Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism

by Fred Feldman

Since ancient times, hedonism has been one of the most attractive and controversial theories about "the Good Life." On this view, the Good Life is the pleasant life-- pleasure is the Good. Now Fred Feldman presents a careful, modern formulation of hedonism, defending the theory against some of the most important objections. Distinguishing some diverse variants of the theory, and assessing their merits, Feldman explains why each deserves to be classified as a form of hedonism. His book offers inspiring vindication for anyone who hopes that it is possible to enjoy oneself and be good at the same time.

Genres: Philosophy

236 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2004

Reviews

[Edward · Rating 4 out of 5]

I love Feldman's writing style: clear, simple language, well organized, and philosophically rigorous. His is the most plausible theory of well-being.

A summary:

0. Introduction
- the Good Life is the life that is good in itself for the one who lives it, or the life high in individual welfare

1. The Quest for the Good Life
- “I claim that the Good Life is the pleasant life. I claim that pleasure is the Good. Since I makes these claims, I am a hedonist”
- Why Should We Be Interested in this Question?
> historical precedent, rationality depends on it, practical (in medicine), intrinsically worthy topic (we just want to know)
- What are the Main Sorts of Answer that have been Given?
> happiness, preferentists (don’t always want what is good for us), perfectionism, objective list, hedonism

2. Hedonism: A Preliminary Formulation
- assumptions about pleasure and pain: feelings/sensations, episodes, duration, intensity, amount (one hedon is “equal in size but opposite in sign” to one dolor), can compare
- Default Hedonism: pleasure is good, pain is bad; pleasant life is good, painful life is bad…
- Long term DH may require opposite of sex, drugs, and rock n’ roll
- Hedonism is not particular theory but family of axiological theories
- (Aristippus:) Bodily, near-term pleasure is better, should persue own…

3. Classic Objections to Hedonism
- The Argument from Worthless Pleasures: Moore says if bestiality was “heaven indeed” , then we ought to promote it; hinted at by Aristotle (‘disgraceful’ and ‘base’ pleasures)
- The Argument from False Pleasures: Nagel’s businessman thinks everyone loves him when they don’t; he doesn’t know he is on the brink of misery
- The Argument from Unconscious Pleasures: Plato said without intelligence, wouldn’t know you feel pleasure and wouldn’t remember it (reply: unconscious pleasures are impossible)
- The Argument from Nonexistent Pleasures: previous arguments try to show that some pleasures are not good, this argument tries to show Good Life without pleasure
> the life of Stoicus; if his life was good in itself for him, even just slightly good, then DH is false
- Moore’s Heap of Filth: beautiful world is more valuable than ugly world, therefore some intrinsic goods “beyond the limits of human existence”
- Ross’s “Two Worlds” Objection: imagine two worlds alike in all ways except in regards to justice and injustice

4. Attitudinal Hedonism
- Attitudinal Pleasure: a person takes AP in some state of affairs if he enjoys it, is pleased about it, is glad that it is happening, is delighted by it; directed onto objects (like fears, but unlike sensory pleasure)
- a feeling is a sensory pleasure if one takes intrinsic attitudinal pleasure in feeling it
- can take pleasure in facts about the past, present, or future
- Measuring AP and Pains: episode has strength (like belief, fear, or hope)
> “That episode has the person as its subject; it has the state of affairs as its object; its duration is the amount of time that it lasts; and its intensity is the average strength”
- Formulating Attitudinal Hedonism: form of mental statism: value of a life depends on facts about the mental states of the person who lives the life
> “If two people are indiscernible with respect to intrinsic attitudinal pleasures and pains, then their lives are of equal intrinsic value for them”
- “No matter how much knowledge, virtue, honor, wealth, health, longevity, loving relationships, etc. he may have, if he takes pleasure in nothing, there is no basis for attributing positive intrinsic value to his life according to IAH”
- “According to IAH, Stoicus had quite a good life”; “That’s because the source of value, according to IAH, is located precisely in the enjoyment of things, not the things enjoyed. Where the enjoyment is missing, there is no value”
- Desires distinct from enjoyment. One may enjoy something that one never desired, and one may desire something one has never enjoyed. AH is different from preferentism
- The Objects of Enjoyment (Mill’s Hedonism): can formulate a version of AH that is like Mill’s hedonism; some objects better suited to be objects of pleasure than others
> “altitude-adjusted”; no object has zero altitude, therefore all pleasure is still good
- one interpretation: enough low-altitude pleasure can equal a high one; another: no amount of a low can equal a high
- Porky did not have a great life (reply to argument from worthless pleasure)
- heterogeneity puzzle: we take AP in different kinds of sensations
- the idea that pains are unpleasant is almost analytic
- warm shower starts nice than gets painful: we stop taking AP in the warmth
- doubt there is “pleasure itself” (never felt it)
- something hurts the masochist (they feel sensory pains) and they enjoy it
- Epicurus valued static pleasure

5. Replies to Some Objections
- False Pleasures (A Problem for IAH?): Can adjust for truth; disanalogy with pain: truth doesn’t matter, pains still suck as bad
> Even false pleasures are worth something, truth functions like duration and intensity
- Unconscious Pleasures (A Problem for IAH?): oyster argument is ineffective; where intelligence produces no other benefits, it seems of little value in itself
- The Objection from Worthless Pleasures: Porky’s life may be ugly, immoral, unproductive, but still good for him; must be in his shoes with his feet
> Can modify IAH: some objects deserve to be object of pleasure, others pain; adjust for desert
- Pleasures (pains) can be better or worse depending on what the object is
- Justification: historical precedent (can formulate principles about one kind of value, by appeal in part to other sorts of value), desert is used in other domains, pragmatic reasons (give us the results we want)

6. Hedonism and the Shape of a Life
- The Shape of a Life: one life begins in the depths but takes an upward trend, another life begins at the heights but slides downhill; not equal
> Challenge additive theories
- Shape of a Life and IAH: did they care about their trajectories? If so, this alters hedons and dolors, if not lives are equal

7. G.E. Moore, Hedonist?
- Moore’s Pluralism: (great unmixed intrinsic goods) the love of our friends for their goodness, the love of beautiful objects for their beauty
- great intrinsic evils: the love of what is evil or ugly, the hatred of what is good or beautiful, the consciousness of pain
- great mixed intrinsic goods: hatred of what is ugly or bad, compassion or sympathy for those who suffer pain
> good things deserve to be loved, bad things deserve to be hated
- each aesthetic appreciation is an organic unity (more than some of parts)
- pleasure of low value
- A Moorean Form of Hedonism: instead of love (hatred), we can say attitudinal pleasure (pain); adjust for desert
> not universal, cuz properly directed pains not bad, improper pleasures are bad
- sympathy is not hatred of another’s pain (as Moore said) but to be pained by it
- implausible
- Appendix D. Darwall on Valuing Activity: a thing with worth is important, thing with merit is worthy of admiration, a person has merit by way she responds to things with worth, everyone has worth but few have merit
> Good Life is engagement in activities that involve appreciation of meritorious and worthy things
- implausible

8. But is it Really “Hedonism”?
- A Historical Account of Hedonism: (one strategy) show theories are relevantly like those espoused by great hedonists
- Moore’s Criterion of Hedonism: H says that pleasure alone is good as an end or in itself; nope
- Hedonism and “Pleasant Lives”: a theory of H must say that an overall pleasant life is Good
- Basic Intrinsic Value States and Hedonism: previous suggestion tries to identify H by looking at output, but not all forms of H say that every pleasant life is good
> try the opposite tactic, look at input of theory; atoms must be pleasures and pains
- Some Hard Cases: (bind) either Moorean theory is a form of H (which Fred wants) and so is dolorism, or neither are
- H is a monistic theory: one kind of goodness
- Axiological Taxonomy: conceive of H as a theory which uses pleasure and pain as value atoms, this includes theories of this book

9. Problems about Beauty and Justice
- Moore is unsuccessful; value of beauty lies (as Sidgwick said) primarily in its capacity to give pleasure to those who observe and enjoy it
- Better for good people to enjoy good things; worse for good people to suffer bad things; better for bad people to suffer bad things; worse for bad people to enjoy good things
> subject’s desert-adjusted intrinsic attitudinal hedonism deals with Ross
- does not offer evaluation of lives, just worlds
- its possible for there to be worlds in which people live good lives, but it is a bad world
- Ross’ objection calls atomism into question, not just single set of atoms

10. Themes and Puzzles
- Themes: different kinds of Good Life, no clear formulation of H, attitudinal/sensory distinction, classic objections are effective against sensory H (not attitudinal), plasticity of H
- My Vision of the Good Life: not sex drugs and rock n’ roll like Aristippus, not flourishing or philosopher life of Aristotle, not the life of the detached Sage like Seneca, or Mill’s life of higher pleasures
> good life is attitudinally pleasant life

[Ada · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book gave me 12 hedons and 26 dolors.

+12 hedons: It’s a very easy and accessible read and consequently very easy to disagree with.
+26 dolors: Feldman has many implausible assumptions about human nature. (Coincidentally, so does his brother, the epistemologist.)

[K. · Rating 4 out of 5]

I liked this book more than I anticipated. He does separate what is "good" and what is "good for someone" more sharply than I think is warranted, which consequently means his axiology is not connected to a form of ethics. A proper, classical view of human teleology might solve this problem. Nevertheless, a more compelling theory than one might think.

[Tilly · Rating 1 out of 5]

didn’t finish the full thing but i wanted to rate it anyway

[Polo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic book. Feldman has provided the philosophical community with a philosophically rigorous account of Hedonism. Clear, concise, and beautifully written.