When Neil Reynolds was first asked in 2003 whether he'd like to work in Iraq as a private military contractor, he didn't even know where it was on the map. But he would soon learn the ins and outs of working and surviving in one of the world's most violent conflict zones. Reynolds was part of one of the first groups of South Africans to start private military security companies in Iraq. His refreshingly honest account tells of all the numerous challenges they from finding a safe hotel in Baghdad to being forced to buy guns on the black market and dodging bullets on several hair-raising protection missions. He describes their successful low profile strategy where they tried to blend in with the local Iraqis in their choice of vehicles and clothing. Reynolds also tells the tragic story of his four South African colleagues who were kidnapped and killed in Baghdad in 2006. His candid observations and dry humour offers a unique perspective on the harsh realities of the life of a private military contractor.
Private military companies played a critical role in the occupation of Iraq but are relatively poorly covered (though still better than the occupied). In the Kill Zone is a private military contractor’s viewpoint of up to roughly 2005. Reynolds brushes over the balance of his employment, which goes well beyond that and included work in Afghanistan, perhaps testing the waters here before considering publishing further books.
Too much of Dad was not necessarily a good thing
In the Kill Zone is perfectly fine as reference material. It’s steadily (if unexcitedly) written and gives a perspective different from a solely military one.
All narrators are unreliable in their own ways, and I don’t think Reynolds is a deliberate liar. However, there’s moments where you’re like:
“Huh.”
…such as how he likes to not be at home too much, or that he had to leave a former Bantustan because the South African embassy in Vendoa felt that I had been too involved in the coup and advised that I leave the ‘country’. He manages to fall into jobs in Iraq, and cash moves very freely. He makes the interesting point about private military companies factoring their accounts receivables to ensure cashflow but Reynolds only appears to disclose things done “above board” by his company. The term “bribe” comes up once in the book, in respect of cigarettes, plus a “fine” that was probably a bribe. While Iraq is now rocketing up the ranks to 157th out of 180 “least corrupt” countries in 2021, I suspect Reynolds in the early 2000s had to grease the wheels of commerce in one way or another. I can’t prove one way or another but if throwing parties:
became critical for business in the Green Zone and companies would spend thousands of dollar on entertainment to attract clients.
…it feels reasonably likely there were less savoury aspects of the job.
All narrators are unreliable in one way or another, but the apparent gaps are a good reminder that a book by an “eye witness” is not necessarily the best source, as there’s no fact checking in the book, or input from other witnesses. I believe Reynolds is (mostly) truthful and that any outright inconsistencies would only be spotted by an expert. But I am confident that he elides things that may have changed the tone of the book.
Perspective
Despite my criticism, there is value with what Reynolds shares. On a tactical point, high profile vs low profile escorting of clients is interesting, even if I cannot personally assess the accuracy of Reynolds’ comments. More relevantly, he provides insights on the occupation forces and other private military contractors, particularly the manner in which they conducted their own missions (forcing other cars off the road, throwing water bottles at or even shooting anyone who got too close). The contrast between the “Green Zone” and the “Red Zone” is another feature. In the Kill Zone doesn’t tell you why there was resistance to the occupation, but it does suggest there were a few motives for it.
There’s also the administration of the contracts, along with some (but not enough!) sharing of what the clients were doing, such as the dodgy scrap metal dealer. There is also your technical “Soldier of Fortune” goodies such as weapons used, other equipment, defensive positions and how operations were conducted, all thankfully told a bit less masturbatorily than similar books – but yes, it is important to know what calibre of firearm you are carrying when protecting clients, information that I will never be called upon to use. The slice of life stories are competently told but revolve around the novelty of the job to the average reader rather than being that exciting in themselves.
In the Kill Zone is a book that could contribute to a comprehensive exploration of the role private military companies. It’s a little marginal in itself and reliant on a lack of competitors, but it is a clear and mostly interesting read.
This was a fascinating book about some South Africans with military and mine security experience who set up a large private security venture in Iraq (and later Afghanistan).
One incident (“the South African four”) was pretty confusing to me. It was a case of one of their teams being stopped by a fake Iraqi checkpoint, taken out of their vehicle, kidnapped, held for months, then eventually murdered. What confused me is that the immediate response of the team (and their overwatch vehicle element) — all the people I’ve ever worked with in Iraq and Afghanistan, military and contractor, wouldn’t have hesitated even a nanosecond to immediately fire on “local police” who tried to “arrest” one of their teams, especially after being given warnings it was a fake checkpoint, and the failure to go to the nearest police station (who were almost certainly complicit, and more likely the actual attackers) and eliminate the threat, with or without US military assistance, was also confusing. I mean, they had a PKM in the overwatch truck; they should have been able to eliminate the entire checkpoint. They might have died, but 8 people dying in destroying a checkpoint beats 4 people kidnapped. I myself almost got stuck in a similar situation and it took about 12 words to go over priority of which guys we’d each engage first with a colleague if we were actually forced out of the vehicle; fortunately it got defused about 30 seconds before that happened, particularly since we just had pistols and AKs and no armor, but I don’t think anyone operating over there would choose capture over going down fighting. Maybe there is more to the situation, but from the other sources I read about the incident, it seems like their immediate response was incorrect.
Lots of little details were very much things I experienced (local weapons vendors, licensing hell, getting badges, local property market, sometimes really competent local staff, bribery/corruption, accidental ammo). Some things were totally alien to me but seemed South Africa. (not being able to enter UAE due to visa problems, staff who had never flown internationally before deploying...).
This company was well known for operating “low profile”, in local vehicles and disguise, in contrast to the high profile big armored and easily identified multi-vehicle convoys. When I was over there we were even lower profile (single car, etc), and the low profile is way does seem superior when available (it isn’t always.)
Overall it was a great account of the 2005-2006 period in Iraq from the perspective of security contractors. South African veterans of the border wars are by far some of the best security personnel anywhere.