Published to coincide with the 80th anniversary of the start of World War II, Robert Forczyk tells the story of Case White, the German invasion of Poland in 1939.
The German invasion of Poland on 1 September, 1939, designated as Fall Weiss (Case White), was the event that sparked the outbreak of World War II in Europe. The campaign has widely been described as a textbook example of Blitzkrieg, but it was actually a fairly conventional campaign as the Wehrmacht was still learning how to use its new Panzers and dive-bombers.
The Polish military is often misrepresented as hopelessly obsolete and outclassed by the Wehrmacht, yet in fact it was well-equipped with modern weapons and armor. Indeed, the Polish possessed more tanks than the British and had cracked the German Enigma machine cipher. Though the combined assault from Germany and the Soviet Union defeated Poland, it could not crush the Polish fighting spirit and thousands of soldiers and airmen escaped to fight on other fronts. The result of Case White was a brutal occupation, as Polish Slavs found themselves marginalized and later eliminated, paving the way for Hitler's vision of Lebensraum (living space) and his later betrayal and invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.
Using a wide array of sources, Robert Forczyk challenges the myths of Case White to tell the full story of the invasion that sparked history's greatest conflict.
Robert Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history.
Forczyk offers a new and detailed perspective on the Polish resistance against the German invasion.
In 1934 the Reichswehr had fewer tanks and aircraft than Poland, but in 5 years Hitler was able to revive the German Wehrmacht and had achieved a decisive superiority in tanks and aircraft. Forczyk shows how this was achieved, both focusing on the Wehrmacht and the Polish army. The overall picture: where Hitler started an unprecedented armament program of epic proportions the Poles, with their smaller industrial base, tried their best but came to late. When war was declared in 1939, much was achieved but to no avail.
As Forczyk mentiones in the introduction, most historians see the attack on Poland no more than a victory parade for the Wehrmacht. Forczyk presents an alternative narrative. Drawing on Polish and German sources, he illustrates that the Polish forces achieved some local victories despite eventually succumbing to the overwhelming force of the German attack.
The ruthlesness of the Germans was demonstrated by Hitler himself, who was present to watch the bombing of Warsaw. When general Blaskowitz asked general Richthofen to halt the bombing, because of the smoke produced prevented him from firing accurately, Hitler simply ordered Richthofen to carry on, and the bombing and shelling continued throughout the day.
The Poles hoped the French and British would assist them. In reality, the French Saar offensive was no more than a symbolic gesture of solidarity. Both Britain and France had known from 1938 that they would not provide any real assistance to the Poles in case of a German attack, but kept this to themselves. Instead, their diplomats fed in the Polish wishful thinking that their guarantee would prevent Germany from overrunning Poland. In reality, the Poles were on their own.
What stands out in this book is how the Poles desperatedly tried to do their best, but in the end were let down by Britain and France, who - despite their promises - were not willing to help.
All in all, a good and detailed overview of the beginning of World War II that is often overlooked in the subsequent battles and victories.
A much-needed overview of the German invasion of Poland. Dr. Forczyk is correct in pointing out that this campaign is usually dismissed with a few pages in English-language histories of the Second World War, and the depth and the detail he achieves in this fine volume help correct that oversight. He also thankfully debunks some of the major legends of the campaign in Poland, such as the stories about Polish lancers charging German panzers or that the Polish Air Force was destroyed on the ground. It needs to be remembered (and Dr. Forczyk forcefully points out) that, while Poland had the 4th-largest army in Europe, she was also a very poor country that had not yet recovered from the damages caused in the First World War. The Polish military had some good up-to-date equipment but not enough to offset the Germans' new gear. Operationally, the Polish Army's deployment was faulty, overly long and with large gaps between units that the Germans would exploit, although it should also be pointed out that this was the result of the need to try and protect Poland's few industrial areas which were in the western part of the country near the German border. The maps could have been larger and more abundant, especially for the latter parts of the campaign, but that is to quibble. A very good book indeed on a subject that needed a new narrative. Military history at its best.
I'm so disappointed in this book -- I preordered it back in June and eagerly awaited its release, and couldn't get past the first few chapters. My biggest issue is that it reads like someone's thesis -- the writing is extremely stilted and clunky -- and has NO primary source quotes to liven up the fact-reporting text, other than the epigraphs at the beginning of each chapter. The author's background is in military and security history, which should have made Case White a worthy read.
At the same time, Roger Moorhouse (a protege of the leading Western expert on Poland, Norman Davies) published a superb study (First to Fight: The Polish War 1939) of the September campaign, the same subject matter as Case White, and it is leagues better than Forczyk's.
This important monograph filled a void as major historians of WW2 usually devoted only a few pages about the opening phase of the conflict. The author debunks several myths about the invasion of Poland; the German army and air force were not at peak efficiency in September 1939 and the blitzkrieg was not yet the unstoppable tactic that it became subsequently. We are also reminded that the USSR, shared responsibility for starting the war. Staline and Hitler agreed to the invasion by their respective armies and to a genocidal pact against the Polish population in a secret protocole that was revealed only after the fall of the USSR in 1990 when some of the archives were declassified.
France and the UK did not engage the few German divisions left on the Western front when Germany was fully militarily committed against Poland. French leadership was so focused on the defensive that it could not generate any substantial military operations. During the 8 months respite that France benefitted between the Polish invasion and the German attack on its borders the period was not used to successfully prepare itself for the incoming onslaught; that in itself reveals a lot about the military and political leadership of the period.
Most historians have not put any emphasis on the Russian/German shared responsibility for starting a war of aggression and agreeing on the elimination of Polish political, social and cultural elites. But the Polish population has not forgotten which explains why Poland is so supportive of Ukraine has it has also been invaded by Russia in 2022 with a specific goal of destroying the culture and population of the country; Russian dictatorships of different eras keep on bringing destruction on neighbor states. The official Russian history about the Great Patriotic War is a work of propaganda which conveniently denies its responsibility for starting WW2; this is why works such as this one are relevant and important.
Niech Was nie zmyli (jak mnie) nazwisko autora. Robert Forczyk to amerykański historyk wojskowości oraz były czołgista i oficer zwiadu. Na swoim koncie ma między innymi opracowania walk pancernych na froncie wschodnim, książkę o upadku Francji i syntezę walk na Krymie. “Fall Weiss” ma za zadanie przedstawić zachodniemu czytelnikowi faktyczny obraz kampanii wrześniowej obalając jednocześnie wiele, ciągle niestety żywych, mitów. Jako że domyślnym odbiorcą książki nie jest czytelnik polski, na wstępie autor przybliża historię Polski do 1939 roku. Skrupulatnej analizie poddane zostały także polskie zbrojenia oraz zagmatwane relacje między Polską a jej sojusznikami.
Danie główne, czyli sama wojna obronna, podzielone zostało chronologicznie i geograficznie, co znacznie ułatwia uzmysłowić sobie całościowy obraz sytuacji na froncie w danej chwili. Opisom większych starć towarzyszą też mapki umiejętnie uzupełniające tekst. Co ciekawe, mimo tytułu, autor poświęca też sporo miejsca starciom polsko-radzieckim.
Forczyk korzystał zarówno ze źródeł niemieckich i anglojęzycznych, jak i polskich, co na rynku anglosaskim jest według autora czymś bezprecedensowym. We wstępie punktuje co popularniejsze opracowania wytykając powielane tam mity, wynikające właśnie z ignorowania źródeł polskich. Autor rozprawia się przede wszystkim z legendą nieomylnego Wehrmachtu, przestarzałego wyposażenia polskiego wojska i bierności polskiego lotnictwa.
Forczyk nie tylko opisuje, ale również ocenia. Oceny te biorą pod uwagę ówczesny stan wiedzy decydentów, nie są więc przemądrzaniem się salonowego historyka z perspektywy po fakcie. Czasami autor daje się jednak ponieść emocjom i używa dość dosadnych słów, szczególnie gdy mowa o Rydzu-Śmigłym.
“Fall Weiss” to bardzo dobra książka, przybliżająca kampanię wrześniową w przystępny i obiektywny sposób. Świetna pozycja dla kogoś, kto niewiele o temacie czytał, a chciałby sięgnąć po rzetelną syntezę, tym bardziej że opisuje nie tylko “co”, ale również “dlaczego”.
Using Polish sources, instead of relying on German records like many previous historians, Forczyk dismantles several longstanding myths about Poland. Polish cavalry did not, for example, attack tanks in the manner typically depicted. Nor was the German military campaign against Poland a smooth and precise operation. Polish soldiers fought well, suffered from bad leadership, but, in the end, they were overwhelmed by two massive invasions, the Germans from the west and the Soviets from the east. This latter component was not a bloodless intervention, but a violent assault on Poland. On top of all this, and the mistakes made by its own government in the 1920s and 1930s (Forsczyk is quite critical of Pilsudski) Poland was betrayed by Britain and France. Neither Western power did anything substantial to help Poland. If you are really interested in World War II, especially the early war in Europe, this is a must read.
