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حروب ايران: ألعاب الجاسوسية - والمعارك المصرفية والصفقات السرية التي أعادت تشكيل الشرق الأوسط
كتاب جاي سولومون هو ثمرة تقارير ومقابلات واسعة ومعمقة مع كافة العناصر الرئيسية الفاعلة في النزاع، من كبار المسؤولين الإيرانيين لوزير الخارجية جون كيري وفريقه التفاوضي. بعين المراسل الثاقبة المحترفة والحذاقة السردية لمؤرخ عظيم، يستعرض لنا سولومون كيف طورت إيران برنامجها النووي بعيداً عن الأنظار على مدى سنوات إلى أن أصبح هذا الموضوع الشغل الشاغل للمجتمع الدولي وهاجسه الأمني الأول. كذلك يصنف لنا سولومون الأخطاء الفادحة الجسيمة لإدارتي بوش وأوباما بعد أن أضناهما البحث عن طريقة للدخول في شراكة مع إيران، مستهلكين الكثير من الجزر والكثير من العصي. كذلك يمضي بنا سولومون في رحلة عبر غرف وردهات الأجنحة الفندقية حيث كان يجري التفاوض على الاتفاق النووي عام 2015، مقدماً تقييماً شفافاً وصريحاً للمستقبل الغامض للعلاقة الأمريكية – الإيرانية.
يحكي هذا الكتاب الرائع قصة العلاقات الأمريكية – الإيرانية على مدى سنوات عديدة ويسلط الضوء على ألعاب الجاسوسية والمعارك المصرفية والصفقات السرية التي أعادت تشكيل الشرق الأوسط. كذلك يسهم هذا الكتاب مساهمة جليلة في فهم التداعيات قصيرة وطويلة الأمد لكيفية إدارتنا لهذه العلاقة الصعبة. وهو يعد بمثابة توصيف إعلامي معمق من واحد من أفضل الصحافيين الذين يكتبون عن الشرق الأوسط اليوم.
ويعد الكتاب أيضاً بمثابة استكشاف إعلامي مثير معمق لصراع نفوذ على مدى عقود بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران أفضى إلى صفقة نووية تاريخية، وربما كارثية. فعلى مدى أكثر من عقد من الزمن، كانت الولايات المتحدة تخوض حرباً مع إيران لا تقل خطورة عن أي حرب أخرى في الشرق الأوسط، حرب تكمن أهميتها أكثر ما تكمن في أنها كانت خافية عن الرأي العام. من خلال مجموعة متنوعة من العقوبات الاقتصادية، الدبلوماسية العالمية، والعمل الاستخباراتي، فقد جهدت الإدارات الأمريكية المتعاقبة لاحتواء طموحات إيران في أن تصبح قوة نووية وتهيمن على المنطقة، الأمر الذي يرى فيه الكثير واحداً من أكبر الأخطار التي تتهدد السلام في الشرق الأوسط. في هذه الأثناء، لجأت إيران إلى استغلال حالة عدم الاستقرار الإقليمي لمصلحتها من خلال نسف وتقويض المصالح الأمريكية. حروب إيران وصف ممتع لمعركة جرى خوضها على عدة مستويات، عسكرية ومالية وسرية.
إنه كتاب يزخر بالكشف بالإلهام، من الاتصالات السرية بين إدارة أوباما والحكومة الإيرانية إلى التقارير المرسلة من الخطوط الأمامية للساحة الجديدة للحرب المالية. من قراء ’حروب الأشباح‘ لـ ستيف كول إلى ’برج يلوح في الأفق‘ لـ لورنس رايت، يكشف لنا كتاب حروب إيران التاريخ الخفي لصراع لا يعرف معظم الأمريكيين حتى بأنه قائم، والذي قد يكون لنتائجه تداعيات جيوبوليتيكية بعيدة المدى.
يحكي هذا الكتاب الرائع قصة العلاقات الأمريكية – الإيرانية على مدى سنوات عديدة ويسلط الضوء على ألعاب الجاسوسية والمعارك المصرفية والصفقات السرية التي أعادت تشكيل الشرق الأوسط. كذلك يسهم هذا الكتاب مساهمة جليلة في فهم التداعيات قصيرة وطويلة الأمد لكيفية إدارتنا لهذه العلاقة الصعبة. وهو يعد بمثابة توصيف إعلامي معمق من واحد من أفضل الصحافيين الذين يكتبون عن الشرق الأوسط اليوم.
ويعد الكتاب أيضاً بمثابة استكشاف إعلامي مثير معمق لصراع نفوذ على مدى عقود بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران أفضى إلى صفقة نووية تاريخية، وربما كارثية. فعلى مدى أكثر من عقد من الزمن، كانت الولايات المتحدة تخوض حرباً مع إيران لا تقل خطورة عن أي حرب أخرى في الشرق الأوسط، حرب تكمن أهميتها أكثر ما تكمن في أنها كانت خافية عن الرأي العام. من خلال مجموعة متنوعة من العقوبات الاقتصادية، الدبلوماسية العالمية، والعمل الاستخباراتي، فقد جهدت الإدارات الأمريكية المتعاقبة لاحتواء طموحات إيران في أن تصبح قوة نووية وتهيمن على المنطقة، الأمر الذي يرى فيه الكثير واحداً من أكبر الأخطار التي تتهدد السلام في الشرق الأوسط. في هذه الأثناء، لجأت إيران إلى استغلال حالة عدم الاستقرار الإقليمي لمصلحتها من خلال نسف وتقويض المصالح الأمريكية. حروب إيران وصف ممتع لمعركة جرى خوضها على عدة مستويات، عسكرية ومالية وسرية.
إنه كتاب يزخر بالكشف بالإلهام، من الاتصالات السرية بين إدارة أوباما والحكومة الإيرانية إلى التقارير المرسلة من الخطوط الأمامية للساحة الجديدة للحرب المالية. من قراء ’حروب الأشباح‘ لـ ستيف كول إلى ’برج يلوح في الأفق‘ لـ لورنس رايت، يكشف لنا كتاب حروب إيران التاريخ الخفي لصراع لا يعرف معظم الأمريكيين حتى بأنه قائم، والذي قد يكون لنتائجه تداعيات جيوبوليتيكية بعيدة المدى.
358 pages, Hardcover
First published June 3, 2014
81 people are currently reading
735 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 54 reviews
August 13, 2016
This is a well-researched book with a ton of information. It's a very heavy read but the author does a great job in making the subject matter interesting to the reader. I'd recommend this book to anyone who has an interest in history, politics, war, current events or the Middle East--I have a keen interest in all those topics yet there was still a wealth of information that I was able to glean from reading this book.
Thank you to Netgalley and Random House Publishing Group for an advance copy of this in exchange for an honest review.
Thank you to Netgalley and Random House Publishing Group for an advance copy of this in exchange for an honest review.
July 12, 2021
حاول الصحفي سولومون توضيح الأحداث التاريخية التي رسمت تاريخ الشرق الأوسط وربما الأحداث التي بفضلها نحن إلى الآن بمنأى عن الحرب . بالنسبة لي لم يذكر الكتاب أحداث جديدة بقدر ما وَضح لي التفاصيل المُبهمة للأحداث كحرب العراق والحصار الاقتصادي خلال رئاسة بوش ، أيضًا سعيّ أوباما الدبلوماسي لتحسين العلاقات الإيرانية- الأمريكية .
الكتاب جميل وترجمة الأستاذ فواز مريحة للقارئ ، لكن الصحفي سولومون يظل أمريكيًا وعلى هذا فإن الأحداث لم تُكتب بقلم مُحايد ، لذا لا تزال صورة الدفاع عن الجانب الأمريكي قوية وتُقرأ بين السطور إن لم تكن مُباشرة .
