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176 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 1976
elections never produce a government dedicated to the expropriation of capital and the realization of socialism. Fifty years after the advent of universal suffrage, such a phenomenon seems further away than ever. What is the reason for this paradox? It must lie in the prior conditioning of the proletariat before the electoral moment as such. The central locus of power must therefore be sought within civil society—above all, in capitalist control of the means of communication (press, radio, television, cinema, publishing), based on control of the means of production (private property). In a more sophisticated variant, the real inculcation of voluntary acceptance of capitalism occurs not so much through the ideological indoctrination of the means of communication as in the invisible diffusion of commodity fetishism through the market of instinctual habits of submission induced by the work routines of factories and offices—in other words, directly within the ambit of the means of production themselves. (63)What’s more, “the ideology of bourgeois democracy is far more potent than that of any welfare reformism, and forms the permanent syntax of the consensus instilled by the capitalist state” (66). It is something of the ruling class sous rature, insofar as consent is generated by the belief by the proletariat that it exerts sovereignty, a “credence in the democratic equality,” “a disbelief in the existence of any ruling class” (68). The dominance extends from beyond the grave, as it were, insofar as “even after a socialist revolution—the conquest of political power by the proletariat—the culturally dominant class remains the bourgeoisie in certain respects (not all—habits more than ideas) and for a certain time (in principle shorter with each revolution)” (94).
This is a very clarifying short book analyzing Gramsci's Prison Notebooks. It was written in the 1970s. In the Preface, Anderson is quite pessimistic. He says he doesn't really see the point in reading this essay today, as the progress of the revolutionary movement has degraded so much as to be virtually nonexistent. That may be true but I still believe it is necessary to understand the breakthroughs and shortcomings of previous thinkers in order to build off of them.
Gramsci basically tackles two sets of problems: defining the nature of capitalist society and deducing what form of strategy would be the most successful in overturning that society. His great insight is that there is more to politics than power. Overthrowing capitalist society is not simply a matter of doing war with the state, or political society, by fighting the military and police. There also exists civil society. This is where Gramsci's famous term hegemony comes in. Hegemony is basically an expanded version of Marx's superstructure. Hegemony is cultural ascendancy, the dominant ideology over the working class by the bourgeoisie. It is rule by consent rather than coercion. This is Gramsci's great breakthrough. He applied this to the fundamental difference in the political structures of East and West, Russia and Europe. Prior to him, no theorist had looked at this divide as coherently and in a systematic way. Russia had a very weak civil society, its feudal culture did not have a strong hold over the people, and so the Bolsheviks could direct their attention directly toward the state. In Europe, a complex civil society existed as a frontal barrier over the state. The means of communication and supporting civil structures create ideological consent for the submission of the working class. The use of violence, coercion, is reserved as a last stand against revolution.
Anderson's critique of hegemony is that Gramsci gives it too much power. He places civil society above the state. While hegemony is crucial and needs to be incorporated into any revolutionary strategy, one can not put aside the power of the state. Anderson argues that "the general form of the representative state - bourgeois democracy - is itself the principal ideological linchpin of Western capitalism, whose very existence deprives the working class of the idea of socialism as a different type of state, and the means of communication and other mechanisms of cultural control thereafter clinch this central ideological effect." The reality of class divisions and the structure of parliamentary democracy and the means of production does more to ideologically contain and defeat the working class than all of civil society. "For it is the freedom of bourgeois democracy alone that appears to establish the limits of what is socially possible for the collective will of a people, and thereby can render the bounds of its impotence tolerable." Later in the Notebooks, Gramsci becomes aware of this problem of over emphasizing civil society but can never resolve the contradiction.
Gramsci's second problem is strategy. He develops the twin concepts of a war of position and a war of maneuver. A war of maneuver was the strategy of the Russian revolution, fast and mobile, a big movement and big risk, overthrowing the state at great speed. A war of position is the strategy Gramsci suggests for the West. Because the social structures are heavily fortified in the West, fast and mobile attacks would in a short time exhaust themselves. A war of position follows the political line of the United Front adopted by the Comintern. Its objective was "to win over the masses in the West to revolutionary Marxism, by patient organization and skillful agitation for working class unity in action." The goal is to slowly and steadily build a unified mass of people and, once it reaches a certain apex, use its collective to power to overthrow the state. Prior to the failure of the German Revolution, this strategy was considered reformist. The German social democrat Kautsky came up with a very similar strategic analysis, using the terms "strategy of attrition" and "strategy of overthrow". His initial analysis was the same as Gramsci, that the West was much stronger than Russia and necessitated a gradual approach. Kautsky's position was called out by Rosa Luxembourg as a "sophisticated apology for reformism." The difference being that Kautsky's solution was electoralism, whereas Gramsci remained a committed Leninist revolutionary.
Here, Anderson's critique of position/maneuver is that Gramsci never explicitly combines the two strategies into a cogent whole. Gramsci simply applies "war of position" in substitute of "war of maneuver". A war of position strategy on its own is dangerous because a winning position is never decisive. There will always be more work to be done, a stricter party line to follow to reach that ultimate collective unity. It can easily fall into an authoritarian, top down movement. A successful Marxist movement in the West must be radically democratic, to show the limits and failure of bourgeois democracy. At some point, a successful war of position strategy must take that crucial leap and transition to a war of maneuver. To sum it up, Anderson puts it clearly:
To formulate proletarian strategy in metropolitan capitalism essentially as a war of maneuver is to forget the unity and efficacy of the bourgeois state and to pit the working class against it in a series of lethal adventures. To formulate proletarian strategy as essentially a war of position is to forget the necessarily sudden and volcanic character of revolutionary situations, which by the nature of these social formations can never be stabilised for long and therefore need speed and mobility of attack if the opportunity to conquer power is not to be missed. Insurrection, Marx and Engels always emphasized, depends on the art of audacity.