On the morning of September 15, 1930, early issues of newspapers across Germany reported that Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers’ party (NSDAP) had scored a stunning electoral triumph. While only two years before the party had languished in obscurity, unable to secure even 3 percent of the votes, when the polls closed on the evening of September 14, 1930 the NSDAP had become the second largest party in the Weimar Republic. This abrupt breakthrough was a portentous milestone in German politics, marking the first of series of impressive electoral performances that within two years would transform the NSDAP into the most popular and powerful party in Germany. The author confronts such questions as Where had this Nazi constituency come from? and How had the Nazi done it? by transcending the narrow geographic and chronological parameters of the traditional analyses and examining the issue on a broader scale. He assesses that the Nazi electoral support was more varied than traditionally assumed, drawing votes not only from the middle class but also from the substantial bourgeoise, the working class, and the Catholic population.
The Nazi policies were often deliberately vague, so that they could appeal to as many voters as possible. Hitler’s promise to remilitarize Germany would bring in massive industrial contracts and thus, secure the support of many industrialists, while his promises of increased employment and better pensions appealed to the traditional socialists and many common men. Many landowners and businessmen supported the Nazis because of the mutual opposition to communism; the NSDAP was seen as the only credible right-wing alternative to left-wing parties. Hitler’s fanatical belief in the supremacy of the German race pleases the nationalists. In those hard years of economic crisis, Hitler’s hatred of Jews struck a chord with many people, especially the working class: the Jews were a convenient scapegoat for all Germany’s problems. Also, the aim to annul the Treaty of Versailles and the idea that the reparations were the main cause of the economic crisis were popular with most Germans.
In general, Thomas Childers has created quite an extensive and meticulously compiled study, which analyses a large national sample (approximately five hundred cities, towns, villages from every area of the Reich), the print media of the time, the widely used campaign literature, the interaction between parties and organizations representing social and occupational groups, and the expanding literature of the NSDAP. The Nazi Voter is a very detailed book on the subject, and with its dry style and abundant statistics, it is not an easy read. Yet, in my opinion, it will prove to be useful to everyone interested in Nazi Germany and Hitler’s ascend to power.