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Powerful And Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive
As America confronts an unpredictable war in Iraq, Stephen Randolph returns to an earlier conflict that severely tested our civilian and military leaders. In 1972, America sought to withdraw from Vietnam with its credibility intact. As diplomatic negotiations were pursued in Paris, President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger hoped that gains on the battlefield would strengthen their position at the negotiating table--working against the relentless deadline of a presidential election year.
In retaliation for a major North Vietnamese offensive breaking over the Easter holidays, the President launched the all-out air campaign known as Linebacker--overriding his Secretary of Defense and clashing with the theater commander in whom he had lost all confidence. He intended to destroy the enemy with the full force of America's "powerful and brutal weapons" and thus shape the endgame of the war. Randolph's narrative, based not only on the Nixon White House tapes and newly declassified materials from the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and the White House but also on never before used North Vietnamese sources, re-creates how North Vietnam planned and fought this battle from Hanoi and how the U.S. planned and fought it from Washington.
Randolph's intimate chronicle of Nixon's performance as commander-in-chief gains us unprecedented access to how strategic assessments were made, transmitted through the field of command, and played out in combat and at the negotiating table. It is a compelling story about America's military decision-making in conflicts with nontraditional belligerents that speaks provocatively to our own time.
In retaliation for a major North Vietnamese offensive breaking over the Easter holidays, the President launched the all-out air campaign known as Linebacker--overriding his Secretary of Defense and clashing with the theater commander in whom he had lost all confidence. He intended to destroy the enemy with the full force of America's "powerful and brutal weapons" and thus shape the endgame of the war. Randolph's narrative, based not only on the Nixon White House tapes and newly declassified materials from the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and the White House but also on never before used North Vietnamese sources, re-creates how North Vietnam planned and fought this battle from Hanoi and how the U.S. planned and fought it from Washington.
Randolph's intimate chronicle of Nixon's performance as commander-in-chief gains us unprecedented access to how strategic assessments were made, transmitted through the field of command, and played out in combat and at the negotiating table. It is a compelling story about America's military decision-making in conflicts with nontraditional belligerents that speaks provocatively to our own time.
- GenresHistory
416 pages, Hardcover
First published March 1, 2007
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
August 5, 2018
An insightful, well-researched work.
Randolph mainly provides a narrative of the Easter Offensive from the operational and tactical level, with a look at the decisionmaking process of Nixon and his advisors. He notes how Nixon was the main advocate of a massive US air offensive against North Vietnam and its invasion forces, and describes the toll it took on American forces. He also covers how Nixon and Kissinger were able to set a bombing campaign in motion against his Cabinet's advice and without congressional input and why Nixon was able to coerce Saigon and was able to "pummel the North Vietnamese into accepting America's surrender," but was unable to bring about an agreement that would survive American withdrawal.
Since air power was the main instrument of direct US involvement, Randolph looks at how the US collected intelligence, selected targets, conducted the strikes, and dealt with the challenges. He describes how the NVA endured and adapted; while the air campaign took a toll, it could only, in retrospect, delay the inevitable, and the NVA took many lessons from their experience that aided their victory in 1975. Much of the book also deals with the international situation, and Randolph describes relations between Russia, China and the US as they all sought rapprochements of some sort, and how the communist powers worked to reconcile it with their commitments to North Vietnam.
There is little on strategy during the narrative. Also, it discusses the battle of Kontum, but does not mention the South Korean troops involved there. In fact, the book doesn’t even really discuss the South Vietnamese troops much either.
A broad, solid work overall.
Randolph mainly provides a narrative of the Easter Offensive from the operational and tactical level, with a look at the decisionmaking process of Nixon and his advisors. He notes how Nixon was the main advocate of a massive US air offensive against North Vietnam and its invasion forces, and describes the toll it took on American forces. He also covers how Nixon and Kissinger were able to set a bombing campaign in motion against his Cabinet's advice and without congressional input and why Nixon was able to coerce Saigon and was able to "pummel the North Vietnamese into accepting America's surrender," but was unable to bring about an agreement that would survive American withdrawal.
Since air power was the main instrument of direct US involvement, Randolph looks at how the US collected intelligence, selected targets, conducted the strikes, and dealt with the challenges. He describes how the NVA endured and adapted; while the air campaign took a toll, it could only, in retrospect, delay the inevitable, and the NVA took many lessons from their experience that aided their victory in 1975. Much of the book also deals with the international situation, and Randolph describes relations between Russia, China and the US as they all sought rapprochements of some sort, and how the communist powers worked to reconcile it with their commitments to North Vietnam.
There is little on strategy during the narrative. Also, it discusses the battle of Kontum, but does not mention the South Korean troops involved there. In fact, the book doesn’t even really discuss the South Vietnamese troops much either.
A broad, solid work overall.
