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Rethinking Existentialism
In Rethinking Existentialism, Jonathan Webber articulates an original interpretation of existentialism as the ethical theory that human freedom is the foundation of all other values.Offering an original analysis of classic literary and philosophical works published by Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Frantz Fanon up until 1952, Webber's conception of existentialism is developed in critical contrast with central works by Albert Camus, Sigmund Freud, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.Presenting his arguments in an accessible and engaging style, Webber contends that Beauvoir and Sartre initially disagreed over the structure of human freedom in 1943 but Sartre ultimately came to accept Beauvoir's view over the next decade. He develops the viewpoint that Beauvoir provides a more significant argument for authenticity than either Sartre or Fanon. He articulates in detail the existentialist theories of individual character and the social identities of gender and race, keyconcerns in current discourse. Webber concludes by sketching out the broader implications of his interpretation of existentialism for philosophy, psychology, and psychotherapy.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
256 pages, Kindle Edition
Published July 18, 2018
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85 people want to read
About the author
Jonathan Webber
31 books3 followersJonathan Webber is a philosophy professor working at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of psychology. He is especially interested in what contemporary social psychology can offer to current debates in moral philosophy, and in how philosophy and psychology can be informed by twentieth-century French existentialism.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
October 28, 2021
Jonathan Webber rethinks Existentialism as an ethical theory. He starts by giving a fairly solid definition of what he considers classical Existentialism to be and suggests reasons why we shouldn’t consider Camus as an existentialist. He then works through Sartre’s radical freedom, and then the criticisms from, among others, both Merleau Ponti and de Beauvoir. He also gives time and place to Fanon while all the time trying to make sense of how to marry the cry of ‘existence before essence’ with a commitment to legislating for mankind by one’s own choices. Thorough and thought provoking and well worth reading if you have a minimal philosophical background and love working through arguments— some which don't convince. I found it a fascinating read made even more fascinating by the revelation that de Beauvoir seems to have been the smart one in the relationship, which was something I had already suspected.
June 21, 2021
Webber presents thoughtful, rigorous examinations of key ideas of different existentialist thinkers. Webber's writing style and nuance of thought will appeal to especially readers who are familiar with the analytic tradition and have been weary or suspicious of 'continental' traditions. This would make for an excellent book for such readers who would like to give existentialism a try.
Webber's starting claim is that there is a precise, coherent thesis of existentialism, contra the status quo understanding that existentialism does not refer to any particular philosophical views but rather refers to a literary/philosophical/historical tradition of thought, of loosely associated thinkers. He spends the bulk of the book articulating this thesis and showing which thinkers typically named as existentialist truly hold this thesis, and which do not but rather contribute in other ways. He concludes with two chapters that apply this thesis to generating an approach to ethics and to suggesting implications existentialism might have for research in social psychology and psychotherapy. I found these last chapters rushed and uninteresting, but the bulk of the book was a rich learning experience. Chapters most worthwhile reading are 1, 3, 4, and 5. Others may be skimmed or skipped.
This is the thesis of existentialism that Webber identifies: all of our values and practical reasons are grounded in our projects, whose continuation depends on our choice and agency. So, in principle, it is always possible for us to revise our projects and thereby transform our values and reasons; this would amount to radical changes in "character" or ways of life. Webber introduces this thesis in chapter 1. In chapter 2, he presents Camus's thought and argues that Camus is not properly an existentialist: he, rather, believes there are some nature-given, unchangeable values, precisely the value of valuing other people's emotions and values.
In chapter 3, Webber presents early-Sartre's thought and explicates this notion of reasons. A misunderstanding or caricature of early Sartre is that he believes that we consciously choose every single action we ever take; a "staccato voluntarism." Sartre did not ever hold that view. Rather, Sartre distinguishes between prereflective and reflective modes of engagement with the world. In a prereflective mode, we are able to act without any choice; our habits determine the meanings that show up in our worlds, and these meanings govern our actions. But in reflection, we may negotiate with which reasons (for certain actions) these meanings provide to us; I will return to this point below.
In chapter 4, Webber presents du Beauvoir's view of freedom and examines how it draws on but differs from Merleau-Ponty's; he later argues that it also differs from early Sartre's, and that Sartre ultimately comes to adopt du Beauvoir's view. This was my favorite chapter; it raised the most new ideas and questions for me. Merleau-Ponty is not an existentialist, according to Webber. He holds that our phenomenal worlds are full of meanings which govern our actions, and these meanings are determined by our social circumstances and environment. Any practical reasons and values we may possibly have are beholden to these socially and environmentally determined meanings. In other words, for Merleau-Ponty, it is not the case that "existence precedes essence," but rather, our social situations precede essence and existence.
Webber analyzes Merleau-Ponty's mistake and Sartre/du Beauvoir's innovation as such: Merleau-Ponty failed to distinguish between (1) meanings that show up in our worlds, and (2) reasons for actions that we form on the basis of these meanings. Once we make this distinction, we may acknowledge that (1) is quite determined by our social contexts, but (2) is determined by us as agents: we choose our projects, and our projects determine whether a certain meaning will provide a reason to do x, y, or z. For example, a hiker might perceive the pain in her legs as unpleasant or debilitating. But this does not serve, for her, as a reason to stop hiking; rather, given her project of being an excellent hiker, this serves as a reason to keep on going and to strengthen the body.
I've never considered this distinction before. But I wonder whether it might be false. It seems that the meanings that show up in the world, automatically or before our reflection, may be very complex and have "reasons" built into them. For example, the hiker might directly perceive the pain in her legs as a reason to keep on going. Perhaps we ought not distinguish between perceived meanings and reasons built on the basis of those meanings, but rather, there are only complex perceived meanings. But there is an alternative distinction which Merleau-Ponty overlooked: there are two, fundamental cognitive modes of perception and of reflection. In perception we take these perceived meanings for granted. Only in reflection do we identify them as contingent meanings at all, and we can then negotiate with them. Webber focuses on this distinction between cognitive modes in the final chapter of his book, so I wonder what reason he has to posit this distinction between meanings and reasons.
That aside, in chapter 4, Webber also shows how du Beauvoir draws on Merleau-Ponty as to create a version of existentialism that differs from early Sartre's. Du Beauvoir takes Merleau-Ponty's concept of sedimentation. This refers to either that the conclusion of some chain of reasoning may persist and influence our behaviors later on, even when we do not engage in this reasoning; or, that there are motives for action that we come to embody unconsciously. Du Beauvoir uses this to criticize Sartre's claim that we can forgo any project at any point, and the only thing that holds us back is a holism between our projects (i.e., that our projects are interdependent, so giving up one requires that we give up or adjust many others). Instead, sedimentation also holds us back; the motives handed to us by our current projects unconsciously drive us. In order to give up a project, we must engage in long-term practice and rehabituation; we must sediment into ourselves new motives.
Chapter 5 is my second favorite chapter. There, Webber shows that existentialism is a modification of psychoanalytic thought, contrary to the mainstream view that the two are incompatible. This mainstream view emphasizes that the psychoanalytic tradition holds that our unconscious and biological drives determine our behaviors; whereas existentialism holds that we, as agents, have the power to determine our behaviors. In fact, Sartre and du Beauvoir hold that unconscious drives do motivate us, but they simply add that these drives are further grounded in the projects that we've previously chosen (or if we haven't chosen them, and rather our social contexts handed them to us, we at least have the power to choose them over longer periods of time).
Chapter 6 is an analysis of Sartre's play No Exit. Webber simply applies this thesis of existentialism that he has identified to explaining the significance of events in the play. I didn't find this chapter as interesting. In chapter 7, Webber examines more precisely the problems in early Sartre's view and the reasons why du Beauvoir's view is immune to those problems. In chapter 8, Webber analyzes Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks and argues that his thought demonstrates this thesis of existentialism. In chapter 9, Webber examines the existentialist concepts of absurdity and bad faith. Chapter 10 is an application of existentialism to articulating an approach to ethics. Chapter 11 presents very brief suggestions of how existentialism might be applied to social psychology and psychotherapy.
Here's one of my lingering thoughts. Our freedom, according to existentialism, really hinges on our capacity to reflect on what we've previously perceived (or, what is sedimented in us). Existentialism presupposes that this reflection is not determined; we, as agents, are responsible for our thoughts and choices here (rather than social norms mechanistically determining our thoughts, for example). This seems right to me. But still there seems to be many constraints in reflection. Where do we get the values and motives that drive our choices in reflection? Intuitively, these need to be grounded in projects we already have. But projects we already have also deterministically govern the meanings that show up in perception. So -- how can it be the case that reflection is free, and perception is determined, given that our previously existing projects (and the social norms that contributed to those) drive both?