Case White by Robert Forczyk is the best of the single volume treatments of the Polish Campaign of 1939 that I have so far encountered. Forczyk, former US Army officer, and current defense analyst, gives a balanced view of the background to, conduct of, and aftermath of the fall of Poland. Although the main focus of this book is the viewpoint of the Poles themselves, Forczyk does not skim over the German side of the equation, nor does he ignore the participation of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania to the overall tale. Forczyk begins his narrative analysis with a brief overview of Polish history, highlighting how Poland and her history can best be summed up as caught between the two giants of German and Russian civilization and interests. Although for a time Poland, as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was one of the premier powers of Europe (even seizing Moscow for a brief time), her own power rapidly waned in the face of the external predatory states of Sweden, Prussia, and Russia. By the late 18th century, Poland was a shell of it's former glory, and was contemptuously carved up between the far more powerful States of Prussia, Russia, and the Austrian Empire. Despite this, however, Poland displayed a cultural tenacity that has only rarely been mirrored in history, and never did the Poles give up the dream of independence and sovereignty. That independence came, finally, in 1918 with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian Empires. Forczyk spends a great deal of the book detailing this brief period of Polish history, and gives a very good character portrait of Josef Pilsudski in the process. Under Pilsudski's leadership, Poland came quite close to expanding her borders deep into Ukraine, taking advantage of the Russian Civil War,even taking Kiev for a brief period and helping the Germans in buttressing an independent, Nationalist Ukrainian government. However, Red Army victories against the uncoordinated and White Army forces allowed the Red Army to allocate a considerable portion of their manpower to driving the Poles out of Ukraine, and crushing the nascent Ukrainian independence movement. Then, in 1920, the Red Army launched a massive invasion of Poland itself, with designs upon marching well into Germany as an ultimate goal. However, at the Battle of Warsaw, the Poles won a stunning victory which crushed the Red Army, inflicted well over 100,000 casualties on the Soviets, and drove them entirely out of Poland in disorganized route. After the settling of the dust of the Polish-Soviet War, Poland was, very briefly, the most powerful state in Eastern Europe outside of the Soviet Union. However, Poland's infrastructure and industry was far behind that of Germany's and the West, and well before the National Socialists took power in Germany, Germany had outstripped Poland in industrial output, as had the Soviet Union. Poland's own oft times aggressive stance towards her neighbors left her somewhat politically isolated, relying upon promises of support from London and Paris to guarantee her security and position. And yet promises is all the Western powers managed to give to Poland. Forczyk is scathing in his treatment of the British and the French in this book. Western pacificity, weakness, and timidity aided and abetted the predatory powers of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in equal measure. Even before the Nazis took charge in Berlin, Berlin and Moscow had discussed the possibility of working together to erase the "Polish Problem" as both states termed it. Both Germany and the Soviet Union had strategic and long standing cultural reasons to wipe Poland off of the map. The Soviets because Poland was seen as a Western bridgehead aimed at the western Soviet frontier zones, and a major obstacle to their goal of exporting the Revolution to the nations of the West via the Red Army. Germany seethed with passionate hatred for a Poland who had been carved out of the corpse of the German Empire. Much of Silesia, Pomerania, and Prussia itself went over to the Poles, and violence between ethnic Germans and Poles was endemic in Poland in the years leading up to the war. This isn't to say, however, that Forczyk white washes Polish history. Polish policy towards their own ethnic minorities; Germans, Ukrainians, Slovakians, Hungarians, Romanians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, was not exactly gentle, and Poland contributed her own fair share to the tabulation of atrocities committed against innocents in the first half of the twentieth century. Despite being a powder keg of ethnic violence waiting to explode, following the death of Pilsudski and the rise of Edward Smigly Rydz, Warsaw utterly failed in their attempt to totally modernize and prepare the country for the war that everyone in Poland knew was inevitable by the end of the 1920's. Forczyk details, in great detail, sometimes to the point of exhaustion, the industrial output and capacity of Polish industry, armaments production and research and development, as well as foreign procurement programs. The training, equipping, and leadership of the Armed Forces of Poland is heavily detailed, and Forczyk does an excellent job of looking into the various operational and tactical doctrines of all three of the major participants of the coming war: Poland, Germany, and the Soviet Union. It's in this section that Forczyk performs a little bit of mythbusting within the narrative. It has long been a canard of military historians that the Spanish Civil War was a training ground for the tactics and operational doctrine that shaped the early years of World War Two. The problem with this analysis is that it focuses entirely on Germany, ignores the Soviet contribution to the Spanish Civil War, and vastly inflates German involvement in said conflict. The Condor Legion, the Luftwaffe contingent sent to aid Franco's Nationalist forces, has long been seen as the test bed for the Luftwaffe's lethal close air support doctrine that helped see the Wehrmacht march to victory in Poland, Norway, France and the Low Countries, the Balkans, North Africa, and come within an ace of knocking out the Soviet Union. However, as Forczyk points out, the Condor Legion was far too small to be seen as a proper testbed for close air support doctrine, and the opposing aerial forces weren't enough of a challenge to truly gauge the effectiveness of Luftwaffe air combat tactics, either. Also, the number of German ground troops who actively participated in fighting on the ground in Spain was tiny, merely a few hundred, and the Italian contribution to Franco's victory