December 7, 2012
An excellent insight into the conduct of the Nixon air campaign in Vietnam in 1972. Using a range of primary sources, Randolph puts "the blood and carnage of this battle in the broader context of American and North Vietnamese strategic objectives." (p.3) In so doing he focuses on three themes: (1) the Nixon administration's leadership during the conflict, in particular how the personalities of Nixon and Kissinger shaped the conduct of the war, (2) the evolution of military effectiveness on both sides during the course of the campaign, and (3) "the action-reaction cycle between the Americans and North Vietnamese" in the evolution of strategy and operations
This book is very comprehensive in the examination it provides. In particular, the insights into the functioning of the White House during this period, and the relationship between the President's inner circle, and the States and Defense bureaucracies and military are eye-opening. Nixon and Kissinger's contempt for the military is shown in stark relief, as is its corresponding effect on the conduct of operations.
Randolph also does an excellent job of tracking the improvements in air power tactics and technology on both sides. This is not focused solely on PGMs, or air defence, but in an interesting discussion of the siege of An Loc, Randolph highlights how innovation played a vital role in supporting the city besieged by the NVA during the Easter Offensive.
Finally, the multidimensional aspects of strategy are brought to the fore as Randolph tracks the interplay of grand and military strategy between the US and the North Vietnamese. Whereas some books have discussed the role of detente on the conduct of the Easter Offensive, Randolph looks at the topic with a more discerning eye (aided by the memos and tape recordings produced by Nixon) to highlight that Nixon was, at times, willing to risk it in order to punish the North Vietnamese.
Overall, and excellent book that would take a couple of reads to fully appreciate. The only criticism is that the book is not structured chronologically, or even thematically. It is therefore a bit difficult to follow for those with only a limited understanding of the timeline of the Vietnam War.
This book is very comprehensive in the examination it provides. In particular, the insights into the functioning of the White House during this period, and the relationship between the President's inner circle, and the States and Defense bureaucracies and military are eye-opening. Nixon and Kissinger's contempt for the military is shown in stark relief, as is its corresponding effect on the conduct of operations.
Randolph also does an excellent job of tracking the improvements in air power tactics and technology on both sides. This is not focused solely on PGMs, or air defence, but in an interesting discussion of the siege of An Loc, Randolph highlights how innovation played a vital role in supporting the city besieged by the NVA during the Easter Offensive.
Finally, the multidimensional aspects of strategy are brought to the fore as Randolph tracks the interplay of grand and military strategy between the US and the North Vietnamese. Whereas some books have discussed the role of detente on the conduct of the Easter Offensive, Randolph looks at the topic with a more discerning eye (aided by the memos and tape recordings produced by Nixon) to highlight that Nixon was, at times, willing to risk it in order to punish the North Vietnamese.
Overall, and excellent book that would take a couple of reads to fully appreciate. The only criticism is that the book is not structured chronologically, or even thematically. It is therefore a bit difficult to follow for those with only a limited understanding of the timeline of the Vietnam War.
November 10, 2013
This is a weighty book that frames the Vietnam War in Nixon’s strategic context of wanting to keep the US, USSR, and PRC in a strategic balance while looking forward to his own re-election. The significant distrust between the NSC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff demonstrated how military leadership can quickly become irrelevant if they do not know how to tie operational goals to strategic intent. There is quite a bit of detail regarding the operational and even some tactical aspects of some of the major operations, but the author strives to highlight the many complications that arose due to North Vietnamese resilience, US military reliance on technology, US military leadership’s relationship to the President, and a lack of military leadership’s ability to appreciate national strategy.
Furthermore, Nixon wanted to achieve much more than was possible with a downsized military. His expectations were conflated with a distrust for his own Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as theater combatant commanders. Finally, when a general came along in whom Kissinger and Nixon had trust (General Vogt), the general did not have the military leadership experience necessary to live up to that trust. This further diminished Nixon’s trust in the military’s ability to carry out his intent within his acceptable risk margin given Nixon’s strategic goals. As the military attempted to shift control of South Vietnam security to the Vietnamese, they found that overdependence on American forces (in at least some measure the fault of the Americans) resulted in operational failure. This forced Nixon to take back the military reigns through Operation LINEBACKER – bypassing his JCS, but ultimately facilitating strategic victories for both the US (with regard to the trilateral balance) and the North Vietnamese.
-- related authors: Gilpin, Clausewitz, Tooze, Feaver, Allison & Zelikow, Jervis, and Kuhn; (maybe) Schelling, Pape, and Boyd/Osinga
Furthermore, Nixon wanted to achieve much more than was possible with a downsized military. His expectations were conflated with a distrust for his own Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as theater combatant commanders. Finally, when a general came along in whom Kissinger and Nixon had trust (General Vogt), the general did not have the military leadership experience necessary to live up to that trust. This further diminished Nixon’s trust in the military’s ability to carry out his intent within his acceptable risk margin given Nixon’s strategic goals. As the military attempted to shift control of South Vietnam security to the Vietnamese, they found that overdependence on American forces (in at least some measure the fault of the Americans) resulted in operational failure. This forced Nixon to take back the military reigns through Operation LINEBACKER – bypassing his JCS, but ultimately facilitating strategic victories for both the US (with regard to the trilateral balance) and the North Vietnamese.
-- related authors: Gilpin, Clausewitz, Tooze, Feaver, Allison & Zelikow, Jervis, and Kuhn; (maybe) Schelling, Pape, and Boyd/Osinga
September 15, 2019
Pretty drily written given the subject matter. Decent analysis of Nixon/Kissinger decision making, but this book needed more editing and focus
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews