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Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944
On 17 September 1944, General Kurt Student, the founder of Nazi Germany's parachute forces, heard the growing roar of aeroplane engines. He went out on to his balcony above the flat landscape of southern Holland to watch the air armada of Dakotas and gliders carrying the British 1st Airborne and the American 101st and 82nd Airborne divisions. He gazed up in envy at this massive demonstration of paratroop power.
Operation Market Garden, the plan to end the war by capturing the bridges leading to the Lower Rhine and beyond, was a bold concept: the Americans thought it unusually bold for Field Marshal Montgomery. But could it ever have worked? The cost of failure was horrendous, above all for the Dutch, who risked everything to help. German reprisals were pitiless and cruel, and lasted until the end of the war.
The British fascination with heroic failure has clouded the story of Arnhem in myths. Antony Beevor, using often overlooked sources from Dutch, British, American, Polish and German archives, has reconstructed the terrible reality of the fighting, which General Student himself called 'The Last German Victory'. Yet this book, written in Beevor's inimitable and gripping narrative style, is about much more than a single, dramatic battle.
It looks into the very heart of war.
Operation Market Garden, the plan to end the war by capturing the bridges leading to the Lower Rhine and beyond, was a bold concept: the Americans thought it unusually bold for Field Marshal Montgomery. But could it ever have worked? The cost of failure was horrendous, above all for the Dutch, who risked everything to help. German reprisals were pitiless and cruel, and lasted until the end of the war.
The British fascination with heroic failure has clouded the story of Arnhem in myths. Antony Beevor, using often overlooked sources from Dutch, British, American, Polish and German archives, has reconstructed the terrible reality of the fighting, which General Student himself called 'The Last German Victory'. Yet this book, written in Beevor's inimitable and gripping narrative style, is about much more than a single, dramatic battle.
It looks into the very heart of war.
560 pages, Paperback
First published May 17, 2018
824 people are currently reading
3763 people want to read
About the author
Antony Beevor
38 books2,585 followersSir Antony James Beevor is a British military historian. He has published several popular historical works, mainly on the Second World War, the Spanish Civil War, and most recently the Russian Revolution and Civil War.
Educated at Abberley Hall School, Winchester College, and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Beevor commanded a troop of tanks in the 11th Hussars in Germany before deciding in 1970 to leave the army and become a writer. He was a visiting professor at Birkbeck, University of London, and the University of Kent. His best-selling books, Stalingrad (1998) and Berlin: The Downfall 1945 (2002), have been acclaimed for their detailed coverage of the battles between the Soviet Union and Germany, and their focus on the experiences of ordinary people. Berlin proved very controversial in Russia because of the information it contained from former Soviet archives about the mass rapes carried out by the Red Army in 1945.
Beevor's works have been translated into many languages and have sold millions of copies. He has lectured at numerous military headquarters, staff colleges and establishments in Britain, the US, Europe, and Australia. He has also written for many major newspapers.
Educated at Abberley Hall School, Winchester College, and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Beevor commanded a troop of tanks in the 11th Hussars in Germany before deciding in 1970 to leave the army and become a writer. He was a visiting professor at Birkbeck, University of London, and the University of Kent. His best-selling books, Stalingrad (1998) and Berlin: The Downfall 1945 (2002), have been acclaimed for their detailed coverage of the battles between the Soviet Union and Germany, and their focus on the experiences of ordinary people. Berlin proved very controversial in Russia because of the information it contained from former Soviet archives about the mass rapes carried out by the Red Army in 1945.
Beevor's works have been translated into many languages and have sold millions of copies. He has lectured at numerous military headquarters, staff colleges and establishments in Britain, the US, Europe, and Australia. He has also written for many major newspapers.
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September 15, 2019
It has been asserted that the British are fondest of commemorating the battles they lost, and that explains the fascination with Arnhem, the famous attempt at ‘a bridge too far’. After reading Anthony Beevor’s thorough account, I daresay I differ. Extraordinary gallantry against impossible odds, whether at Thermopylae, Isandlwana, or Arnhem, cannot be regarded as defeat. It is also an encounter that is almost unique. It involved the Parachute Regiment and the Brigade of Guards, each elite but in a very different ways. It also features two American formations most unusually under British command, the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions.
