In the introduction to Egypt in Search of a Political Community, Nadav Safran postulates that political systems work only if they are founded on a functional shared belief system and there is a connection between material realities and ideological values. His argument in regards to his case study is that neither of these conditions was present in pre-Revolutionary Egypt, and thus nationalist intellectuals, both liberal and Islamic, failed to produce a pragmatic political system capable of replacing British rule. Because Egyptian ideologies were negative in essence – in that they were framed around not what the nation should be but what it should not be (i.e. under British occupation) – they were unable to produce a program that could engender sufficient popular support by meeting everyday social and cultural needs.
Safran’s first three body chapters provide a historical context to his study by examining the period prior to the 1882 British occupation. Prior to the 19th century, Islam was the foundation of all political thought and it possessed a pessimistic quality due to the belief that perfection lay in the past. He also suggests that even if Islam could be interpreted as being democratic, power has not historically been exercised in that way in Muslim countries. He portrays Egypt in a typical Orientalist fashion as a land suffering from long-term stagnation and isolation, as well as authoritarian rule that created a gap between the rulers and the ruled. Muhammad Ali and his successors were somewhat better, but they accomplished more in terms of tearing down old structures rather than building new ones, with their most significant failures being in the realm of education. Nonetheless, westernizing reforms and economic subordination to foreign powers led to an undermining of traditional Islamic ideology and allowed intellectuals to begin to question fundamental beliefs about government. This movement was catalyzed by the activism of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who believed that Muslims must engage the same modern developments of Europe but remain true to Islamic ideological principles. Although he focused on resisting foreign intrusion, his successor Muhammad Abdu emphasized the development of legitimate power within the local community. Revolutionary leader Ahmad Urabi was influenced by these ideas, but his movement failed because, according to the author, it was reactive and negative with no pragmatic plan forwards, leaving it vulnerable to collapse.
Safran then spends three chapters outlining the two major ideological trends: reformist Islam and liberal nationalism. He begins by arguing that the British, prior to World War I, were not in a position to undertake large-scale social reform, and thus such a task was left to the indigenous population, although it was facilitated by the British-supported freedom of the press. Proponents of reformist Islam attempt to inject a new measure of interpretability into Islam that would emphasize its relationship to reason and thus congruence with modern political thought. In essence, they were attempting to reconcile science and religion, for which it was essential to go back to the “pure” Islam of the past rather than rely on the corrupt, self-serving doctrines of more recent eras. The liberal nationalists, meanwhile, moved away from Islam and wanted to construct a political theory based on modern, western ideologies. In his brief third part, the author argues that liberal nationalism achieved much more success at first because it had a positive element of a unifying ideology that was attractive to the newly-formed, but disenfranchised, middle class. The 1919 Revolution brought more interaction between the people and the government, helped in the promulgation of a constitution, and weakened the influence of Islamic law.
The problem with the 1919 Revolution, however, was that it was driven by the negative aspects of the ideology and was led by a small section of privileged individuals who received the lion’s share of the benefits of the new political system. In his lengthiest section, therefore, Safran narrates the progress and decline of the liberal nationalist movement. After providing brief, contextualizing biographies, he proceeds with a comprehensive analysis of the works of liberal nationalism’s key figures as a way to understand why they failed to provide a lasting political foundation for Egypt, one that is interspersed with the political history of the pre-revolutionary era. Essentially, these thinkers needed to solidify the security of national and individual sovereignty as being principles of the country, but their works were too general and theoretical to be accessible. Moreover, they tended towards idealism and did not produce a consistent or comprehensive ethical and political program. Furthermore, they reacted poorly to the reformist Islam backlash against their ideas by attempting to reconcile their positions with religion. They were unsuccessful in doing so, which the author attributes to the practical irreconcilability between the two subjects, and thus these efforts served only to add confusion and contradiction to an already inchoate philosophy. New social strains, meanwhile, undermined intellectual faith in reason and led to a rise in support of religious organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who seemed more willing and able to deal with the everyday problems of the people at a time when liberal politics was corrupt and stagnant. In terms of educational development, a key element of the liberal nationalist agenda, the intellectuals broke down traditional models but did not replace them with anything pragmatic, leading to a generation of educated, but unemployed and disillusioned, middle class individuals. Further attempts by the liberal nationalists to bring Islam back into the fold only reinforced the idea that previous iterations of Islam were paramount, thus failing to offer a pragmatic path forward.
In his last section, Safran investigates “the threat of the traditionalist reaction” and argues that, like the liberal nationalists, the Muslim Brotherhood formed a political ideology around what they did not want for Egypt, yet had no practical plan to replace it. What made them dangerous, however, was that they were willing to use violence to overthrow this system, but had no framework for containing that violence or outlining its proper use. All it offered, therefore, was an excuse to enact violence against those with alternative perspectives and an open door to political and social chaos. In his conclusion, the author summarizes his key points and suggests that Egypt could not produce a viable ideology because the change had to happen too fast, the relevant ideas were foreign at a time when foreign oppression made them less amenable to the masses, and Islam was too involved in the process. In looking at the contemporary (1961) situation, he suggests that it is too early to comment on the viability of the post-revolutionary political system, but that the attempt to break free from these moulds discussed in his book and combine the best elements of each side has at least permitted the emergence of a genuinely indigenous project.
Overall, Egypt in Search of a Political Community is a traditional work from an Orientalist and high political perspective that focuses on stereotypical and negative elements of Egyptian culture without balancing it with some of the more positive social developments. The signposting and recapitulation are poor throughout, which is particularly problematic given Safran’s lengthy analyses of individual works, but his conclusion does a good job of bringing everything together and making it comprehensible. It is, ultimately, an outdated take on Egyptian political life, but one that is perhaps worth browsing for those who specialize in the topic.