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Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India
Britain's precipitous and ill-planned disengagement from India in 1947--condemned as a "shameful flight" by Winston Churchill--had a truly catastrophic effect on South Asia, leaving hundreds of thousands of people dead in its wake and creating a legacy of chaos, hatred, and war that has lasted over half a century.
Ranging from the fall of Singapore in 1942 to the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, Shameful Flight provides a vivid behind-the-scenes look at Britain's decision to divest itself from the crown jewel of its empire. Stanley Wolpert, a leading authority on Indian history, paints memorable portraits of all the key participants, including Gandhi, Churchill, Attlee, Nehru, and Jinnah, with special focus on British viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten. Wolpert places the blame for the catastrophe largely on Mountbatten, the flamboyant cousin of the king, who rushed the process of nationhood along at an absurd pace. The viceroy's worst blunder was the impetuous drawing of new border lines through the middle of Punjab and Bengal. Virtually everyone involved advised Mountbatten that to partition those provinces was a calamitous mistake that would unleash uncontrollable violence. Indeed, as Wolpert shows, civil unrest among Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs escalated as Independence Day
approached, and when the new boundary lines were announced, arson, murder, and mayhem erupted. Partition uprooted over ten million people, 500,000 to a million of whom died in the ensuing inferno.
Here then is the dramatic story of a truly pivotal moment in the history of India, Pakistan, and Britain, an event that ignited fires of continuing political unrest that still burn in South Asia.
Ranging from the fall of Singapore in 1942 to the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, Shameful Flight provides a vivid behind-the-scenes look at Britain's decision to divest itself from the crown jewel of its empire. Stanley Wolpert, a leading authority on Indian history, paints memorable portraits of all the key participants, including Gandhi, Churchill, Attlee, Nehru, and Jinnah, with special focus on British viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten. Wolpert places the blame for the catastrophe largely on Mountbatten, the flamboyant cousin of the king, who rushed the process of nationhood along at an absurd pace. The viceroy's worst blunder was the impetuous drawing of new border lines through the middle of Punjab and Bengal. Virtually everyone involved advised Mountbatten that to partition those provinces was a calamitous mistake that would unleash uncontrollable violence. Indeed, as Wolpert shows, civil unrest among Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs escalated as Independence Day
approached, and when the new boundary lines were announced, arson, murder, and mayhem erupted. Partition uprooted over ten million people, 500,000 to a million of whom died in the ensuing inferno.
Here then is the dramatic story of a truly pivotal moment in the history of India, Pakistan, and Britain, an event that ignited fires of continuing political unrest that still burn in South Asia.
272 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
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1032 people want to read
About the author
Stanley Wolpert
23 books112 followersStanley A. Wolpert is an American academic, Indologist, and author considered one of the world's foremost authorities on the political and intellectual history of modern India and Pakistan and has written fiction and nonfiction books on the topics. He taught at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) from 1959-2002.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 42 reviews
July 26, 2015
The central argument of the book is, as the name indicates, that British, when they decided to leave India, did not plan the transfer of power properly enough.
The consequences of their lack of preparation were catastrophic as, inter alia, there were unresolved border disputes between the newly independent states of India and Pakistan (the latter divided into East and West wings) - and princely states, including Kashmir, were left in constitutional limbo due to which millions of people were uprooted from their ancestral homes in a tragedy which cost up to one million lives.
The British were desperately trying to chalk out a workable plan of Independence acceptable to both parties of the conflict (Muslims and Hindus) for at least a decade. Failing that, after World War II, when British power waned considerably, they just decided to dump India and go home. The last post-WWII viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, brought forward the date of Independence by one year, against the time-frame set by the British Parliament in London. In later years Mountbatten reflected on his policies and conceded that he “fucked it up”.
From Sir Stafford Cripps’s mission after the Fall of Singapore in 1942 till the assassination of Gandhi in 1948 this books gives a detailed account of the events that led up to the Partition and Independence of the Indian Subcontinent. This is a detailed and rewarding work by an author who is arguably one of the most authoritative writers on the subject.
The consequences of their lack of preparation were catastrophic as, inter alia, there were unresolved border disputes between the newly independent states of India and Pakistan (the latter divided into East and West wings) - and princely states, including Kashmir, were left in constitutional limbo due to which millions of people were uprooted from their ancestral homes in a tragedy which cost up to one million lives.
The British were desperately trying to chalk out a workable plan of Independence acceptable to both parties of the conflict (Muslims and Hindus) for at least a decade. Failing that, after World War II, when British power waned considerably, they just decided to dump India and go home. The last post-WWII viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, brought forward the date of Independence by one year, against the time-frame set by the British Parliament in London. In later years Mountbatten reflected on his policies and conceded that he “fucked it up”.
From Sir Stafford Cripps’s mission after the Fall of Singapore in 1942 till the assassination of Gandhi in 1948 this books gives a detailed account of the events that led up to the Partition and Independence of the Indian Subcontinent. This is a detailed and rewarding work by an author who is arguably one of the most authoritative writers on the subject.
July 24, 2016
The partition of Pakistan and India had been on my mind for some time. I wanted to find a book that would be minimally biased and well-researched. I asked a friend, who is well-read in history, to show me a starting point from where I could silence my subconscious, which periodically would make me feel ignorant about my roots. He suggested that I should read this book (along with a few other books to complete the puzzle).
A remarkable book that details the role of the key players in the partition which lead to chaos and bloodshed. I was captivated from the beginning. I also felt very strong negative emotions of depression, anxiety and frustration as the political drama unfolded. In the end, I emerged as someone who has just enough knowledge of the complex, ego-driven madness, to be able to answer the question: "Who was at fault?"
A remarkable book that details the role of the key players in the partition which lead to chaos and bloodshed. I was captivated from the beginning. I also felt very strong negative emotions of depression, anxiety and frustration as the political drama unfolded. In the end, I emerged as someone who has just enough knowledge of the complex, ego-driven madness, to be able to answer the question: "Who was at fault?"
August 23, 2024
When India’s autonomy in conclusion became an authenticity in August 1947, there were two divergent dualities:
1) The blissful nature of the event was palpable; a nation that had for so long been under the repression of an unfair colonial power was liberated to create its own path.
2) This, alternatively, contrasted with a more solemn circumstance. Millions of people in the new states of India and Pakistan were uprooted from their ancestral homelands and had to make traumatic journeys across the border. One million people were sucked into the plunder and massacre which accompanied this mass migration and never made it.
Perhaps the implausible polarization between these two extremes led people not to focus as much on the miracle of how India had suddenly become independent.
After all, this was the “Jewel of the British Crown” which the British had moved heaven and earth to enthusiastically keep in their grab.
Why else were so many independence leaders locked up repetitively?
For what reason did the British pass such draconian legislation like the Defense of India Act of 1915 and the Rowlatt of 1919 which brutally curtailed civil liberties and freedom of expression, other than to preserve colonial rule?
Why did Reginald Dyer see fit to massacre civilians at Amritsar?
The independence of India is in actuality relatively incomprehensible in the context of the lengths to which the British authorities had gone to repress all impending rebellion.
So how and why did the Raj end?
The title of this book has been rented from Churchill's visionary caution to Prime Minister Clement Attlee's government in the British House of Commons all through the first debate over Labour's Indian Independence Bill.
Mountbatten's disconcerted rage in accelerating the originally taut extraction timetable, mandated by Britain's cabinet to expand to June 1948, triggered Britain's "shameful flight, by an untimely rushed scuttle" that left South Asia susceptible to abhorrence and fright, compounded by unaware horrors and hideous rumors, multiplied by hundreds of millions.
How was it likely for the leaders of Great Britain, hardly two years after defeating, with U.S. support, the armies of Hitler and Mussolini, to withdraw its 14,000 British officers in such inappropriate swiftness from India?
The author argues that an amalgamation of historic causes led to that disastrous ‘faux pas’, only the most instantaneous of which was Mountbatten's ineffectiveness.
Mounting British aggravations with Indian political leaders, their never-ending bickering, swelling demands, and lack of thankfulness or dependability, made even their closest British wartime friends in the Labour Party lose confidence in them, in particular after the cave in of Sir Stafford Cripps's mission, launched right away following Singapore's surrender.
One would do well to remember that the Second World War (WW2) put a colossal sprain on the British economy. Nearly 12 million tons of merchant shipping was sunk by 1945 and exports were down two-thirds by the conclusion of the war.
Britain was forced to put up for sale most of its abroad assets and depended on the Lend-Lease act to carry on imports from the United States, which they were not capable to pay for. This was while the British government still had to bear the complete cost of maintaining India’s army and colonial administration.
Britain’s military potency was also pushed to the verge of collapse such that it had to depend on American help to guard Australia.
The letdown of Congress leaders to be grateful for what Cripps tried to do damaged India much more than Britain.
Churchill deceitfully assisted Cripps's collapse, even while using his mission as "proof positive" to Roosevelt of Britain's "best intentions" toward India.
In August 1942, Congress Party leaders launched the "Quit India" movement, giving Viceroy Linlithgow the chance he enthusiastically desired to lock all of them up, including Gandhi and Nehru, leaving them to rust behind British bars for the remaining years of the war.
Jinnah, the League's eternal president, took benefit of his wartime freedom to augment the prestige of his Muslim constituency.
Jinnah kept demanding nothing less than an autonomous Muslim nation of Pakistan, as Muslim India's postwar reward for the service of its loyal Muslim troops on all fronts and for the support, Muslim leaders like himself gave the viceroy and his governors.
In his ire and indignation the author blames it all on the ineptitude of Mountbatten and Radcliffe and does not forget to extol Gandhi and Nehru.
And there were others reasons too for such a speedy retreat. History records that Mountbatten was given the mandate to transfer power and superintend the British departure from the subcontinent by June 1948. However, the escalating communal viciousness, with extensive riots, mass carnages, and dislocation of communities on the one hand and the momentous trials, including financial restraints and the need to decolonize facing the British Empire, Mountbatten and his peers in London were praying for a rapid partition which could help protect both their tactical interests in the region and enable a suave exodus from India.
Very fascinatingly, neither the Congress highcommand nor the British intelligence had the least idea of Jinnah’s Tuberculosis.
In this respect I am tempted to quote straight from ‘Freedom at Midnight’ by Lapierre and Collins:
"That secret was frozen on to the grey surface of a piece of film, a film which could have upset the Indian political equation and would almost certainly have changed the course of Asian history. Yet so precious was the secret that even the British CID, one of the most effective investigative agencies in the world, was ignorant of its existence... That film was an X-ray, the X-ray of a pair of human lungs. The black circles were pulmonary cavities, gaping holes in which the lung’s vital tissues no longer existed. The little chain of white dots indicated areas where more pulmonary or pleural tissue was already hardening and confirmed the diagnosis: tuberculosis was devouring the lungs. The damage was already so extensive that the human being whose lungs were on that film could have barely two or three years to live. Sealed in an unmarked envelope, those X-rays were locked in the office safe of Dr J. A. L. Patel, a Bombay physician. The lungs depicted on them belonged to the rigid and inflexible man who had frustrated Louis Mountbatten’s efforts to preserve India’s unity. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the one unmovable obstacle between the Viceroy and Indian unity, was living under a sentence of death."
Jinnah would not have long as per the report and he eventually died within a year of partition.
And if we are to believe lately released documents in London, we are afforded supplementary clarity to what the real British strategy was. The British were playing a rather deceitful game. They sought to make the whole situation appear as though they were absolutely supportive of a United India. The fact was somewhat very unlike, alas!
The British basically sought to certify that the North Western part of India was left under their perpetual shadow-control. This was for the reason that they wanted to guarantee that the Western world would incessantly have access to central Asia so as to act as a check and bulwark to the U.S.S.R.
In keeping this plan at heart, the date for the transfer of status for India was principally moved up by a number of years. This came as an uncouth jolt to the Congress. In 1946 they were essentially told that India would be on it’s own within a year and that Pakistan would be created as measure of this prearrangement.
Hold your breath and imagine!! Had the date been pushed back to 1950, as per the initial expectations, there almost certainly would not have been a partition. Jinnah would have been gone, and in his absence the more rational voices in the Muslim League would not have endorsed the scheme.
However, these are big What Ifs of history.
A conspiracy theory I drop here: They say that Radcliffe was the fall-guy, who thoughtlessly followed Churchill’s map. Churchill and his cabinet had drawn this up years before anything would come to pass. The Conservatives promised a Pakistan to Jinnah. And even after the Conservatives were voted out and Attlee stepped in, Churchill’s map was not discarded. The British needed a Pakistan as they foresaw the fact that the middle-east would soon be under the influence of the west, post-holocaust. And Stalin was busy looking for a tropical naval base. [Conspiracy theory, so very little documented proof here, except the Stalin part]
Nevertheless, my principal pickle and my fundamental predicament with this tome is that it hardly mentions Subhaschandra Bose, aside from six-seven pages of informal reference.
Obviously there was Bose. His shadow loomed large.
Though Bose’s project was an operational malfunction, it was the INA’s inheritance that held the greatest weight.
The British idiotically charged three INA officers, Gurbaksh Singh Dillion, Shah Nawaz Khan, and Prem Sahgal with sedition and sentenced them to death. The resulting hubbub, uproar and public pandemonium, forced their discharge and release, and the very notion that Indian soldiers could dissent against their colonial masters set a paradigm for additional revolts against the Raj.
First the Navy and then the Police.
And who can forget the year 1956, when former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee had come on a pan-India tour?
Former Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, P. V. Chakraborty had managed to extract a productive conversation with him. When he asked, “There was nothing in the Indian situation at that time, which made it essential for the British to leave India in a scurry. Why then did they do so?”
Clement Attlee gave out more than a few explanations, among which the most outstanding ones were the ascent of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army, which lessened and deteriorated their British army, and the the Royal Indian Navy mutiny.
When Chakraborty asked him about the brunt of Gandhi’s 1942 Quit India movement, Atlee deprecatingly remarked with a grin “Minimal”.
A run of the mill book!! 600 pages of no new information and makeshift academic debauchery!
1) The blissful nature of the event was palpable; a nation that had for so long been under the repression of an unfair colonial power was liberated to create its own path.
2) This, alternatively, contrasted with a more solemn circumstance. Millions of people in the new states of India and Pakistan were uprooted from their ancestral homelands and had to make traumatic journeys across the border. One million people were sucked into the plunder and massacre which accompanied this mass migration and never made it.
Perhaps the implausible polarization between these two extremes led people not to focus as much on the miracle of how India had suddenly become independent.
After all, this was the “Jewel of the British Crown” which the British had moved heaven and earth to enthusiastically keep in their grab.
Why else were so many independence leaders locked up repetitively?
For what reason did the British pass such draconian legislation like the Defense of India Act of 1915 and the Rowlatt of 1919 which brutally curtailed civil liberties and freedom of expression, other than to preserve colonial rule?
Why did Reginald Dyer see fit to massacre civilians at Amritsar?
The independence of India is in actuality relatively incomprehensible in the context of the lengths to which the British authorities had gone to repress all impending rebellion.
So how and why did the Raj end?
The title of this book has been rented from Churchill's visionary caution to Prime Minister Clement Attlee's government in the British House of Commons all through the first debate over Labour's Indian Independence Bill.
Mountbatten's disconcerted rage in accelerating the originally taut extraction timetable, mandated by Britain's cabinet to expand to June 1948, triggered Britain's "shameful flight, by an untimely rushed scuttle" that left South Asia susceptible to abhorrence and fright, compounded by unaware horrors and hideous rumors, multiplied by hundreds of millions.
How was it likely for the leaders of Great Britain, hardly two years after defeating, with U.S. support, the armies of Hitler and Mussolini, to withdraw its 14,000 British officers in such inappropriate swiftness from India?
The author argues that an amalgamation of historic causes led to that disastrous ‘faux pas’, only the most instantaneous of which was Mountbatten's ineffectiveness.
Mounting British aggravations with Indian political leaders, their never-ending bickering, swelling demands, and lack of thankfulness or dependability, made even their closest British wartime friends in the Labour Party lose confidence in them, in particular after the cave in of Sir Stafford Cripps's mission, launched right away following Singapore's surrender.
One would do well to remember that the Second World War (WW2) put a colossal sprain on the British economy. Nearly 12 million tons of merchant shipping was sunk by 1945 and exports were down two-thirds by the conclusion of the war.
Britain was forced to put up for sale most of its abroad assets and depended on the Lend-Lease act to carry on imports from the United States, which they were not capable to pay for. This was while the British government still had to bear the complete cost of maintaining India’s army and colonial administration.
Britain’s military potency was also pushed to the verge of collapse such that it had to depend on American help to guard Australia.
The letdown of Congress leaders to be grateful for what Cripps tried to do damaged India much more than Britain.
Churchill deceitfully assisted Cripps's collapse, even while using his mission as "proof positive" to Roosevelt of Britain's "best intentions" toward India.
In August 1942, Congress Party leaders launched the "Quit India" movement, giving Viceroy Linlithgow the chance he enthusiastically desired to lock all of them up, including Gandhi and Nehru, leaving them to rust behind British bars for the remaining years of the war.
Jinnah, the League's eternal president, took benefit of his wartime freedom to augment the prestige of his Muslim constituency.
Jinnah kept demanding nothing less than an autonomous Muslim nation of Pakistan, as Muslim India's postwar reward for the service of its loyal Muslim troops on all fronts and for the support, Muslim leaders like himself gave the viceroy and his governors.
In his ire and indignation the author blames it all on the ineptitude of Mountbatten and Radcliffe and does not forget to extol Gandhi and Nehru.
And there were others reasons too for such a speedy retreat. History records that Mountbatten was given the mandate to transfer power and superintend the British departure from the subcontinent by June 1948. However, the escalating communal viciousness, with extensive riots, mass carnages, and dislocation of communities on the one hand and the momentous trials, including financial restraints and the need to decolonize facing the British Empire, Mountbatten and his peers in London were praying for a rapid partition which could help protect both their tactical interests in the region and enable a suave exodus from India.
Very fascinatingly, neither the Congress highcommand nor the British intelligence had the least idea of Jinnah’s Tuberculosis.
In this respect I am tempted to quote straight from ‘Freedom at Midnight’ by Lapierre and Collins:
"That secret was frozen on to the grey surface of a piece of film, a film which could have upset the Indian political equation and would almost certainly have changed the course of Asian history. Yet so precious was the secret that even the British CID, one of the most effective investigative agencies in the world, was ignorant of its existence... That film was an X-ray, the X-ray of a pair of human lungs. The black circles were pulmonary cavities, gaping holes in which the lung’s vital tissues no longer existed. The little chain of white dots indicated areas where more pulmonary or pleural tissue was already hardening and confirmed the diagnosis: tuberculosis was devouring the lungs. The damage was already so extensive that the human being whose lungs were on that film could have barely two or three years to live. Sealed in an unmarked envelope, those X-rays were locked in the office safe of Dr J. A. L. Patel, a Bombay physician. The lungs depicted on them belonged to the rigid and inflexible man who had frustrated Louis Mountbatten’s efforts to preserve India’s unity. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the one unmovable obstacle between the Viceroy and Indian unity, was living under a sentence of death."
Jinnah would not have long as per the report and he eventually died within a year of partition.
And if we are to believe lately released documents in London, we are afforded supplementary clarity to what the real British strategy was. The British were playing a rather deceitful game. They sought to make the whole situation appear as though they were absolutely supportive of a United India. The fact was somewhat very unlike, alas!
The British basically sought to certify that the North Western part of India was left under their perpetual shadow-control. This was for the reason that they wanted to guarantee that the Western world would incessantly have access to central Asia so as to act as a check and bulwark to the U.S.S.R.
In keeping this plan at heart, the date for the transfer of status for India was principally moved up by a number of years. This came as an uncouth jolt to the Congress. In 1946 they were essentially told that India would be on it’s own within a year and that Pakistan would be created as measure of this prearrangement.
Hold your breath and imagine!! Had the date been pushed back to 1950, as per the initial expectations, there almost certainly would not have been a partition. Jinnah would have been gone, and in his absence the more rational voices in the Muslim League would not have endorsed the scheme.
However, these are big What Ifs of history.
A conspiracy theory I drop here: They say that Radcliffe was the fall-guy, who thoughtlessly followed Churchill’s map. Churchill and his cabinet had drawn this up years before anything would come to pass. The Conservatives promised a Pakistan to Jinnah. And even after the Conservatives were voted out and Attlee stepped in, Churchill’s map was not discarded. The British needed a Pakistan as they foresaw the fact that the middle-east would soon be under the influence of the west, post-holocaust. And Stalin was busy looking for a tropical naval base. [Conspiracy theory, so very little documented proof here, except the Stalin part]
Nevertheless, my principal pickle and my fundamental predicament with this tome is that it hardly mentions Subhaschandra Bose, aside from six-seven pages of informal reference.
Obviously there was Bose. His shadow loomed large.
Though Bose’s project was an operational malfunction, it was the INA’s inheritance that held the greatest weight.
The British idiotically charged three INA officers, Gurbaksh Singh Dillion, Shah Nawaz Khan, and Prem Sahgal with sedition and sentenced them to death. The resulting hubbub, uproar and public pandemonium, forced their discharge and release, and the very notion that Indian soldiers could dissent against their colonial masters set a paradigm for additional revolts against the Raj.
First the Navy and then the Police.
And who can forget the year 1956, when former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee had come on a pan-India tour?
Former Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, P. V. Chakraborty had managed to extract a productive conversation with him. When he asked, “There was nothing in the Indian situation at that time, which made it essential for the British to leave India in a scurry. Why then did they do so?”
Clement Attlee gave out more than a few explanations, among which the most outstanding ones were the ascent of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army, which lessened and deteriorated their British army, and the the Royal Indian Navy mutiny.
When Chakraborty asked him about the brunt of Gandhi’s 1942 Quit India movement, Atlee deprecatingly remarked with a grin “Minimal”.
A run of the mill book!! 600 pages of no new information and makeshift academic debauchery!
January 11, 2019
Good book by the oft overlooked but solid historian of South Asia, Stanley Wolpert. In a slim volume, he covers well the disastrous policy of the British Raj in organising the transfer of power. Several things emerge clearly which often aren't emphasised in more traditional narratives. Firstly, is the sheer lack of power on the ground the British had by 1947 with only 10,000 British troops and officers in India - most of the rest had been shipped home after the end of WWII as exhaustion set in once the war had ended. There was also a distinct reluctance to continue fighting or risk British lives in managing a communal conflict for the end of Empire. Secondly, there was also the fact that Britain was effectively financially bankrupt and owed India money as well as being dependent on American loans to keep its economy afloat. So it simply did not have much by way of resources in terms of men and money by 1945 to spend on managing an effective withdrawal.
Having said this, Wolpert does provide a blistering critique of many British figures, especially Mountbatten, who despite his other qualities, made the damaging decision to accelerate independence by 1 year to August 1947 and insisted on partitioning what should have taken months not years, in only a matter of weeks. This along with the botched partition of the Punjab and Bengal provinces led to the deaths of at least 1 million civilians in the rioting that followed.
Having said this, Wolpert does provide a blistering critique of many British figures, especially Mountbatten, who despite his other qualities, made the damaging decision to accelerate independence by 1 year to August 1947 and insisted on partitioning what should have taken months not years, in only a matter of weeks. This along with the botched partition of the Punjab and Bengal provinces led to the deaths of at least 1 million civilians in the rioting that followed.
December 18, 2011
Shameful Flight is a concise but thorough account of one of the most important events of the 20th century: the end of British rule and partition of India. The creation of a "moth-eaten Pakistan" (to quote M.A. Jinnah) resulted in the death of approximately 1 million Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs and made refugees of approximately 10 million more. Wolpert blames Lord Mountbatten, the last viceroy of India and cousin of Colin Firth, er King George VI, for accelerating British withdrawal and carelessly charging ahead with partition. It's not entirely unfair, though it was hardly dispassionate-he hates him. Mountbatten could have at best mitigated some of the bloodshed and perhaps resolved the Kashmir issue definitively. Other than failing in those regards, there is plenty of culpability to go around. Wolpert's use of direct quotes from other principals, particularly Gandhi, Jinnah, and Nehru, shows them blameworthy. To Gandhi's credit, he seemed to be the only one who saw what was coming, and made heroic attempts to prevent disaster (unfortunately, not until the he knew the British were definitely leaving). Nehru at least came to regret the ways he contributed to partition, but I think he bears the brunt of the blame for inflaming Kashmir. Jinnah was endlessly obstinate, though his concern about the subjugation of Muslims wasn't completely unreasonable. Still, the father of Pakistan died a bitter man, and the shadow of these events stalk his country still to this day.
January 30, 2017
“Would it not be a world crime…that would stain…our good name for ever?” Churchill asked, in response to Mountbatten’s monstrously stupid “plan” to execute the shameful flight that this book is titled after. I found this (p. 132 of the 2006 edition), a most interesting question.
Cut to about 2011. In a group of Indians, we had a Harvard graduate (b.t.w. it could have been any university) going on about what a terrible thing the Holocaust was. I replied that it’s interesting that the Holocaust is remembered as a tragedy for humankind, but the deaths of almost as many Indians (in the absence of lists, the Indian numbers are not really known) between the Bengal famine and the Partition of India are somehow “less” tragic in the world’s eyes. The lady thought about it for a minute, then said that the Holocaust was different because the victims were gassed to death. (Before I am accused of being a holocaust denier, let me swear that I am not.)
It is an astounding fact that the world crime that Mountbatten and the Empire’s officials perpetrated, and the Indian/Pakistani leaders abetted, has not stained their name for ever. Today, the sun never sets on the Empire’s boot-lickers. In the popular narrative, the Raj unified India for the first time, and the Indian freedom movement won over the Raj with non-violence, which would not have worked with any other colonial power. Who was responsible for the horror of partition? We don’t know, and we don’t care all that much.
Shameful Flight , like any other work that deals with a genocide, is not easy reading, but it is essential reading for those (like me) who have formed some opinions earlier by watching Gandhi and reading Freedom at Midnight. Wolpert pretty much lays out his conclusion by the second page of the introduction, with Mountbatten’s own admission of guilt to a BBC correspondent. Of course, he does much more than that, with his meeting-by-meeting description of how a partition that was a bargaining chip turned into a bloody reality. The author’s use of research to put together a story accessible to the average reader is very impressive. Almost every sentence has a phrase in quotes, with an end-note, but the text remains very readable.
From a general reader’s perspective, I thought the shortcomings to this work become more obvious when you ask if it tells the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Now of course there is no such thing, but the question is if it comes close.
On the subject of Mountbatten, I did not read anything about him falsifying his war record, and perhaps not being the great hero that he successfully made himself out to be. Most importantly, his record in (read here and here) dodging responsibility for the Dieppe disaster seems very relevant to this book.
Then there is the subject of “Netaji”, Subhash Chandra Bose. He is always a controversial figure, but he was, perhaps, more than “Japan’s puppet leader” as Wolpert describes him. Or if the description is right, I would conclude that de Gaulle was the Brit’s puppet leader. There are books on Bose that helped me understand him better: Peter Ward Fay, Leonard Gordon and Hugh Toye have written books published decades ago, and the first two were professional historians. Toye was a British Intelligence officer and his account is quite sympathetic to Bose. Gordon spoke to Japanese officers who saw a Samurai spirit in Bose.
The launching of the Jihad in Kashmir, and the events leading to and after it, are covered with more relevant detail in Nisid Hajari’s Mignight’s Furies.
Finally, there is evidence dating back to 1976 that Atlee’s government was motivated mainly by the INA trials and the 1946 naval mutiny in deciding to leave India. Atlee’s comment that the Quit India movement and the Congress had a “minimal” impact on the decision should at least get a small section in any account on independence.
So, in spite of the author’s credentials, there are some holes in the narrative, which is perhaps not such a surprise given the complexity of the topic.
The biggest gap, however, comes from not raising the right questions. Why did Mountbatten and the others who were responsible for an unnecessary partition do what they did? Why was the date for independence advanced? This is where fiction proves itself superior to history. In his haunting work Kitne Pakistan (literally “How Many Pakistans?”, but the English translation is called Partitions ), the Hindi novelist Kamleshwar notes (as Wolpert also does) that Jinnah was the only Muslim leader who could have made Pakistan happen. But he goes further, and asks the question: what were the chances that British Intelligence did not know Jinnah was terminally ill?
It is easy to be a critic and go on about shortcomings. The positives remain what they are: this is a great work that at least urges us to stop pretending that the “world crime” of Partition happened without any criminal intent.
Cut to about 2011. In a group of Indians, we had a Harvard graduate (b.t.w. it could have been any university) going on about what a terrible thing the Holocaust was. I replied that it’s interesting that the Holocaust is remembered as a tragedy for humankind, but the deaths of almost as many Indians (in the absence of lists, the Indian numbers are not really known) between the Bengal famine and the Partition of India are somehow “less” tragic in the world’s eyes. The lady thought about it for a minute, then said that the Holocaust was different because the victims were gassed to death. (Before I am accused of being a holocaust denier, let me swear that I am not.)
It is an astounding fact that the world crime that Mountbatten and the Empire’s officials perpetrated, and the Indian/Pakistani leaders abetted, has not stained their name for ever. Today, the sun never sets on the Empire’s boot-lickers. In the popular narrative, the Raj unified India for the first time, and the Indian freedom movement won over the Raj with non-violence, which would not have worked with any other colonial power. Who was responsible for the horror of partition? We don’t know, and we don’t care all that much.
Shameful Flight , like any other work that deals with a genocide, is not easy reading, but it is essential reading for those (like me) who have formed some opinions earlier by watching Gandhi and reading Freedom at Midnight. Wolpert pretty much lays out his conclusion by the second page of the introduction, with Mountbatten’s own admission of guilt to a BBC correspondent. Of course, he does much more than that, with his meeting-by-meeting description of how a partition that was a bargaining chip turned into a bloody reality. The author’s use of research to put together a story accessible to the average reader is very impressive. Almost every sentence has a phrase in quotes, with an end-note, but the text remains very readable.
From a general reader’s perspective, I thought the shortcomings to this work become more obvious when you ask if it tells the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Now of course there is no such thing, but the question is if it comes close.
On the subject of Mountbatten, I did not read anything about him falsifying his war record, and perhaps not being the great hero that he successfully made himself out to be. Most importantly, his record in (read here and here) dodging responsibility for the Dieppe disaster seems very relevant to this book.
Then there is the subject of “Netaji”, Subhash Chandra Bose. He is always a controversial figure, but he was, perhaps, more than “Japan’s puppet leader” as Wolpert describes him. Or if the description is right, I would conclude that de Gaulle was the Brit’s puppet leader. There are books on Bose that helped me understand him better: Peter Ward Fay, Leonard Gordon and Hugh Toye have written books published decades ago, and the first two were professional historians. Toye was a British Intelligence officer and his account is quite sympathetic to Bose. Gordon spoke to Japanese officers who saw a Samurai spirit in Bose.
The launching of the Jihad in Kashmir, and the events leading to and after it, are covered with more relevant detail in Nisid Hajari’s Mignight’s Furies.
Finally, there is evidence dating back to 1976 that Atlee’s government was motivated mainly by the INA trials and the 1946 naval mutiny in deciding to leave India. Atlee’s comment that the Quit India movement and the Congress had a “minimal” impact on the decision should at least get a small section in any account on independence.
So, in spite of the author’s credentials, there are some holes in the narrative, which is perhaps not such a surprise given the complexity of the topic.
The biggest gap, however, comes from not raising the right questions. Why did Mountbatten and the others who were responsible for an unnecessary partition do what they did? Why was the date for independence advanced? This is where fiction proves itself superior to history. In his haunting work Kitne Pakistan (literally “How Many Pakistans?”, but the English translation is called Partitions ), the Hindi novelist Kamleshwar notes (as Wolpert also does) that Jinnah was the only Muslim leader who could have made Pakistan happen. But he goes further, and asks the question: what were the chances that British Intelligence did not know Jinnah was terminally ill?
It is easy to be a critic and go on about shortcomings. The positives remain what they are: this is a great work that at least urges us to stop pretending that the “world crime” of Partition happened without any criminal intent.
January 18, 2022
Focuses on the last years of British rule in India and the creation of modern India and Pakistan. I must say I like "Freedom at Midnight" by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre more.
December 27, 2010
‘Shameful Flight’ relates the history of the final years of the British Raj in India, including the partition of India into both Pakistan (West and East) and India, and the early hostility of the two new nations destined for perpetual warfare in such regions as the Kashmir.The history of this era of political instability on the subcontinent includes all the main players from Great Britain, India and Pakistan.These main players include Winston Churchill, Viceroy Louis Mountbatten, Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru and Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah. There is not a single figure in this history of India’s partition who comes out of it in a good light, though several seem to have had very well-intentioned aims and motivations. It is the true story of lost opportunity and the devastating consequences of human pride and selfishness that have reverberated down through the decades to the present day and remain visible in the continuing clashes between India and Pakistan, as well as in the extremism expressed in both the Islamic and Hindu communities throughout the sub-continent. It is a story of perpetual tragedy and human suffering with no end in sight.
This book is extremely easy to read, passes on a wealth of historical information and whets the appetite for further research on the India/Pakistan situation. It provides enlightenment, by bringing understanding to the current political instability in both India and Pakistan, by clearly revealing the root of the problem – the manner of the birth of both nations out of British imperialism and that nation’s final haphazard departure aptly described as a ‘Shameful Flight.’ This is a great book for understanding the sub-continent and the wounds it still carries to this day.
This book was provided to me for review by Oxford University Press – www.oup.com
This book is extremely easy to read, passes on a wealth of historical information and whets the appetite for further research on the India/Pakistan situation. It provides enlightenment, by bringing understanding to the current political instability in both India and Pakistan, by clearly revealing the root of the problem – the manner of the birth of both nations out of British imperialism and that nation’s final haphazard departure aptly described as a ‘Shameful Flight.’ This is a great book for understanding the sub-continent and the wounds it still carries to this day.
This book was provided to me for review by Oxford University Press – www.oup.com
February 29, 2012
This is a revelation, after the "politically correct" version of the events leading to India's independence as documented in "Freedom at Midnight" (Lapierre & Collins). Only after going through this does one understand the complete short-sightedness and selfishness that drove the whole partitioning strategy and timeline, the complete stupidity of the entire political class (including the leading then Congress leaders), and how M.K.Gandhi was just used a curry leaf by his own people to achieve their purposes and remove him from the scene, when he was against their political machinations. The after math of the partition could be squarely laid on the shoulders of the Nehru-Mountbatten coterie.
It is shameful how "Freedom at Midnight", an official version of the Independence movement, has been more popular, though it is based on input from the "guilty" themselves. Of course, it suits the rulers of India that people are kept unaware of the actual background events and incidents, and be satisfied with the sanitized, untrue version of the story.
I strongly recommend this book to all those who want to know the other side of the story. It is written in a lucid, fast-paced manner, and crisper than "Freedom at Midnight".
It is shameful how "Freedom at Midnight", an official version of the Independence movement, has been more popular, though it is based on input from the "guilty" themselves. Of course, it suits the rulers of India that people are kept unaware of the actual background events and incidents, and be satisfied with the sanitized, untrue version of the story.
I strongly recommend this book to all those who want to know the other side of the story. It is written in a lucid, fast-paced manner, and crisper than "Freedom at Midnight".
January 10, 2013
Makes it crystal clear who all are ultimately responsible for the disaster that was the death of 1-5 million people and the 10-20 million refugees following the partition of India.
Makes a compelling argument for why the partition of Punjab and Bengal was suicidal.
Makes a compelling argument for why the partition of Punjab and Bengal was suicidal.
December 3, 2024
Wolpert has been my first True introduction to the British Raj/20th century Indian subcontinents history. And I’m so glad that it was! In my opinion, this book was a very thorough account of the events that lead to the partition of India, being especially focused on the British politicians/leaders roles (their “Shameful Flight” of India) during this revolutionary time. I appreciated references to the many direct quotes spoken by all the important British and Indian leaders, it really gave me a better impression of who they were and their stance.
I had heard the names of some of the Indian leaders of the time, Quaid e Azam (Jinnah), Gandhi of course, and Nehru. I also vaguely knew that National Congress Party = Hindu majority; Muslim League = representing Muslim interests, so muslim majority political party.
But I learned sooo much more about these influential Indian leaders and their respective political parties from this book. What they thought of one another, their tactics to bring change (Jinnah’s appeal’s to British Parliament vs Gandhi’s calls for revolution in the beginning of the book, for example). Why they held the fears they did (Muslim League’s fears of being ruled by a ruthless Hindu Raj, Congress Party’s fears of an India divided), and how their fears bounced off of one another and escalated the situation onto the countries peoples and lead to Partition the way it did.
But just as importantly, and very focal to this book, I learned of the terrible hand Britain had in setting up India for ruin. It was either very intentional sabotage attempts in the worst case…and less intentional, more due to British neglect/lack of care in the best(?) case. There were some Good White guys, who seemed like they were trying as hard as they could to leave India united and strong (Stafford Cripps comes to mind first, Wavell also tried his hardest to bring attention to things like the Bengal famine to Churchill/back home in London), but there was a lot moving against them in their attempts at getting Indian leaders and London to agree to meetings they wanted to hold, Deals they wanted passed for potential interim gov in India, etc.
The British were not planning on “fleeing” until just about the very end, even after 1945 (marking the end of WW2) Britain’s imperial claws still had to be pried away from their prized “jewel” India.
To avoid literally writing out an entire summary of the book, I’ll just list out some new history (more so facts vs my personal political stance on India’s Partition) that I learned that came as a complete surprise to me when reading this book:
- When Japan invaded Singapore (another British colony), they were terrified that the Japanese were coming for India next??? And left wing Bengali’s wanted this, they looked positively at a Japanese invasion of India. I had absolutely no idea the role that Japan played in India during this time
- There were two Japanese air raids of South India?? In 1942? And civilians in two indian ports were killed
- Differing sentiments held by the Indian leaders of the time of Japanese invasion, some thought it would be amazing, some thought the Japanese would turn Indians into slaves, Gandhi used it as an excuse to say: hmmm well maybe if you guys [British] weren’t here, we wouldn’t be getting invaded by the Japanese ya know, so you guys should get outta here!
- This Bengali guy Chandra Bose lead 20,000 British Indian soldiers that were captured by the Japanese when they were fighting in Singapore, they became a sort of revolutionary fighter group against the British, allied with Japan
- Churchill really liked this concept of creating a state called “Princestan”?? Which would be a third dominion (besides India and Pakistan) containing 565 then existing princely states, that would remain under the British Empire (so just yet another plan by the British to further balkanize India and maintain their power in the region)
- Just, the death. And Britain’s brutality. Just how bad it was, the numbers of deaths of the Bengal Famine? And how terrible it was that Indian’s had the land to grow grain to feed everyone in their country, and it was being exported to Britain to be hoarded in Europe. Things like Jallainwala Bagh massacre in punjab, and the “crawling orders” the British imposed on indian residents living in Amritsar. How bad things got in Lahore for Sikh people
- Churchill and FDR being BFF’s, but India’s future was something they didn’t agree on
- No plebiscite actually happened for the creation of Pakistan, like Jinnah initially had intended. The decision of creating the two states had simply been decided because Mountbatten was in a hurry to get shit up and over with so he could go back to his Navy job
- Gandhi was assassinated?? By a Hindu nationalist?
To end this very all-over-the-place review (lol), I’ll address why I gave this book 4/5 instead of 5 stars. I think this book paints Gandhi in a sort of saint-like manner (not by lying, but everything Gandhi related is just the good parts especially near the end. Maybe I’m missing something and Gandhi really was that Good of a character in the eyes of Pakistani’s when the country was formed, in comparison to Nehru or Patel)
After reading the book I’ve realized how Gandhi played a very important role in paving the way for Indian revolution against their imperialist power, the British (the concept of noncooperation, and then later of civil disobedience birthed by the Salt March of 1930). His diplomacy with Jinnah and the Muslim League/Muslims in Pakistan was, to me, a much better stance that the one Nehru or Patel took once Pakistan was born.
But I’ve also read a darker side of the man, where he’s slept with his grandniece naked to test his celibacy and held racist views of African people when visiting South Africa, and while he preached to dismantle the caste system, there are other contradictory quotes by him that arguably upheld it.
And so this book makes me want to read more about him. While he was a great leader who should be recognized for helping kick the British out of India and preached unity to all of India’s people, he also was a flawed character who should not be put on a pedestal.
I had heard the names of some of the Indian leaders of the time, Quaid e Azam (Jinnah), Gandhi of course, and Nehru. I also vaguely knew that National Congress Party = Hindu majority; Muslim League = representing Muslim interests, so muslim majority political party.
But I learned sooo much more about these influential Indian leaders and their respective political parties from this book. What they thought of one another, their tactics to bring change (Jinnah’s appeal’s to British Parliament vs Gandhi’s calls for revolution in the beginning of the book, for example). Why they held the fears they did (Muslim League’s fears of being ruled by a ruthless Hindu Raj, Congress Party’s fears of an India divided), and how their fears bounced off of one another and escalated the situation onto the countries peoples and lead to Partition the way it did.
But just as importantly, and very focal to this book, I learned of the terrible hand Britain had in setting up India for ruin. It was either very intentional sabotage attempts in the worst case…and less intentional, more due to British neglect/lack of care in the best(?) case. There were some Good White guys, who seemed like they were trying as hard as they could to leave India united and strong (Stafford Cripps comes to mind first, Wavell also tried his hardest to bring attention to things like the Bengal famine to Churchill/back home in London), but there was a lot moving against them in their attempts at getting Indian leaders and London to agree to meetings they wanted to hold, Deals they wanted passed for potential interim gov in India, etc.
The British were not planning on “fleeing” until just about the very end, even after 1945 (marking the end of WW2) Britain’s imperial claws still had to be pried away from their prized “jewel” India.
To avoid literally writing out an entire summary of the book, I’ll just list out some new history (more so facts vs my personal political stance on India’s Partition) that I learned that came as a complete surprise to me when reading this book:
- When Japan invaded Singapore (another British colony), they were terrified that the Japanese were coming for India next??? And left wing Bengali’s wanted this, they looked positively at a Japanese invasion of India. I had absolutely no idea the role that Japan played in India during this time
- There were two Japanese air raids of South India?? In 1942? And civilians in two indian ports were killed
- Differing sentiments held by the Indian leaders of the time of Japanese invasion, some thought it would be amazing, some thought the Japanese would turn Indians into slaves, Gandhi used it as an excuse to say: hmmm well maybe if you guys [British] weren’t here, we wouldn’t be getting invaded by the Japanese ya know, so you guys should get outta here!
- This Bengali guy Chandra Bose lead 20,000 British Indian soldiers that were captured by the Japanese when they were fighting in Singapore, they became a sort of revolutionary fighter group against the British, allied with Japan
- Churchill really liked this concept of creating a state called “Princestan”?? Which would be a third dominion (besides India and Pakistan) containing 565 then existing princely states, that would remain under the British Empire (so just yet another plan by the British to further balkanize India and maintain their power in the region)
- Just, the death. And Britain’s brutality. Just how bad it was, the numbers of deaths of the Bengal Famine? And how terrible it was that Indian’s had the land to grow grain to feed everyone in their country, and it was being exported to Britain to be hoarded in Europe. Things like Jallainwala Bagh massacre in punjab, and the “crawling orders” the British imposed on indian residents living in Amritsar. How bad things got in Lahore for Sikh people
- Churchill and FDR being BFF’s, but India’s future was something they didn’t agree on
- No plebiscite actually happened for the creation of Pakistan, like Jinnah initially had intended. The decision of creating the two states had simply been decided because Mountbatten was in a hurry to get shit up and over with so he could go back to his Navy job
- Gandhi was assassinated?? By a Hindu nationalist?
To end this very all-over-the-place review (lol), I’ll address why I gave this book 4/5 instead of 5 stars. I think this book paints Gandhi in a sort of saint-like manner (not by lying, but everything Gandhi related is just the good parts especially near the end. Maybe I’m missing something and Gandhi really was that Good of a character in the eyes of Pakistani’s when the country was formed, in comparison to Nehru or Patel)
After reading the book I’ve realized how Gandhi played a very important role in paving the way for Indian revolution against their imperialist power, the British (the concept of noncooperation, and then later of civil disobedience birthed by the Salt March of 1930). His diplomacy with Jinnah and the Muslim League/Muslims in Pakistan was, to me, a much better stance that the one Nehru or Patel took once Pakistan was born.
But I’ve also read a darker side of the man, where he’s slept with his grandniece naked to test his celibacy and held racist views of African people when visiting South Africa, and while he preached to dismantle the caste system, there are other contradictory quotes by him that arguably upheld it.
And so this book makes me want to read more about him. While he was a great leader who should be recognized for helping kick the British out of India and preached unity to all of India’s people, he also was a flawed character who should not be put on a pedestal.
April 9, 2025
was really useful for my history coursework. very clearly argued with a wide variety of primary sources to help illustrate the sequence of events
November 6, 2022
The first book by Stanley Wolpert I read was "Jinnah of Pakistan." I later learned it was also the first book written by him about people and events of subcontinent. The Shameful Flight happens to be his last book regarding the subcontinent written much later. The synopsis of the book that attracted me to pick it was the mention of Lord Mountbatten. There was a movie few years back made by Indian origin British filmmakers "Viceroy's house." The movie portrayed the last and probably the least competent viceroy of British India Lord Mountbatten, is somewhat a soft light. If I did not know any better I would have felt sorry for the poor white man who "tried his best." I wanted to read more about the guy who tried his best but his best costed the two countries so much pain and sowed the seeds of hate that continue to this day.
The book focuses on the last seven eight years of the British Raj. It dwells on the multiple attempts of the British colonizers to find a way to let India go from the grip of Raj. Gandhi and Jinnah remained somewhat of the main players in negotiations that would take place with British for the at least the first five six years. The British did not plan to quit India completely, at least during the war years they felt the could still control India somewhat and form multiple tier government to give Indian politicians representation. However, once the British knew that the world after the second world war just did not allow them to be colonizers of India. The started leaving India well before independence was given. One would think British leaving the country would be a good thing turns out as they left they also slowly crippled the administration of the subcontinent. British controlled most administrative posts and military posts. They were responsible for most of the law and order. Their hasty departure left a vacuum in local administration, which later became one of the major factors that government of subcontinent simply lacked the man power and the resources to control the communal riots that began in summer of 1947. A large portion of the book revises what we already know about the disagreement between League and Congress. However, the most interesting thing about this read is how the politicians evolved during those last years. Mountbatten as it turns out was simply a incompetent man, he rushed partition when he was particularly begged by Jinnah, Gandhi even other people including some British to not rush the process. There was just simply not enough time between his arrival in India and 3rd June plan. His relationship with Nehru was really questionable to be honest. Those two were too close, the trusted each other's half baked ideas and barely functional decisions too heartedly. The two men completely froze out Gandhi from all decision making process. As it turns out Mountbatten did not like Jinnah, his dislike was extension of Nehru's dislike and did not heed an advice given by Jinnah regarding the partition process. Mountbatten as the author writes never admitted that he messed up the process. For Nehru time was not so kind, he soon realized after the horrors of partition that they have been too hasty and he had made a mistake.
A thing I did not know was that Huseyn Suhrawardy and Sarat Bose both suggested the idea of Bangladesh (united west and east Bengal, which would not be Pakistan). Jinnah agreed that united Bangladesh would a be good idea. It was Nehru and Mountbatten who refused to let Bangladesh happen in 1947.
The shameful flight as the name indicates points towards the shameful flight of British from subcontinent. A region they ruled for for more then hundred years. A region whose resources and military they used in two world wars. A region whose economy fueled the the second world war. They were the enslavers and we were the enslaved. British are the reason for the Kashmir issue, the fact that Pakistan was robbed of many Muslim majority areas, the basis of the East Pakistan issue (though West Pakistan remains the culprit). However, to this day in Pakistan for
reasons that completely allude me, Britain is seen as ally while India a sovereign enemy.
The book focuses on the last seven eight years of the British Raj. It dwells on the multiple attempts of the British colonizers to find a way to let India go from the grip of Raj. Gandhi and Jinnah remained somewhat of the main players in negotiations that would take place with British for the at least the first five six years. The British did not plan to quit India completely, at least during the war years they felt the could still control India somewhat and form multiple tier government to give Indian politicians representation. However, once the British knew that the world after the second world war just did not allow them to be colonizers of India. The started leaving India well before independence was given. One would think British leaving the country would be a good thing turns out as they left they also slowly crippled the administration of the subcontinent. British controlled most administrative posts and military posts. They were responsible for most of the law and order. Their hasty departure left a vacuum in local administration, which later became one of the major factors that government of subcontinent simply lacked the man power and the resources to control the communal riots that began in summer of 1947. A large portion of the book revises what we already know about the disagreement between League and Congress. However, the most interesting thing about this read is how the politicians evolved during those last years. Mountbatten as it turns out was simply a incompetent man, he rushed partition when he was particularly begged by Jinnah, Gandhi even other people including some British to not rush the process. There was just simply not enough time between his arrival in India and 3rd June plan. His relationship with Nehru was really questionable to be honest. Those two were too close, the trusted each other's half baked ideas and barely functional decisions too heartedly. The two men completely froze out Gandhi from all decision making process. As it turns out Mountbatten did not like Jinnah, his dislike was extension of Nehru's dislike and did not heed an advice given by Jinnah regarding the partition process. Mountbatten as the author writes never admitted that he messed up the process. For Nehru time was not so kind, he soon realized after the horrors of partition that they have been too hasty and he had made a mistake.
A thing I did not know was that Huseyn Suhrawardy and Sarat Bose both suggested the idea of Bangladesh (united west and east Bengal, which would not be Pakistan). Jinnah agreed that united Bangladesh would a be good idea. It was Nehru and Mountbatten who refused to let Bangladesh happen in 1947.
The shameful flight as the name indicates points towards the shameful flight of British from subcontinent. A region they ruled for for more then hundred years. A region whose resources and military they used in two world wars. A region whose economy fueled the the second world war. They were the enslavers and we were the enslaved. British are the reason for the Kashmir issue, the fact that Pakistan was robbed of many Muslim majority areas, the basis of the East Pakistan issue (though West Pakistan remains the culprit). However, to this day in Pakistan for
reasons that completely allude me, Britain is seen as ally while India a sovereign enemy.
May 6, 2023
Very lucid and clear exposition of the difficult years of intransigent negotiations among British government, Hindu, and Moslem leaders during World War II and the postwar years over how the British should leave “the Raj” and what they should leave behind, leading up finally to the “Partition” of August 1947, the least satisfactory and most disastrous course of action. Other possible solutions to governance and the so-called Hindu-Moslem “communal” issues that might have avoided the uprooting of millions and the violence that took place in 1947 and ‘48—widespread arson, rapes, massacres of tens of thousands Hindus by Moslems and vice versa (and also Gandhi’s assassination by a Hindu extremist in January 1948)—were proposed but never agreed upon or tried, either due to Hindu opposition under Nehru, Moslem opposition under Jinnah, or British incompetence and impatience under Mountbatten, the last British viceroy, who knew little of the issues and seemed to care less or not care beyond getting the British out and himself back to his naval career as quickly as possible, local consequences be damned! Partition created Pakistan, consisting of West and East Pakistan (the latter now Bangladesh), and modern India out of the British Raj. Injudicious borders drawn by a British official with no experience in British India divided two majority Moslem border provinces, Punjab in the northwest and Bengal in the east, assigning Moslem areas to Pakistan and Hindu areas to India, though there were obviously mixed communities in which thousands of followers of one faith would be living in the country of the other—thus the mass migrations of fear, panic, and violence. In addition, the Indian leaders insisted on keeping Calcutta in India, though it was the capitol and lifeblood of Bengal while the eastern part of the province was a “rural slum” of impoverished millions (which after a 1971 war became independent Bangladesh) and also on making exceptions to agreed-upon boundary rules in Punjab over water rights and access to Kashmir in the north. I appreciated this book as clear and informative on a complicated topic, resourced with excellent use of first-person primary sources—letters, cables, reports, etc, from the principals—and very well written and readable (at less than 200 pages) as I have had an interest in the subject for a long time (but knew very little of the details) and have read a number of novels touching upon it or on India’s continuing religious divisions. So, for me, very well done.
April 10, 2014
Shameful Flight – None are Without Sin
“All my sense of history rebels against this unnatural state of affairs that has been created in India and Pakistan… There is no settling down to it and conflicts continue.”1 – Pandit Nehru
Shameful Flight is Stanley Wolpurt’s account of the final days of the British Raj in India, and the transition of British Empire’s crown jewel from colonized state during the Second World War, to that of two independent nations in shambles – the Republic of India and Pakistan (East and West). The Partition of India resulted in between 500,000 to a million deaths and uprooted over 10 million peoples from their homes.2 I believe that Wolpurt had intended Shameful Flight to be an exposé of the “glorious charade of British Imperial largesse and power” found in the person of Lord Louis Mountbatten the propagator of Partition’s terms. Yet, this account appears to be fairly unbiased. The author inadvertently places the blame of Partition’s disastrous effect as and the political strife between Pakistan and India afterwards almost equally upon the shoulders of those involved, and reflects the embarrassing quality of historical reality. Although Mountbatten had accelerated the process of nation building and British withdrawal from India, the author directly quotes the other key players in a most unflattering fashion as well and clearly delineates to them an equal responsibility.
In Wolpurt’s account, the threads which bound the British Empire together began to unravel with the fall of Singapore, “to a Japanese force one-third the size of the British-Indian garrison, in mid-February of 1942.”3 In hopes of keeping the Japanese forces from taking India, the British hoped to improve the morale and fighting spirit of the Indian people to defend their land from the Japanese by offering them a carrot – their long dreamed of independence from Great Britain. Throughout the war, the British Empire would send delegates and viceroyalty to the people in hopes of forming a constitution that would suffice for a healthy Indian self-governance post war. Yet a compromise among political/religious leaders – led by Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru (the Congress Party), and Quid-Azam Jinnah (the Muslim League) – within India failed to flourish under ever increasing party disparities. The debates spanned from 1942 through 1948, and encompassed the terms of Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee, and three viceroyalty: Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir Archibald Wavell, and Lord Louis Mountbatten.
When Mountbatten received the position of viceroyalty and attempted to solve the issue of Indian independence with record speed, the nation was already beginning to burn. Widespread panic due to feelings of insecurity and potential marginalization among Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims had already led to mass murder and arson throughout Bengal.4 So Mountbatten, who personally desired a unified republic, devised a scheme to grant each party as many concessions as possible, with as much speed as possible, by drawing up the terms of partition and independence for the nations of Pakistan and the Republic of India while setting up the nation of Pakistan to purposefully fail. “He vainly hoped…that Pakistan would prove insolvent after it was born and, in the not-too-distant future [they] would beg forgiveness and ask for permission to join India’s union.”5 Yet, this plan would not have prevailed without the acceptance from both the Indian Congress Party and Muslim League. Even Nehru, who advocated Partition on the same grounds as Mountbatten – in hopes of the eventual failure of Pakistan – later professed regret stating that, “[a]ny plan, indeed, would have been ‘preferable’ to Partiton,” which was, “the cause of so many deaths, and [at least 60] more years of fighting.”6
Each major plot point concerning the independence of India and Pakistan from Great Britain is told with intricate detail. Wolpurt made use of interview records, Top Secret missives between government officials, newspaper and magazine articles, political propaganda books by Indian party leaders and British government minute meetings records. His primary source collection is nearly all encompassing, and one would be hard pressed to find some little snippet that would refute his account. Furthermore, each excerpt appeared to validate Wolpurt’s assertions or prove some minute point concerning the nature of politics in India.
I personally found Wolpurt’s historical account fascinating. Unfortunately, Wolpurt failed to accomplish what he purported to be his argument in the introduction, and perhaps speculated a little too much on the personal nature of political matters which he disapproved of. One such example would be of the author referring to Churchill’s decision to prohibit Jinnah, the Muslim League party leader from visiting Mahatma Gandhi in prison as “egotistical.”7 I personally believe that historical accounts are typically best when the author only presents a cut and dry representation of the facts in lieu of antiquated conjecturing and thick description8. Apart from these two factors, Shameful Flight is a remarkable account of British Imperialism in the Indies. Although the author failed to completely convince the reader of the proposed argument in the introduction, he did succeed in giving an in-depth view of the responsible parties for Partition’s ruinous effects upon the Indian landscape.
The “shameful flight” of the British rule from the soils of Indian and Muslim nations in effort to, “be rid of their Indian albatross and to extricate His Majesty’s Government without too much pain or enduring blame,”9 left a legacy of chaos in the lands they once so dearly cherished. However, I believe that Shameful Flight does more than just point fingers at the former British overlords for mishandling the situations causing Partition. It allows for the scholar to delve into the day to day political intrigue of the peoples involved. Wolpurt does a remarkable job in maintaining readability throughout his account as well as presenting many unheard historical facets. Not only does he provide excerpts of discourse from both those within the ruling imperial power but also the colonized to explain the intricate nature of nation building politics. His work substantially adds to the discussion of Partition and could prove a useful analysis for a variety of fields in the social sciences.
Notes:
1. Stanley Wolpurt, Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (New York: Oxford University Press 2006), 192.
2. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, back cover synopsis.
3. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 13.
4. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 119-126.
5. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 153.
6. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 192.
7. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 58.
8. Thick description is a Geertzian theoretical method utilized to explain the behavior of a subject within the context it is committed in hopes of explaining it to an outsider in terms that the committer themselves would recognize.
9. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 145.
“All my sense of history rebels against this unnatural state of affairs that has been created in India and Pakistan… There is no settling down to it and conflicts continue.”1 – Pandit Nehru
Shameful Flight is Stanley Wolpurt’s account of the final days of the British Raj in India, and the transition of British Empire’s crown jewel from colonized state during the Second World War, to that of two independent nations in shambles – the Republic of India and Pakistan (East and West). The Partition of India resulted in between 500,000 to a million deaths and uprooted over 10 million peoples from their homes.2 I believe that Wolpurt had intended Shameful Flight to be an exposé of the “glorious charade of British Imperial largesse and power” found in the person of Lord Louis Mountbatten the propagator of Partition’s terms. Yet, this account appears to be fairly unbiased. The author inadvertently places the blame of Partition’s disastrous effect as and the political strife between Pakistan and India afterwards almost equally upon the shoulders of those involved, and reflects the embarrassing quality of historical reality. Although Mountbatten had accelerated the process of nation building and British withdrawal from India, the author directly quotes the other key players in a most unflattering fashion as well and clearly delineates to them an equal responsibility.
In Wolpurt’s account, the threads which bound the British Empire together began to unravel with the fall of Singapore, “to a Japanese force one-third the size of the British-Indian garrison, in mid-February of 1942.”3 In hopes of keeping the Japanese forces from taking India, the British hoped to improve the morale and fighting spirit of the Indian people to defend their land from the Japanese by offering them a carrot – their long dreamed of independence from Great Britain. Throughout the war, the British Empire would send delegates and viceroyalty to the people in hopes of forming a constitution that would suffice for a healthy Indian self-governance post war. Yet a compromise among political/religious leaders – led by Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru (the Congress Party), and Quid-Azam Jinnah (the Muslim League) – within India failed to flourish under ever increasing party disparities. The debates spanned from 1942 through 1948, and encompassed the terms of Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee, and three viceroyalty: Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir Archibald Wavell, and Lord Louis Mountbatten.
When Mountbatten received the position of viceroyalty and attempted to solve the issue of Indian independence with record speed, the nation was already beginning to burn. Widespread panic due to feelings of insecurity and potential marginalization among Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims had already led to mass murder and arson throughout Bengal.4 So Mountbatten, who personally desired a unified republic, devised a scheme to grant each party as many concessions as possible, with as much speed as possible, by drawing up the terms of partition and independence for the nations of Pakistan and the Republic of India while setting up the nation of Pakistan to purposefully fail. “He vainly hoped…that Pakistan would prove insolvent after it was born and, in the not-too-distant future [they] would beg forgiveness and ask for permission to join India’s union.”5 Yet, this plan would not have prevailed without the acceptance from both the Indian Congress Party and Muslim League. Even Nehru, who advocated Partition on the same grounds as Mountbatten – in hopes of the eventual failure of Pakistan – later professed regret stating that, “[a]ny plan, indeed, would have been ‘preferable’ to Partiton,” which was, “the cause of so many deaths, and [at least 60] more years of fighting.”6
Each major plot point concerning the independence of India and Pakistan from Great Britain is told with intricate detail. Wolpurt made use of interview records, Top Secret missives between government officials, newspaper and magazine articles, political propaganda books by Indian party leaders and British government minute meetings records. His primary source collection is nearly all encompassing, and one would be hard pressed to find some little snippet that would refute his account. Furthermore, each excerpt appeared to validate Wolpurt’s assertions or prove some minute point concerning the nature of politics in India.
I personally found Wolpurt’s historical account fascinating. Unfortunately, Wolpurt failed to accomplish what he purported to be his argument in the introduction, and perhaps speculated a little too much on the personal nature of political matters which he disapproved of. One such example would be of the author referring to Churchill’s decision to prohibit Jinnah, the Muslim League party leader from visiting Mahatma Gandhi in prison as “egotistical.”7 I personally believe that historical accounts are typically best when the author only presents a cut and dry representation of the facts in lieu of antiquated conjecturing and thick description8. Apart from these two factors, Shameful Flight is a remarkable account of British Imperialism in the Indies. Although the author failed to completely convince the reader of the proposed argument in the introduction, he did succeed in giving an in-depth view of the responsible parties for Partition’s ruinous effects upon the Indian landscape.
The “shameful flight” of the British rule from the soils of Indian and Muslim nations in effort to, “be rid of their Indian albatross and to extricate His Majesty’s Government without too much pain or enduring blame,”9 left a legacy of chaos in the lands they once so dearly cherished. However, I believe that Shameful Flight does more than just point fingers at the former British overlords for mishandling the situations causing Partition. It allows for the scholar to delve into the day to day political intrigue of the peoples involved. Wolpurt does a remarkable job in maintaining readability throughout his account as well as presenting many unheard historical facets. Not only does he provide excerpts of discourse from both those within the ruling imperial power but also the colonized to explain the intricate nature of nation building politics. His work substantially adds to the discussion of Partition and could prove a useful analysis for a variety of fields in the social sciences.
Notes:
1. Stanley Wolpurt, Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (New York: Oxford University Press 2006), 192.
2. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, back cover synopsis.
3. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 13.
4. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 119-126.
5. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 153.
6. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 192.
7. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 58.
8. Thick description is a Geertzian theoretical method utilized to explain the behavior of a subject within the context it is committed in hopes of explaining it to an outsider in terms that the committer themselves would recognize.
9. Wolpurt, Shameful Flight, 145.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 21, 2025
This book discusses the partition of India into India and Pakistan. This division is outlined in the Indian Independance Act of 1947, which dissolved the British Raj. British colonial forces occupied and controlled the Indian subcontinent from 1858 until the dissolution in 1947. While occupied by the British, India faced several serious disasters. Famines occurred with great frequency, resulting in the starvation deaths of many. There was a cholera epidemic, a bubonic plague outbreak, malaria, sexually transmitted infections and diseases, and a staggering issue with leprosy. British officials attempted to implement many public health and infrastructure programs to reduce the impacts of disease. There were major economic impacts, which resulted in famine, including high taxes and over consumption of resources. Women were abducted and raped, many were forced into sex work, and were terrified of returning home to be outcast by their families. People went missing during the move from India to Pakistan (or vice versa). Some people believe that none of these atrocities would have occurred without British intervention into a place they did not belong, while others say that they helped the continent so much with infrastructure and other public works. One of the major players in the partition was Lord Mountbatten, a close family member of the British Royal family.
(As a side note, I can tell you for free I would have hated this man [Mountbatten] soundly had I known him in real life.)
AT ANY RATE: This book gave a good look into the last remaining days of the British Raj in India. It was interesting to look at the decisions that were made. People in government or those that rule other people like to say that they are "for the people" but they are for their pockets and their egos most of the time. There are plenty of strong indicators of that very thing in this particular situation. The book provided decent research and was not boring. It was easy to follow and educational.
(As a side note, I can tell you for free I would have hated this man [Mountbatten] soundly had I known him in real life.)
AT ANY RATE: This book gave a good look into the last remaining days of the British Raj in India. It was interesting to look at the decisions that were made. People in government or those that rule other people like to say that they are "for the people" but they are for their pockets and their egos most of the time. There are plenty of strong indicators of that very thing in this particular situation. The book provided decent research and was not boring. It was easy to follow and educational.
December 4, 2018
Some quotes to share:
"We must face the evils that are coming upon us," Churchill warned, his voice almost breaking, as he added, "and that we are powerless to avert, we must do our best in all circumstances....but, at least, let us not add --by shameful flight, by a premature, hurried scuttle, at least, let us not add, to the pangs of sorrow so many of us feel, the taint and smear of shame. Churchill
"I yearn for heart friendship between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims," "Today it is non-existent.... Fasting is a satyrgurah's Last resort...this time my fast is not only against Hindus and Muslims but also against the judases who put on false appearances and betray themselves, myself and society." Gandhi
England plundered India and then when they were ready to cut them loose, they cut them loose! The mistakenly appointed Dickie mountbatten was given the job of closing up England's troops and civil structures that they had managed for~100 years. Mountbatten was at the point of studying for an admiral's license, and in a hurry to get back to it, but thought, "Oh, this'll be a plume in my hat to wrap this up in less Time than they planned." Without putting into plan any way to supervise this transition, mountbatten approved a plan to cut India apart and make an East and West part for Muslims. Ay ay ay, the problems and murder and rape and violence that ensued.!!! Poor Indians had no means of dealing with the slaughter, refugees, division of government property and resources.!!! England took all her troops, artillery, officers, everything that could have helped to supervise the frantic migration of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims trying to get to the badly partitioned part of India that their people were concentrated in. Millions never made it, as each group was full of maddened religious fervor.
"We must face the evils that are coming upon us," Churchill warned, his voice almost breaking, as he added, "and that we are powerless to avert, we must do our best in all circumstances....but, at least, let us not add --by shameful flight, by a premature, hurried scuttle, at least, let us not add, to the pangs of sorrow so many of us feel, the taint and smear of shame. Churchill
"I yearn for heart friendship between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims," "Today it is non-existent.... Fasting is a satyrgurah's Last resort...this time my fast is not only against Hindus and Muslims but also against the judases who put on false appearances and betray themselves, myself and society." Gandhi
England plundered India and then when they were ready to cut them loose, they cut them loose! The mistakenly appointed Dickie mountbatten was given the job of closing up England's troops and civil structures that they had managed for~100 years. Mountbatten was at the point of studying for an admiral's license, and in a hurry to get back to it, but thought, "Oh, this'll be a plume in my hat to wrap this up in less Time than they planned." Without putting into plan any way to supervise this transition, mountbatten approved a plan to cut India apart and make an East and West part for Muslims. Ay ay ay, the problems and murder and rape and violence that ensued.!!! Poor Indians had no means of dealing with the slaughter, refugees, division of government property and resources.!!! England took all her troops, artillery, officers, everything that could have helped to supervise the frantic migration of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims trying to get to the badly partitioned part of India that their people were concentrated in. Millions never made it, as each group was full of maddened religious fervor.
November 13, 2020
I found the book deeply insightful of the top brains which engineered the British exit from India and the subsequent political landscape in the subcontinent. The experience of reading this book was like being a fly on the wall, witnessing all the secret discussions, letters, and schemings of the then leaders, due to the heavy use of verbatim quotations.
The central thesis of the book is that a lot of mistakes were made on the part of Hindu and Muslim leadership, but it was the assignment of Lord Mountbatten to the last viceroyalty of India that proved disastrous for the fate of the land. The hundreds of thousands dead, the glaring problems in the boundaries and the subsequent bitterness between Pakistan and India were in large part due to Mountbatten's irrational and idiotic mania to rush the Partition and bringing forth the partition by almost a year.
The book lays out all the circumstances, negotiations and changing atmospheres in detail starting from 1942. It details the failed Cripps and Cabinet mission efforts at a peaceful British withdrawal. I found the British back channel communications most interesting and very telling of the kind of mindset they ruled India with.
The only thing I find lacking from the book is further discussion on the Congress' 2 year rule of 1937-39. In my view, the book ought to have taken start from 1937 rather than 1942, because that's when the Muslim League really became more adamant in its demand for a separate country. Knowing the events of those two years in detail would serve to bolster the thesis of an otherwise impeccable piece of historical scholarship.
The central thesis of the book is that a lot of mistakes were made on the part of Hindu and Muslim leadership, but it was the assignment of Lord Mountbatten to the last viceroyalty of India that proved disastrous for the fate of the land. The hundreds of thousands dead, the glaring problems in the boundaries and the subsequent bitterness between Pakistan and India were in large part due to Mountbatten's irrational and idiotic mania to rush the Partition and bringing forth the partition by almost a year.
The book lays out all the circumstances, negotiations and changing atmospheres in detail starting from 1942. It details the failed Cripps and Cabinet mission efforts at a peaceful British withdrawal. I found the British back channel communications most interesting and very telling of the kind of mindset they ruled India with.
The only thing I find lacking from the book is further discussion on the Congress' 2 year rule of 1937-39. In my view, the book ought to have taken start from 1937 rather than 1942, because that's when the Muslim League really became more adamant in its demand for a separate country. Knowing the events of those two years in detail would serve to bolster the thesis of an otherwise impeccable piece of historical scholarship.
August 16, 2020
When the British decided to go home they did not plan the transfer of power.
At first the British were trying to chalk out a plan which would be acceptable to both Congress and League but after WW2 when they waned economically and politically they decided to dump India and go home. Mountbatten the last viceroy of India brought forward the actual date of power by one year.
The consequences of lack of preparation for partition were disastrous as there were unsettled border disputes between newly born states of Pakistan and India, For instance, Kashmir dispute, state of Hyderabad and Junagarh due to which millions of people were uprooted from their homes and nearly one million people were killed. When the law and order situation in Lahore became worst at that time the British were not able to impose Marshal law because they fear that they would be exposed and also Mountbatten was not aware of the ground realities about partition of Punjab when Redcliff told him that he had planned the partition of Punjab on 9th August, Mountbatten told him to brought the map he was amazed to see that the population of Sikhs was divided into equal halves.
Also at first Redcliff awarded the districts of Gurdaspur and Ferozpur to Pakistan because they were Muslim majority areas but later due to Nehru’s influence over Mountbatten, Redcliff awarded those areas to India in order to provide road access to Kashmir.
At first the British were trying to chalk out a plan which would be acceptable to both Congress and League but after WW2 when they waned economically and politically they decided to dump India and go home. Mountbatten the last viceroy of India brought forward the actual date of power by one year.
The consequences of lack of preparation for partition were disastrous as there were unsettled border disputes between newly born states of Pakistan and India, For instance, Kashmir dispute, state of Hyderabad and Junagarh due to which millions of people were uprooted from their homes and nearly one million people were killed. When the law and order situation in Lahore became worst at that time the British were not able to impose Marshal law because they fear that they would be exposed and also Mountbatten was not aware of the ground realities about partition of Punjab when Redcliff told him that he had planned the partition of Punjab on 9th August, Mountbatten told him to brought the map he was amazed to see that the population of Sikhs was divided into equal halves.
Also at first Redcliff awarded the districts of Gurdaspur and Ferozpur to Pakistan because they were Muslim majority areas but later due to Nehru’s influence over Mountbatten, Redcliff awarded those areas to India in order to provide road access to Kashmir.
April 1, 2022
This is a historical narrative of the final days of India under colonial rule, and the leaders Mohatma Ghandi and Muhammad Ali Jinnah who jockeyed at the forefront of the battle to redraw the lines of the borders between India and the new Islamic state of Pakistan.
Mostly this felt like a transcription of notes from a journalist, sometimes day-to-day events and the back and forth between politicians posturing for the most gains from their constituents. There are accounts of the frenzied migration of Hindus from west to east, and Muslims seeking to be on the Pakistan side of the border before becoming trapped in India. And then there was the plight of Sikhs whom few seemed to want and whose place in Punjab province was less than secure.
I knew very little about the partition of 1947, let alone the reasons that Jinnah has become a national hero as the creator of Pakistan. His picture still adorns official and unofficial buildings and documents throughout Pakistan, and is commemorated with the national holiday each March 23. I found the writing a bit tedious and stale at times, but the history is important and the events leading up to and through partition still serve to explain the ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan to this day. The author's contention is that more time and deliberation could have created a more thoughtful partition and avoided the dangerous hostilities that persist until this day.
Mostly this felt like a transcription of notes from a journalist, sometimes day-to-day events and the back and forth between politicians posturing for the most gains from their constituents. There are accounts of the frenzied migration of Hindus from west to east, and Muslims seeking to be on the Pakistan side of the border before becoming trapped in India. And then there was the plight of Sikhs whom few seemed to want and whose place in Punjab province was less than secure.
I knew very little about the partition of 1947, let alone the reasons that Jinnah has become a national hero as the creator of Pakistan. His picture still adorns official and unofficial buildings and documents throughout Pakistan, and is commemorated with the national holiday each March 23. I found the writing a bit tedious and stale at times, but the history is important and the events leading up to and through partition still serve to explain the ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan to this day. The author's contention is that more time and deliberation could have created a more thoughtful partition and avoided the dangerous hostilities that persist until this day.
February 8, 2024
I only gave 4 stars because this was a slow read for me, although the information and scholarship was 5 star. I was always under the impression that Muslim and z Hindu refugees were from all over India and Pakistan. Now I see the two areas mainly affected by Mountbatten’s portion were the punjab and Bengali. Nehru as the second in power after Mountbatten in the freed india Blindly spent India’s wealth on trying to secure Kashmir, which we know created wars. For a long time. The majority of Kashmir was Muslim, but ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. Gandhi tried to get Nehru to act peacefully instead of with weapons to solve the problems. Later after Gandhi was shot by a Hindu radical, he seemed to realize his mistakes.
I don’t agree with the author’s premise that violence and deaths could have been avoided by Mounbatten sticking to the 1948 planned date of free India. The religious animosity could not be contained at any time. Perhaps if no patroon occurred as Cripps and Gandhi wanted, so Much violence could have been prevented. Too late now!
I don’t agree with the author’s premise that violence and deaths could have been avoided by Mounbatten sticking to the 1948 planned date of free India. The religious animosity could not be contained at any time. Perhaps if no patroon occurred as Cripps and Gandhi wanted, so Much violence could have been prevented. Too late now!
October 29, 2024
read for history 419.
from a historian stand point, there is way too much personal bias. wolpert bashes mountbatten (which, i mean reasonably so, but we’re writing history here. not opinions.) and related how he treated other figures based on their relationship with mountbatten. nehru sees the brunt of this where the last chapter acts as more of a blame shifting game than a conclusion. jinnah gets off extremely light compared to many other figures outlined in this book, and it seems directly linked to his lack of work with mountbatten. is that confirmed? no, but it’s awfully convenient.
outside that, it was an overly complex read for no reason. many pages felt like they could’ve had the same impact in just a paragraph. the excessive use of quotes also just messed with my head. while in some instances it worked well with understanding the situation, other times it was just too convoluted. i do not see any reason for a page to be over 50% quotations. summarize and move on. please.
from a historian stand point, there is way too much personal bias. wolpert bashes mountbatten (which, i mean reasonably so, but we’re writing history here. not opinions.) and related how he treated other figures based on their relationship with mountbatten. nehru sees the brunt of this where the last chapter acts as more of a blame shifting game than a conclusion. jinnah gets off extremely light compared to many other figures outlined in this book, and it seems directly linked to his lack of work with mountbatten. is that confirmed? no, but it’s awfully convenient.
outside that, it was an overly complex read for no reason. many pages felt like they could’ve had the same impact in just a paragraph. the excessive use of quotes also just messed with my head. while in some instances it worked well with understanding the situation, other times it was just too convoluted. i do not see any reason for a page to be over 50% quotations. summarize and move on. please.
July 16, 2025
This was an incredibly dense recap of the British’s failure to draw yet another boundary line outside of Europe. This one in particular, being one of the most violent and least discussed. While an incredibly relevant and interesting topic, I found the author fearful of deliberating on any opinion. Much of the book is citations/quotations of the story’s cast, which might be for some but certainly not for me.
Not beginner friendly
3.25/5
Not beginner friendly
3.25/5
June 15, 2024
..How few people can drastically change the course of events impacting millions, only to realize they ate more than they could digest
Absolute diplomatic blunder motivated by the personal interest of all parties alike.
Absolute diplomatic blunder motivated by the personal interest of all parties alike.
September 4, 2018
highly recommended. some prior knowledge of subcontinental history needed.
November 29, 2020
Another book on Independence with some new insights. It depends on the view you take from which side you observe. Ok sort of book
April 25, 2022
Another great book from Stanley for students of Indo Pak history.
December 15, 2023
Lmao(?)
February 2, 2024
Best book of the year so far. If there's one thing I would say about this book: heart-wrenching.
November 7, 2024
3.5 stars, A lot of information in the book has to be taken at face value, interesting depiction of Jinnah and Gandhi relationship, but feels incomplete.
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