Lysis - Interpretarea unui dialog platonic

by Plato, Constantin Noica

'Ah, Hippothales, I said; what a noble and really perfect love you have found! I wish that you would favour me with the exhibition which you have been making to the rest of the company, and then I shall be able to judge whether you know what a lover ought to say about his love, either to the youth himself, or to others.'

Genres: Philosophy, Classics, Nonfiction, Ancient, Ancient History, Literature, History

144 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 381

About the author

Plato (Greek: Πλάτων), born Aristocles (c. 427 – 348 BC), was an ancient Greek philosopher of the Classical period who is considered a foundational thinker in Western philosophy and an innovator of the written dialogue and dialectic forms. He raised problems for what became all the major areas of both theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, and was the founder of the Platonic Academy, a philosophical school in Athens where Plato taught the doctrines that would later become known as Platonism.
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."

Reviews

[Sarah Far · Rating 4 out of 5]

خداوند کسانی را که مانند یکدیگرند به‌هم نزدیک می‌سازد و با هم دوست می‌کند

مجادله‌‌ای در باب دوستی و عجب از سقراط...

[Greg · Rating 3 out of 5]

And I would rather have a good friend than the best cock

Lysis is the Plato dialogue on Friendship.

After a preliminary discussion with Lysis about his parents and the things he is and not premitted to do, Menexenus enters into the dialogue and the focus shifts to friendship.

Socrates says, "I should greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of Darius, or even to Darius himself: I am such a lover of friends as that. And when I see you and Lysis, at your early age, so easily possessed of his treasure, and so soon, he of you, and you of him, I am amazed and delighted, see that I myself, although I am now advanced in years, am so far from having made a similar acquisitiion, that I do not even know in what way a friend is acquired." With this kind of preamble to the start of the 'innocent' questions you have an idea that the concept of Friendship is in trouble.

The moves that Socrates makes through his questioning end up in a stalemate about what is Friendship. The dialogue ends with Socrates saying, "O Menexenus and Lysis, how ridiculous that you two boys, and I, and old boy, who would fain be one of you, should imagine ourselves to be friends--that is what the by-standers will to away and say--and as yet we have not been able to discover what is a friend!"

Besides this last little bit of dialogue being kind of creepy (these first two dialogues that I've reviewed lately (I'm reading through the complete Dialogues of Plato, translated and edited by Benjamin Jowett, in case if you're wondering about the order of them that I'm reading), each have this sort of creepy quality of Socrates, as a lecherous old man sitting around a group of half-naked boys and trying to make himself 'one of the guys'), it also raises some thought about why something as simple as friendship shouldn't be able to achieved. If you follow Socrates line of reasoning you sort of arrive at a lite-paradox about friendship, in crude terms it is like this, friendship is good. Only good people have friendships, good people by the definition of good have no need of friends. There is more subtlety here, but that is the basic argument using giant leaps and bounds.

To me this means one of three things. Either Lysis is a very cynical dialogue about friendship, which might be the case if you take into consideration the quote I took from the start of the dialogue; why doesn't Socrates have any friends? Or, the dialogue is pointing towards Friendship being beyond the scope of reason, that there is say a sublime aspect to it (which is also possible, if one looks at the digression towards the end of the dialogue where first causes are invoked, and if you re-define friendship away from the more utilitarian definition that Socrates seems to attribute to it, and think of Friendship as a thing-for-itself and not reducible to something else, in which case much of the arguments prior to this point in the dialogue collapse under the mistaken definitions the argument had been founded on). Or, third, that the dialogue isn't about friendship at all, but rather it is an attack on Sophistry and an attempt to show that their are limits (misuses?) to Reason.

Or maybe it's a combination of all these things?

In the first part of the dialogue, the Lysis section, Socrates starts by showing Lysis that there are problems with the idea that his parents love him since they won't let him do certain tasks that a slave is allowed to do, or that they put slaves in a position to teach and scold him, so does that mean they value the slave more than their own son? These questions are innocent sounding, but they are also showing how someone skilled with some logical questions can sow discord where there shouldn't be any present. Of course, commonsense dictates, his parents don't value the slaves more than their own beloved son, but you can see how Socrates could put doubts that aren't easily dispelled into the youngsters mind through 'reason'. Reading this section made me try to remember if there were actual examples given in the Trial and Death dialogues for exactly how Socrates was corrupting the youth of Athens. In this case, Socrates doesn't act irresponsibly and brings Lysis to a satisfactory answer for why his parents would act the way they do and yet still love him, but looking at the way the second part of Lysis ends you can wonder about situations where logic is deployed to destroy things and all that is left is some ambiguous rumble and a wise old man standing in the midst of it with a goofy grin and a shrug.

And isn't this in a way what the Sophists did? They taught people who to reason well in order to win arguments. But every undergraduate in Philosophy quickly learns that logic is fairly easily deployed to destroy just about anything you want to knock down (not that the questions you use to knock something down are necessarily correct ones to ask, but they can be used as the right one to smash holes in things), but replacing what you've demolished with something constructive that isn't worse than what you've just gotten rid of isn't exactly an easy task. It's sort of just a more mature way of playing this favorite game of kids: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5af8wm...

I'm going to wrap up this mini-review / some thoughts here. I don't feel like I've done justice to anything I wrote here, but I guess this will just serve as some notes for this dialogue.

[Manny · Rating 2 out of 5]

The Trial of Socrates and Rolf Harris (part 1)

[A courtroom at The Hague. SOCRATES, ROLF HARRIS, various COUNSELS and COURT FUNCTIONARIES, JOURNALISTS and members of the PUBLIC]

COURT USHER: The case of Zeus versus Socrates and Rolf Harris, Lord Justice Cocklecarrot presiding, all rise, all rise.

COCKLECARROT: Please be seated. Socrates and Rolf Harris, you stand accused of corrupting the youth of Athens and Perth. How do you plead?

SOCRATES: Guilty.

HARRIS: Not guilty.

[Murmurs from the public gallery. COCKLECARROT motions to the PROSECUTOR]

PROSECUTOR: Mr. Harris, would you tell us in your own words what happened on the afternoon of July 17, 1978, when you were alone with the woman we are referring to as Miss A, then 13 years old?

HARRIS: I told her that she was very beautiful and that I wanted to kiss her. I said she had "bewitched my senses".

PROSECUTOR: And how did she react?

HARRIS: She said I should not speak to her like that and that if I did it again she would tell my wife.

PROSECUTOR: What did you say then?

HARRIS: I asked her where she got off on being a cocktease and a flirty little bitch.

PROSECUTOR: Why did you say those words?

HARRIS: I had read Plato's Lysis earlier the same day. He suggests that using a tone of this kind is generally a good idea.

[Further murmurs. SOCRATES smiles faintly but says nothing]

PROSECUTOR: Please tell us what happened next.

HARRIS: Je- Miss A started crying. I put my arm around her and said I wanted to be her friend.

PROSECUTOR: Do you consider that you were in fact a good friend to Miss A?

HARRIS: Plato points out that the notion of friendship is hard to define. I wanted to be her friend, but she didn't want to be my friend. It is a paradox.

PROSECUTOR: Would you care to elaborate on the reasons why you find this paradoxical?

HARRIS: I tried to put my hand up her skirt but she didn't like it. If that's not paradoxical, then what is?

[The case continues]

[booklady · Rating 5 out of 5]

Socrates is Plato’s Christ-like figure in that he asks enigmatic questions designed to provide knowledge and self-revelation for those wise enough to see it. His dialogues seek to answer some consequential over-arching question—in the case of Lysis here, “What is Friendship?”—through a series of smaller deceptively simple questions. But also like Jesus, Socrates cannot be taken at face value. His questions are never as they seem, in that your answers say more about YOU than they do about anything else. Plato does not provide answers to his (Socrates’s) questions, only questions. You provide your own answers. Will you be wise enough to realize that?

The setting, conversation, and the various motives of the characters are a mere backdrop, props for the dialogue. We’re not to put too much credence into their reality or we will get caught in Socrates’ trap. Rather, use the questions as a way to quiz yourself. For example, “What do I mean by Friendship?” Or, “What am I looking for from Friendship?” Or, “Do I see myself in any of these characters?”

The Dialogue, Lysis, opens with an older man, Hippothales, expressing his infatuation with the young, beautiful boy, Lysis, who he desires. Hippothales can stand for anyone with extreme desires. In this case, I think he is supposed to represent all those who long for romantic friendships/relationships. Socrates takes pity on this fool and lets him lurk-in on his conversation with the object of his desire, Lysis, all the while educating the young man through a series of back-and-forth leading questions. Hippothales does not see the boy as a person but as an object. Socrates on the other hand addresses the young man as a person, elder/teacher to young student.

Socrates accomplishes a tri-fold purpose masterfully. He does not awaken any suspicion, yet demonstrates for the dreamy romantic how to ‘handle’ the ‘object’ of desire and teaches Lysis the necessity of wisdom in his relationships, all the while entertaining us, the audience. So has Socrates ‘sold’ the boy out? Has he led him into a trap? The dialogue isn’t over.

