regard to the campaigns on the Southern Front [Kursk]).
The book starts out, following the typical "Campaign" series format, with a comparison of each side's commanders. The Germans, as usual, had the better but the gap in leadership quality between 1941-2 and 1943 had decreased considerably. The Soviet Union now had more experienced and generally better high level leaders than it had earlier. Plus the quality of Soviet lower level human capital (i.e., NCOs, officers, infantry in general) had improved while the German had decreased. The same applied for both quantity and quality of equipment.
The book then moves on to discuss and analyze how the battle itself, as well as to factors contributing to it, played out. A very important factor that prevented total German defeat was that the Germans were able to, very successfully, tell where the blows would come and hence had prepared accordingly in both their defensive positions as well as the setting up of their reserves. The Soviets, on the other hand, had their usual superiority in terms of men and material. However, this was considered a low priority front hence there were not enough resources dedicated to it (in particular fuel and artillery ammunition). Plus, the Soviets had a serious problem in their logistical supply train. Hence the offensive took the form of numerous stop-and-go steps that gave the Germans the much-needed pause they needed to reform their defensive lines, re-group and receive reinforcements. This was probably the most important factor that had prevented a complete and utter collapse, from the German perspective, on this front.
All and all both the narrative and analysis put forth in the book is this regard. Additionally, the book is very well researched. Dr. Forczyk, thanks to his command of German, has made very extensive use of original German-language primary sources (in particular records contained in the US National Archives and Records Administration) as well as secondary sources (in particular Russian language literature). These sources are all mentioned in the bibliography. However the book, typical of the "Campaign" series, lacks footnotes thus the reader has no way of knowing where specific information comes from. This is a serious disservice to both the reader and the author. It is an issue that this series of books desperately needs to fix (hope someone from Osprey Publishing is reading this).
The book does have a few weaknesses that do need to be mentioned however. One has to do with the maps in the Kindle edition (the Barnes and Noble Nook edition also has the same problem). They are way to small (and have a mediocre degree of resolution that further worsens the problem) to follow what is going on and there is no way to make them larger.
A second problem involves two of Dr. Forszyk's conclusions. One of the conclusions reached was that "from the German point of view, there was relatively little that either Von Kluge or Henrici could have done to alter the outcome, given their limited resources" (unfortunately this reviewer read the Kindle version so cannot provide an exact page number for his quote). This really derides the contribution of both Von Kluge and Henrici. If lesser mortals, in terms of command capability, had been in charge this campaign could have went, for the Germans, from a not that great conclusion to an utter disaster. The way things did turn out, at least the Germans were able to stabilize the front at the end of campaign. It could have turned out being much worse - like the Soviet break through over the Dnepr post battle of Kursk.
Dr. Forczyk's second conclusion was that Hitler's diversion of resources to Italy and Greece, in particular of three panzer divisions, played an important role in the defeat. He writes "If the OKH had been able to introduce even two fresh mobile divisions to reinforce 4. Armee [force responsible for Smolensk Front] by late August, Von Kluge might have been able to salvage more from this situation and limit the gains achieved by Operation Suvorov [Soviet name for offensive on this front]" (again, this reviewer cannot cite the page number for this quote thanks to having used the Kindle edition). However, this view begs the question, especially considering how large the Eastern Front was and the larger disasters befalling the Germans on the Southern Front (in particular the post-Kursk environment), along with their higher priorities for OKH, why would any of these tied up divisions been sent to Smolensk?
Despite these weaknesses this book is still excellent. It is very well researched and written (especially considering the restraints imposed by the "Campaign" series) and the narrative and analysis are fantastic. Five stars.
Any review of this book would have to start out by mentioning that is part of Osprey Publishing's "Campaign Series". Books in this series are relatively short, at only about 90 pages of length (typically and very roughly, a third or so consisting of illustrations such as maps and contemporaneous photographs). Hence if one is looking for an academic tome on the subject, this is not it. Despite not being such, however, it still does a very good job (given the limitations imposed by the "Campaign" series) and fills an important gap in the literature (there is little to be found on this campaign and most of what has been written about this time frame is in regard to the campaigns on the Southern Front [Kursk]).
