Herman Cappelen investigates ways in which language (and other representational devices) can be defective, and how they can be improved. In all parts of philosophy there are philosophers who criticize the concepts we have and propose ways to improve them. Once one notices this about philosophy, it's easy to see that revisionist projects occur in a range of other intellectual disciplines and in ordinary life. That fact gives rise to a cluster of How doesthe process of conceptual amelioration work? What are the limits of revision? (How much revision is too much?) How does the process of revision fit into an overall theory of language and communication? Fixing Language aims to answer those questions. In so doing, it aims also to draw attention to atradition in 20th- and 21st-century philosophy that isn't sufficiently recognized. There's a straight intellectual line from Frege and Carnap to a cluster of contemporary work that isn't typically seen as closely much work on gender and race, revisionism about truth, revisionism about moral language, and revisionism in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. These views all have common core revision is both possible and important. They also face common challenges about themethods, assumptions, and limits of revision.
This book is an exceptional discussion about what conceptual engineering is and what it is not. Conceptual Engineering (if I can have a go at defining it) is about the assessment and amelioration of the concepts that we utilize in philosophy and other fields of study. Arguably, concepts structure our beliefs, hopes, desires, representations and actions - Burgess and Plunkett phrase it better in their “Conceptual Ethics” (quoted below). Cappelen surveys lots of different varieties of conceptual engineering, their flaws and proposes an arguably pessimistic view about whether or not amelioration of our concepts is possible. But, I believe that Cappelen’s Austerity Framework - essentially words depend on the past, other people, patterns of use that are external to us over which we know nothing and have NO control over and therefore conceptual engineering is very difficult to achieve- is simply pessimism with a realistic qualification. For all those reasons, conceptual engineering may or may not happen, but it won’t be because of us. The sooner we recognize that defect in our intellect, the better. Fantastic read.
“Our conceptual repertoire determines not only what beliefs we can have but also what hypotheses we can entertain, what desires we can form, what plans we can make on the basis of such mental states, and accordingly constrains what we can hope to accomplish in the world.” (Not from Cappelen, but nevertheless relevant)
A clear approach to conceptual engineering (which, ultimately, is neither pertaining to a realm of the conceptual nor a form of engineering sensu intentional restructuring of concepts, in Cappelen's view). In a way, this is a perfectly good view of conceptual engineering, but it was to me a big let down. I came in wanting to learn about conceptual engineering, and I did not learn much about conceptual engineering. For instance, reading Carnap and Strawson's response seemed far more interesting, and Cappelen's engagement with these thinkers seemed like a radical departure that I could not really follow. I do believe there are concepts. I also believe our changing of concepts is not done via changing extensions. So, as Cappelen suggests, I suppose there is nothing to do but to provide my own framework of conceptual engineering. The book was good in general, I was just let down because I went into it with dumb expectations. Not a good book for an introduction to conceptual engineering, I would say.
The most important question Cappelen raises is what even a modest externalism means for "conceptual engineering" projects, and I think his skepticism about the efficacy of conceptual engineering is salutary, even if it is a little overstated. An important corrective would be Herb Clark's work on "communal lexicons", which are shared among different overlapping communities. We might have more control over the way certain expressions refer within those smaller communities than we do in English as a whole--however that ends up being understood. But that will require thinking hard about what exactly a lexicon is and how it can vary across different groups.