There seems to be something special about reflection as a cognitive mode. We use language there. We can compare different projects we already have and question them. In effect, we can "slide" between the perspectives or sets of values to which our projects amount. I want to understand in more detail how language (and what other conditions) makes this possible. That might help us understand the precise extent to which we're free, and the limitations on this.
Webber's starting claim is that there is a precise, coherent thesis of existentialism, contra the status quo understanding that existentialism does not refer to any particular philosophical views but rather refers to a literary/philosophical/historical tradition of thought, of loosely associated thinkers. He spends the bulk of the book articulating this thesis and showing which thinkers typically named as existentialist truly hold this thesis, and which do not but rather contribute in other ways. He concludes with two chapters that apply this thesis to generating an approach to ethics and to suggesting implications existentialism might have for research in social psychology and psychotherapy. I found these last chapters rushed and uninteresting, but the bulk of the book was a rich learning experience. Chapters most worthwhile reading are 1, 3, 4, and 5. Others may be skimmed or skipped.
This is the thesis of existentialism that Webber identifies: all of our values and practical reasons are grounded in our projects, whose continuation depends on our choice and agency. So, in principle, it is always possible for us to revise our projects and thereby transform our values and reasons; this would amount to radical changes in "character" or ways of life. Webber introduces this thesis in chapter 1. In chapter 2, he presents Camus's thought and argues that Camus is not properly an existentialist: he, rather, believes there are some nature-given, unchangeable values, precisely the value of valuing other people's emotions and values.
In chapter 3, Webber presents early-Sartre's thought and explicates this notion of reasons. A misunderstanding or caricature of early Sartre is that he believes that we consciously choose every single action we ever take; a "staccato voluntarism." Sartre did not ever hold that view. Rather, Sartre distinguishes between prereflective and reflective modes of engagement with the world. In a prereflective mode, we are able to act without any choice; our habits determine the meanings that show up in our worlds, and these meanings govern our actions. But in reflection, we may negotiate with which reasons (for certain actions) these meanings provide to us; I will return to this point below.
In chapter 4, Webber presents du Beauvoir's view of freedom and examines how it draws on but differs from Merleau-Ponty's; he later argues that it also differs from early Sartre's, and that Sartre ultimately comes to adopt du Beauvoir's view. This was my favorite chapter; it raised the most new ideas and questions for me. Merleau-Ponty is not an existentialist, according to Webber. He holds that our phenomenal worlds are full of meanings which govern our actions, and these meanings are determined by our social circumstances and environment. Any practical reasons and values we may possibly have are beholden to these socially and environmentally determined meanings. In other words, for Merleau-Ponty, it is not the case that "existence precedes essence," but rather, our social situations precede essence and existence.
Webber analyzes Merleau-Ponty's mistake and Sartre/du Beauvoir's innovation as such: Merleau-Ponty failed to distinguish between (1) meanings that show up in our worlds, and (2) reasons for actions that we form on the basis of these meanings. Once we make this distinction, we may acknowledge that (1) is quite determined by our social contexts, but (2) is determined by us as agents: we choose our projects, and our projects determine whether a certain meaning will provide a reason to do x, y, or z. For example, a hiker might perceive the pain in her legs as unpleasant or debilitating. But this does not serve, for her, as a reason to stop hiking; rather, given her project of being an excellent hiker, this serves as a reason to keep on going and to strengthen the body.
I've never considered this distinction before. But I wonder whether it might be false. It seems that the meanings that show up in the world, automatically or before our reflection, may be very complex and have "reasons" built into them. For example, the hiker might directly perceive the pain in her legs as a reason to keep on going. Perhaps we ought not distinguish between perceived meanings and reasons built on the basis of those meanings, but rather, there are only complex perceived meanings. But there is an alternative distinction which Merleau-Ponty overlooked: there are two, fundamental cognitive modes of perception and of reflection. In perception we take these perceived meanings for granted. Only in reflection do we identify them as contingent meanings at all, and we can then negotiate with them. Webber focuses on this distinction between cognitive modes in the final chapter of his book, so I wonder what reason he has to posit this distinction between meanings and reasons.
That aside, in chapter 4, Webber also shows how du Beauvoir draws on Merleau-Ponty as to create a version of existentialism that differs from early Sartre's. Du Beauvoir takes Merleau-Ponty's concept of sedimentation. This refers to either that the conclusion of some chain of reasoning may persist and influence our behaviors later on, even when we do not engage in this reasoning; or, that there are motives for action that we come to embody unconsciously. Du Beauvoir uses this to criticize Sartre's claim that we can forgo any project at any point, and the only thing that holds us back is a holism between our projects (i.e., that our projects are interdependent, so giving up one requires that we give up or adjust many others). Instead, sedimentation also holds us back; the motives handed to us by our current projects unconsciously drive us. In order to give up a project, we must engage in long-term practice and rehabituation; we must sediment into ourselves new motives.
Chapter 5 is my second favorite chapter. There, Webber shows that existentialism is a modification of psychoanalytic thought, contrary to the mainstream view that the two are incompatible. This mainstream view emphasizes that the psychoanalytic tradition holds that our unconscious and biological drives determine our behaviors; whereas existentialism holds that we, as agents, have the power to determine our behaviors. In fact, Sartre and du Beauvoir hold that unconscious drives do motivate us, but they simply add that these drives are further grounded in the projects that we've previously chosen (or if we haven't chosen them, and rather our social contexts handed them to us, we at least have the power to choose them over longer periods of time).
Chapter 6 is an analysis of Sartre's play No Exit. Webber simply applies this thesis of existentialism that he has identified to explaining the significance of events in the play. I didn't find this chapter as interesting. In chapter 7, Webber examines more precisely the problems in early Sartre's view and the reasons why du Beauvoir's view is immune to those problems. In chapter 8, Webber analyzes Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks and argues that his thought demonstrates this thesis of existentialism. In chapter 9, Webber examines the existentialist concepts of absurdity and bad faith. Chapter 10 is an application of existentialism to articulating an approach to ethics. Chapter 11 presents very brief suggestions of how existentialism might be applied to social psychology and psychotherapy.
Here's one of my lingering thoughts. Our freedom, according to existentialism, really hinges on our capacity to reflect on what we've previously perceived (or, what is sedimented in us). Existentialism presupposes that this reflection is not determined; we, as agents, are responsible for our thoughts and choices here (rather than social norms mechanistically determining our thoughts, for example). This seems right to me. But still there seems to be many constraints in reflection. Where do we get the values and motives that drive our choices in reflection? Intuitively, these need to be grounded in projects we already have. But projects we already have also deterministically govern the meanings that show up in perception. So -- how can it be the case that reflection is free, and perception is determined, given that our previously existing projects (and the social norms that contributed to those) drive both?
There seems to be something special about reflection as a cognitive mode. We use language there. We can compare different projects we already have and question them. In effect, we can "slide" between the perspectives or sets of values to which our projects amount. I want to understand in more detail how language (and what other conditions) makes this possible. That might help us understand the precise extent to which we're free, and the limitations on this.
July 6, 2020
If you enjoy studying the work of Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon in some detail, then this is your book. Jonathan Webber's careful and clear analysis of some of their key works is impressive, as is his overarching discussion of the points of agreement and disagreement between them. It's not an easy read, and requires some previous understanding of existential philosophy, but if you persist, it is a rewarding one, especially for his elaboration of some of the confusions and contradictions among these three existentialist authors.
September 2, 2024
An extremely useful and (relatively) understandable compendium of ideas various people have had on being a person. From what I can understand (which is definitely not everything) this is an extremely good guide to understanding existentialism. I will now go read the books/plays/essays talked about and I hope that I can come back in years to come to this book and say “yea that’s basically the same thing”.
March 17, 2025
Secondary texts on existentialism are often tone deaf. Texts on Kierkegaard, for example, often abuse his works by turning them into their opposite: dry, dull sets of propositions to be analysed by the people he mocked as ‘paragraph munchers’, doomed to misunderstand him.