The book starts out, following the typical "Campaign" series format, with a comparison of each side's commanders. The Germans, as usual, had the better but the gap in leadership quality between 1941-2 and 1943 had decreased considerably. The Soviet Union now had more experienced and generally better high level leaders than it had earlier. Plus the quality of Soviet lower level human capital (i.e., NCOs, officers, infantry in general) had improved while the German had decreased. The same applied for both quantity and quality of equipment.
The book then moves on to discuss and analyze how the battle itself, as well as to factors contributing to it, played out. A very important factor that prevented total German defeat was that the Germans were able to, very successfully, tell where the blows would come and hence had prepared accordingly in both their defensive positions as well as the setting up of their reserves. The Soviets, on the other hand, had their usual superiority in terms of men and material. However, this was considered a low priority front hence there were not enough resources dedicated to it (in particular fuel and artillery ammunition). Plus, the Soviets had a serious problem in their logistical supply train. Hence the offensive took the form of numerous stop-and-go steps that gave the Germans the much-needed pause they needed to reform their defensive lines, re-group and receive reinforcements. This was probably the most important factor that had prevented a complete and utter collapse, from the German perspective, on this front.
All and all both the narrative and analysis put forth in the book is this regard. Additionally, the book is very well researched. Dr. Forczyk, thanks to his command of German, has made very extensive use of original German-language primary sources (in particular records contained in the US National Archives and Records Administration) as well as secondary sources (in particular Russian language literature). These sources are all mentioned in the bibliography. However the book, typical of the "Campaign" series, lacks footnotes thus the reader has no way of knowing where specific information comes from. This is a serious disservice to both the reader and the author. It is an issue that this series of books desperately needs to fix (hope someone from Osprey Publishing is reading this).
The book does have a few weaknesses that do need to be mentioned however. One has to do with the maps in the Kindle edition (the Barnes and Noble Nook edition also has the same problem). They are way to small (and have a mediocre degree of resolution that further worsens the problem) to follow what is going on and there is no way to make them larger.
A second problem involves two of Dr. Forszyk's conclusions. One of the conclusions reached was that "from the German point of view, there was relatively little that either Von Kluge or Henrici could have done to alter the outcome, given their limited resources" (unfortunately this reviewer read the Kindle version so cannot provide an exact page number for his quote). This really derides the contribution of both Von Kluge and Henrici. If lesser mortals, in terms of command capability, had been in charge this campaign could have went, for the Germans, from a not that great conclusion to an utter disaster. The way things did turn out, at least the Germans were able to stabilize the front at the end of campaign. It could have turned out being much worse - like the Soviet break through over the Dnepr post battle of Kursk.
Dr. Forczyk's second conclusion was that Hitler's diversion of resources to Italy and Greece, in particular of three panzer divisions, played an important role in the defeat. He writes "If the OKH had been able to introduce even two fresh mobile divisions to reinforce 4. Armee [force responsible for Smolensk Front] by late August, Von Kluge might have been able to salvage more from this situation and limit the gains achieved by Operation Suvorov [Soviet name for offensive on this front]" (again, this reviewer cannot cite the page number for this quote thanks to having used the Kindle edition). However, this view begs the question, especially considering how large the Eastern Front was and the larger disasters befalling the Germans on the Southern Front (in particular the post-Kursk environment), along with their higher priorities for OKH, why would any of these tied up divisions been sent to Smolensk?
Despite these weaknesses this book is still excellent. It is very well researched and written (especially considering the restraints imposed by the "Campaign" series) and the narrative and analysis are fantastic. Five stars.
January 27, 2021
I loved how detailed it was and how it really talked about operation Suvorov and the liberation of Smolensk. It talks about the Western and Kalinin Fronts attack against the 4 armee and all of the information is a mazing. It starts by talking about the Origins then opposing commander, forces and plans but not only that it also has a section of the order of battles for the Western, Kalinin and the 4 armee. With sub notes of when the commanders were replaced then it goes on talking about all of the three phases of Operation Suvorov and the liberation of Smolensk with very good pictures of the battlefield and also the maps and the 3d maps just add to the experience and the writing is very informational. And after all that it talks about the aftermath and the battlefield today. So overall if you want to no more about the Eastern front especially how the Western and Kalinin fronts defeated the Germans or the liberation of Smolensk I highly recommend this book.
January 30, 2022
A book in the Osprey Ca series. Very short but very well written account of a not very well known offensive - the Battle of Smolensk in 1943.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews