Another book on intelligence to expand my knowledge of this subject. Overall, it is a very good read but covers the subject much like a college textbook (by design). The book is very well organized with a deep breadth of information that will certainly provide a reader with more than enough information for the average individual. As someone who has read and utilized intelligence products over my career, the book did keep my interest even though I was already familiar with this topic. Key excerpts are below.
- Intelligence is different from other government functions for at least two reasons. First much of what goes on is secret…. The second reason... is that the US intelligence community is a relatively recent government phenomenon…. Some Americans are uncomfortable with the concept that intelligence is a secret entity within an ostensibly open government based on checks and balances. P1. PJK. While transparency is in most cases good, citizens must understand that a certain amount of secrecy is essential or else your country will lose; not all business can be conducted out in the open.
- Strategic surprise should not be confused with tactical surprise… Tactical surprise, when it happens, is not of sufficient magnitude and importance to threaten national existence. P2. PJK. In reality, 9-11 was a tactical surprise in my assessment. The country was shaken deeply, but ultimately its existence was never truly threatened. Some of our normal life had to change, but the “surprise” attack had a short shelf life for most.
- Compared with the permanent bureaucracy, all senior policymakers are transients. P2. PJK. Elected officials tend to fear this, but it’s the truth. Unfortunately it does lead to some mistrust of the bureaucracy which is unfortunate.
- But policymakers and intelligence officers cannot restrict themselves to thinking only about enemies. They must also keep track of powers that are rivals, even though they may be neutrals, friends, or even allies. P5.
- Mirror imaging, or assuming that other states or individuals will act just the way we do, can undermine analysis… The other problem with mirror imaging is that it assumes a certain level of shared rationality... It leaves no room for the “irrational” actor…. P8. PJK. This is a huge issue in our intelligence analysis and planning. How does one truly know how another nation will behave?
- The goal of the US intelligence community is to produce all-source intelligence, or fusion intelligence, that is, intelligence based on as many collection sources as possible in order to compensate for the shortcomings of each and to profit from their combined strength. P55. PJK. I’ve used fusion cell intelligence on numerous occasions over the years, but this is perhaps the best definition of such products that I’ve ever seen.
- The classic rationale behind covert action is that policymakers need a third option. P124.
- Policymakers and intelligence officials examine at least two levels of risk before approving a covert action. The first is the risk of exposure. A director should always assume that an operation will become known at some point. The second risk to be weighed is failure of the operation. Failure may be costly at several levels: in human lives and there's a political crisis… p126-7.
- Every political leadership - democratic or totalitarian - worries about the state of its economy because this has the greatest daily effect on the population: the availability of food and commodities, the stability of prices, the relative ease or difficulty with which basic needs can be met. Economic unrest often leads to political unrest. P129.
- The NSC staff is primarily interested in the execution of policy as defined by the president and senior presidential appointees. P140.
- But policymakers also tend to assume, incorrectly, that “everything” is being covered, at least at some minimal level. P144. PJK. Priorities matter; not everything is covered by a satellite, HUMINT, etc.
- There is nothing in the constitution about “the public's right to know.” The Constitution safeguards freedom of speech and of the press, but these are not the same as a right to information. In the case of intelligence, the principle of openness does not apply. P163.