It was a bad plan made worse by excessive caution, landing too far from the objective to avoid enemy antiaircraft fire. Such a bold attempt at a coup de main was so totally out of character for the cautious and slow moving Montgomery, who seeing what appeared to be a chance cross the Rhine against weak German resistance, gambled desperately and underrated his enemy. As once remarked: it was as if an elderly clergyman of retiring habits should suddenly decide to turn burglar, and his maiden attempt be on the Bank of England. Not only did the Germans have two weakened but still formidable SS Panzer divisions close at hand, but they displayed their usual extraordinary ability to counterattack immediately with scratch formations. The battle group composed of students from the SS junior leaders school most have been really frightening.
The American paratroopers were equally terrifying. The British General Horrocks described them as the ‘toughest soldiers’ he had ever seen. Another British observer thought their rations consisted of ‘raw meat and dynamite’. Usually they didn’t bother with taking German prisoners till the American intelligence officers, desperate for POWs to interview, offered a weekend in Paris for each German they captured alive. But it was the British ‘Red Devils’ with their battle cry of ‘Whoa Mohammet’ who faced the most appalling combat, Only about one in ten were evacuated to allied lines. The Poles, who would rather have parachuted into Warsaw than Arnhem (and they would have if the allies had allowed it), displayed a keen appetite for killing Germans, despite the shabby treatment of their commander by the British generals.
Besides dropping the Parachute Division too far from its objective and the extraordinary resilience of the German enemy, the third major failure that doomed the operation was the slow progress of the Guards Armoured Division. The Americans thought they ‘stopped for tea’ but the real explanation for their failure was having to advance up one narrow road bordered with polder with no flank protection in the face of determined German resistance. I doubt a commander like Patton or Guderian would have been more successful.
In the end the operation served only to prolong the war and greatly added to the sufferings of the people of the Netherlands. But as a display of the very best fighting qualities that the British, American, and German forces could deploy, the battle for Arnhem, ‘the bridge too far’, must continue to fascinate military history students.
Anthony Beevor and Sir Max Hastings surely divide honours as the greatest living military historians in the English speaking world. Appropriately, neither is an academic. Beevor’s first of many accounts of battle was of the German airborne invasion of Crete, where their heavy loses persuaded Hitler that parachute operations were too costly to pursue. And indeed Beevor made it clear that if the British at Crete had resisted with more determination and skill, the attack would have been a failure. At Arnhem, the Germans demonstrated how a parachute invasion should be resisted, and it was a costly failure. All of which seems to show that whilst parachuting is a good way to exit an aircraft in mid-air, it is mostly a successful strategy for fighting a weak enemy, as in the case of the Israelis in the Sinai in 1956. Only when the airborne attack can be relieved by conventional ground forces in a very short time can paratroopers succeed, which is why the Americans avoided the fate of the British at Arnhem. Dienbienphu was a disaster for the French. The Parachute Regiment was a new formation, and it was to proceed to become one of the most effective and feared regiments in the British Army. But in the Falklands they fought as regular infantry.
It was a bad plan made worse by excessive caution, landing too far from the objective to avoid enemy antiaircraft fire. Such a bold attempt at a coup de main was so totally out of character for the cautious and slow moving Montgomery, who seeing what appeared to be a chance cross the Rhine against weak German resistance, gambled desperately and underrated his enemy. As once remarked: it was as if an elderly clergyman of retiring habits should suddenly decide to turn burglar, and his maiden attempt be on the Bank of England. Not only did the Germans have two weakened but still formidable SS Panzer divisions close at hand, but they displayed their usual extraordinary ability to counterattack immediately with scratch formations. The battle group composed of students from the SS junior leaders school most have been really frightening.
The American paratroopers were equally terrifying. The British General Horrocks described them as the ‘toughest soldiers’ he had ever seen. Another British observer thought their rations consisted of ‘raw meat and dynamite’. Usually they didn’t bother with taking German prisoners till the American intelligence officers, desperate for POWs to interview, offered a weekend in Paris for each German they captured alive. But it was the British ‘Red Devils’ with their battle cry of ‘Whoa Mohammet’ who faced the most appalling combat, Only about one in ten were evacuated to allied lines. The Poles, who would rather have parachuted into Warsaw than Arnhem (and they would have if the allies had allowed it), displayed a keen appetite for killing Germans, despite the shabby treatment of their commander by the British generals.
