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Plutarch's Lives - Folio Edition Volume 2
Volume 2 - The Age of Empire-Builders
* Pelopidas
* Dion
* Timoleon
* Phocion
* Demosthenes
* Alexander
* Eumenes
* Demetrius
* Pyrrhus
* Agis
* Cleomenes
* Aratus
* Philopoemen
* Pelopidas
* Dion
* Timoleon
* Phocion
* Demosthenes
* Alexander
* Eumenes
* Demetrius
* Pyrrhus
* Agis
* Cleomenes
* Aratus
* Philopoemen
585 pages, Hardcover
Published January 1, 2010
About the author
Plutarch
4,326 books984 followersPlutarch (later named, upon becoming a Roman citizen, Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus; AD 46–AD 120) was a Greek historian, biographer, and essayist, known primarily for his Parallel Lives and Moralia. He is classified as a Middle Platonist. Plutarch's surviving works were written in Greek, but intended for both Greek and Roman readers.
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March 9, 2026
Folio's edition of Plutarch's Lives is organized by "nationality" (Greek/Hellenistic, then Roman) and temporally. It also lacks extensive footnotes. I never thought I'd miss footnotes.
Some notes mostly for myself, as chances are it will be some time before I move on to the next volume. These are things that piqued my interest as I read:
(1) The biographies of Dion and Timoleon are interesting in part because there is a theme of revolutionary land reform. Plutarch explores these themes on the Roman side, in the biographies - for example - of the Gracchii, but that's in a later volume. Land reform is also a persistent theme in the biographies of several Greek leaders, most notably Cleomenes. What stands out in the case of Dion and Timoleon, the biographies of which take place primarily in eastern Sicily, is that land reform is not tied to military reform. In classical antiquity, the decline of the "small landholder" is associated with the decline of citizen armies. For example, Cleomenes' reforms are aimed in large part at providing Spartan men the means to pay for the means to equip themselves for war, allowing Cleomenes to meaningfully swell the ranks of his army. In the Syracusan land reform, that explicit relationship between land reform and military power is not made. It makes you wonder whether the Syracusan movement was truly revolutionary, in a modern sense - a revolution of the people. Note, most historians would reject this notion of there being a class consciousness or an identity analogous to that of the modern-day working class or peasant.
(2) It is in the biography of Pyrrhus, if I remember correctly, that Plutarch talks a bit about the Molossians and Illyrians. He gives a short account of the royal lineage, and then mentions almost off the cuff that for other periods these people did not have history, that their story was insignificant. That is a very bold way of saying, "since I have not read any recorded history of these people during that time, I am assuming that their existence was meaningless." At least, that's the way Plutarch's attitude comes off. It's interesting because the Romans, within the context of the Hellenic biographies, emerge almost suddenly. Pyrrhus, it's clear, hasn't even heard of them and is surprised to see their order in battle. Suddenly, around the turn of the 2nd century B.C., the Romans became increasingly relevant as they intervened in Macedon in the years following the Second Punic War. It makes you think, let's say that, for whatever reason, the Romans and Greeks never make contact, and Plutarch never learns about Roman history. I bet you he would assume their history to have been meaningless as a result. It makes you realize just how little we know about the ancient world, and how concentrated (and therefore biased) our literary sample is. In this view, it would behoove us not to make the same mistake in Plutarch is writing off meaningful unknown unknowns.
(3) Propitious to have re-read Mancur Olson's famous The Logic of Collective Action while reading Plutarch. The history of the Greek city-states is one of a struggle to resolve the collective action problem of self-defense against larger states that had already figured out the problem. This is an interesting framing because it's the culture of the Greek city-state that's venerated by modern Western society, not the culture of the arguably superior states that surrounded them. This is because, going back to my second note, the culture of the Greek city-state is that which we happen to know. Anyway, in Olson's theory, large groups that solve collective action problems are unstable because there is a strong incentive to free-ride. We see this in Plutarch's biographies of Greek leaders like Aratus and Philopoemen, who were important leaders in the Achaean League's attempt at building a "supranational" state with respect to the member city-states. Some curious illustrations of "Olsonian problems:"
(i) without a means of forcing members to participate, there is an incentive to exit the organization - we see this in the frequent revolt of cities (Argos, Megalopolis, and Sparta, for example).