At this point Lysis’s ‘pugnacious’ friend, Menexenus, returns from making his sacrifice to the gods. Socrates way of ‘questioning’ totally changes now. He is dealing with an entirely different sort of character here. The back-and-forth repartee becomes faster and—for me at least—was harder to follow. It seemed to go from drizzle to downpour.

The three discuss the various qualities of friendship: love/hate, the lover/beloved, good/evil, like/unlike, friend/enemy. By the end, they were back where they began, almost as if they walked a very large circular track, but they arrive without a fixed definition of ‘Friendship’.

Were the two young friends better or worse off for having made the journey with Socrates, exploring the ins and outs of Friendship ? Have they learned anything? Is Lysis in more danger from Hippothales? Less? Do we know any more about Friendship? Were we left with any new discoveries about Friendship? Those are the sorts of questions each reader of Lysis has to answer for him/herself.

As for Lysis and Menexenus, however, Socrates gave them the answer to the question before ever the dialogue began when he said, ‘I have a passion for friends; and I would rather have a good friend than (anything else) ... And when I see you and Lysis, at your early age, so easily possessed of this treasure, and so soon, he of you, and you of him, I am amazed and delighted.’ So they know Friendship is that which is to be desired above all else AND it is what they have already found in the simple comradeship they already enjoy.

An ironic, thoughtful read. Well done Plato!




October 17, 2017, Some initial thoughts: Oh! I can see this is going to be a problem right from the start as you have an older man talking about his young male "lover". If I had not just read Mr. Bernard SUZANNE's excellent interpretation of this dialogue, I might have stopped reading in the first few exchanges. Not so much that I am a prude, or maybe I am-there are worse things to be-but just thinking, do I really need to read this? Aren't there better things to read? However, thanks to the explanation, I was cognizant of my 21st American filter. Me biased? Yes. We ALL see through cultural perspectives. It is impossible not to. Future generations will laugh at us for thinking we were the first to rise above this ... if there are any around to laugh.

There are many subtleties going on in this dialogue which tie it into other dialogues--which I have not yet read. There are also many Greek words and they have shades of meaning which are not readily translatable.

One of the things Professor David Roochnik discussed in his course An Introduction to Greek Philosophy was that Plato was often writing his dialogues as an argument against the Sophists, those pre-Socratics who made their living collecting students and teaching relativism, i.e., that there are no objective truths, everything is subjective, a doctrine which Socrates and Plato-and Aristotle after them-were vehemently opposed to.

So! This is not just some story about an older man trying to seduce a younger man. It is genuinely a dialogue about the qualities inherent in friendship ... which Socrates will get to through his questions ... if readers are patient and can keep their minds focused.

[Simo Ibourki · Rating 3 out of 5]

After a little small talk about the boy and his "favourite" other boy (his lover), Socrates jumps right into the main issue which is: what is the nature of friendship?

Socrates gives a definition ...
Then another one ...
Then another one ...
Then he says to himself that his "head is dizzy (my head too) with thinking of the argument"
Then another one ...
Then he says "may not the other theory have been only a long story about nothing? (Really Socrates?!)
At last he admits that it's really ridiculous to be in a friendship with others without even knowing what is a friend!

Plato's Dialogues should be called Socrates's Labyrinths

[Théo d'Or]

The body as prison.
Reincarnation.
Post-mortem reward.
Punishment.

Plato - behind all this.
But he does not call the body a prison because it is a banishment of the soul for some original sin, but because it is imagined as an unpleasant enclosure that restrains the soul and keeps it from reunification with the divine. If Plato say that " after death, the good soul will continue existing separately from the bad body " , the reader would have understood the concept, but would not have been encouraged to feel any real disdain for the body or desire for separation from it, because the argument would not appeal to their imagination.
" For the lovers of knowledge", he said, " 'know that when philosophy first receives their soul it is absolutely imprisoned in the body, forced to behold the realities not alone by itself, but through the body as if through a " cage ", and wallowing in complete ignorance. And philosophy sees that the most terrible thing about the " cage " -,is that it is there because of desires, so that most of all the " prisoner " himself is the accomplice of his imprisonment ".

Plato was unquestionably an initiate. He really knows how to awaken a skeptical and mocking world, and most important, how to restrain those who believing too well would unwisely rush in unprepared. And to teach us to see the One in the many, and the many in the One.