Besides dropping the Parachute Division too far from its objective and the extraordinary resilience of the German enemy, the third major failure that doomed the operation was the slow progress of the Guards Armoured Division. The Americans thought they ‘stopped for tea’ but the real explanation for their failure was having to advance up one narrow road bordered with polder with no flank protection in the face of determined German resistance. I doubt a commander like Patton or Guderian would have been more successful.
In the end the operation served only to prolong the war and greatly added to the sufferings of the people of the Netherlands. But as a display of the very best fighting qualities that the British, American, and German forces could deploy, the battle for Arnhem, ‘the bridge too far’, must continue to fascinate military history students.
Anthony Beevor and Sir Max Hastings surely divide honours as the greatest living military historians in the English speaking world. Appropriately, neither is an academic. Beevor’s first of many accounts of battle was of the German airborne invasion of Crete, where their heavy loses persuaded Hitler that parachute operations were too costly to pursue. And indeed Beevor made it clear that if the British at Crete had resisted with more determination and skill, the attack would have been a failure. At Arnhem, the Germans demonstrated how a parachute invasion should be resisted, and it was a costly failure. All of which seems to show that whilst parachuting is a good way to exit an aircraft in mid-air, it is mostly a successful strategy for fighting a weak enemy, as in the case of the Israelis in the Sinai in 1956. Only when the airborne attack can be relieved by conventional ground forces in a very short time can paratroopers succeed, which is why the Americans avoided the fate of the British at Arnhem. Dienbienphu was a disaster for the French. The Parachute Regiment was a new formation, and it was to proceed to become one of the most effective and feared regiments in the British Army. But in the Falklands they fought as regular infantry.
November 30, 2025
Some Success or Complete Failure?
Sir Antony Beevor’s book Arnhem is a revisit to Operation Market Garden and the ambitious plan by the allies to liberate the Netherlands, secure a bridge over the Rhine and bring a swift conclusion to the Second World War. Why shouldn’t it have succeeded? The tide of WWII had changed, with the relentless march of the allied and Soviet troops on the Third Reich following the great victories of Stalingrad and D-Day. Confidence was high, the Wehrmacht was exhausted and the ever growing military might of the US was descending on Western Europe. However, all did not go as planned and as such the allied advance stalled. As a result the war would go into another year and the Red Army looked very more likely to capture Berlin.
The Battle of Arnhem has become famous in British military history. Alongside Waterloo, The Somme, Rorke’s Drift and many more the battle is synonymous what happened. The poor planning, lack of intelligence, the failure to identify the location of the Panzer Divisions, lack of contingencies to absorb what the enemy would do, the clash of egos in command, poor equipment and once again with so many battles; the weather have all influenced this battle. But was Field Marshal Montgomery’s master plan a complete failure? Well, it’s main object of securing the Arnhem bridge failed, but Nijmegen and Eindhoven were liberated. Famously stated by the British at the time, 90% of the objectives are achieved, at the cost of just under 8000 men. However, the price paid by the Dutch following the German counter attacks was horrific and they would not be fully liberated until after Hitler committed suicide in April 1944.
Beevor once again is solid, completely in his element with Second World War military history. The operation, strategic and tactical parts are complicated, but as Beevor has shown before this is no barrier to him. He is able to break this down and provide a bare bones overview of all parts. With all his books, we also get a person touch, which makes up any good military history book. We hear from the soldiers on both sides and of course the Dutch who are squashed between two mighty forces colliding together. Both showed humanity, but also unfortunately took advantage of them. The German retribution, however does overshadow some of the poor treatment by the US, Canadian and British troops.
I did at times find myself confused with the details and struggled keep up with where I was in the battle. The writing jumps around a lot between different individuals and events. I feel that other readers would feel the same and that Arnhem would take either another book or several reads to understand this battle fully. That being said, it was still enjoyable and there is a lot to take from Beevor’s work. It is just perhaps this is not an entry level book.
Sir Antony Beevor’s book Arnhem is a revisit to Operation Market Garden and the ambitious plan by the allies to liberate the Netherlands, secure a bridge over the Rhine and bring a swift conclusion to the Second World War. Why shouldn’t it have succeeded? The tide of WWII had changed, with the relentless march of the allied and Soviet troops on the Third Reich following the great victories of Stalingrad and D-Day. Confidence was high, the Wehrmacht was exhausted and the ever growing military might of the US was descending on Western Europe. However, all did not go as planned and as such the allied advance stalled. As a result the war would go into another year and the Red Army looked very more likely to capture Berlin.
The Battle of Arnhem has become famous in British military history. Alongside Waterloo, The Somme, Rorke’s Drift and many more the battle is synonymous what happened. The poor planning, lack of intelligence, the failure to identify the location of the Panzer Divisions, lack of contingencies to absorb what the enemy would do, the clash of egos in command, poor equipment and once again with so many battles; the weather have all influenced this battle. But was Field Marshal Montgomery’s master plan a complete failure? Well, it’s main object of securing the Arnhem bridge failed, but Nijmegen and Eindhoven were liberated. Famously stated by the British at the time, 90% of the objectives are achieved, at the cost of just under 8000 men. However, the price paid by the Dutch following the German counter attacks was horrific and they would not be fully liberated until after Hitler committed suicide in April 1944.
Beevor once again is solid, completely in his element with Second World War military history. The operation, strategic and tactical parts are complicated, but as Beevor has shown before this is no barrier to him. He is able to break this down and provide a bare bones overview of all parts. With all his books, we also get a person touch, which makes up any good military history book. We hear from the soldiers on both sides and of course the Dutch who are squashed between two mighty forces colliding together. Both showed humanity, but also unfortunately took advantage of them. The German retribution, however does overshadow some of the poor treatment by the US, Canadian and British troops.
I did at times find myself confused with the details and struggled keep up with where I was in the battle. The writing jumps around a lot between different individuals and events. I feel that other readers would feel the same and that Arnhem would take either another book or several reads to understand this battle fully. That being said, it was still enjoyable and there is a lot to take from Beevor’s work. It is just perhaps this is not an entry level book.
May 22, 2018
A brilliant new history of one of the epic tragedies of the Second World War. As the author states what tempted him to write another history of this well known battle was access to a lot of new materials.
Fans of Beevor’s previous works on Stalingrad, Berlin and D Day will not be disappointed but will perhaps feel the frustration and disappointment in the Generals and the planning of this disaster in the making.
At one point Beevor writes something like that many of us have pointed out issues and errors with the plan for example what if the radios worked properly, but it was just a bad plan badly made and should never have happened.
I would recommend
Fans of Beevor’s previous works on Stalingrad, Berlin and D Day will not be disappointed but will perhaps feel the frustration and disappointment in the Generals and the planning of this disaster in the making.
At one point Beevor writes something like that many of us have pointed out issues and errors with the plan for example what if the radios worked properly, but it was just a bad plan badly made and should never have happened.
I would recommend
October 26, 2019
-La alta oficialidad, con sus propios intereses que muchas veces no son propiamente bélicos y sí personales, tomó decisiones polémicas en los despachos que afectaron mucho a lo que sucedió sobre el terreno.-
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. El libro La batalla por los puentes (publicación original: Arhhem. The Batlle for the Bridges 1944, 2018), con el subtítulo Arnhem 1944. La última victoria alemana en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, nos presenta los entresijos (y despropósitos) de la concepción estratégica de la Operación Market Garden, su ejecución, la reacción de las tropas alemanas y sus resultados.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro sin spoilers? Visite:
https://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com...
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. El libro La batalla por los puentes (publicación original: Arhhem. The Batlle for the Bridges 1944, 2018), con el subtítulo Arnhem 1944. La última victoria alemana en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, nos presenta los entresijos (y despropósitos) de la concepción estratégica de la Operación Market Garden, su ejecución, la reacción de las tropas alemanas y sus resultados.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro sin spoilers? Visite:
https://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com...
September 28, 2020
So, a bit of a Damascene moment, provoked by a bit of reflection on other texts (including a passing comment in Peter Caddick-Adams's Snow and Steel) and appropriately enough, sitting rewatching A Bridge Too Far (Gene Hackman's 'What of the Ghermans?' moment, oddly enough).
All of which prompted the sudden realisation that I actually had read it all before... there's actually next to nothing that's not come around in A Bridge Too Far, or Kershaw's It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944 or excellent A Street in Arnhem: The Agony of Occupation and Liberation, and Buckingham's Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944 (published after Beevor's effort) pretty much of squashes Beevor's lazy and constant harping on Montgomery as the architect of the Operation (on that basis, we should probably be pointing the finger of blame at Ike for green lighting the Operation).
