Limited Inc

by Jacques Derrida

In Limited Inc. Derrida presenta una sua "etica della discussione entrando in una serrata polemica con la filosofia analitica americana e, in particolare con John R. Searle e con la sua interpretazione degli "atti linguistici". Oltre a questo interesse specifico, l'opera si propone come un rilevante esempio di confronto tra tradizioni di pensiero.

Genres: Philosophy, Theory, Nonfiction, Language, Academic, France, Literary Criticism

286 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1988

About the author

Jacques Derrida was a French philosopher best known for developing deconstruction, a method of critical analysis that questioned the stability of meaning in language, texts, and Western metaphysical thought. Born in Algeria, he studied at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he was influenced by philosophers such as Heidegger, Husserl, and Levinas. His groundbreaking works, including Of Grammatology (1967), Writing and Difference (1967), and Speech and Phenomena (1967), positioned him at the center of intellectual debates on language, meaning, and interpretation.
Derrida argued that Western philosophy was structured around binary oppositions—such as speech over writing, presence over absence, or reason over emotion—that falsely privileged one term over the other. He introduced the concept of différance, which suggests that meaning is constantly deferred and never fully present, destabilizing the idea of fixed truth. His work engaged with a wide range of disciplines, including literature, psychoanalysis, political theory, and law, challenging conventional ways of thinking and interpretation.
Throughout his career, Derrida continued to explore ethical and political questions, particularly in works such as Specters of Marx (1993) and The Politics of Friendship (1994), which addressed democracy, justice, and responsibility. He held academic positions at institutions such as the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and the University of California, Irvine, and remained an influential figure in both European and American intellectual circles. Despite criticism for his complex writing style and abstract concepts, Derrida’s ideas have left a lasting impact on contemporary philosophy, literary theory, and cultural criticism, reshaping the way meaning and language are understood in the modern world.

Reviews

[Joshua Stein · Rating 2 out of 5]

The majority, and center, of this book is Derrida's response to John Searle. I have many thoughts on it, and it is the most important and engaging part of the book, for better or for worse. It opens with the essay "Signature Event Context" [hereafter SEC] which is at the center of the dispute between Searle and Derrida; Searle takes SEC to include a ridiculous and mistaken reading of J.L. Austin and to make a number of claims bout language that are untenable, unacceptable, and ridiculous. I'm not going to deal with, here, whether or not I think that Searle is right in making that judgment about SEC. The essay is confusing and, though Derrida defends it well, even on rereading, it is sufficiently obscurantist that it is hard to say that Derrida's defense is totally acceptable, and Searle's misreadings are unjustified.

The major problem with the book is in its content. The extended essay that is Derrida's response to Searle is obnoxious, making jokes at Searle's expense and failing to hold Derrida himself to the same standard of serious reading that he is holding Searle (regularly criticizing Searle's use of citation while engaging in the same practices) and there is serious reason to be suspicious to whether Derrida understands much at all about the tradition of analytic philosophy of language on which he attempts to comment in this response. This is a typical critique from analytic philosophers, and the defense from students and followers of Derrida is often to accuse those analytics of not having read Derrida closely enough. Whether or not it is true that analytic critics have not given Derrida a fair shake, it seems also fair to say that Derrida has either not tried or is not equipped to respond to genuine issues in analytic philosophy of language. Derrida's writing moves in interesting patterns connecting concepts, but he seems to take for granted a number of things that he shouldn't given his dispute is with Searle:

1.) a Hegelian view of concepts that understands each predicate (seriousness, consciousness, etc.) as in a reciprocal relationship with its negation (pp. 104) which has been disputed by the analytic tradition.
2.) a Freudian view of the Unconscious (pp. 73-75)
3.) the non-triviality of the implication that possibility implies necessary possibility (pp. 48-50)
4.) a non-additive notion of parasitism (pp. 103)

I could go on and on with that list, but I'm going to end up writing something for someone other than Goodreads which gives an account of why Derrida is almost certainly mistaken about most of these issues. I'll add a link to those articles (when they are finished) at the end of this review.

It isn't just that Derrida is taking on a lot of conceptual baggage, or even that his grasp on the basic concepts of analytic philosophy (like meta-language/object-language distinction, the nuanced use of intention, the role of indexicals in establishing meaning) seems tenuous at best. It is also that he presents himself as someone antagonized by the analytic discourse, who is genuinely attempting to engage with figures like Austin, while not acknowledging the substantive differences in what is accepted as functional and methodologically sound. Derrida does acknowledge a difference in the tradition, initially, but then proceeds to ignore that difference as important throughout the essay, which suggests that he doesn't have an intention of engaging Searle so much as an audience who already agrees that Hegel and others were generally correct about things like meaning.

In that tone, Derrida presents himself as having some parity with Searle and co. in disputing the right to argue about interpreting Austin. It is unfair, he seems to think, that a tradition of Anglo-Saxon philosophers has taken over the legacy of J.L. Austin and claimed exclusive right to interpretation. Derrida maintains that this is unfair and that his understanding of Austin is informed by thorough reading. However, he doesn't acknowledge the role that the aforementioned difference in tradition and background assumption plays in who has a right to interpret Austin. Because Austin was a part of a group of philosophers who are ideologically very similar to Searle (after all, many of the same theorists who were formative for Austin were also formative for Searle; they were part of the same academic environment) there is some strength to the claim to interpreting Austin. At no point does Derrida appear to give a reasoned criticism of this, nor does he appear at any point to take into account the ideological roots of Austin that are formative to his thought. This is the sort of negligence that legitimizes analytic criticisms of Derrida, and which directly fuels the animosity of those criticisms.

I would strongly recommended, for reasons of the philosophical content alone, that folks who read Derrida only attempt this after having familiarized themselves with Austin and the analytic tradition, as well as some of the relevant background literature that informs Derrida, though Derrida does a fine job at staking out his own position; it is the positions of the interlocutors and an account of their backgrounds that suffer for the negligence. This book is a very lopsided account of an incredibly difficult and nuanced issue; it is written in a style which feels at times deliberately difficult when it doesn't need to be (especially in the case of SEC, though still sometimes in the course of Limited Inc itself); and it is problematic in its content.

[David Griffiths · Rating 5 out of 5]

I came to this exchange already a fan of Derrida and of Austin with a slight expectation that I may have my loyalties conflicted. The expectation was unwarranted. Derrida establishes a number of important criticisms centred on the unsupportable binary categories upon which much of the analysis of language descending from Austin rests upon.

Many of the other reviews here charge Derrida with obscurantism, and while Derrida's writing is sometimes, necessarily, difficult I find the charge in relation to this text specifically to be grossly unfair.

I suspect people often find Derrida's writing to be obscure simply because they expect it to be.

Then comes a summary of a response written by Searle.

I tried very hard to give it a fair chance, to explore its context and find a copy but Searle's version of Derrida bears no similarity to the one I had just read. He frequently criticises Derrida for not taking in to account things that clearly were taken into account, or often simply ignores key parts of concepts seemingly merely to support his own prejudices about what he wants Derrida to mean.

The last section, the largest, is composed of Derrida's own response to Searle. It is witty and clearly written though it is certainly too aggressive for my own tastes. It adds little to the contents of the first essay, though it is certainly a useful text when taken into conjunction with the first essay, and the aggression is made more forgivable by the context of the response.

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this. It was both amusing and informative. Certainly also one of the more accessible writings Derrida produced.

[Francisca · Rating 3 out of 5]

i have never read a sassier academic response in my life. this edition consists of three different texts. the first, fairly approachable, discussing derrida's views on iterability and the written text. i must admit if i had not read Jacques Derrida beforehand, this reading experience would have been more gruesome. the second text, considerably shorter, is an abbreviated version of john r. searle's reply to derrida's text. again, nothing out of the blue--particularly if you took notes of the first one. the third and final text gives this edition its name. it also serves to exemplify derrida's reputation as a special type of author and theorist.

it was infuriating.

i was both glad and mad for having read the routledge classics introduction before tackling this book. glad that i was familiar with the contents (to an extent--i could never claim to be an expert or an avid student of his work) but mad that i had not prepared myself to his style. ´cause the boy got sass.

without exaggerating, derrida begins his reply doing a proper mariah carey. "i don't know who this person is." even worse, searle's essay is titled "reiterating the differences: a reply to derrida," which prompts derrida to wonder: "i certainly don't know this man but he must know me since he treats me with such familiarity in his title."

although i can't physically at the moment (and, who am i kidding, i might never be able to) give a summary of the contents in this third essay (i do recommend reading nicholas royle's take), this is all you need to know of it: at some point, derrida starts calling searle "sarl." because, words, you know.

[Maksym Karpovets · Rating 3 out of 5]

Так вже складно пише Дерріда, що інколи хочеться просто вити. Після прочитання Signature Event Context, найбільш важливого й потрібного мені тексту, у мене підкралось чітке розуміння того, що у Дерріда серйозні проблеми зі стилем. Людина просто не уміє (чи не хоче, що теж можливо) просто й глибоко писати. Пробував читати французький варіант, який теж пішов не легко. Натомість перечитав першу главу українською і французькою "Наглядати й карати" Мішеля Фуко й відразу відчув просто вселенську різницю між умінням цікаво й системно розгортати свою теорію. Не хочу зараз вдаватись у дискусії, що, мовляв, Дерріда пишучи вже деконструює, манера письма Дерріда подібна до амальгами, письмо Дерріда треба відчувати - це усе звучить як певні виправдання. Йдеться зараз не про відсутність думки чи ідеї (вони є, це справді після якогось разу вловлюється), а про невміння її донести до читача. Утім, можливо, це я так туговато сприймаю зірку постструктуралізму, тому треба ще попрацювати над собою. Деконструювати себе, так би мовити.

[Spoust1 · Rating 5 out of 5]

I was looking at some of the other reviews of this book, about how it "is a great introduction to," or "shows the basic schematics" of "deconstruction." This is the type of proposition Derrida would problematize. His texts cannot be reduced to anything called "deconstruction," there is no "thing" called deconstruction, which might be excavated from reading this (or any other) book by Derrida. He never attempts to sum up his own work like that; the notion of describing in writing some idea, some fragment of logos, called "deconstruction," is contrary to how Derrida conceives of writing. To read Derrida to understand "deconstruction" is absolutely the wrong way to read him; it isn't a faux pas as much as it is, as Derrida himself shows, an impossible and absurd task.

I had to say that.

"Limited Inc" consists of three parts. The first, "Signature Event Context," is an essay problematizing the idea of "intention," arguing that it is impossible for some notion of "intention" to govern the meaning of any sign system, flesh of text, for text is by its own nature full of undecidabilities, is constituted by the possibility of meaning. Derrida also traces the ripples, the ruptures, this has for speech acts theory and the notion of communication. In addition it is a complex, rich, literary text - still structured, unlike some of his later work, but also charged with ambiguities.

The second essay, "Limited Inc abc," is a response to a critique "Signature Event Context" by analytic philosopher John R. Searle. It includes a brief summary of Searle's essay, "Reiterating the Differences," which Searle refused to allow be published in the collection, and Derrida ends up quoting almost the entire thing in his length response. As I understand it, Searle missed the point of Derrida's critique and ended up making the same argument Derrida deconstructed, the argument Austin made, again, with different words. Derrida's response is polemical - in a mischievous way; he takes plenty of detours, using this as an opportunity to show how "the author" is an arbitrary label and an ideology, among other things; and using this as an excuse to do - again, among other things - amusing things with Searle's name. His response is serious intellectually, however. Derrida shows not only that Searle's logic is no different than Austin's, that Derrida had already done away with it; he also shows that the possibility Searle misunderstood Derrida in fact is an example of one of the things he showed in "Signature Event Context": how we can never be sure communication can or will take place.

The third part is an interview with Derrida, which I have heard is "a good introduction to deconstruction" - I will not comment.

[surfurbian · Rating 3 out of 5]

I have not been able to think straight since I read this. My scores (from years ago) on the GRE tell the tale the clearest. I can now grasp the implications of what I read while completely missing the main idea.

[Jenny Webb · Rating 4 out of 5]

There's a whole lot to chew on here, and Derrida's reaction to Searle is one of the funniest / most entertaining takedowns in academic prose that I've read. If you're interested in the development of the concept of performativity from Austin through Searle and on, this is the next place to go.

[Emily · Rating 4 out of 5]

The most aggressive, yet lucid, version of his theories. A must-read and probably a good beginning to Derrida.

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent introduction to basic Derridian/deconstructionist ideas. He also rips Searle a new one in a way that kind of makes me cringe.

[Eric · Rating 5 out of 5]

Derrida opens "Signature Event Context" ("SEC"), the opening piece in Limited Inc, by questioning the homogeneity of the word/concept "communication": Does it really "mean" a generalizable thing? He argues no, but claims that the "ambiguous field" of its meaning can be "massively reduced by the limits of what is called a context." Then again, he asks, "[A]re the conditions ... of a context ever absolutely determinable?" (2). If not, Derrida argues this “would mark the theoretical inadequacy of the current concept of context” and “would necessitate a certain generalization and … displacement of the concept of writing” (3), the latter being a concept he is keenly concerned with throughout the essay.

He pushes the concept of writing by challenging its analogical relationship to the purportedly broader concept of “communication.” Writing is not just an “extension” of the “homogeneous space of communication,” nor is it simply a logical step in the development of human language and communication (3). For Derrida, writing is not just a stand-in for the original writer or communicator—a modified form of presence to make up for the addressor’s bodily absence. His attempt to generalize and displace the concept of writing is based on the notions that “the absence within the particular field of writing will have to be of an original type” and that writing “would no longer be one species of communication” (7). Writing must instead “be repeatable—iterable—in the absolute absence of the receiver” (my emphasis), as “writing that is not structurally readable … beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing.” The “mark” can even “do without the referent” as well as the sender and receiver (10). (Derrida notably extends these qualities even to “experience,” arguing “there is no experience of pure presence.”) Even when writing is radically divorced from its original context, meaning, receiver, and sender, it continues to mean (or possess the potential to mean) given writing’s iterable and citational nature: “This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center or absolute anchoring” (12).

Derrida then begins explicitly citing Austin, whose theory of performatives he sees as relying on “a value … of context exhaustively determined”—a context that includes “the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking subject in the totality of the speech act” (14). In addition to arguing against Austin’s dismissal of some kinds of speech (and “writing” as classically defined) as “parasitic,” Derrida argues that present-to-itself consciousness is not simply present in speech, writing, and experience: “the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its place, but from the place it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance” (18). Derrida doesn’t just replace intention with convention, but suggests neither is the sole determinant of performative language’s/writing’s functionality. All language possesses some degree of “citationality or iterability,” and is thus to some degree parasitic and not simply the conscious creation of the writer. Before a coda on signatures, then, Derrida concludes, “Difference, the irreducible absence of intention or attendance to the performative utterance, the most ‘event-ridden’ utterance there is, is what authorizes me … to posit the general graphematic structure of every ‘communication’” (18-19). Thus all communication is a form of writing—not vice versa. And the signature’s “condition of possibility” is “its sameness which, by corrupting its identity and its singularity, divides its seal” (20), evincing a “dissemination irreducible to polysemy” that points toward Derrida’s “‘new’ concept of writing”—a writing which, “if there is any, perhaps communicates, but certainly does not exist” (21).

In “Limited Inc,” Derrida builds on “SEC” in the form of a sort-of counter-argument directed at John Searle. Or, really, at, “Sarl” a sort-of metaphorical limited liability (in)corporation that includes at least Searle, Searle’s father, and Derrida, who’s already inside the Searle essay “Limited Inc” engages with (and Searle’s head, as Kendall put it). It’s not quite a counter-argument in that Derrida acknowledges his presence in the very text he’s engaging with, and in that he sees Searle’s essay as performatively demonstrating the claims of “SEC” even as its explicit argument attempts to discredit “SEC.” I suppose one could see it as grumpy or mean or rhetorically violent to Searle, but that it’s directed towards Sarl--among many other things--seems to displace the text into a much more playful, if not traditionally congenial, realm.

[JobyC · Rating 5 out of 5]

After reading the back cover the best part of the book is, "I do not believe I have ever spoken of 'indeterminacy', whether in regards to 'meaning' or anything else. Undecidability is something else again."

Very good book overall. Setting the debate aside, Limited Inc is a great introduction to Derrida's work. This is because one can see him engaged in deconstructive argumentation at the same time as he discusses his texts, principally Signature Event Context.

[Jillian · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have a slight crush on this sassy philosopher. I recommend viewing the documentary "Derrida's Elsewhere" in addition to reading his works.

[Connor · Rating 4 out of 5]

go off, King

[Ben Gross · Rating 5 out of 5]

Polemicism at its finest (grained), least transparent, and most flinchingly clever.

[Mark · Rating 4 out of 5]

Derrida. Exclusive, of Centers: That We Must Have Faith

"For I do not seek to understand in order to believe, but I believe in order to understand. For I believe even this: that unless I believe, I shall not understand." -- Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, 1077-8

"In substituting 'of writing' for 'of God,' Sec has not merely replaced one word by another...drawing the name of God (of the infinite Being) into a graphematic drift that excludes (for instance) any decision as to whether God is more than the name of God, whether the "name of God" refers to God or to the name of God, whether it signifies "normally" or "cites," etc. God being here, qua writing..." -- Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., 1977


Almost exactly 900 years apart, but sleeping in the same bed, sharing the same bread. "Writing, if there is any, perhaps communicates, but certainly does not exist." So writes Derrida in Signature Event Context five years earlier, betraying his lack of faith in writing, in God, if those are really two different things. But what does this (lack of) belief entail? It couldn't be merely distance, silence, which Anselm bemoans in the Proslogion. In Sec, Derrida posits that the "radical absence" of the sender/receiver is a paradoxical problem for writing. It, like iteration itself, is both required for writing a message, but also destroys writing, and thus meaning. What is iteration? "The graphics of iterability inscribes alteration irreducibly in repetition...a priori, always and already, without delay" (p. 60). What this means is that because transmission may be corrupted, it always already is corrupted (by original sin?), and thus never is completely trustworthy (all possibilities are structural necessities and must be accounted for, as he argues on p. 48 & 57). Put another way, any definition implies its opposite, or as Derrida writes, "What is re-markable about the mark includes the margin within the mark" (p. 70). Put yet another way, "if a certain 'break' is always possible, that with which it breaks must necessarily bear the mark of this possibility inscribed in its structure. This is the thesis of Sec" (p.64).

Much of Limited Inc. lives amidst the frustration of speaking different languages, both literally (Searle and Austin write in English, Derrida in French) and philosophically. Like most "debates," I feel this one tells us much more about the authors involved than anything approximating "the truth." Derrida writes less an argument than a stance, an outlook, a hermeneutic of suspicion, an attack on assumptions. He admits as much ("I become suspicious," p. 40) and in a rare moment his motivations are explicitly tied to his approach: "Iterability... dislocates, subverts, and constantly displaces" (p. 102). I'm highly skeptical, for example, that Derrida's approach is any different in kind than Austin's or Searle's. Derrida posits "The determination of 'positive' values ('standard,' serious, normal, literal, non-parasitic, etc.) is dogmatic" (p. 91). I would agree, but I would say so is his insistence that excluded margins are necessary. Derrida's defense against this comes lower on the page, where he says "And vice-versa, for I do not mean simply to invert the order of logical dependence." Despite what Derrida "means" to do, this is in effect what happens.

The real root of the debate is the role of exclusion. Traditionally, "the exception proved the rule." Exclusions were things shaved away so that neat, tidy categories could be used. Exclusions under the traditional (Derrida might say "metaphysical," as he does on p. 93) approach risk being forgotten, risk not being accounted for. This is interpreted as oppression and violence, in the parlance of today's political climate. The margins are seen as just that: marginal, extra, exceptions to the rule, and thus the rule is the center from which the margins are derivative. This is closely linked to Augustine's theodicy, whereby evil doesn't exist per se, rather evil is a distance from God, from the Good.

Derrida's contention (which is a dogmatic assertion, not a definitive argument like he believes) is that all exceptions must be taken into account at the point of defining something. This is why debates around once-simple topics have complicated prolifically, with every possibility now apparently requiring account. The strength of this argument is that it claims to account for everything, that it doesn't "leave anyone (or anything) behind." One can see here the political angle, which Derrida admits quite explicitly (p. 116, 119).

The problem (for Derrida) is that this politicization levels the playing field: whereas he claimed that the debate is between "the tradition and its other" (p. 71), Derrida really makes explicit that "this discussion is, will be, and ought to be at bottom an ethical-political one" (p. 116) and "Those who wish to simplify at all costs and who raise a hue and cry about obscurity...are in my eyes dangerous dogmatists and tedious obscurantists. No less dangerous (for instance, in politics) are those who wish to purify at all costs" (p. 119). I could just as easily flip this latter citation by replacing a few words: "Those who wish to [complicate] at all costs and who raise a hue and cry about [simplicity]...are in my eyes dangerous dogmatists and tedious obscurantists. No less dangerous (for instance, in politics) are those who wish to [profane] at all costs." This partisanship (and the ease with which it can be proven) is disappointing and surprising, given the hopeful non-partisan nudge he gives later: "We need here to distinguish very carefully if we are not to succumb to the facile solutions and ideological consensus of the doxai of right or left" (132).

So need we give in to the battle between the margins and the center? I'd propose a third way.

Derrida argues that Linguistic meaning is fundamentally indeterminate because the contexts which fix meaning are never stable ("there are only contexts without any center or absolute anchoring," p. 12, 65). Certainly, there is some truth to this; after all, there is no "complete" context (the only complete context, it might be noted, would include literally everything, which we cannot fathom), only more or less context. As Yeats said, "Things fall apart, the center cannot hold." But is this where the story ends? Is this how it has always been? Returning to Anselm (via Augustine), "All phrases of theology are analogies, figures of speech, and approximations." Since the invention of language, humans have experienced this distance, this severance, and often via negativa is as close as we can get to God.

But, as naive as it sounds, the key is faith, that is, trust. Just as Anselm posits that we must believe in God in order to understand him, I posit we must believe in language in order for it to function; it’s not logical, and to bemoan it for not being so is to miss the point. The key lies in the third person of the Trinity. We find it comparatively easy to believe in God the Father, the source of all Being, and we find it easy to believe in the Son of God who was crucified, died and was buried. But the Holy Spirit, the mediator, the translator if you will, between the two, we postmoderns find the difficulty there. But it is precisely the Holy Spirit’s conveyance of divinity into man (the Annunciation) which links the Word (Christ) with the ultimate Reality (God the Father). This linkage is precisely the space between the sign and the signifier. The fact that this traumatic separation is self-imposed is a Felix Culpa, a happy fall. It can be remedied, and in fact already has been remedied.

I believe (credo) that at the bottom of everything is faith (epistemological as well as theological): assumptions must be taken on faith, trust must be placed in someone or something, otherwise thinking becomes impossible; if that's so, we're brutalized to the level of acting purely on instinct like animals. The civilizational trauma of the World Wars and the culmination of modernism both shattered the human capacity for faith, which shows itself in the faith-less nihilism of postmodernity. But this worldview isn't a proper worldview, it's a lack of a worldview, an aimless, blind wandering. So much is given away in the name: "post"-Modernism. It does not make positive assertions because it cannot: it lacks virility, it fears making exclusive statements. Derrida, in his deft dancing with language, raises an important point: Searle (or as he's called, S.a.r.l., by his debate partner) is not just one man, nor just a group of men (Searle and those who he consulted while writing a response to Derrida): Sarl is a long chain of metaphysical assumptions, a litany of authors living and dead, a three-millenium-long theology.

Derrida wishes to complicate this inheritance, these assumptions. So be it. But doing so in the service of dubious political assumptions should be discouraged. I think Derrida knew deep down that his project was ultimately as impossible as the one he ostensibly opposed. Just as the traditional approach excludes in order to make neat categories, so too does deconstruction flatten until there's nothing left. If you ask one person, one science, one anything to account for everything, you are bound to fail. That is, unless that one Being is God. Then, suddenly, things become comprehensible again. With exclusion, you can separate the sheep from the goats; without, all are damned to the survival of the fittest, to Nietzschian brutality.

If one follows the flattening tendency of deconstruction to its logical conclusion, language itself becomes impossible, as does action itself. Even actions necessarily fit into a hierarchy. At any given time, you can be in one place and do one thing (meaningfully, without distraction) at a time. Thus doing any action excludes all other possible actions. Is this a bad thing? Most certainly not! Exclusion is what gives choices (and categories) any power in the first place. To complain about this is to misunderstand the point of categories. Yes, categorization cuts, it divides, it excludes. But "the Son of Man came to seek and to save the lost" (Luke 19:10), "The Lord is a refuge for the oppressed, a stronghold in times of trouble" (Psalm 9:9). And, that height of sublimity, when the Logos himself "taught them, saying,

Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.
Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.
Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.
Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.
Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake."

-- Matthew 5:2-11


Post Script

There is too much to say about this book, and too many thoughts are contained in it. Just as Mr. Ramsay in To the Lighthouse had reached the letter "Q" (but not quite "R"), and just as Boxer in Animal Farm only could reach "D" (never quite reaching "E"), so too do I feel I've advanced another letter, on this, the third attempt I've made at reading this book. Things are both so much more complex and so much simpler than Derrida makes them. I hated his style initially, but now that I understand it, I don't hate it anymore. Funny how that works.

Derrida showed himself a witty, memorable, thoughtful, powerful close reader, really shining his brightest when writing in response to Searle (Sarl), rather than the density of responding to Austin. The first essay, "Signature Event Context" still remains the densest thing I've read and actually understood, and I'm blown away both that I do understand it and that I was able to see through and past his arguments to make my own. That, I never expected.

Lastly, here's something bittersweet about Derrida's remarks on "missing" Austin (who had died before "Signature Event Context" was written and thus couldn't respond to it), and I too am writing in response to a "radically absent" (dead) Derrida. Language is a miracle of God, and I don't think it's an overstatement to conflate "the Word" and God, as Christianity does. In fact, it's probably the only way to make sense of this strange phenomenon, which, complications notwithstanding, endures forever (VDMA). "That dispatch should thus have been signed. Which I do, and counterfeit, here. Where? There." M.S.

[Álvaro]

durisima experiencia, no recomiendo

[Henrik · Rating 4 out of 5]

Derrida's reading of Austin is certainly more interesting than Searle's—if Searle's is even a 'reading' at all.

[Mary · Rating 2 out of 5]

Oh Derrida, why? It's no secret that I'm not wild about deconstructionism, not necessarily because of its own (dis)merits, but because of the context, that this is the domineering philosophy of the past 30 years and now it's time to freakin' move on, people. My dislike of the theory aside, this book progresses like a tragedy, starting with a cheerful, confident Derrida making some great, positive (in the sense of defining something new) observations. The next reading is a defensive, if still playful response to Searle et al that does get a little testy at times. "Afterward," though, is downright depressing, though, with Derrida lashing out against journalists, philosophers (Searle and de Mann), his own compiler(?) and fiercely asserting what he did or didn't say and what it does or doesn't imply. He even says that there are those who "make errors, not understand, read badly, not respect the pragmatic, grammatical or moral rules, the fact that I have been obliged and able to remind them of it"(151). It just ends bitterly, Derrida at war with his own words quoted back to him through other interpretations.

[M.E. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Derrida's contributions to critical theory, cultural studies, and gender theory are immense. I fell in love with his work in the late 90s as an undergrad. Many complain about his work being too hard to read; I would counter it is immensely, beautifully poetic. It's isn't the kind of thing anyone should have to read. But if it catches you like it caught me, you could have some great years ahead. Limited Etc. is one of the best introductions to his work. It's light, and more accessible. It's also the argument Butler draws from in her notion of gender performativity. For those who have tried to trudge through Butler's (horrendous) early-90s prose, this particular work of Derrida's can provide a rich depth.

[Paul Ocampo · Rating 5 out of 5]

derrida for the first time lays out his objective for the movement for which he would be associated and upholds a debate with john searles, a structuralist in his philosophy on language. derrida's writing is as always challenging, yet he doesn't hold back on trashing searle in his defense of "writing."

[Dachi]

derrida for the first time lays out his objective for the movement for which he would be associated and upholds a debate with john searles, a structuralist in his philosophy on language. derrida's writing is as always challenging, yet he doesn't hold back on trashing searle in his defense of "writing."

[Youze da Funk · Rating 3 out of 5]

dude, alright, i get it. the signature's occurrence qua event, as embedded in the possibility of its effect only as the graphematic enunciation of its own iteration of itself as such, splits the production of that utterance in its very dehiscence. chill.

go to the beach or something man, damn.

[Philip Gomez · Rating 5 out of 5]

The most direct Derrida gets regarding his theory of deconstruction.

[Cone · Rating 2 out of 5]

painful.

[Tim · Rating 5 out of 5]

Probably the snarkiest book I've ever read. And it just happens to also be 'philosophy.' And also probably the best introductory primary source to Derrida's thought.

[Jamie (books.and.bad.ideas) · Rating 2 out of 5]

Ugh. That is all.

[Johannes Bertus · Rating 1 out of 5]

If it looks like a method and it works like a method, it's probably a method. Not that there is anything wrong with a method, unless you have insistently promised something else.

[Ian · Rating 5 out of 5]

The most intelligent evisceration anyone will ever write. Brilliant, difficult, but also very amusing at times. The afterword contains some of the most straightforward Derrida that one can read.

[Michal Lipták · Rating 3 out of 5]

I only know Andy Kaufman from Forman's Man on the Moon, I've never actually watched the man himself. In any case, I would suppose this:

1. Signature Event Context is Mighty Mouse routine.
2. Limited Inc abc... is Andy Kaufman in a wrestling match (yeah yeah yeah yeah!).
3. Afterword: Toward An Ethic of Discussion is "milk and cookies" Carnegie Hall performance.

And as with Andy Kaufman, we can wonder whether Derrida is dead, or whether he has actually ever lived, or whether someone like Derrida is even "quasi-transcendentally" (p. 152) possible. "But where is he? Do I know him?" (p. 29).

Thankfully, "from the point of view of semantics, but also of ethics and politics, "deconstruction" should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism" (p. 148). And though possibility of destabilization looms above everything, there are contexts (and "it n'y a pas de hors-texte means nothing else: there is nothing outside context" [p. 136]) which are more or less, probabilistically, stable. Which allows one to conclude at least this:

4. To get a grasp of what's going on, it's surely necessary to read Derrida directly instead of watching renderings of him by all those Formans (which is something I should do in case of Kaufman, too, after all, since it is actually highly probable that this review is based on - and even Derrida [OK, I can't and won't pretend he may have not existed, since my feeble phenomenological training ties me mercilessly to "givenness"] would not have had objected to this - disinterpretation of Kaufman; not "deconstruction", but "false (that's right: false, not true) and feeble" reading [p. 146]).
5. Derrida would have never starred in anything like Taxi.

The latter difference (not différance, just difference) is absolutely crucial and ""the most important"" (p. 44).

[Kerimcan Ak · Rating 4 out of 5]

First I have read this, I was like struck by lightning... "what is this guy even saying?" then I put down the book, looked up another works and then after a while I finished the book in one sitting.

Very aggressive and actually resembles a scolding rather than a criticism, intentionally uses small mind games to play his prey Searle, honestly I am even terrified at some passages after a laugh.

Especially after when I saw the handwritten word on my paper and phrase "let's be serious" at the beginning of a paragraph actually being a thought experiment makes me first laugh and then think, I just read this gentleman's book and I think this guy was capable!

Perhaps because he makes fun of Searle, or he is serious about the copyright issue, he points to Searle's quotation error, and he says the "Reply" is perhaps a company holding as that will be the only way this quotation error will be accepted. Or perhaps, I am still laughing, he suggests there will be lawsuits between the "Reply" and "Limited Inc" (the company he just founded, yes the book is literally the company he is talking about.

Only one star is less because I do not think that this book was informative, a clever work but that is it.
Perhaps what I learned from the book is Sec is one concept that I should accept, or else I will be scolded by Derrida's followers, and Searle is not a very good theoretician of speech in terms of giving importance to context.

The response to this work is The Construction of Social Reality which is perhaps a good read too.