Webber’s book is not this. In fact, it was a revelation to me. His overall task, of recovering what is worth recovering from the existentialism of Sartre, Beauvoir, and Fanon - particularly in relation to ethics - is itself a worthwhile project achieved with persuasive arguments by Webber.
But what makes me love this book are the inspired interpretations offered of key works from the history of existentialism. For years I’ve struggled to make sense of books like The Outsider and No Exit (wrongly titled, as Webber points out) as part of the existentialist canon. Is the nihilistic, passionless murderer of The Outsider really an existentialist hero? Is he just as bad as the conformist society that executes him? Does Sartre really think our relationships all have to degenerate into hellish, sadomasochistic torture as we struggle to objectify one another. Are other people always hell? It would be a struggle to find anything more than a nihilistic rebellion in such interpretations. Webber rejects such readings and, with a close and patient unpacking of such texts themselves, alongside exploring them in relation to the wider literature of Sartre, Camus, et al. makes a strong case for reassessing their messages. The Outsider is a hero of absurdity but not authenticity as he struggles to escape nihilism; the hell of No Exit is not the model of all relationships but rather what relationships are like when conducted in bad faith.
These are just some examples of a wealth of persuasive and innovative ideas Webber’s book brings to the discussion of a reinvigorated existentialism. It makes me wish such books had existed decades ago when I was first discovering existentialism - the avenues for future development and research in existentialism they make possible promises to reinvigorate the existential approach if they are heeded.
Webber’s book is not this. In fact, it was a revelation to me. His overall task, of recovering what is worth recovering from the existentialism of Sartre, Beauvoir, and Fanon - particularly in relation to ethics - is itself a worthwhile project achieved with persuasive arguments by Webber.
But what makes me love this book are the inspired interpretations offered of key works from the history of existentialism. For years I’ve struggled to make sense of books like The Outsider and No Exit (wrongly titled, as Webber points out) as part of the existentialist canon. Is the nihilistic, passionless murderer of The Outsider really an existentialist hero? Is he just as bad as the conformist society that executes him? Does Sartre really think our relationships all have to degenerate into hellish, sadomasochistic torture as we struggle to objectify one another. Are other people always hell? It would be a struggle to find anything more than a nihilistic rebellion in such interpretations. Webber rejects such readings and, with a close and patient unpacking of such texts themselves, alongside exploring them in relation to the wider literature of Sartre, Camus, et al. makes a strong case for reassessing their messages. The Outsider is a hero of absurdity but not authenticity as he struggles to escape nihilism; the hell of No Exit is not the model of all relationships but rather what relationships are like when conducted in bad faith.
These are just some examples of a wealth of persuasive and innovative ideas Webber’s book brings to the discussion of a reinvigorated existentialism. It makes me wish such books had existed decades ago when I was first discovering existentialism - the avenues for future development and research in existentialism they make possible promises to reinvigorate the existential approach if they are heeded.
May 7, 2025
Challenging to rate this. I found the explanation of Sartre and Beauvoir's work helpful and informative, especially the aspect around sedimentation. Sedimentation is a concept Beauvoir coined about how our social context embeds our values within us, and this creates limitations on our freedom (something Sartre took time to agree with). The mixed review is that towards the end the author turns to psychology, and seems to make some claims that as a psychologist steeped in existential thinking, I don't agree with. What is even more interesting, is he doesn't seem to name any current theorists, or really any theorists. I was left with the impression that he wasn't very knowledgable about people influenced by Sartre and Beauvoir, which I think there are many.
August 28, 2024
My favorite part was when the author accused Simone de Beauvoir of misreading her own arguments in Pyrrhus and Cineas. Perhaps he’s rethinking existentialism a little too hard?
On a more serious note, this was a clear and helpful guide to the topic. But, to be honest, it made existentialism seem less rather than more plausible to me.
Edit: Having now read Pyrrhus and Cineas, I fail to see the textual basis for Jonathan Webber’s interpretation of it, which makes his comment about Beauvoir misreading herself even funnier!
On a more serious note, this was a clear and helpful guide to the topic. But, to be honest, it made existentialism seem less rather than more plausible to me.
Edit: Having now read Pyrrhus and Cineas, I fail to see the textual basis for Jonathan Webber’s interpretation of it, which makes his comment about Beauvoir misreading herself even funnier!
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews