In this highly original book, Markus Gabriel offers an account of the human self that overcomes the deadlocks inherent in the standard positions of contemporary philosophy of mind. His view, Neo-Existentialism, is thoroughly anti-naturalist in that it repudiates any theory according to which the ensemble of our best natural-scientific knowledge is able to account fully for human mindedness. Instead, he shows that human mindedness consists in an open-ended proliferation of mentalistic vocabularies. Their role in the human life form consists in making sense of the fact that the human being does not merely blend in with inanimate nature and the rest of the animal kingdom. Humans rely on a self-portrait that locates them in the broadest conceivable context of the universe. What distinguishes this self-portrait from our knowledge of natural reality is that we change in light of our true and false beliefs about the human being.
Gabriel’s argument is challenged in this volume by Charles Taylor, Andrea Kern and Jocelyn Benoist. In defending his argument against these and other objections and in spelling out his theory of self-constitution, Gabriel refutes naturalism’s metaphysical claim to epistemic exclusiveness and opens up new paths for future self-knowledge beyond the contemporary ideology of the scientific worldview.
Markus Gabriel was born in 1980 and studied in Heidelberg, Lisbon and New York. Since 2009 he has held the chair for Epistemology at the University of Bonn; and with this appointment he became Germany's youngest philosophy professor. He is also the director of the International Center for Philosophy in Bonn.
This is an interesting book. A philosophical text written in the language of analyticity, yet firmly grounded in the history of Continental philosophy (the title, not only nominally linked to Existentialism, but committed to its style). The philosopher Markus Gabriel, who I had the pleasure of meeting after finishing this book (on a train from Amsterdam to Nijmegen, where he gave an eponymous talk that evening) is exciting, breathing new life into philosophy and revitalizing the role of the philosopher as public intellectual. Previous existentialisms, Gabriel argues, does not tarry enough with the mind/body problematic (I'm not sure if I agree), yet a Neo-Existentialism, while keeping in mind the necessity of self-determination, uses the language of geist (and philosophy is herein a "geistig" activity) to describe our mindedness, as a part of a mentalistic vocabulary that seeks to articulate our human existence. A stern critique of naturalism and other philosophical methodologies (of the professional, pseudo-scientific kind) functions as a bulwark against reductionism and simplification, this text seeks to return the existentiality to philosophical language. I highly recommend it.
Interesting take on the mind but I'm not entirely sure how this approach doesn't ultimately fall into the traps of idealism or dualism but hey! I'm not a professional philosopher!
„Menschen sind genuin von ihren Selbstauffassungen abhängig, da sie im Lichte einer Vorstellung davon handeln, wer sie sind.“
„Das Verhältnis zwischen Gehirn und Bewusstsein ist […] das gleiche Verhältnis wie das zwischen Fahrrädern und Fahrradfahren“
Großartig mit Augenzwinkern: „Cum grano salis und mit etwas Ironie könnte man tatsächlich die Diagnose stellen, der Naturalismus sei ein sowjetisch-historisch-dialektischer Materialismus, nur ohne Sowjets, ohne Historie und ohne Dialektik, also nichts anderes als eine verwässerte Version des guten alten Materialismus“ - wird wahrlich Zeit diese Ideologie zu überwinden
Uhhhh menudo lache de libro... los verdaderos existencialistas estarán removiendose en sus tumbas con semejante título clickbait... well, en resumen, ideas de bombero de cuatro letrosos pretenciosos acomplejados que en lugar de formarse en ciencia dicen tonterías que leen en Wikipedia. Ponéos a estudiar anda, p4letos, que no hay quien os aguante!!!!!!
Giest, used by Gabriel to refer to a seemingly ether like substance, is not exactly teased out in this book. Besides the authors objections to naturalism and reductionism, I doubt many 'scientists' would claim that the brain is a purely natural phenomenon, as the author spends most of the book arguing against. Further, I found some of the replies also lacking in substance, and not really getting to a definitive, clear point of view.