[Mohammadreza · Rating 5 out of 5]

«لوسیس» ، یکی دیگر از رسالات دیالوگ گونه یِ افلاطون است که در بابِ مفهوم و چیستیِ «دوستی» نوشته شده. شاید مواجهه با لفظِ «دوستی» در نظرمان چنان بنماید که گویی به یقین می دانیم معنایِ دوستی چیست... اما سقراط ، که افلاطون از قولِ او دیالوگ ها را نگاشته است، نظر دیگری دارد... سقراط با دو نوجوان آتنی، لوسیس و منکسنوس در بابِ چیستیِ دوستی به بحث می نشیند و طریقتِ مشهور خود را در کاویدنِ معنای دوستی به کار می بندد. ابتدا بحث را از پرسش های ساده شروع می کند و به پاسخ می رسد. سپس پاسخ را زیر رگبارِ پرسش های نو می برد و پاسخ واپسین را باطل می کند و برای دفعاتِ متعددی چنین می کند. واردِ جزئیاتِ دیالوگ ها نمی شوم، «لوسیس» رساله ایست خواندنی و مستلزم تأمل در بابِ آنچه پیش پا افتاده بنظر می رسد و فکر می کنیم از عمق معنای آن آگاهیم. چنین می پنداریم که می دانیم، اما افسوس که زندگیمان را همین پندار ها و همین دانسته هایِ این چنینی و تأمل ناشده فرا گرفته. رسالات افلاطون با هنرپیشه نقش اول او ، سقراط ، حاوی پیامی هستند که هرروز باید با خود مرور کنیم، اینکه بدانیم که نمی دانیم. این، آقایان، خانمها، سرآغاز حکمت و معرفت است.

خوانشِ دوم , دو چندان لذت بخش و تأمل برانگیز بود.

[Roy Lotz · Rating 3 out of 5]

This dialogue is normally grouped along with Laches and Charmides as an early, inconclusive dialogue. They are also alike in providing amusing portraits of life in Athens. This dialogue, for example, has a humorous beginning. Ctesippus complains to Socrates that Hippothales is always going on about his great love for the beautiful youth, Lysis, and composing horrid love poems in honor of his beloved. Socrates chides Hippothales and professes to demonstrate the correct way to speak to a beloved. What commences from this, however, is a rather ordinary Socratic interrogation—this time about the relationship of privilege to knowledge—which I doubt was very useful to the would-be wooer.

The topic of the dialogue then abruptly shifts to the nature of friendship. My general impression from reading Ancient Greek writings it that friendship was a far more important institution for the Greeks than it is for us. In any case Socrates and his interlocutors make little headway with this seemingly obvious problem. Is friendship the attraction of like to like? of like to unlike? of good to good? of neutral to good?—and so on, until they call it quits. I do think that the nature of friendship, which we are wont to take for granted, is an interesting topic to explore. But this dialogue contains, at best, only suggestions for future investigation.

[Serch Sánchez]

Los cuestionamientos de Sócrates al joven Lisis sobre la amistad los llevan a encontrar qué es lo que no es una amistad o un amigo, y ciertas características que definitivamente debería tener. Me llamó mucho la atención que a pesar de la época, pudieron resolver que, por ejemplo, un amigo no es amigo solamente de sus semejantes, haciendo referencia a que necesariamente tendremos nuestras diferencias con ellos; si tu amigo busca hacerte el mal y no el bien, será tu enemigo por deducción lógica. Igualmente se toca el tema de la reciprocidad, ya que uno no puede ser amigo de otro por alguna utilidad, sino ese sería mi fin y estaría usando a la persona como medio, y esto no puede ser así ya que las personas somos fines, necesariamente. El amigo es el fin de mi amor, por lo tanto el amigo es el que ama sin necesidad de devolución, lo quiero por él mismo en esencia. Finalmente, Sócrates toca el tema de un ser intermedio, ya que estamos expuestos todo el tiempo al bien y el mal, pero nosotros mismos y nuestras decisiones reducen todo a si empeoramos o mejoramos como personas; si yo me pego a algo (alguien) o viceversa, puede parecer que soy algo que no, el mal o el bien, refiriéndose a que elijamos bien nuestras compañías, ya que si nos pegamos demasiado a algo malo, sí podemos convertirnos en algo malo; el amigo es una relación muy profunda para el alma, por lo que sí pueden transformarte, para bien o para mal. A través de la mayéutica Sócrates hace distintas preguntas durante el diálogo, y al final sarcásticamente dice que no pudieron resolver lo que es la amistad ya que tuvieron que irse con sus Maestros, ya que Lisis y su amigo Menexenes eran jóvenes.

[Alberto Grandi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Un percorso sull'amicizia e sull'infanzia. Attuale anche dopo 2500 anni

[Madlen Zagorska · Rating 4 out of 5]

"I do not quite follow you, he said"
and I felt that
i vsichkoto tova zashtoto socrat e wingman i ally

[Sookie · Rating 2 out of 5]

Plato offers a very clinical and detached view on "Friendship". There is a utilitarian view on this subject and Socrates subtly implies he prefers having a good friend over love.

Lysis seems like an easy read but isn't so as Reason plays alongside the dialogues on necessary of others in our lives. Great primer to Plato's dialogues.

People walk around calling everyone there best friend. The term doesn't have any real meaning anymore. Mere acquaintances are lavished with hugs and kisses upon a second or at most third meeting. Birthday cards get passed around offices so everybody can scribble a snippet of sentimentality for a colleague they barely met. Everyone just loves everyone. As a result when you tell somebody you love them today. It isn't much heard. I love you Denny, you are my best friend. I couldn't imagine going through life without you as my best friend.
- Alan Shore, Boston Legal

This says it all.

[Ahmed Oraby · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sad reactions only

[Hayden Prather · Rating 2 out of 5]

The first 1/2 is Socrates fujoshing out and the second 1/2 is him giving himself a headache

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read this in relation to some background research for a chapter in my thesis. I am totally unfamiliar with Plato's work, though I am generally familiar with his ideas on a second-hand basis. This was a good work on friendship, which had broader definitions than our modern concept. I like how his philosophy, this work in particular, takes the form of a short story: it makes the ideas a lot easier to digest, although this was a tough one with rather complex arguments. And, after all that, it came to no definite conclusion regarding the nature of friendship. As to why, I'd have to think further about that, but I don't think it was because Plato didn't have a good answer; rather, I think the ambiguity of his ending had something to say about the value of conversation and philosophical discussion specifically. It's not about the answers, but the joy of the experience.

[Regan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great and readable primer on the Lysis. I'd definitely recommend it as a first read to get one's bearing on the actual dialogue. It doesn't bog the reader down with all of the interpretive disputes about the dialogue. It is a straight read. If the reader is interested in disputes, the final chapter will point them to the greater issues at stake in interpretation.

[Mădălina Bejenaru · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dialogul lui Platon despre natura prieteniei în care, ironic, nu aflăm la final natura prieteniei, ci ne dăm seama cât de greu este să vorbești despre niște concepte cu care suntem atât de obișnuiți.

Definițiile lui Socrate sunt vag circulare, pleacă de la binomul bine-rău, căruia i se adaugă un intermediar, după cum îl numește Andrei Cornea (ceea ce nu este nici bine, nici rău). Dacă noi suntem intermediarii, iar prietenia este utilitaristă, cauza prieteniei este răul, scopul ei fiind binele. Pentru noi este o perspectivă destul de egoistă, nu ne alipim de oamenii dragi doar pentru a ne desăvârși pe noi, iar bunătatea noastră nu ne este autosuficientă în mediul social.
Ideea care mi-a plăcut aici este una destul de utopică: dacă răul ar dispărea brusc, am mai avea nevoie de bine? Și totuși cu intermediarii cum rămâne? Socrate nu ne dă un răspuns concret, în absența răului, binele nu mai contează, iar ceea ce nu era nici bine, nici rău înainte de apocalipsa conceptelor rămâne într-o imponderabilitate filosofică. Ceea ce e fascinant la Socrate este modul în care privește un obiect: din toate părțile. Am spune că dacă ar dispărea răul, ar dispărea și cauzele suferințelor noastre-săracia, foamea, șamd. Însă senzația foamei este prielnică în timpul postului. Răul nu este neapărat absolut aici, ci există ramuri ale răului care ne sunt de folos. În acest sens, de-ar fi să dispară, ce ar mai rămâne?
Revenind la explicarea unor manifestări intrinseci pe care le putem numi, dar nu știm să le definim. Și cum suntem conștienți că prietenia este ceva mai mult decât semne de egalitate cu flori, frumusețe, frunze, primăveri din compunerile de la școală, ne regăsim în același stadiu precum Socrate și auditorii:

“Am ajuns acum, Lysis și Menexenos, de tot râsul: atât eu, un om bătrân, cât și voi. Căci, plecând, lumea de față va zice că noi credem că suntem prieteni unii cu alții - mă pun și pe mine în rândul vostru -, dar că n-am fost în stare încă să descoperim ce anume este prietenul.”

[Joao Baptista · Rating 4 out of 5]

Neste diálogo, Platão, pela boca de Sócrates, investiga o sentido da amizade, ou melhor, da philia, que parece ter um conteúdo mais amplo do que o conceito de amizade, tal como o usamos actualmente. Aliás, toda a discussão assenta na colocação da questão através da dicotomia entre o “amante” e o “amado”, isto é, aquele que ama ou vota amizade e aquele (ou aquilo) que é objecto dessa amizade, sendo que o primeiro surge como o termo activo e o segundo como o termo passivo: «Quando alguém ama outrem, qual é que se torna amigo do outro: o que ama, do que é amado, ou que é amado, do que ama?» (212a-b).
A discussão passa em revista várias teses possíveis, desde a da aproximação natural entre iguais, à versão oposta da aproximação entre os opostos, à introdução de um terceiro termo: “o que não é bom nem mau”, todos sendo, a final, rejeitados. O diálogo – como, em geral, os desta fase – termina de forma inconclusiva, com o regresso às primeiras teses que haviam sido rejeitadas.
Porém, há aspectos que sobrevivem à aporia: a ideia de que o termo passivo da amizade é o supremo bem, considerado o “primeiro amigo”, isto é, aquele que é amigo por si e não em vista de outro amigo (outro objecto de amizade): a causa final da amizade; bem como a ideia do desejo como causa eficiente da philia, isto é, a busca daquilo de que se está privado (quem é perfeitamente bom é auto-suficiente, não carece de nada e como tal não padece de desejo; quem é mau é incapaz de amar o bem).
Embora seja um diálogo menos conhecido, ele abre as portas para uma melhor compreensão do Banquete e para o Fedro, introduzindo a ideia do desejo como motor do amor e tratando a questão em torno da dialéctica entre amante/amado, sendo já possível vislumbrar ou pressentir a teoria das formas neste tratamento da questão.

[David Sarkies · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Question of Friendship
29 November 2019 – Maryborough

Well, I have now made it to the town of Maryborough, and after wandering around this morning, killing time while waiting to be able to check in to my motel, I have finally managed to get here, so that I can sit down and actually write a review about this work of Plato’s. Interestingly, this isn’t written as a dialogue, but rather as a prose discussion between Socrates and some others about the definition of friendship. Yeah, once again, I’d probably point him to the Oxford English Dictionary. Okay, that’s actually Wikipedia, but that’s because I can’t seem to find a definition in the online version of the OED (unless I create an account, which I won’t be doing). Anyway, I’m not entirely sure this is what he was on about, though it does seem that the Wikipedia article is quite detailed.

Then again, Socrates wasn’t speaking, and Plato wasn’t writing, in English, so going to an English definition probably defeats the point as well, despite the fact that this has been translated into English, the translator does go to great pains to explain that there does happen to be a difference between Greek and English. Then again, maybe this page would be a little more authentic.

But, lets get beyond sending people to Wikipedia pages and try to get an idea of what is going on here. Like, the thing with Greek, or at least Ancient Greek, is that it can be pretty specific at times. For instance, they have a word for the person who is the subject of affection, and the person who is giving the subject affection. Of course, we have Philia, which is roughly translated to friend, but some people sort of argue that it is a bit stronger that just friends. For instance, we have friends, we have acquaintances, and we have besties. I get the impression that Philia sort of refers to bestie, though in English we rarely, if ever, use the word love to describe that relationship.

Actually, the word love seems to really have two uses in the English language, and one is in relation to a person with whom we are having a sexual relation with (or at least want to), and our feelings towards a meat pie (if it is the case that we do feel that way towards a meat pie). Mind you, unless you happen to be Jason Biggs, most people would understand that if you say that you loved a meat pie, that you wouldn’t be implying that you wanted to have a sexual relationship with it (though in Bigg’s case it happened to be an apple pie).

But, one of the debates that they were having was whether a relationship could be consider a friendship if the relationship was unrequited. I’ve sort of been in that situation, not in the case of sexual relationships (though I course I have gone down many dead ends in that regards as well), but rather wanting to be somebody’s bestie, or even hang out with them, and they, well, didn’t want to do that in return. Honestly, as I have grown older I sort of shake my head and wonder why I even bothered.

However, there is another catch here, and that is what about if your bestie doesn’t have your best interests at heart? Yeah, you’re friends, you do things together, you hang out together a lot, but the thing is that this person is a really, really bad influence on you. The thing is that on the outside there seems to be a lot of elements of friendship here, even going as far as being Philia, but the friend is, well, a complete jerk. Not to you, but rather that this particular person not only gets you into trouble, but eventually gets you into an awful lot of trouble. For instance, their stupidity on the road might eventually result in both of you being in a car crash, and you being left crippled for life – if that person truly is a friend, then is that person really showing Philia towards you?

Mind you, with the whole question of unrequited friendship, they do raise the issues of objects. Beer for instance (though in the text it is wine). I like beer. I really like beer. But the thing is that beer, well, is an inanimate object, so it really isn’t going to show any affection towards me. So, is this unrequited love? No, this is me liking beer, and personally, I’m not sure if Philia is the correct word to use in this case, and I suspect that most Greeks would have known that you don’t use Philia in that sense – I believe the word that is used here is Storge. In fact, I suspect that they would have though that you were a bit of a drongo if you used the word Philia in relation to an inanimate object.

One of the reasons that this conversation starts up is that two young men appear, and it is clear that they are friends. Now, I’m not quite sure whether it was actually sexual or not – it isn’t made clear – but the Athenians operated in the sense that male to male sexual relations would be between and older man, and a younger man. In fact they had specific words for each of the participants as well, with the older man being the active participant, and the younger man being the passive (interestingly, in Roman culture is was okay for a man to be active, and disgraceful for him to be passive, which is why the passive participants generally were slaves).

In a way though, it does come across, at least in the text, that the relationship that is being explored here was a little unusual because, as I suggested, it used to be the situation that it was between older, and younger, people. Here we have two younger people who are clearly the best of friends, which no doubt prompts Socrates to start discussing, and exploring, what friendship actually is.

[Roman Zadorozhnii · Rating 5 out of 5]

Спроба розібратися в сутності поняття “дружба”

[Logan Miller · Rating 3 out of 5]

Plato annoys me

[Truls Ljungström · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lysis är Platons genomgång av vänskap, och den kommer fram till att vänskap är ett begär efter något som representeras av den som man är vän till. Det Platon börjar med att konstatera är att vänskap inte måste vara ömsesidig, och att det man är vän med är en projektion - personen vi är vänner till behöver inte veta att vi är det, och behöver inte reciprocera; och vi ser eller förstorar bara de delar av vännen som vi faktiskt uppskattar.

Platons tes implicerar också att den perfekta varelsen inte kan ha vänner, eftersom allt vad den behöver finns inom dess själv. Den koppling som först kommer till mig, är till renässansens teologiska diskussion om huruvida Gud kunde lida eller ej, där man menade att endast en makt som upplevt lidande skulle kunna känna värme inför lidandet andra upplever. Implicit måste Gud vara ofullkomlig för att kunna vara fullkomlig i kärlek/vänskap till även en skadad och imperfekt mänsklighet.

Boken är inte alls dålig, men ganska deprimerande, och väldigt naken vad gäller kulturskillnaden mellan nu och dåtida Grekland. Detta är inte oöverstigliga hinder, men det kan vara bra att veta att denna bok kommer kräva en del av läsaren, dess korthet till trots.

[Viji (Bookish endeavors) · Rating 1 out of 5]

Well.. It was a perfect lesson on how to keep on talking for an hour and mean absolutely nothing at all. I do not understand the need to confuse things when it could've been done the easy way. It seems like Socrates is talking like the sophists,simply creating confusion without intending to reach any conclusion. I wouldn't recommend this dialogue to people who don't have enough patience.

[Illiterate · Rating 4 out of 5]

Socrates: only the good have friends. Everyman: yeah right. Philosopher: it depends how you define friend. Socrates: it’s about wanting (not having) wisdom.

[Utkarsh Bansal · Rating 1 out of 5]

The idea of trying out various definitions of friendship and arguing against them, realising we don't have a clear concept of what it is at all, is great. The arguments themselves, utter horseshit.

[Siddiq Khan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Have you ever asked yourself why with some people you strike up an almost instant connection of scintillating intensity, whereas with others, as much as you may like them, the relationship never becomes more than one in which to pass the time pleasantly?

This is the crux of the issue in this dialogue, and if the inconclusive ending is frustrating, it only reflects the mystery of the encounter between true friends (who may or may not also be lovers).

What is the difference between a congenial acquaintance and a true friend? What -- besides the raw biological fact of sex -- is the difference between a best friend and a lover? Until now, my only answer was "chemistry".

It still seems a pretty good answer, but in this, chronologically the first of his Erotic dialogues, we start to see the seeds of another story. Read together with Phaedrus and the Symposium, these seeds mature into an enriched vision of love, intimacy, attraction, romance, friendship, sex and desire that has clarified my understanding and ennobled my intent.

From Lysis we are initiated into the labyrinthine nature of the mystery. As Kenneth Rexroth wrote in one of his poems, "All questions rise in love, and finding no answers, return to it". Chemistry, ironically, cannot be atomized analytical mind.

We then pass to Phaedrus where we are initiated into the mad love which possesses us of an insane urge towards wholeness remembered dimly by a self severed from its source (as in the Amor Fou of Andre Breton or the drunken desire of Rumi´s reed). The beloved is revealed as an image used by Eros to remind the self of its primal unity (beautifully illustrated by Dante Alighieri in his poem La Vita Nuova), and the act of love revealed as a sacrament for the return to this communion with the source (beautifully illustrated by Octavio Paz in his poem Piedra de Sol). Behind the irreducible chemistry of every unique relationship lies a certain perception of a common path shared by lover and beloved, personified* by the god to which the two are given:

"Now the lover who is taken to be the attendant of Zeus is better able to bear the winged god, and can endure a heavier burden; but the attendants and companions of Ares, when under the influence of love, if they fancy that they have been at all wronged, are ready to kill and put an end to themselves and their beloved. And he who follows in the train of any other god, while he is unspoiled and the impression lasts, honours and imitates him, as far as he is able; and after the manner of his God he behaves in his intercourse with his beloved and with the rest of the world during the first period of his earthly existence. Every one chooses his love from the ranks of beauty according to his character, and this he makes his god, and fashions and adorns as a sort of image which he is to fall down and worship. The followers of Zeus desire that their beloved should have a soul like him; and therefore they seek out someone of a philosophical and imperial nature, and when they have found him and loved him, they do all they can to confirm such a nature in him, and if they have no experience of such a disposition hitherto, they learn of any one who can teach them, and themselves follow in the same way. And they have the less difficulty in finding the nature of their own god in themselves, because they have been compelled to gaze intensely on him; their recollection clings to him, and they become possessed of him, and receive from him their character and disposition, so far as man can participate in God. The qualities of their god they attribute to the beloved, wherefore they love him all the more, and if, like the Bacchic Nymphs, they draw inspiration from Zeus, they pour out their own fountain upon him, wanting to make him as like as possible to their own god. But those who are the followers of Here seek a royal love, and when they have found him they do just the same with him; and in like manner the followers of Apollo, and of every other god walking in the ways of their god, seek a love who is to be made like him whom they serve, and when they have found him, they themselves imitate their god, and persuade their love to do the same, and educate him into the manner and nature of the god as far as they each can; for no feelings of envy or jealousy are entertained by them towards their beloved, but they do their utmost to create in him the greatest likeness of themselves and of the god whom they honour. Thus fair and blissful to the beloved is the desire of the inspired lover, and the initiation of which I speak into the mysteries of true love, if he be captured by the lover and their purpose is effected."

Whereas in Lysis we see a slew of densely seeded conjectures and refutations, in Phaedrus we see a slew of densely enfolded theses, some of which were elaborated in book-length form by the philosopher of dialogue Martin Buber in his books "I & Thou" and "Between Man and Man" --

That the madness of the love relation is the entry point, the "gateway drug", through which the lover passes from intercourse with his beloved into intercourse with the whole world.

That the madness of love is what allows the lover to become most himself in the face of forces constantly conspiring to distract him -- "And of madness there were two kinds; one produced by human infirmity, the other was a divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention."

That chemistry is a conspiracy between lover and beloved to recognise and reveal the divine beauty within themselves, one another and the world according to the dictates of their highest good.

In the Symposium, the lines of inquiry begun in the Lysis and Phaedrus are brought to a superlative conclusion whose contents I had better treat in my review of that title.

*The personification I mean here is the basis of the book "Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion" by Stewart Elliott Guthrie

[Markéta · Rating 4 out of 5]

Lysis, or; Socrates Is Asked To Help Two Pining Young Men But Instead Entangles Them In A Neverending Talk About Friendship.

I liked it.

Also, the start is just killer cool.
Someone is like: Hey, Socrates, my man, come for a chat with us!
And Socrates is like: Eh, i dunno...
And someone is like: We've got some mighty fine lads here, you know.
And Socrates is like: Mighty fine lads, you say??? :O I am COMING!

Fun and super confusing at the same time.
4/5

[Talie · Rating 4 out of 5]

در دیالوگ های افلاطون به روند استدلال علاقه مندم. گرچه گفته می شود این دیالوگ به دسته ی اولیه ی دیالوگ های افلاطون – که چهره ی واقعی سقراط را نشان می دهند و سقراط پرسنده و ناقد است- تعلق دارد، در لا به لای گفته های سقراط رد واضحی از نظریه ی مثل افلاطون را می توان دید. در واقع این دیالوگ مقدمه ای بر سمپوزیوم افلاطون است و شباهت های بسیاری به آن دارد.

[buttercup · Rating 3 out of 5]

gay

[Savannah Schoen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Plato thought he was funny for this one. As usual Socrates was carrying however Menexenus was giving nothing, I mean asserted nothing for himself, he was giving sheep, ruined the dialogue.