(ii) because participation is asymmetric, meaning participants who invest heavily in the organization's outcomes will have leverage [power] over the organization, the organization tends to follow the path set by this asymmetric player. Greek leaders often had to rely on outside powers to maintain the balance necessary to allow for their sovereignty. They appealed to Ptolemaic Egypt, Antigonid Macedonia, and later the Romans. And when they did so, they inevitably had to "corrupt" the "ideals" of the organization; e.g., giving the Acro-Corinth fortress to Macedonia in order to enlist their support against Cleomenes. Similarly, in the biography of Philopoemen, the Romans are affronted by the fact that the Achaens would choose one of their own, rather than a Roman, to arbitrate a dispute.
(4) What makes Greek history particularly interesting is that it's a history of failed state-building. The biography of Cleomenes is notable because there is an explicit argument that Cleomenes, despite his tactical and strategic capabilities, ultimately could not compete with the Macedonians in terms of resources. He did not have the financial capacity to fund military action against the Macedonians perpetually, and so the Macedonians forced him into a disadvantageous battle, knowing that Cleomenes was battling against time. This dynamic had been true for centuries. Athens tried and failed to create a dominant federation; Sparta tried and failed afterwards; Thebes tried and failed afterwards; Achaea tried and failed afterwards. In contrast, a prominent thread in Roman history is its capacity to mobilize resources. See, for example, the fantastic book, Mediterranean War, Interstate Anarchy, and the Rise of Rome by Arhtur Eckstein. Eckstein attributes Rome's success to its inclusive citizen policy, but I suspect there is more to the story.
Coming back to my second note, once again, it makes you wonder whether our default assumption of ancient Greece's place in the world is overambitious. For us, classical Greek culture is paramount, and for good reason, as our own culture is heavily influenced by ancient Greek literature. There is a prevailing attitude that ancient cultures outside of Greece's, and maybe Rome's, were backwards, until they came into contact with these civilizations. Thus, the most civilized parts of Gaul are those that made contact with Greek cities like Massalia; and, in the explicit case of the Molossians and Illyrians, their history is relevant literally when it intersects with the history that Plutarch covers. But if Greece was, in a sense, a history of failed state-building, it puts into question their supposed cultural superiority vis-a-vis those cultures we know almost nothing about.
(5) The Greek leaders that Plutarch writes about are, for all intents and purposes, petty kings and tyrants. This is explicit in the comparison to Macedon, Ptolemaic Egypt, and Seleucia, which commanded huge resources against which the Greek city-states couldn't really resist, unless they could distract one power against the other.
Petty kings and tyrants are often the way we see the barbarians who ultimately crossed into Rome. They too lack history and are assumed to be backward, except for those in contact with Rome - and that in gradients. The evidence suggests that the barbarians may not have been any more backwards than the Greeks.
I'm reminded of Priscus' history. Priscus participated in an embassy to Attila, and this is the densest part of his short, fragmentary history. What stands out about Attila is his ability to mobilize great resources. Priscus writes that the eastern empire had assembled its field army in Sicily in the early 440s, in preparation for an invasion of North Africa, to retake the province from the Vandals. Attila crosses the Danube and starts to plunder these provinces, triggering Constantinople to bring their field army back to Thracia. These are the comitatenses, or the best of the empire's troops. Per Priscus, they are, without exaggeration, swept aside by Attila, who not only shatters this army but is able to very quickly besiege and sack several walled towns and fortifications. When it came to resource mobilization to achieve bigger goals, the ancient Greek city-states were inferior to the Huns. In short, the barbarians that crossed the Rhine and Danube were not backward; they likely had formed complex societies in many respects.