was far and away greater than was Germany's (it should be noted that it was the Spanish Nationalists, more than their allies, who ultimately won that war). The Soviet Union sent a much greater contingent to Spain than did Germany, including a plethora of heavy equipment and aerial squadrons. However, the Purges of the Red Army which began in 1937 hamstrung any Soviet efforts to properly analyze and inculcate any lessons that could have been learned in Spain, and so the Red Army which invaded eastern Poland in mid September 1939, was still a very untried, untested, unsure force. In the final days of peace before the outbreak of war, Forczyk details the secret clauses of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, showing convincingly that the two powers colluded to carve up Eastern Europe into spheres of influence, as well as mapping out the total erasure of Poland as an independent State much like what had happened in the late 18th century. And again, Forczyk is relentless in his berating of the French and British for their inexcusable cowardice in the face of coming hostilities. In terms of narrating the course of the fighting itself, much like he did in his excellent "Case Red: The Fall of France 1940", Forczyk is a superb analyzer of combat, and is a skilled enough writer to deliver a coherent picture to the reader of the flow of military events, though some readers will find the level of detail and description too academic and militarily scientific for their taste. Again, Forczyk busts quite a few myths about the performance of the Germans in the early days of the War. First of all, he categorically shoots down the notion that the Luftwaffe destroyed the Polish Air Force in the first two days of the War. Far from it. The Polish Air Force performed magnificently against numerically and technologically superior German aircraft, eroding the effectiveness of German strategic bombing of Polish strategic targets, albeit the Polish Air Force was simply too small to also provide much in the way of air cover for her hard pressed ground forces. Even so, many a German bomber, Stuka, and fighter went spiraling down in flames to the guns of the persistent, and genuinely heroic Polish fighter pilots. In fact, the Polish Air Force only ceased to be a factor when the Wehrmacht overran Polish airfields and supply depots. And while the Luftwaffe did attrit the Poles quite severely in the air, the Poles, statistically, did better in the air against the Germans than anyone else before 1943. On the ground, too, the Poles fought much better than they have been given credit for, and the Germans were far from the fearsomely Teutonically efficient force that they have been pegged as for years. For one, the Germans were green, and like all green forces, mistakes, miscues, blunders, and disorganization which lead to panic was not unheard of, and the Poles inflicted more than a few tactical defeats on the Germans in heavy fighting. It was the nature of Polish geography, and the German occupation of Slovakia, which largely doomed Polish efforts despite the level of their resistance. Due to the variegies of Polish geography, and the fact that operating out of Slovakia, the Germans could easily outflank the exposed Polish southern flank, the Poles found themselves being strategically squeezed by the advancing German pincers from north and south. And with so much of the developed portion of Poland having been in the former German Empire, the Poles were forced to front load their forces along their western frontiers, a position that was easily outflanked by the Germans. Had the portion of Poland once belonging to Russia not been the poor, underdeveloped side, Poland may have opted to defend further inland, giving them some options to further delay the German advance. However, as Forczyk points out, such a strategic option was politically unthinkable regardless as the majority of the Polish population was in the Western half of the nation. And even so, defending the Eastern half would not help them in the case of a Soviet strike into their rear. Which on 17 September, is precisely what happened. Forczyk spends more time detailing the Red Army's operations in eastern Poland than any other book on the conflict. The Red Army waged a clumsy, largely inept campaign, although several younger officers did standout who would go on to become major players in the eventual Soviet victory in 1945 such as Ivan Konev. As Forczyk points out, the damage done to the Red Army by Stalin's Purges was all to apparent to all outside observers who paid attention to the Red Army's lackluster performance in Poland (one notable effect being the total haphazard way in which the operations were planned, and the absolute failure of the Red Army's logistical network; something that wouldn't had happened had the Red Army not been eviscerated at the top by the Purges as the Red Army pre-Purge was a well honed machine). The Germans especially noted the Soviet's poor performance, a performance that would bear truly bitter fruit in 1941 as it was largely what convinced the Germans that they could knock the Russians out in a single blow. Despite heroic fighting, the twin invasions doomed Poland. And following the defeat of the Poles, Forczyk details the fate of the occupied country, those in the armed forces and government who managed to escape, and the contribution the Poles continued to make to the overall Allied war effort. Forczyk spares no details on the harsh German and Soviet occupation of Poland. Both the Germans and the Soviets were ruthless in their rooting out, and murder, of Polish intellectuals and patriots. Both the Germans and the Soviets were determined to break Poland culturally, as well as physically. The Katyn Massacre is not ignored, and Forczyk is fairly scathing of the Western Allies collusion in aiding the Soviet Union in covering up the crime as well as the scale of the slaughter. He also discusses the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, not failing to showcase who the Allies, Soviet and Western, colluded to allow the Germans to destroy the Polish Home Army. And while it's obviously beyond the purview of the topic, Forczyk does at least take a few paragraphs to briefly discuss the nature of Soviet and Warsaw Pact occupation of Poland until the rise of the Solidarity Movement which aided in the fall of Communism in Poland. This really is a standout book, one that should be required reading for anyone seeking to study Polish, German, or Russian history as well as the Military and Political history of the Second World War and of Eastern Europe. Very highly recommended.
I probably should have given this book 5 stars. I didn’t because I could not understand the descriptions of the battles. Part of that was my inability to concentrate but part of it I lay at the authors feet for seemingly describing where every bomb was dropped and shot fired. It became overwhelming. In the hands of the right person this book is good for understanding the military tactics.
I grew up hearing “Pollock jokes” as kids we never understood why. Well after reading this and other accounts of what happened to the polish people and the disinterest America (FDR) held about their fate it really makes me sick that those jokes were being told. The Poles were warriors and got spat on by both the Nazi’s and the Soviets.
I am glad to live in a time when they have achieved political independence. I hope nothing like what happened to them in this book ever happens again.
To sum the book up Poles good everyone else bad (France, Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, U.S.)
This is a look at the German 1939 attack on Poland and how both sides faired. He does use Polish sources which apparently many authors don't. He treats this more than a sideshow. It is a comprehensive look at the fighting an what happened.
If the author wasn't so biased toward all except the Poles it would be a more balanced presentation.
An enlightening book on the German (and Soviet) invasions of Poland. Poland was unprepared and quickly beaten, but did get in some good licks on the Germans. The German “blitzkrieg” was not especially effective- they would do much better in France in 1940 - and the Luftwaffe did not turn in a credible effort. The Polish allies, France and Britain, did nothing to help. The real winner was Stalin. He gained half of Poland at little expense, which probably spoiled Germany’s chance to defeat the Soviet Union in 1941 by pushing back the Operation Barbarossa start line by several hundred miles.
***I was granted an ARC of this via Netgalley from the publisher.***
If you have studied the Second World War, you know that Poland was the first to fall victim to the forces of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. This five-week action tends to be glossed over in most popular histories of the war with Germany shown to be an unstoppable, efficient machine. In the book, Case White: The Invasion of Poland 1939 by Robert Forczyk, he strives to show the campaign in detail and dispel any myths that have been propagated. In the introduction, Forczyk points to the lack of western historians using Polish sources to inform the histories of the campaign. He seeks to remedy that with this book. He starts by giving the reader a brief history of Poland from the middle ages to the first world war. Then he provides the military affairs and politics of interwar Poland and Germany and the road that led to war. He spends most of his time on the opening moves of the war and how those opening successes and failure on both sides eventually led to the Polish downfall. He does a great job in covering the ground, air and sea aspects of the campaign as well. Forczyk also offers a great evaluation of the campaign from both sides and how both sides could have fought their campaign better, what lessons the Germans should have but didn’t, the failure of the Allies response to German aggression and German and Russian crimes in Poland. The author has done an excellent job in giving a blow by blow of the Poland campaign and providing detailed insight into the consequences of decisions made before, during and after the campaign. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in military history, World War 2 history and Polish history.
This book is an extremely difficult read. It took longer to read, than the operation itself and requires the question WHY was it written? It professes to be deeper and more accurate coverage than other offerings. It is however a standard boilerplate, Polish elitist view of the events blaming everyone from Polish politicians, the Brits, the French, Polish neighbors, and even Polish Jews, including the vile Germans and Soviets. Everyone that is, except the elites and nobles that set the system in place to profit from and have their flunkies run. Forczyk is at his best in describing the early history and the diplomatic efforts leading up to war. Once he turns to battle action, it is into the weeds as far as clarity. There are authors who can write about simultaneous events, and, like a juggler keep several balls in the air at the same time. Forczyk is not one of them. Considering that this is published by Osprey, the maps are mediocre at best. One wonders if the author and cartographers talked at all. The author talks about corps level groups, the maps show only divisional, so one must search through many units to find the three or four that make up the corps. He does not refer to maps by page number or name. River names on the maps are almost afterthoughts. The author does provide a valuable appendix, but again, flipping back and forth to access maps and information is cumbersome. His style is also awkward. Every time he mentions someone he gives his full rank and name, using their rank in the relevant army. Again, WHY? To show off his language skills? Is he paid by the letter? He does handle some small actions well and the footnotes for those killed in the Katyn Forest are a quiet but effective statement. But, overall, it just is not worth the effort.
I wish that I could simply review this book from the perspective of straight military history, as I would be rather more enthusiastic about it, as this is the best operational account of Germany's invasion of 1939 I've ever seen. Forczyk's perspective regarding most of the participants is unsparing, and he is often as critical of Polish actors as he is of the Germans or Soviets. However, particular disdain is reserved for Chamberlain's government in Britain; let's just say that when Forczyk uses the word "appeasement" you can hear the sibilant hiss of contempt. As for what would have really made a difference in regards to Poland's long-term survival, Forczyk tends to focus on Anglo-American willingness to provide resources to the Soviet state in the name of business, and the Anglo-French unwillingness to truly punish the Nazi Regime for it's flagrant disregard of Versailles, which allowed Berlin and Moscow to respectively accelerate their military preparations. I have to admit that this seems to be a rather unrealistic perspective considering the political chaos of the post-1929 era. Still, Forczyk essentially does admit that the Polish Second Republic was often its own worst enemy, what with Joszef Pilsudski's grandiose dreams of territorial expansion and a military high command warped by internal political conflict. Poland deserved better, but that's usually besides the point in international conflict. Finally, some readers might be put off by Forczyk's often polemical tone; it's as though he fears Poland will be betrayed again by the West in the face of Vladimir Putin's regime of subversion.