الكتاب جميل وترجمة الأستاذ فواز مريحة للقارئ ، لكن الصحفي سولومون يظل أمريكيًا وعلى هذا فإن الأحداث لم تُكتب بقلم مُحايد ، لذا لا تزال صورة الدفاع عن الجانب الأمريكي قوية وتُقرأ بين السطور إن لم تكن مُباشرة .
December 30, 2016
Very thorough review and analysis of the past 35+ years of US-Iran engagement and policies. One realizes that due to the nature of the Iran theocracy, the US has never quite been sure how to interpret Iran's actions/intents and react accordingly. This culminates, of course, with the Iran nuclear deal in 2015. I must admit that I have always been opposed to the Iran deal, as I believe we gave too much for too little in return. Nothing in this book convinced me otherwise...if anything, I am even more concerned. A worthy read.
September 1, 2023
Neocon propaganda, but not bereft of perspective. A pleasant read, but take everything with a grain of salt.
July 16, 2019
As an absolute amateur on the subject this book offers a comprehensible yet fantastically readable introduction. Despite the flashy title, Solomon offers one of the most sober accounts of the events leading up to the nuclear deal in 2015 between P5+1 and Iran.
One thing that struck me reading about the Obama administration's strategy leading up to the negotiations in Lausanne and Geneva was its complex and extremely delicate and well-thought out nature. The balance between economic sanctions serving other purposes than just punishment is especially striking in this time of a "slap another 25% tariff on 'em" presidency. Indeed, while the economic sanctions placed on Iran were 'draconian', every single one seemed to serve a very specific purpose leading up to the actual negotiations of a nuclear deal. A simple example was the fuel swap agreement, where Iran was forced to hand over 3/4 of their stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.5% purity (to be used in a nuclear bomb). In return Russia and France would help provide uranium enriched to a degree where it could be used as nuclear fuel but not in a bomb. This type of calling the opponent's bluff (the bluff here being Khamenei stating that Iran does not seek an atomic bomb but only wants to develop nuclear capacities for civilian energy supply purposes) seems of a political ingenuity we can only dream of these days. Sadly.
Another curious point in the process leading up to the Vienna agreement is the very similar pressure both sides of the negotiating table (John Kerry and US energy sec Ernest Moniz on one side and Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Association of Iran and Mohammad Zarif, foreign minister) were facing. While the US side had to manage idiocies like Republican senator Tom Cotton sending a letter directly to Ayatollah Khamenei proclaiming that the White House had no authority to sign a deal without the support of the Congress and that a future president could scrap the deal with the stroke of a pen; potentially tanking the delicate diplomatic effort made by the negotiators. On the other side, Zarif and Salehi faced several outbursts by Ayatollah Khamenei which completely blindsided the negotiating team. The best example is from July 2015 when Khamenei publicly stated that Iran sought enrichment capacities almost 20 times the size proposed by the Americans and already accepted by both the Iranian negotiators in Vienna.
A final and more general note concerns the general foreign policy approach to Iran implemented by the Obama administration. Where previous administrations (most (in-)famously the George W. Bush years of regime change) sought to engage a moderate political opposition inside (but more often outside) Iran, Obama instead wanted to establish a dialogue directly with Khamenei and first Ahmadinejad and later Hassan Rouhani. I believe both approaches hold their own merit (the first more idealistic than the latter) but contrast it once more to the current state of affairs where there seems to be no course at all. Can we call a grown-up, please?
One thing that struck me reading about the Obama administration's strategy leading up to the negotiations in Lausanne and Geneva was its complex and extremely delicate and well-thought out nature. The balance between economic sanctions serving other purposes than just punishment is especially striking in this time of a "slap another 25% tariff on 'em" presidency. Indeed, while the economic sanctions placed on Iran were 'draconian', every single one seemed to serve a very specific purpose leading up to the actual negotiations of a nuclear deal. A simple example was the fuel swap agreement, where Iran was forced to hand over 3/4 of their stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.5% purity (to be used in a nuclear bomb). In return Russia and France would help provide uranium enriched to a degree where it could be used as nuclear fuel but not in a bomb. This type of calling the opponent's bluff (the bluff here being Khamenei stating that Iran does not seek an atomic bomb but only wants to develop nuclear capacities for civilian energy supply purposes) seems of a political ingenuity we can only dream of these days. Sadly.
Another curious point in the process leading up to the Vienna agreement is the very similar pressure both sides of the negotiating table (John Kerry and US energy sec Ernest Moniz on one side and Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Association of Iran and Mohammad Zarif, foreign minister) were facing. While the US side had to manage idiocies like Republican senator Tom Cotton sending a letter directly to Ayatollah Khamenei proclaiming that the White House had no authority to sign a deal without the support of the Congress and that a future president could scrap the deal with the stroke of a pen; potentially tanking the delicate diplomatic effort made by the negotiators. On the other side, Zarif and Salehi faced several outbursts by Ayatollah Khamenei which completely blindsided the negotiating team. The best example is from July 2015 when Khamenei publicly stated that Iran sought enrichment capacities almost 20 times the size proposed by the Americans and already accepted by both the Iranian negotiators in Vienna.
A final and more general note concerns the general foreign policy approach to Iran implemented by the Obama administration. Where previous administrations (most (in-)famously the George W. Bush years of regime change) sought to engage a moderate political opposition inside (but more often outside) Iran, Obama instead wanted to establish a dialogue directly with Khamenei and first Ahmadinejad and later Hassan Rouhani. I believe both approaches hold their own merit (the first more idealistic than the latter) but contrast it once more to the current state of affairs where there seems to be no course at all. Can we call a grown-up, please?
March 19, 2017
Jay Solomon’s The Iran Wars tilts heavily towards a confrontational approach to Iran. Light on both analysis of Iran’s strategic goals and the regional context, he cherry picks events and perspectives to make the Iran Nuclear Agreement seem destabilizing and harmful. He glosses over the fact that without the agreement Iran would have the bomb or we would have attacked them. The deal is only a step in the right direction and taking more steps will be difficult. The US needs help understanding Iran so that we know where to pressure them and where to extend a hand. But this book’s preference for rhetoric over analysis fails to deliver such understanding and provides a rationale for simplistic, unreflective positions on Iran.
The contains a great deal of solid information on US sanctions, the negotiation process and Iran’s support of various proxies in the region. It is a shame that such an informed and influential journalized spends so much ink stoking fear rather that increasing understanding.
Here are a few examples:
2003 Iraq War:
Solomon does a great job of describing Iran’s dual approach to the conflict. They supported the democratic process in Iraq because pro-Iranian Shiite candidates closely tied to the Iran kept winning. They simultaneously supported Shia insurgencies, training and arming fighters who accounted for 20% of the American deaths in Iraq. This is how Iran works. They shake with one hand while slashing out with a knife in the other. Doubling dealing is what they expect and respect. Our approach needs to understand this. The nuclear diplomacy worked because of the economic noose we squeezed around the country while talking. But how should we apply pressure now?
Iran’s goals:
Solomon’s says little about Iran’s goal beyond “to defeat the US or destroy Israel.” This doesn’t help us understand the country, which is critical to achieving our ends. Here is a simple version of the country’s goals:
Iran seeks to enhance its regional and global stature; to promote its ideals, including Islamic democracy but it is distinct religiously (Shia vs. Sunni) and culturally (Arab vs. Persian) from most of its neighbors. It has chosen to attract other countries by aggression action with US and Israel.
And so they:
- Continuously harass Israel from via proxies.
- Works to weaken Saudi Arabia, its only serious Arab opponent, to the extent that Riyadh can no longer oppose its regional expansion.
- Keeps Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria fragmented along sectarian lines so that the secular Arab order will face colossal challenges whenever it manages to emerge.
Their goal isn’t to defeat us as much as inflate themselves. Is there a different path for them to the influence that they seek? How might we encourage them to try it?
Green Revolution:
Solomon rightly points out that we had no idea the popular rejection of Iranian election outcome was coming. The Obama Administration took a stance of silence. It was consistent with their approach to the country. Solomon engages fantasy thinking when saying missed a tremendous opportunity. We have helped plenty of countries overthrow their leaders, but it takes planning, support and lots of lead-time. As horrific as Iran’s repression of the protestors was, perhaps our silence avoided a worse outcome. The protestors struggled against both a theocratic government and the military that controls almost half of the economy. Supporting the protestors was unlikely to uproot either power-base and may have just created another Syrian or Libyan catastrophe.
I’m not arguing the Obama Administration made the right the decision but rather that Solomon’s description is idealistic and incomplete. His certainty that we missed an opportunity is founded on sand because he has given us so little content on Iran’s internal factions or external goals. He relies on some undergraduate hope that the people just need to rise up and over through the government. It is an argument made for use by American pundits on American TV but doesn’t help us understand Iran.
Same ol’ partisan fights:
We need to drop the Democratic/Republican split when discussing foreign relations. Far too often we use event overseas as fodder for political battles as home. This is dangerous as we end up acting based on internal politics rather than external realities. Solomon’s book suffers from this penchant as US mistakes under the Bush Administration get minimized while those under Obama’s get amplified. We would be better served by examining the interests of the entire country rather than one party at a time. Or how about we focus on the inherent weakness of switching approaches every 4 or 8 years?
Our relationship with Iran two possible futures: Solomon rightly says that we don’t understand or trust Iran and that there are two possible futures for our relationship with Iran. He describes one future as greater conflict and mistrust. He hopes that future isn’t before us – but never states what the other future is! The other future never even gets named, never mind described. How about Iran positions itself as a trading hub, a cultural center, and a regional model, instead of as an opponent and threat. They build hospitals rather than bombs. We don’t know which future will develop. But if we maintain our bias towards confrontation, Iran is likely to remain an oppositional threat.
My wish is that journalists such as Solomon spend more time discussing how to improve the situation rather than gear us up for war. The seeds of such an approach lie dormant in the book. The US’ dual strategy of diplomacy and tough sanctions worked. We must conduct open dialogue while tightening the screws. The hard part is to know where to place the screws. Solomon describes how effective General Petraeus is in combatting Iran’s use of IRAM weapons in Iraq. He knew the players, the tactics, and their intentions, and, therefore, developed a strong, effective deterrent. But such informed action is very rare in our dealing with Iran. We rarely know what is happening in the country, who has influence, what they want or how they plan to get it. This is the information so needed and the information that is missing in this book.
The contains a great deal of solid information on US sanctions, the negotiation process and Iran’s support of various proxies in the region. It is a shame that such an informed and influential journalized spends so much ink stoking fear rather that increasing understanding.
Here are a few examples:
2003 Iraq War:
Solomon does a great job of describing Iran’s dual approach to the conflict. They supported the democratic process in Iraq because pro-Iranian Shiite candidates closely tied to the Iran kept winning. They simultaneously supported Shia insurgencies, training and arming fighters who accounted for 20% of the American deaths in Iraq. This is how Iran works. They shake with one hand while slashing out with a knife in the other. Doubling dealing is what they expect and respect. Our approach needs to understand this. The nuclear diplomacy worked because of the economic noose we squeezed around the country while talking. But how should we apply pressure now?
Iran’s goals:
Solomon’s says little about Iran’s goal beyond “to defeat the US or destroy Israel.” This doesn’t help us understand the country, which is critical to achieving our ends. Here is a simple version of the country’s goals:
Iran seeks to enhance its regional and global stature; to promote its ideals, including Islamic democracy but it is distinct religiously (Shia vs. Sunni) and culturally (Arab vs. Persian) from most of its neighbors. It has chosen to attract other countries by aggression action with US and Israel.
And so they:
- Continuously harass Israel from via proxies.
- Works to weaken Saudi Arabia, its only serious Arab opponent, to the extent that Riyadh can no longer oppose its regional expansion.
- Keeps Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria fragmented along sectarian lines so that the secular Arab order will face colossal challenges whenever it manages to emerge.
Their goal isn’t to defeat us as much as inflate themselves. Is there a different path for them to the influence that they seek? How might we encourage them to try it?
Green Revolution:
Solomon rightly points out that we had no idea the popular rejection of Iranian election outcome was coming. The Obama Administration took a stance of silence. It was consistent with their approach to the country. Solomon engages fantasy thinking when saying missed a tremendous opportunity. We have helped plenty of countries overthrow their leaders, but it takes planning, support and lots of lead-time. As horrific as Iran’s repression of the protestors was, perhaps our silence avoided a worse outcome. The protestors struggled against both a theocratic government and the military that controls almost half of the economy. Supporting the protestors was unlikely to uproot either power-base and may have just created another Syrian or Libyan catastrophe.
I’m not arguing the Obama Administration made the right the decision but rather that Solomon’s description is idealistic and incomplete. His certainty that we missed an opportunity is founded on sand because he has given us so little content on Iran’s internal factions or external goals. He relies on some undergraduate hope that the people just need to rise up and over through the government. It is an argument made for use by American pundits on American TV but doesn’t help us understand Iran.
Same ol’ partisan fights:
We need to drop the Democratic/Republican split when discussing foreign relations. Far too often we use event overseas as fodder for political battles as home. This is dangerous as we end up acting based on internal politics rather than external realities. Solomon’s book suffers from this penchant as US mistakes under the Bush Administration get minimized while those under Obama’s get amplified. We would be better served by examining the interests of the entire country rather than one party at a time. Or how about we focus on the inherent weakness of switching approaches every 4 or 8 years?
Our relationship with Iran two possible futures: Solomon rightly says that we don’t understand or trust Iran and that there are two possible futures for our relationship with Iran. He describes one future as greater conflict and mistrust. He hopes that future isn’t before us – but never states what the other future is! The other future never even gets named, never mind described. How about Iran positions itself as a trading hub, a cultural center, and a regional model, instead of as an opponent and threat. They build hospitals rather than bombs. We don’t know which future will develop. But if we maintain our bias towards confrontation, Iran is likely to remain an oppositional threat.
My wish is that journalists such as Solomon spend more time discussing how to improve the situation rather than gear us up for war. The seeds of such an approach lie dormant in the book. The US’ dual strategy of diplomacy and tough sanctions worked. We must conduct open dialogue while tightening the screws. The hard part is to know where to place the screws. Solomon describes how effective General Petraeus is in combatting Iran’s use of IRAM weapons in Iraq. He knew the players, the tactics, and their intentions, and, therefore, developed a strong, effective deterrent. But such informed action is very rare in our dealing with Iran. We rarely know what is happening in the country, who has influence, what they want or how they plan to get it. This is the information so needed and the information that is missing in this book.
December 20, 2024
Very detailed and relevant for today’s events. Could be a bit more succinct, was a little all over the place in terms of timeline.
September 28, 2016
The book exams the decades long strife between the United States and Iran and attempts to examine the issues leading up to the Obama-Kerry nuclear deal with Iran. The author does not exam the legal on Constitutional issues involved in the deal. While well written as one with degrees in both political science and history, I find the work less than objective although well worth reading. This was a free review copy obtained through Goodreads.com.
November 6, 2016
I agree with others that have said this is a heavy read. It took me a number of weeks to read, but I also had my iPad at the ready to look up terms & do my own additional research / verification. There is a trove of data to absorb, mostly delivered in a dry but very straightforward manner. If you have any interest about Iran & its influence on us & the Middle East, this is the place to go. It will make you hungry from more.
I received this book in a give-away.
I received this book in a give-away.
February 18, 2017
Fantastic! A must read for learning and better understanding of the tinderbox that is the Middle East and Iran's influence in the never ending conflict. The author is particularly objective and doesn't seem to lean one way or the other in the political aisle. Can't recommend this book enough or praise it more. It's just superb history and journalism.
October 3, 2018
When the young people of Iran hit the streets in protest about suspicious election returns in 2009, the United States was unexpectedly quiet. For years DC's establishment had voiced ominous desires to effect regime change in Iran, and now an opportunity had presented itself. All that was needed was a little stoking of the fires, passing of intelligence and funds to the right people. And yet..nothing happened, and soon the leaders of the "Green Movement" were in jail. What no one realized then was that the Obama administration had already begun its efforts to move toward some kind of concordance with Iran, and that this silence was a show of good faith, an indication that the administration was serious about its efforts to establish a working relationship with the Islamic Republic. Much of DC's foreign policy in the middle east from 2001 to 2016 was conducted with an eye towards Iran, including the American response to Syria, and The Iran Wars follows two presidents' attempts to find a solution to the Iranian problem, through war, finance, and diplomacy.
The middle east is a complicated place, to say the least, with active ethnic, religious, and political conflicts. Iran's role in all this is poorly understood by many Americans; in addition to Persians and Arabs being two separate ethnic groups with a competitive history, the version of Islam which is the state religion in Iran is a minority everywhere else, and viewed with contempt by Saudi-held Arabia, al-Queda and its would-be successor, ISIS. Iran's sole ally in the Arab world, Syria, is an important support for it, and a source of continuing conflict between Iran and the west.
The events of September 11, 2001, as tragic as they were, presented an opportunity for American-Iranian relations to begin anew, with a common enemy in al-Queda and its drug trade. What opportunity there may have been, never developed by skeptical aides, was dead by the time DC chose to invade Iraq, with the intent of weakening Iran's influence in the region by freeing its Shiite majority from Saddam's rule and giving them the opportunity to protest against the ayatollahs. Instead, that Shiite majority aligned with Iran more closely as sectarian war erupted in the region, That conflict was promoted by both Syria and Iran to prevent American power from growing in Iraq, as Assad promoted Sunni militias in the north and Iran promoted Shiia power in the south. Their role in promoting Iraqi instability made both enemies in DC and abroad. Still worse, Iran counted itself the implacable foe of Israel and
Although some in DC ominously hinted that military options were fully on the table for addressing Iran, with so many resources mired in two civil wars, few actually proposed it. Bush chose instead to develop a third option: disrupting Iran's nuclear program through cyber warfare. (See Countdown to Zero Day for a comprehensive history of that.) Solomon only barely mentions this, but moves quickly on to Obama's two-track attempt to reach some kind of concordance with Iran. Obama moved to isolate Iran financially by working with China and the powers of Europe to effect heavy sanctions and remove Iran from the global economy, while at the same time reaching out to the Iranian people through public speeches, and Iranian leadership through an Omani intermediary who saw his vocation as being a broker of peace between DC and Iran.
Both tracks meant compromise, as DC had to give more than it would like to prove to both its international partners and Iran that it was serious about effecting a deal. It also meant that Obama felt compelled to intervene in Libya to indicate to Iran that he was serious about enforcing red lines, but had to walk back his threats against Assad so as not to drive the Syrian ruler's allies from the negotiating table. Although the deal itself was hailed as a triumph, with one historian optimistically chronicling it in a volume called Losing an Enemy, Jay Solomon concludes this history with a warning. If DC and Iran do truly establish a lasting peace, there will be disruption to contend with. The Saudi family in particular may aggressively court other alliances, and whatever influence DC has over its codependent partner will lessen. The Iran wars are not over, writes Solomon; this deal, as promising as it sounds, is only the start of a new chapter.
Solomon was quickly proven correct, and in 2018 it is sad to read about the years of dogged labor Kerry, Obama, Mohammad Zarif, and Sultan Qaboos poured into making the deal, including the long labors with Europe and China, now squandered, and US diplomatic credibility seriously reduced. For me, this was a valuable book to read, illustrating why Obama reacted toward Syria as he did, and why Syria is such an obsessive target for the west in the first place.
Related:
The Twilight War: The Secret of America's Thirty Year War with Iran, David Crist
Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon, Kim Zetter
Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of Power, David Sanger
Iran and the United States: An Insider's View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, Seyed Hossain Mousavian
The middle east is a complicated place, to say the least, with active ethnic, religious, and political conflicts. Iran's role in all this is poorly understood by many Americans; in addition to Persians and Arabs being two separate ethnic groups with a competitive history, the version of Islam which is the state religion in Iran is a minority everywhere else, and viewed with contempt by Saudi-held Arabia, al-Queda and its would-be successor, ISIS. Iran's sole ally in the Arab world, Syria, is an important support for it, and a source of continuing conflict between Iran and the west.
The events of September 11, 2001, as tragic as they were, presented an opportunity for American-Iranian relations to begin anew, with a common enemy in al-Queda and its drug trade. What opportunity there may have been, never developed by skeptical aides, was dead by the time DC chose to invade Iraq, with the intent of weakening Iran's influence in the region by freeing its Shiite majority from Saddam's rule and giving them the opportunity to protest against the ayatollahs. Instead, that Shiite majority aligned with Iran more closely as sectarian war erupted in the region, That conflict was promoted by both Syria and Iran to prevent American power from growing in Iraq, as Assad promoted Sunni militias in the north and Iran promoted Shiia power in the south. Their role in promoting Iraqi instability made both enemies in DC and abroad. Still worse, Iran counted itself the implacable foe of Israel and
Although some in DC ominously hinted that military options were fully on the table for addressing Iran, with so many resources mired in two civil wars, few actually proposed it. Bush chose instead to develop a third option: disrupting Iran's nuclear program through cyber warfare. (See Countdown to Zero Day for a comprehensive history of that.) Solomon only barely mentions this, but moves quickly on to Obama's two-track attempt to reach some kind of concordance with Iran. Obama moved to isolate Iran financially by working with China and the powers of Europe to effect heavy sanctions and remove Iran from the global economy, while at the same time reaching out to the Iranian people through public speeches, and Iranian leadership through an Omani intermediary who saw his vocation as being a broker of peace between DC and Iran.
Both tracks meant compromise, as DC had to give more than it would like to prove to both its international partners and Iran that it was serious about effecting a deal. It also meant that Obama felt compelled to intervene in Libya to indicate to Iran that he was serious about enforcing red lines, but had to walk back his threats against Assad so as not to drive the Syrian ruler's allies from the negotiating table. Although the deal itself was hailed as a triumph, with one historian optimistically chronicling it in a volume called Losing an Enemy, Jay Solomon concludes this history with a warning. If DC and Iran do truly establish a lasting peace, there will be disruption to contend with. The Saudi family in particular may aggressively court other alliances, and whatever influence DC has over its codependent partner will lessen. The Iran wars are not over, writes Solomon; this deal, as promising as it sounds, is only the start of a new chapter.
Solomon was quickly proven correct, and in 2018 it is sad to read about the years of dogged labor Kerry, Obama, Mohammad Zarif, and Sultan Qaboos poured into making the deal, including the long labors with Europe and China, now squandered, and US diplomatic credibility seriously reduced. For me, this was a valuable book to read, illustrating why Obama reacted toward Syria as he did, and why Syria is such an obsessive target for the west in the first place.
Related:
The Twilight War: The Secret of America's Thirty Year War with Iran, David Crist
Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon, Kim Zetter
Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of Power, David Sanger
Iran and the United States: An Insider's View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, Seyed Hossain Mousavian
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September 27, 2022الكتاب: حروب إيران: ألعاب الجاسوسية، المعارك المصرفية، والصفقات السرية التي أعادت تشكيل الشرق الأوسط
المؤلف: جاي سولومون
الناشر: راندوم هاوس
عدد الصفحات: 352
تاريخ الإصدار: 23 أغسطس 2016
اللغة: الإنجليزية
(1)
جدلٌ مشحون حول كيف وصلت العلاقات بين الولايات المتحدة إلى هذه النقطة مع إيران؟ وإلى أين تتجه العلاقات بينهما؟ هذا هو: موضوع كتاب "حروب إيران: ألعاب الجاسوسية، المعارك المصرفية، والصفقات السرية التي أعادت تشكيل الشرق الأوسط" لمؤلفه جاي سولومون، الصادر باللغة الإنجليزية عن دار نشر "راندوم هاوس"، في 352 صفحة، بتاريخ 23 أغسطس 2016.
بمزيجِ من العقوبات الاقتصادية، والدبلوماسية الدولية، والعمل الاستخباراتي، ناضلت الإدارات الأمريكية المتعاقبة لاحتواء طموحات إيران في أن تصبح قوة نووية مهيمنة على المنطقة، وهو ما يراه كثيرون أخطر تهديد للسلام في الشرق الأوسط. في المقابل، استخدمت إيران عدم الاستقرار في المنطقة لصالحها من أجل تقويض المصالح الأمريكية.
يستوعب كتاب "حروب إيران" هذه المعركة التي تم خوضها على العديد من المستويات؛ العسكرية والمالية والسرية. وهو نتاج تقارير ومقابلات واسعة وشاملة مع جميع اللاعبين الرئيسيين في الصراع، بدءًا من المسئولين الإيرانيين رفيعي المستوى وصولا إلى وزير الخارجية الأمريكي جون كيري وفريقه التفاوضي.
بعينِ مراسلٍ استقصائيٍّ محترف، وسرد مؤرخٍ بارع؛ يبين "سولومون" كيف استمرت إيران في تطوير برنامجها النووي لسنوات دون أن يلاحظ المجتمع الدولي، حتى أصبح على رأس المخاوفه الأمنية العالمية. ويرصد الأخطاء التي ارتكبتها إدارتي بوش وأوباما في التعامل مع إيران، باستخدام الأنواع ذاتها من العصي والجزر. كما يصحبنا في أروقة الفنادق، حيث جرى التفاوض على الاتفاق النووي عام 2015؛ ليقدم تقييما صريحًا للمستقبل الغامض للعلاقات بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران.
ويفيض الكتاب باتصالات سرية بين إدارة أوباما والحكومة الإيرانية، ورسائل من الخطوط الأمامية على جبهة قتالٍ جديدة في ساحة الحرب المالية، ليعرض تاريخًا خفيًا من الصراع، لم يكن الأمريكيون يدركون مجرد وجوده، رغم أن النتيجة المترتبة عليه يمكن أن يكون لها آثار جيوسياسية بعيدة المدى.
(2)
يلفت الكتاب النظر إلى ما يعتبره البعض فرصة ضيّعها أوباما؛ حين أُعلن فوز أحمدي نجاد في الانتخابات الرئاسية عام 2009، وخرجت المعارضة الإيرانية إلى الشوارع وهم يهتفون، ليس فقط: "الموت للدكتاتوريين"، ولكن أيضًا: "الرئيس أوباما.. هل أنت معنا أم ضدنا؟".
يقول "سولومون": لم يرفض أوباما فقط تقديم الدعم لهم، بل أنهى برامج كانت توثق انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان الإيرانية، وأمر وكالة المخابرات المركزية CIA بأن تدير ظهرها للحركة الخضراء.
ويضيف: "كانت وكالة CIA تمتلك خططًا للطوارئ من أجل تقديم الدعم لأي انتفاضات ديمقراطية في أي مكان حول العالم. هذا يشمل: توفير وسائل الاتصال، والأموال، وحتى الأسلحة في الحالات القصوى، للمنشقين. لكن في هذه الحالة، أصدر البيت الأبيض أوامره بعدم التدخُّل".
(3)
"ليس لدي أدنى شك في أننا تجنبنا الحرب"، قالها وزير الخارجية الأمريكي لمؤلف الكتاب هذا العام. قد يكون على حق. وقد يكون النقيض هو الصواب: ما يراه كيري باعتباره تجنبا للحرب يمكن أن تكشف الأيام أنه لم يكن سوى تأجيلا لها.
استند كيري ورئيسه أوباما إلى الحدس بدلا من الأدلة، واعتقدا أن الجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية ستميل إلى الاعتدال بعد الاتفاق النووي، وستتخلى عن طموحاتها لإقامة إمبراطورية إسلامية مترامية الأطراف، وستتوقف عن الحلم بـ "موت أمريكا وإسرائيل والسعودية، وغيرها من "الدول الكافرة"، ولن تتطوَّر إلى خصم أشد فتكًا"، على حد قول كليفورد ماي في صحيفة واشنطن تايمز.
لكن "سولمون" يقول: "راهن أوباما على أن خامنئي وحلفاءه لن يلتزموا بشروط الاتفاق النووي. وإذا فعلوا ذلك، فإن الولايات المتحدة ستخاطر حينها بإطلاق شلال نووي أكبر في الشرق الأوسط. نعم هذا هو الرهان"!
(4)
الخبير الاقتصادي ووزير الخارجية الأمريكي الأسبق، جورج شولتز، توقف أمام كلمة "حروب" المستخدمة بصيغة الجمع في عنوان الكتاب، ليلفت النظر إلى أن العلاقات المضطربة بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران استمرت لأعوام عديدة، ويسلط الضوء على أهميتها في فهم التداعيات قصيرة وطويلة المدى المترتبة على إدارة الإدارات الأمريكية المتعاقبة لهذه العلاقة.
أما جوبي واريك، الحائز على جائزة بوليتزر ومؤلف كتاب "أعلام سوداء: صعود داعش"، فاعتبر "سولومون" أحد أفضل الصحفيين الذين يكتبون عن الشرق الأوسط اليوم. ورأى أن هذا الكتاب "يوفر إطلالة شديدة القرب، من الخطوط الأمامية، على ألعاب الجاسوسية، والاغتيالات، والمكائد السياسية، والدبلوماسية عالية المخاطر، التي احتشدت لتشكل العلاقة مع "أحد أكثر خصوم أمريكا مكرًا وخطرًا".
ويحظى المؤلف، جاي سولومون، بسيرة مهنية حافلة، حيث عمل مديرًا لمراسلي الشؤون الخارجية في صحيفة وول ستريت جورنال التي رشحته لثلاث جوائز بوليتزر. ولقرابة عقدين من الزمن، كتب تقاريره من آسيا وأفريقيا والشرق الأوسط، بما في ذلك جاكرتا، وإندونيسيا، وسيول، وكوريا الجنوبية، ونيودلهي، والهند، وواشنطن.
(نُشِرَ هذا العرض على موقع مركز إدراك للدراسات والاستشارات في عام 2016، ومتاح على الرابط التالي https://idraksy.net/iran-wars/، كما نُشِرَ على موقع "العالم بالعربية"؛ أول منصة عربية متخصصة في رصد وتحليل اتجاهات الصحف ومراكز الأبحاث والإصدارات العالمية)
المؤلف: جاي سولومون
الناشر: راندوم هاوس
عدد الصفحات: 352
تاريخ الإصدار: 23 أغسطس 2016
اللغة: الإنجليزية
(1)
جدلٌ مشحون حول كيف وصلت العلاقات بين الولايات المتحدة إلى هذه النقطة مع إيران؟ وإلى أين تتجه العلاقات بينهما؟ هذا هو: موضوع كتاب "حروب إيران: ألعاب الجاسوسية، المعارك المصرفية، والصفقات السرية التي أعادت تشكيل الشرق الأوسط" لمؤلفه جاي سولومون، الصادر باللغة الإنجليزية عن دار نشر "راندوم هاوس"، في 352 صفحة، بتاريخ 23 أغسطس 2016.
بمزيجِ من العقوبات الاقتصادية، والدبلوماسية الدولية، والعمل الاستخباراتي، ناضلت الإدارات الأمريكية المتعاقبة لاحتواء طموحات إيران في أن تصبح قوة نووية مهيمنة على المنطقة، وهو ما يراه كثيرون أخطر تهديد للسلام في الشرق الأوسط. في المقابل، استخدمت إيران عدم الاستقرار في المنطقة لصالحها من أجل تقويض المصالح الأمريكية.
يستوعب كتاب "حروب إيران" هذه المعركة التي تم خوضها على العديد من المستويات؛ العسكرية والمالية والسرية. وهو نتاج تقارير ومقابلات واسعة وشاملة مع جميع اللاعبين الرئيسيين في الصراع، بدءًا من المسئولين الإيرانيين رفيعي المستوى وصولا إلى وزير الخارجية الأمريكي جون كيري وفريقه التفاوضي.
بعينِ مراسلٍ استقصائيٍّ محترف، وسرد مؤرخٍ بارع؛ يبين "سولومون" كيف استمرت إيران في تطوير برنامجها النووي لسنوات دون أن يلاحظ المجتمع الدولي، حتى أصبح على رأس المخاوفه الأمنية العالمية. ويرصد الأخطاء التي ارتكبتها إدارتي بوش وأوباما في التعامل مع إيران، باستخدام الأنواع ذاتها من العصي والجزر. كما يصحبنا في أروقة الفنادق، حيث جرى التفاوض على الاتفاق النووي عام 2015؛ ليقدم تقييما صريحًا للمستقبل الغامض للعلاقات بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران.
ويفيض الكتاب باتصالات سرية بين إدارة أوباما والحكومة الإيرانية، ورسائل من الخطوط الأمامية على جبهة قتالٍ جديدة في ساحة الحرب المالية، ليعرض تاريخًا خفيًا من الصراع، لم يكن الأمريكيون يدركون مجرد وجوده، رغم أن النتيجة المترتبة عليه يمكن أن يكون لها آثار جيوسياسية بعيدة المدى.
(2)
يلفت الكتاب النظر إلى ما يعتبره البعض فرصة ضيّعها أوباما؛ حين أُعلن فوز أحمدي نجاد في الانتخابات الرئاسية عام 2009، وخرجت المعارضة الإيرانية إلى الشوارع وهم يهتفون، ليس فقط: "الموت للدكتاتوريين"، ولكن أيضًا: "الرئيس أوباما.. هل أنت معنا أم ضدنا؟".
يقول "سولومون": لم يرفض أوباما فقط تقديم الدعم لهم، بل أنهى برامج كانت توثق انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان الإيرانية، وأمر وكالة المخابرات المركزية CIA بأن تدير ظهرها للحركة الخضراء.
ويضيف: "كانت وكالة CIA تمتلك خططًا للطوارئ من أجل تقديم الدعم لأي انتفاضات ديمقراطية في أي مكان حول العالم. هذا يشمل: توفير وسائل الاتصال، والأموال، وحتى الأسلحة في الحالات القصوى، للمنشقين. لكن في هذه الحالة، أصدر البيت الأبيض أوامره بعدم التدخُّل".
(3)
"ليس لدي أدنى شك في أننا تجنبنا الحرب"، قالها وزير الخارجية الأمريكي لمؤلف الكتاب هذا العام. قد يكون على حق. وقد يكون النقيض هو الصواب: ما يراه كيري باعتباره تجنبا للحرب يمكن أن تكشف الأيام أنه لم يكن سوى تأجيلا لها.
استند كيري ورئيسه أوباما إلى الحدس بدلا من الأدلة، واعتقدا أن الجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية ستميل إلى الاعتدال بعد الاتفاق النووي، وستتخلى عن طموحاتها لإقامة إمبراطورية إسلامية مترامية الأطراف، وستتوقف عن الحلم بـ "موت أمريكا وإسرائيل والسعودية، وغيرها من "الدول الكافرة"، ولن تتطوَّر إلى خصم أشد فتكًا"، على حد قول كليفورد ماي في صحيفة واشنطن تايمز.
لكن "سولمون" يقول: "راهن أوباما على أن خامنئي وحلفاءه لن يلتزموا بشروط الاتفاق النووي. وإذا فعلوا ذلك، فإن الولايات المتحدة ستخاطر حينها بإطلاق شلال نووي أكبر في الشرق الأوسط. نعم هذا هو الرهان"!
(4)
الخبير الاقتصادي ووزير الخارجية الأمريكي الأسبق، جورج شولتز، توقف أمام كلمة "حروب" المستخدمة بصيغة الجمع في عنوان الكتاب، ليلفت النظر إلى أن العلاقات المضطربة بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران استمرت لأعوام عديدة، ويسلط الضوء على أهميتها في فهم التداعيات قصيرة وطويلة المدى المترتبة على إدارة الإدارات الأمريكية المتعاقبة لهذه العلاقة.
أما جوبي واريك، الحائز على جائزة بوليتزر ومؤلف كتاب "أعلام سوداء: صعود داعش"، فاعتبر "سولومون" أحد أفضل الصحفيين الذين يكتبون عن الشرق الأوسط اليوم. ورأى أن هذا الكتاب "يوفر إطلالة شديدة القرب، من الخطوط الأمامية، على ألعاب الجاسوسية، والاغتيالات، والمكائد السياسية، والدبلوماسية عالية المخاطر، التي احتشدت لتشكل العلاقة مع "أحد أكثر خصوم أمريكا مكرًا وخطرًا".
ويحظى المؤلف، جاي سولومون، بسيرة مهنية حافلة، حيث عمل مديرًا لمراسلي الشؤون الخارجية في صحيفة وول ستريت جورنال التي رشحته لثلاث جوائز بوليتزر. ولقرابة عقدين من الزمن، كتب تقاريره من آسيا وأفريقيا والشرق الأوسط، بما في ذلك جاكرتا، وإندونيسيا، وسيول، وكوريا الجنوبية، ونيودلهي، والهند، وواشنطن.
(نُشِرَ هذا العرض على موقع مركز إدراك للدراسات والاستشارات في عام 2016، ومتاح على الرابط التالي https://idraksy.net/iran-wars/، كما نُشِرَ على موقع "العالم بالعربية"؛ أول منصة عربية متخصصة في رصد وتحليل اتجاهات الصحف ومراكز الأبحاث والإصدارات العالمية)
June 16, 2024
"It's a pity both sides can't lose."
~ Henry Kissinger, on the Iran-Iraq War
For twenty years after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the US and Iran endured a long winter of mutual mistrust, punctuated by occasional flashes of violence. But their interests converged all too briefly in the months after 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq: both wanted the removal and marginalisation of the Taliban, both wanted Saddam Hussein deposed, and both wanted a say in the regional order to follow. Unsurprisingly, the detente didn't last. Iran utilised its shared cultural and religious heritage with Iraq to quickly move into the political and military vacuum. Jay Solomon explores the tripartite theatre of the resulting conflict in The Iran Wars, leading up to the 2015 nuclear deal.
Solomon makes three main arguments in The Iran Wars. First, despite never openly engaging in armed conflict, the US and Iran have nevertheless found themselves embroiled in second-hand hostilities, spanning the four decades (and much of the Middle East) since 1979. Second, there are political parties, government agencies and allies on both sides, all clamouring to shape how each country engages with the other, meaning neither is sufficiently "joined up" to engage productively with the other and limiting potential progress. Finally, whatever progress can be made is usually very costly -- the 2015 nuclear deal between the two countries might have reduced the speed, scope and scale of regional conflict, but such conflict will almost certainly continue, and for every day it believes the US opposes or antagonises it, Iran will continue finding ways to make this expensive.
The Iran Wars contains a number of fascinating chapters covering Iran's murky nuclear program, the US effort to impose economic sanctions on Tehran, and the 2009 Green Movement. Solomon delivers a detailed explanation of the many complexities in the US-Iran relationship since 9/11, without hewing too closely to partisan narratives over this sensitive foreign policy issue. He is supportive of the need for a non-proliferation mechanism between Washington and Tehran, for example, but recognises any such deal will solve only the largest problem, with many smaller ones left to fester. The Iran Wars would have benefitted from some selective repetition of Solomon's key arguments, however, and perhaps less indulgence on Syria: the reader is left to distil his core thesis alone, which due to Solomon's journalistic style may mean coming away with a full sense of the facts but a foggy sense of his analysis.
This reviewer once read that all parties suffer for the lack of mutual understanding between the Islamic Republic and the United States. The Iran Wars hammers home this point effectively, especially in a world where the 2015 nuclear deal is no longer so certain: Iran isn't the Gulf, Afghanistan isn't quite the Middle East and Arab politics does not always cleave neatly to the Sunni-Shia divide. Any mechanisms for non-proliferation must begin, rather than end, dialogue between Tehran and Washington: only then might these eponymous conflicts finally draw to a close.
~ Henry Kissinger, on the Iran-Iraq War
For twenty years after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the US and Iran endured a long winter of mutual mistrust, punctuated by occasional flashes of violence. But their interests converged all too briefly in the months after 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq: both wanted the removal and marginalisation of the Taliban, both wanted Saddam Hussein deposed, and both wanted a say in the regional order to follow. Unsurprisingly, the detente didn't last. Iran utilised its shared cultural and religious heritage with Iraq to quickly move into the political and military vacuum. Jay Solomon explores the tripartite theatre of the resulting conflict in The Iran Wars, leading up to the 2015 nuclear deal.
Solomon makes three main arguments in The Iran Wars. First, despite never openly engaging in armed conflict, the US and Iran have nevertheless found themselves embroiled in second-hand hostilities, spanning the four decades (and much of the Middle East) since 1979. Second, there are political parties, government agencies and allies on both sides, all clamouring to shape how each country engages with the other, meaning neither is sufficiently "joined up" to engage productively with the other and limiting potential progress. Finally, whatever progress can be made is usually very costly -- the 2015 nuclear deal between the two countries might have reduced the speed, scope and scale of regional conflict, but such conflict will almost certainly continue, and for every day it believes the US opposes or antagonises it, Iran will continue finding ways to make this expensive.
The Iran Wars contains a number of fascinating chapters covering Iran's murky nuclear program, the US effort to impose economic sanctions on Tehran, and the 2009 Green Movement. Solomon delivers a detailed explanation of the many complexities in the US-Iran relationship since 9/11, without hewing too closely to partisan narratives over this sensitive foreign policy issue. He is supportive of the need for a non-proliferation mechanism between Washington and Tehran, for example, but recognises any such deal will solve only the largest problem, with many smaller ones left to fester. The Iran Wars would have benefitted from some selective repetition of Solomon's key arguments, however, and perhaps less indulgence on Syria: the reader is left to distil his core thesis alone, which due to Solomon's journalistic style may mean coming away with a full sense of the facts but a foggy sense of his analysis.
This reviewer once read that all parties suffer for the lack of mutual understanding between the Islamic Republic and the United States. The Iran Wars hammers home this point effectively, especially in a world where the 2015 nuclear deal is no longer so certain: Iran isn't the Gulf, Afghanistan isn't quite the Middle East and Arab politics does not always cleave neatly to the Sunni-Shia divide. Any mechanisms for non-proliferation must begin, rather than end, dialogue between Tehran and Washington: only then might these eponymous conflicts finally draw to a close.
September 25, 2025
Jay Solomon’s The Iran Wars is the kind of book that manages to take the tangled mess of Middle Eastern politics and present it in a way that makes you feel like you’re finally starting to understand the plot of a show you’ve been binge-watching for years without subtitles. It’s an impressive feat, especially considering the cast includes Iran, the United States, Israel, Gulf monarchies, and the occasional cameo by Oman, the understated neighbor who quietly hosts secret diplomatic meetings while everyone else is busy setting the curtains on fire.
One of the book’s strongest contributions is its candid exploration of Iran’s use of proxy networks. Solomon lays out how Tehran perfected the art of waging influence and conflict through Hezbollah, Shia militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. If the Iranian Revolutionary Guard were running a corporate training program, this would be their “How to Project Power Without Inviting Airstrikes 101.” It’s both sobering and eye-opening, especially when you realize how effectively these proxies have allowed Iran to extend its reach across the region.
Just as compelling is Solomon’s treatment of economic sanctions. The book captures how Washington and its allies crafted an ever-tightening regime of sanctions designed to squeeze Iran’s finances without starting an outright war. Bank accounts froze, oil exports shrank, and international companies suddenly remembered they had “other priorities.” The story of sanctions is one of painstaking diplomacy, financial chess moves, and the occasional moment when you wonder if the West’s strategy was less about strangling Tehran and more about seeing how many loopholes Iran’s traders could creatively exploit.
Equally refreshing is the book’s attention to other actors often relegated to the background of Western narratives. Oman emerges as a quiet but essential player, a diplomatic Switzerland in a region otherwise fond of brinkmanship. Meanwhile, the Gulf states come into sharper focus, not as passive bystanders, but as active participants wrestling with their own insecurities, ambitions, and complicated ties to Washington. It’s a welcome shift from the usual caricatures of “oil-rich sheikdoms with flashy skylines.”
Solomon’s writing is sharp, clear, and sprinkled with enough detail to make policy wonks nod appreciatively while still being readable for those who don’t mainline think tank reports for fun. The book doesn’t shy away from the uncomfortable truths of U.S. policy either, but it avoids descending into finger-wagging. Instead, it offers readers a balanced perspective on a rivalry that has defined much of modern Middle East geopolitics.
In short, The Iran Wars is a must-read if you want to understand how Iran managed to outmaneuver much of the region using a strategy that’s equal parts clever, ruthless, and maddening. And if you’ve ever wondered why Oman seems to be the only adult in the room during Middle Eastern diplomacy, this book will make you appreciate them even more.
One of the book’s strongest contributions is its candid exploration of Iran’s use of proxy networks. Solomon lays out how Tehran perfected the art of waging influence and conflict through Hezbollah, Shia militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. If the Iranian Revolutionary Guard were running a corporate training program, this would be their “How to Project Power Without Inviting Airstrikes 101.” It’s both sobering and eye-opening, especially when you realize how effectively these proxies have allowed Iran to extend its reach across the region.
Just as compelling is Solomon’s treatment of economic sanctions. The book captures how Washington and its allies crafted an ever-tightening regime of sanctions designed to squeeze Iran’s finances without starting an outright war. Bank accounts froze, oil exports shrank, and international companies suddenly remembered they had “other priorities.” The story of sanctions is one of painstaking diplomacy, financial chess moves, and the occasional moment when you wonder if the West’s strategy was less about strangling Tehran and more about seeing how many loopholes Iran’s traders could creatively exploit.
Equally refreshing is the book’s attention to other actors often relegated to the background of Western narratives. Oman emerges as a quiet but essential player, a diplomatic Switzerland in a region otherwise fond of brinkmanship. Meanwhile, the Gulf states come into sharper focus, not as passive bystanders, but as active participants wrestling with their own insecurities, ambitions, and complicated ties to Washington. It’s a welcome shift from the usual caricatures of “oil-rich sheikdoms with flashy skylines.”
Solomon’s writing is sharp, clear, and sprinkled with enough detail to make policy wonks nod appreciatively while still being readable for those who don’t mainline think tank reports for fun. The book doesn’t shy away from the uncomfortable truths of U.S. policy either, but it avoids descending into finger-wagging. Instead, it offers readers a balanced perspective on a rivalry that has defined much of modern Middle East geopolitics.
In short, The Iran Wars is a must-read if you want to understand how Iran managed to outmaneuver much of the region using a strategy that’s equal parts clever, ruthless, and maddening. And if you’ve ever wondered why Oman seems to be the only adult in the room during Middle Eastern diplomacy, this book will make you appreciate them even more.
March 10, 2019
Recommended for: People interested in middle eastern regional politics; anyone interested in the JCPOA, but not interested in the heavy-duty science behind it.
Stuff that was awesome: The broad overview of the history and regional politics that led to the agreement of the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - JCPOA)
Stuff that was annoying: I wish there had been a little more detail about what the JCPOA actually did include, about the sunset clauses written into it, and about the role of countries other than the U.S., Iran, and France; particularly, he could have explored the role of the EU. Admittedly, this desire is borne of current politics, which this book could not have covered. Also, there were a couple of errors in place names: the author wrote about Syria and the conflict continuing there and listed a place called Hassekh - I think he meant Hassekeh (which is still a cruddy transliteration, but whatever). He also wrote about U.S. national laboratories, including the one at Oakwood, TN. There isn't one at Oakwood, but there is one in Oak Ridge, TN.
Despite the U.S. having withdrawn from the international JCPOA, Iran and the other countries have remained in the plan. If anything, the U.S.'s withdrawal should increase, rather than diminish, the U.S. public's interest in understanding the JCPOA and Iran's current program.
This book gives a really thorough overview of the negotiations, including a lot of 20th century history, that led up to our current agreements with Iran, specifically the agreements about their nuclear program. It's well-written and broken into easily-digestible chapters and sub-sections. The book is scoped well - it easily could have delved into ancient history and politics in the region or into a deep discussion of the details of Iran's nuclear program and the science of the agreement, but didn't. This is, I think, a strength of the book. It already includes a lot of information - these extra details would have been mostly superfluous and would not have contributed greatly to the reader's understanding.
Stuff that was awesome: The broad overview of the history and regional politics that led to the agreement of the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - JCPOA)
Stuff that was annoying: I wish there had been a little more detail about what the JCPOA actually did include, about the sunset clauses written into it, and about the role of countries other than the U.S., Iran, and France; particularly, he could have explored the role of the EU. Admittedly, this desire is borne of current politics, which this book could not have covered. Also, there were a couple of errors in place names: the author wrote about Syria and the conflict continuing there and listed a place called Hassekh - I think he meant Hassekeh (which is still a cruddy transliteration, but whatever). He also wrote about U.S. national laboratories, including the one at Oakwood, TN. There isn't one at Oakwood, but there is one in Oak Ridge, TN.
Despite the U.S. having withdrawn from the international JCPOA, Iran and the other countries have remained in the plan. If anything, the U.S.'s withdrawal should increase, rather than diminish, the U.S. public's interest in understanding the JCPOA and Iran's current program.
This book gives a really thorough overview of the negotiations, including a lot of 20th century history, that led up to our current agreements with Iran, specifically the agreements about their nuclear program. It's well-written and broken into easily-digestible chapters and sub-sections. The book is scoped well - it easily could have delved into ancient history and politics in the region or into a deep discussion of the details of Iran's nuclear program and the science of the agreement, but didn't. This is, I think, a strength of the book. It already includes a lot of information - these extra details would have been mostly superfluous and would not have contributed greatly to the reader's understanding.
December 30, 2018
Interesting book presuming the historical representations are largely true
After reading this book I can’t help but scratch my head over what appears to be divergent tracks taken by President Trump. On the one hand, this history makes a strong case in support of Trump’s decision to bag the Iran nuclear deal. On the other hand, his recent decision to bail out of Syria appears inconsistent with the apparent Iranian threat.
Do I believe that Iran is a threat and does this book do a good job demonstrating the extent of that threat? I think so. The fact that it was written pre-Trump and doesn’t even mention him seems to mitigate an argument that this telling is all about politics.
In any case, I think it was a worthwhile read.
After reading this book I can’t help but scratch my head over what appears to be divergent tracks taken by President Trump. On the one hand, this history makes a strong case in support of Trump’s decision to bag the Iran nuclear deal. On the other hand, his recent decision to bail out of Syria appears inconsistent with the apparent Iranian threat.
Do I believe that Iran is a threat and does this book do a good job demonstrating the extent of that threat? I think so. The fact that it was written pre-Trump and doesn’t even mention him seems to mitigate an argument that this telling is all about politics.
In any case, I think it was a worthwhile read.
January 11, 2020
I only gave this book one star because I don't know how to give it zero. It probably has useful information in it. The problem is that it presents every bit of information about Iran as though the author has never read anything or talked to anyone that isn't the historical equivalent of Tom Clancy. I wanted to learn about how the Iran deal came about, including its good points and bad ones; I didn't want to read a polemic about how it was the worst deal ever and Iran is a bunch of terrorists. I highly recommend finding a different book whose author is capable of imagining geopolitical relations among nations as just that, not as a morality play in which Iran and the Obama administrations are the villains.
January 3, 2018
Didn't write a full review for this book because I really don't have much to say about it. It was hard to get through and did not hold my attention as much as it should have. I found it overwhelmingly dry and lacking in intrigue. My favorite parts were the parts where Solomon inserted himself and talked about interviewing the Syrian president and other important figures. Overall though, unless one is really into dry Middle-Eastern history, I wouldn't go for this.
Read more like this review on my blog, http://www.bookwormbasics.blogspot.com
Read more like this review on my blog, http://www.bookwormbasics.blogspot.com
February 8, 2020
Well researched book mostly dealing with authors US centric view of events between 9/11 till recent Iran deal. The book is narrative and enlightening easy read of historical chain of events. Again it is important to note that the view is US centric rather than neutral. That is not a fault just a comment. We also need to understand the Iranian and Russian version of events to make better sense of the issue.
April 21, 2021
I thought the book was informative and deep in it's research. Jay Solomon took the time to put out a good book about Iran. It covers the Iran period during mainly during President Obama's term and some before that. Overall the book describes in-depth the negotiations, the sanctions, and the other nuances of dealing with Iran during that time, and is a good rule of thumb when dealing with that country.
May 5, 2024
As someone who was in military intelligence from 2010-2019, focusing on the Middle East and Southwest Asia, this did a great job of highlighting the behind the scenes of the “why”. I was aware of the complexity of the Middle East throughout the decade, but leading up to it and behind closed doors I was less knowledgeable of. The lengths Obama went to (good or bad) to avoid a direct confrontation/war were interesting.
October 18, 2017
"The Iran Wars" by Jay Solomon makes a perfect sequel to David Crist's "The Twighlight War" in coverage in the extensice multi-front covert war between the US and the Iranians. Picking up in the late 90s and following through the course of the early years after 9/11 and Afghanistan and on into
March 10, 2019
A realistic view of not just US-Iran relations but the fight to establish sovereign power in Middle East. It also depicts the volatility of today's world wherein sanctions are imposed by Western powers and it's implications on Iranian economy & ultimately it's impact on Asian countries like India, Pakistan, China, etc.
Must read to know the present geopolitics in Middle East.
Must read to know the present geopolitics in Middle East.
July 15, 2021
This book is the first-hand account of a journalist, one Jay Solomon, and his analysis of the Obama-era nuclear deal and the events leading up to, and through, its signage and approval in Congress. This isn't a beach read, or a riveting account of events, but if you want to know all the many pieces of this puzzle, and its granularity, this is a good place to start.
September 7, 2023
Really great book about the Iran nuclear arms build up and the negotiations during Bush and Obama presidency. As I said great engaging work, but it was a bit complex to read as the number of characters and the various strategies involved. Also the book needs an update due to the Trump and Biden presidency. One begs to know what happened since.
May 16, 2020
Denser than the normal journalistic reading I'm used to, but by the end very informative background to a historic agreement. Eerie to read it now, just a few years later, that things have fallen apart.
September 13, 2022
Fantastic book! It's probably best in giving the context, both historical and geographical. I couldn't think of a better book that would give introduction and background to this topic with such great context thinking in mind. Great book.
October 2, 2024
Fairly comprehensive review of Iran’s military and associated geopolitical wranglings through the Obama administration. Informing read, albeit limited in 2024 and give recent light on some aspects of the JCPOA.
December 22, 2017
Deep and detailed insights into how international diplomacy is carried out and how the various players exercise their influence.
December 10, 2018
Iranian negotiators pull U.S. pants down.
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