(6) Within the context of Roman statebuilding, it's interesting that the history of Greece is driven - in these biographies - by factionalism within the cities. Larger federations are often undone by factional politics. Likewise, Macedonian domination over Greece also suffers the safe fate because of factionalism within the cities where they have garrisons. These factions find allies and eject their opponents. I doubt factionalism was unique to the ancient Greek city-state; we just know more about it because of the bias in the surviving literature. In fact, we know of factionalism within Rome (the city), and we know of factionalism between cities of the empire later on. Factionalism within the city was likely endemic; we just don't hear much about it in Roman history because, in their case, Rome was able to successfully dominate a growing network of peoples. It makes me think that factionalism was not as important as the weight, or rather concentration, of it in Plutarch's biographies suggests. There is a more important factor, or set of factors, that determines a city's political trajectory. I'll have to revisit this note after reading the next two volumes.
Some notes mostly for myself, as chances are it will be some time before I move on to the next volume. These are things that piqued my interest as I read:
(1) The biographies of Dion and Timoleon are interesting in part because there is a theme of revolutionary land reform. Plutarch explores these themes on the Roman side, in the biographies - for example - of the Gracchii, but that's in a later volume. Land reform is also a persistent theme in the biographies of several Greek leaders, most notably Cleomenes. What stands out in the case of Dion and Timoleon, the biographies of which take place primarily in eastern Sicily, is that land reform is not tied to military reform. In classical antiquity, the decline of the "small landholder" is associated with the decline of citizen armies. For example, Cleomenes' reforms are aimed in large part at providing Spartan men the means to pay for the means to equip themselves for war, allowing Cleomenes to meaningfully swell the ranks of his army. In the Syracusan land reform, that explicit relationship between land reform and military power is not made. It makes you wonder whether the Syracusan movement was truly revolutionary, in a modern sense - a revolution of the people. Note, most historians would reject this notion of there being a class consciousness or an identity analogous to that of the modern-day working class or peasant.
(2) It is in the biography of Pyrrhus, if I remember correctly, that Plutarch talks a bit about the Molossians and Illyrians. He gives a short account of the royal lineage, and then mentions almost off the cuff that for other periods these people did not have history, that their story was insignificant. That is a very bold way of saying, "since I have not read any recorded history of these people during that time, I am assuming that their existence was meaningless." At least, that's the way Plutarch's attitude comes off. It's interesting because the Romans, within the context of the Hellenic biographies, emerge almost suddenly. Pyrrhus, it's clear, hasn't even heard of them and is surprised to see their order in battle. Suddenly, around the turn of the 2nd century B.C., the Romans became increasingly relevant as they intervened in Macedon in the years following the Second Punic War. It makes you think, let's say that, for whatever reason, the Romans and Greeks never make contact, and Plutarch never learns about Roman history. I bet you he would assume their history to have been meaningless as a result. It makes you realize just how little we know about the ancient world, and how concentrated (and therefore biased) our literary sample is. In this view, it would behoove us not to make the same mistake in Plutarch is writing off meaningful unknown unknowns.
(3) Propitious to have re-read Mancur Olson's famous The Logic of Collective Action while reading Plutarch. The history of the Greek city-states is one of a struggle to resolve the collective action problem of self-defense against larger states that had already figured out the problem. This is an interesting framing because it's the culture of the Greek city-state that's venerated by modern Western society, not the culture of the arguably superior states that surrounded them. This is because, going back to my second note, the culture of the Greek city-state is that which we happen to know. Anyway, in Olson's theory, large groups that solve collective action problems are unstable because there is a strong incentive to free-ride. We see this in Plutarch's biographies of Greek leaders like Aratus and Philopoemen, who were important leaders in the Achaean League's attempt at building a "supranational" state with respect to the member city-states. Some curious illustrations of "Olsonian problems:"
(i) without a means of forcing members to participate, there is an incentive to exit the organization - we see this in the frequent revolt of cities (Argos, Megalopolis, and Sparta, for example).
(ii) because participation is asymmetric, meaning participants who invest heavily in the organization's outcomes will have leverage [power] over the organization, the organization tends to follow the path set by this asymmetric player. Greek leaders often had to rely on outside powers to maintain the balance necessary to allow for their sovereignty. They appealed to Ptolemaic Egypt, Antigonid Macedonia, and later the Romans. And when they did so, they inevitably had to "corrupt" the "ideals" of the organization; e.g., giving the Acro-Corinth fortress to Macedonia in order to enlist their support against Cleomenes. Similarly, in the biography of Philopoemen, the Romans are affronted by the fact that the Achaens would choose one of their own, rather than a Roman, to arbitrate a dispute.
(4) What makes Greek history particularly interesting is that it's a history of failed state-building. The biography of Cleomenes is notable because there is an explicit argument that Cleomenes, despite his tactical and strategic capabilities, ultimately could not compete with the Macedonians in terms of resources. He did not have the financial capacity to fund military action against the Macedonians perpetually, and so the Macedonians forced him into a disadvantageous battle, knowing that Cleomenes was battling against time. This dynamic had been true for centuries. Athens tried and failed to create a dominant federation; Sparta tried and failed afterwards; Thebes tried and failed afterwards; Achaea tried and failed afterwards. In contrast, a prominent thread in Roman history is its capacity to mobilize resources. See, for example, the fantastic book, Mediterranean War, Interstate Anarchy, and the Rise of Rome by Arhtur Eckstein. Eckstein attributes Rome's success to its inclusive citizen policy, but I suspect there is more to the story.
Coming back to my second note, once again, it makes you wonder whether our default assumption of ancient Greece's place in the world is overambitious. For us, classical Greek culture is paramount, and for good reason, as our own culture is heavily influenced by ancient Greek literature. There is a prevailing attitude that ancient cultures outside of Greece's, and maybe Rome's, were backwards, until they came into contact with these civilizations. Thus, the most civilized parts of Gaul are those that made contact with Greek cities like Massalia; and, in the explicit case of the Molossians and Illyrians, their history is relevant literally when it intersects with the history that Plutarch covers. But if Greece was, in a sense, a history of failed state-building, it puts into question their supposed cultural superiority vis-a-vis those cultures we know almost nothing about.
(5) The Greek leaders that Plutarch writes about are, for all intents and purposes, petty kings and tyrants. This is explicit in the comparison to Macedon, Ptolemaic Egypt, and Seleucia, which commanded huge resources against which the Greek city-states couldn't really resist, unless they could distract one power against the other.
Petty kings and tyrants are often the way we see the barbarians who ultimately crossed into Rome. They too lack history and are assumed to be backward, except for those in contact with Rome - and that in gradients. The evidence suggests that the barbarians may not have been any more backwards than the Greeks.
I'm reminded of Priscus' history. Priscus participated in an embassy to Attila, and this is the densest part of his short, fragmentary history. What stands out about Attila is his ability to mobilize great resources. Priscus writes that the eastern empire had assembled its field army in Sicily in the early 440s, in preparation for an invasion of North Africa, to retake the province from the Vandals. Attila crosses the Danube and starts to plunder these provinces, triggering Constantinople to bring their field army back to Thracia. These are the comitatenses, or the best of the empire's troops. Per Priscus, they are, without exaggeration, swept aside by Attila, who not only shatters this army but is able to very quickly besiege and sack several walled towns and fortifications. When it came to resource mobilization to achieve bigger goals, the ancient Greek city-states were inferior to the Huns. In short, the barbarians that crossed the Rhine and Danube were not backward; they likely had formed complex societies in many respects.
(6) Within the context of Roman statebuilding, it's interesting that the history of Greece is driven - in these biographies - by factionalism within the cities. Larger federations are often undone by factional politics. Likewise, Macedonian domination over Greece also suffers the safe fate because of factionalism within the cities where they have garrisons. These factions find allies and eject their opponents. I doubt factionalism was unique to the ancient Greek city-state; we just know more about it because of the bias in the surviving literature. In fact, we know of factionalism within Rome (the city), and we know of factionalism between cities of the empire later on. Factionalism within the city was likely endemic; we just don't hear much about it in Roman history because, in their case, Rome was able to successfully dominate a growing network of peoples. It makes me think that factionalism was not as important as the weight, or rather concentration, of it in Plutarch's biographies suggests. There is a more important factor, or set of factors, that determines a city's political trajectory. I'll have to revisit this note after reading the next two volumes.
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