How much of a buff are you on World War II? Can you quote the minutia of tank, ship and plane statistics? Do you know which country had the 4th largest army in Europe in 1939? Can you describe the opening battles of World War II? Evening if you can do all that, you still can learn a lot from Robert Forczyk's Case White: The Invasion of Poland, 1939.
Robert Forczyk provides a revisionist history of the standard story of the Polish invasion by diving into Polish history and telling the story from the Polish viewpoint as much as possible. He spends the first four chapters on laying the groundwork of the formation of the 2nd Polish Republic, its enemies, its preparation for survival, its arms race with its neighbors, and the bad hand it was dealt by the Western Allies. Then comes the war. And this is not the brief tale of German victories over hapless Poles. Rather this is a tale of inept leadership, bad planning, lack of support, and that was just on the German side! The Poles fought hard, but also suffered from inept leadership, lack of resources, lack of support from the West, and the dagger stuck in their back by the Soviet Union.
So if you are looking for a scholarly, readable study of the 1939 Polish Campaign replete with notes, maps, and bibliography that has a strong viewpoint, Case White could be that book!
This book was just dull and this topic is intriguing to me, but Mr. Florczyk had overloaded this book with information in one place - I was not able to follow all the information that was covered by Case White. I wanted to like this story and find it intriguing as this topic is something that i find really intriguing as it's the history of my own country.
In my personal opinion, there are few events in modern history of Europe that are as consistently bypassed or getting short shrift by western historians as the German-Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939. In English literature, its significance is limited to being the starting point for the world-wide cataclysm known as World War II and the first example of effectiveness of German “blitzkrieg” approach to warfare. In regard to the campaign itself, the most widely known “fact” about it should be regarded as the most persistent and longest lasting victory of Goebbels’ propaganda machine – those foolish horse cavalry charges against German panzers… which never really happened.
This lazy and negligent attitude of western military historians, while hard to excuse, is at least understandable. The fact that the campaign of September 1939 seems to be similarly neglected by “native” historians is much harder to explain. Don’t get me wrong, plenty of books have been written by Polish historians about the invasion, especially over the last couple of decades. By now, the Polish book market is saturated by unit histories, personal memoirs and especially by books dedicated to specific events that took place during the campaign and earned their place in national mythology. Westerplatte, the stubborn stand at Mokra, defense of the capitol, Bzura counter-offensive - by now they are all covered in detail by Polish historians. But, surprising as it may seem, one is hard-pressed to find a single volume written in Polish which provides a detailed, multifaceted overview of the September 1939 campaign as a whole.
So, for me at least, publication of Robert Forczyk’s “Case White” was an event of uttermost importance and I’ve had extremely high expectations of this book. I am happy to report that it turned out to be exactly what I hoped for – an exceptionally detailed and thoughtful analysis of the entire campaign, with plenty of space given to all involved parties.
The book itself starts with a superb overview of the inter-war period of 1918-1939, which sets the conflict in question in proper context. Author’s breakdown of the political scene and evolution of the military forces in the fledgling state of Poland is a masterpiece all in its own right. Furthermore, for me personally it turned out to be a treasure trove of information of the “they didn’t teach me that in school”-kind.
Once the narrative reaches the period immediately before the outbreak of the hostilities, the author narrows his focus to military and technical issues faced by all parties involved in the conflict. The analysis in this part of the books covers military capabilities, organization and operational plans of respective sides. The author shows clearly that, as so often is the case in regard to military operations, the actual course of events was to a large extent decided by decisions taken during this time period. Here, Forczyk proves beyond any doubt in my mind that the German technological and numerary superiority wasn't the real cause of the cataclysmic and rapid nature of Poland's defeat. Naturally, those factors played a vital role, but their significance was amplified by grave flaws in plans and disposition of forces by the Polish high command.
Final part of the book is dedicated to the military conflict itself. Initial German assault was conducted along three major axes of advance and stretched over the period of 1-9 th September. Each of those operations is analyzed by Forczyk separately and in detail. Next, the narrative coalesces and handles the retreat of Polish forces toward Warszawa and the defense of the Polish capital itself. The only major Polish offensive action of the campaign – the counter-attack at Bzura river – is given special attention. The analysis of the campaign is concluded by coverage of Soviet advance into Polish territory and mopping up operations conducted by German forces during the last weeks of September.
In my opinion, the value of this book is twofold. First of all, it is to my best knowledge only the second book written in English language dedicated specifically to this topic. Based solely on that fact, “Case White” is a most welcome addition to my library. But, far more importantly, Forczyk’s no nonsense, purely analytical and strictly military approach to the subject matter is exactly what I wished for from this book. I believe that this book will be highly appreciated by anyone interested in this campaign in particular and World War 2 in general and recommend it without any reservations.
This well researched and compellingly told history is a great example of an author bringing to light interesting new revelations about a very "familiar" historical event through thorough, holistic study. Despite the normal perception of Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939 being a fairly easy, quick won victory; Mr. Forczyk's ability to draw upon primary Polish resources (as well as Russian) has paid readers greatly in this book. Most Western histories of this conflict draw heavily upon German sources which portray a feeble Polish military doomed to charge tanks with horse cavalry. What the author shows us is that, although defeated by a combined German and Russian onslaught, the Polish military had more tanks than the German Army and fought bravely despite the odds. Yes, Poland did make mistakes which the author points out equally as much as he points out the German's blunders during this campaign. In fact, the lessons learned by the German military (Army and Air Force mostly) from this campaign radically reshaped and improved German military tactics, equipment, and combined arms cooperation in subsequent campaigns like the invasion of France.
While I really enjoyed this book and found it to be a very interesting read, it does get fairly technical regarding military doctrine, strategy, and equipment which may turn off (or at least lose) casual readers. I highly recommend anyone in the Armed Forces in general and Army specifically read this book because it really speaks to this conflict on several levels. First, it addresses the historiography of this conflict and its unfortunate reliance upon just one side's sources (German in this case). Second, it really does provide a fair and balanced critic of all sides involved (to include Russia to a lesser extent). Third and finally, this book's author is able to weave discussions of tactics, strategy, equipment, and more into a very cogent and interesting narrative which can be challenging with the amount of ground this work covers. I am not an expert on this campaign, but I suspect this book is the definitive work on the Polish Campaign.
"Case White" was a greatly enjoyable read when it reviewed the history of Poland, the inter war years and the lead up to war. There was a great deal of data related to the state of Poland and it's mission to prepare itself for national defence. I believe the author argued very well in making claims that Poland in fact was a modernized military in terms of hardware and struggled more as a result of command and control issues and problems created by the quasi fascist state in power which required loyalty to the party among the officer corps over skill. Additionally I think the most obvious tragedy is the failure of Western powers to halt Hitler and German militarization. Not only did they not halt it but they sold equipment to the state to increase the rate of re-armament. The largest point attempted by the author, which is not fully argued out is the attempt to state that Russia was culpable for starting world war two with it's invasion of Poland. Although some culpability lies with the USSR, so does some fall to france, the UK and the USA. Russia was not attempting to assist German they were attempting to take back land lost in the treaty of brest-litovsk and that was continued with their annexation of baltic states which broke away during the civil war. It's not that the USSR isn't partially responsible it's more that the context for their war was tied more to the end of world war 1, the dissolution of the russian tsarist regime and the russo polish war. A second Russo Polish war was going to happen it was just a matter of time.
The coverage of the campaign was well done and I think anyone interested in the begining of the war should give the book a read. The myth of the blitzkrieg needs to be broken. Nazi propaganda should not be repeated on modern academic works on the subject. They should instead be inspected, evaluated and tossed out for what they are.
Robert Forczyk does a wonderful job of debunking the myths surround the 1939 Polish campaign.
While the Wehrmacht is lauded for its blitzkrieg tactics and success using combined arms, the author lays out how untried, and at times, unprepared Germany was for the war it was about to fight. Poland proved to be an advanced training ground for both the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe prior to its 1940 campaigns in the West. However, not all of the lessons learnt in Poland would be applied; these would come back to haunt Hitler in the Battle of Britain and most especially at Stalingrad.
The author is also quick to applaud and condemn the Polish forces when necessary. Poor strategic leadership and communications between large forces left a lot to be desired. That being said, the Polish forces fought hard despite innumerable issues and their grit and tenacity were truly legendary.
Finally, the author is honest in distributing blame across all the major players. Roosevelt, Chamberlain and the French government have much to answer for in allowing Poland to wither on the vine.
Forczyk has done a remarkable job offering the reader a balanced account of events before, during and after Poland’s collapse.
This book reveals a good history of Poland a few years before and post-WWII. My perception of the German invasion has evolved after this reading. I am used to reading in other writings about the German Blitzkrieg method being a well thought out and precise strategy. This book leaves me believing otherwise. The invasion of Poland could have easily failed for the Germans with some simple binary decisions and some lucky timings. The Blitzkrieg style of war was being formulated and learned by the Germans during this invasion.
I have a better appreciation of the Soviet strategy around pulling Poland into the Socialist Republic. And subsequently, how Poland became an independent nation again after the fall of the Soviet Union.
I enjoyed learning how some of the borders moved across countries such as Lvov Poland, which became Lviv Ukraine.
Overall, this was an enjoyable read packed with a lot of facts. I did feel overwhelmed with too much detail, which at times, distracted from the flow of the overall story.
Mjög áhugaverð yfirferð yfir innrás Þjóðverja og Sovétmanna inn í Pólland haustið 1939. Forczyk byggir mikið á pólskum heimildum og áhugavert er að sjá hvernig pólski herinn stóð oft vel í hárinu á þýska hernum og víða gerðu stjórnendur beggja herja afdrífarík mistök sem reyndust Pólverjum þó öllu verr því þeir máttu ekki við slíku. Pólverjar voru í óða önn að endurbæta tæknibúnað herafla síns og voru framarlega á ýmsum sviðum en langt á eftir Þjóðverjum á vissum sviðum s.s. samskiptabúnaði herdeilda. Þjóðverjar voru rétt að byrja að þróa leiftursóknina, hernaðaraðferð sem gjörbylti hernaði á fyrri hluta seinni heimsstyrjaldar. Oft lentu þeir í miklum vandræðum vegna þess að herbúnaðurinn hentaði ekki og hernaðartæknin var oft á tíðum vanþróuð. Þeir lærðu hins vegar af mistökum sínum, nýttu sér reynsluna frá Póllandi til hins ítrasta í innrásinni í Frakkland og unnu sína glæstustu sigra 1941 þegar þeir réðust inn í Sovétríkin áður en andstæðingar þeirra þróuðu tækni og varnir sem stóðust hervél Þjóðverja fyllilega snúning.
I never, ever DNF books but this one had me as close as I've ever came.
Case White is incredibly heavy on military detail which I'm sure is great to those who have at least a base knowledge of military history or just any general military knowledge. For me, as someone who had practically no prior knowledge, this just felt like pages and pages and pages of numbers and weapon listings.
So, I guess that's partly my own issue because without that prior knowledge it's a difficult read but I will say that Case White is still incredibly informative. I'm sure actual historians can better confirm the accuracy of everything detailed here but as a "general" reader of WW2 non-fiction, there was a lot here that I had never known that I found fascinating and would love to learn even more about (perhaps more on the political events) and so I am glad I stuck with it.
Thanks to Osprey Publishing and NetGalley for providing me with a copy for review.
This is another enjoyable read by Forczyk, although not as enjoyable as Case Red and Where the Iron Crosses Grow. In part I wonder how much of this he wrote. By this I mean he is an American and he used American-English spelling of words in Case Red such as "defense" but in this book he spells the the same word "defence". Why would he spell a word a certain in one title but use an alternative spelling in another? It struck me as an oddity. There were also a few grammatical mistakes that I don't remember appearing in the other titles. Another oddity was that he measured distance in miles when he wrote Where the Iron Crosses Grow but kilometers in this book. It just seems peculiar that the same author would go from one standard of measurement to another. As to the content itself, it is a solid work. I learned a few details about the campaign and personalities that I wasn't aware of such as it wasn't quite the walkover I have always been led to believe it was. However, the overall quality of the writing wasn't as engaging as the other 2 titles.
The premise (correcting misconceptions regarding the German invasion of Poland) sounded more interesting than it actually was. This book covered the invasion itself, including some interesting background on Poland as a nation leading up to WW2, before going into a detailed description of the battles fought during the campaign.
I felt like the beginning and end of the book where the author offered commentary and analysis were the most interesting, but after the opening moves of the invasion, most of the book kinda blended together. I also feel like I didn’t walk away with a ton of insight into what the given commanders etc were thinking as they made different choices to defend or withdraw etc. For that, 3 stars.
Thank you to Netgalley for the opportunity to read and review this book. The German invasion of Poland is commonly accepted as the beginning of World War Two. 'Case White' delves much further into the political and military events of the time. It is well researched and written. As is the case with foreign place names and people it is easy to get lost as a reader keeping everything straight. The fighting and war crimes unfortunately tend to blend into each other. The maps, while accurate, could have been simpler with less military unit designations. The politics of the time were much more valuable to the casual reader.
Bardzo dobrze opisana kampania wrześniowa, oczami amerykańskiego historyka. Najpierw wprowadzenie w historię Polski, odzyskanie niepodległości, rys polityczno - gospodarczo - wojskowy Polski, Niemiec i ZSRR przez całe dwudziestolecie. A potem mięsko, czyli opis wojsk i całej kampanii. Momentami zbyt dokładna jak dla mnie, z opisem walk poszczególnych batalionów itd, ale dzięki temu mam znacznie lepszy pogląd na to co działo się pamiętnego września. Zaleta: bardzo konkretna, bez wodolejstwa, i przystępnie napisana.