Beevor's baffling inability to provide any credit to British forces (flying in the face of such works as Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe) lies at odds with his equally baffling decision to absolve US forces of any culpability in the delay of XXX Corps (the destruction of the Wilhelmina Canal bridge at Son or the utter failure to take the pivotal Waal crossing at Nijmegen, for example). I can only assume that he's attempting to push the American market and hope the British one will be blinded by the name. A shame, and certainly not in the calibre of Crete The Battle And The Resistance, Stalingrad or Berlin. The Downfall, 1945. Only really any good, now, for fans of Stephen Ambrose.
And the Peter Caddick-Adams quote? He's discussing Robert Merriam's Dark December: The Full Account of the Battle of the Bulge and notes that Merriam found "...Montgomery's generalship was sound: a view that many Americans still find unpalatable today"
An examination of the Allied attempt to punch a hole across the Dutch river obstacles to drive forces into the Ruhr. It's all been told before, and my fear was that there would be little to be told that hadn't been recounted before.
Thankfully my fears proved groundless, although all the familiar stories are there, there are also a wealth of other personal accounts which help bring the story to life, from British Guardsmen driving Sherman tanks up the Highway toward Arnhem to U.S. Airborne troops struggling to hold the corridor open, to the British and Polish paras at the "Far End" and the brave Dutch civilians who were so cruelly let down by the ultimate failure of the operation.
The book is good in these areas, and excellent in its depiction of the cruelty of the German occupation and the criminal activities in Arnhem and occupied Holland after the operation. If there's one criticism, it's that the hatchet job on Brush senior command is a little laboured (not unjustified, but perhaps a little overdone).
Perhaps art it's best when combined with other works, but recommended to anyone wanting to build up a better overview of Market Garden.
All of which prompted the sudden realisation that I actually had read it all before... there's actually next to nothing that's not come around in A Bridge Too Far, or Kershaw's It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944 or excellent A Street in Arnhem: The Agony of Occupation and Liberation, and Buckingham's Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944 (published after Beevor's effort) pretty much of squashes Beevor's lazy and constant harping on Montgomery as the architect of the Operation (on that basis, we should probably be pointing the finger of blame at Ike for green lighting the Operation).
Beevor's baffling inability to provide any credit to British forces (flying in the face of such works as Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe) lies at odds with his equally baffling decision to absolve US forces of any culpability in the delay of XXX Corps (the destruction of the Wilhelmina Canal bridge at Son or the utter failure to take the pivotal Waal crossing at Nijmegen, for example). I can only assume that he's attempting to push the American market and hope the British one will be blinded by the name. A shame, and certainly not in the calibre of Crete The Battle And The Resistance, Stalingrad or Berlin. The Downfall, 1945. Only really any good, now, for fans of Stephen Ambrose.
And the Peter Caddick-Adams quote? He's discussing Robert Merriam's Dark December: The Full Account of the Battle of the Bulge and notes that Merriam found "...Montgomery's generalship was sound: a view that many Americans still find unpalatable today"
Thankfully my fears proved groundless, although all the familiar stories are there, there are also a wealth of other personal accounts which help bring the story to life, from British Guardsmen driving Sherman tanks up the Highway toward Arnhem to U.S. Airborne troops struggling to hold the corridor open, to the British and Polish paras at the "Far End" and the brave Dutch civilians who were so cruelly let down by the ultimate failure of the operation.
The book is good in these areas, and excellent in its depiction of the cruelty of the German occupation and the criminal activities in Arnhem and occupied Holland after the operation. If there's one criticism, it's that the hatchet job on Brush senior command is a little laboured (not unjustified, but perhaps a little overdone).
Perhaps art it's best when combined with other works, but recommended to anyone wanting to build up a better overview of Market Garden.
June 30, 2018
Although there have been many books written about Operation Market Garden, I hadn’t personally read any before, so when I heard that Anthony Beevor was bringing out a book about the Arnhem battle, I thought “This is bound to be good”, and it is good of course, although best as a narrative.
One thing I would say is that much of the earlier part of the book feels like a follow-on from Beevor’s earlier book about the Normandy battle. I haven’t read that and I was left with the feeling it would have been better to have done so. (I’m not very methodical with my reading and my choice of material tends to depend my mood at the time).
Beevor is pretty scathing about Field Marshal Montgomery and the slapdash way the plan was conceived, commenting that historians who have looked at “what if” details of the operation ignore the basic problem that “It was quite simply a very bad plan right from the start and right from the top.” I won’t attempt to go into the many problems highlighted by the author as it would make this review too long. Suffice to say the arguments are set out in detail in the book.
There’s a considerable amount of personal testimony, and this is where the narrative is at its best. They range from the humorous to the very moving. After 4 years of occupation, Dutch civilians were bemused at the politeness of the British soldiers they encountered. One diarist commented on how one night a “Tommy” came very quietly down the stairs into her family’s cellar so as not to disturb her children, and politely asked the family to stay as quiet as possible and not use any lights. She added that “A Boche would simply have said ‘Shut your mouth!”
A much more sombre note is provided in a story from a Private Milbourne, wounded and in hospital. “A boy from Carlisle”, badly wounded, was in the same ward. One night, when the other soldiers were chatting, they head him “in a hoarse, croaking voice try to sing the first few bars of “God Save The King”. A deathly hush fell over the ward. Listening to the boy, cold shivers ran up and down Milbourne’s spine…Nurses moved the dying boy into a side ward. Milbourne got up and followed him there. He was still trying to sing the national anthem. Half an hour later he was dead.”
The Arnhem battle was a tragedy, most of all for the Dutch civilians and resistance fighters, many of who showed unbelievable heroism in assisting the Allied soldiers, and who suffered terrible reprisals after the defeat. If you already know the story of the battle in detail you may not learn much more from this book. For me it was both readable and informative.
One thing I would say is that much of the earlier part of the book feels like a follow-on from Beevor’s earlier book about the Normandy battle. I haven’t read that and I was left with the feeling it would have been better to have done so. (I’m not very methodical with my reading and my choice of material tends to depend my mood at the time).
Beevor is pretty scathing about Field Marshal Montgomery and the slapdash way the plan was conceived, commenting that historians who have looked at “what if” details of the operation ignore the basic problem that “It was quite simply a very bad plan right from the start and right from the top.” I won’t attempt to go into the many problems highlighted by the author as it would make this review too long. Suffice to say the arguments are set out in detail in the book.
There’s a considerable amount of personal testimony, and this is where the narrative is at its best. They range from the humorous to the very moving. After 4 years of occupation, Dutch civilians were bemused at the politeness of the British soldiers they encountered. One diarist commented on how one night a “Tommy” came very quietly down the stairs into her family’s cellar so as not to disturb her children, and politely asked the family to stay as quiet as possible and not use any lights. She added that “A Boche would simply have said ‘Shut your mouth!”
A much more sombre note is provided in a story from a Private Milbourne, wounded and in hospital. “A boy from Carlisle”, badly wounded, was in the same ward. One night, when the other soldiers were chatting, they head him “in a hoarse, croaking voice try to sing the first few bars of “God Save The King”. A deathly hush fell over the ward. Listening to the boy, cold shivers ran up and down Milbourne’s spine…Nurses moved the dying boy into a side ward. Milbourne got up and followed him there. He was still trying to sing the national anthem. Half an hour later he was dead.”
The Arnhem battle was a tragedy, most of all for the Dutch civilians and resistance fighters, many of who showed unbelievable heroism in assisting the Allied soldiers, and who suffered terrible reprisals after the defeat. If you already know the story of the battle in detail you may not learn much more from this book. For me it was both readable and informative.
March 21, 2019
With Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944, Mr. Beevor has once again delivered a well-researched and balanced account of a major World War II event. The author tells the story of “A Bridge Too Far”, to borrow the title of Cornelius Ryan classic on the same battle, from the Dutch, German and Allied perspective. The author tells the tale of the Battle for all levels of command – from Montgomery’s HQ down the paratroopers trying capture and hold the major bridges.
He tells the story of the battle from the planners and commanders down to the Paratroopers and Guardsmen who had to carry out those plans. From the beginning of the battle, Mr. Beevor opines that, esp for the British what could go wrong, did. Everything from poor selection of drop zones – is some cases more than 8 miles away from the objectives – throwing away the airborne greatest asset, surprise. The drop zones were also on the wrong side of the river. The problems of just getting the men and equipment there is also well done. There was not enough lift for the paratroopers, nor enough gliders for their “heavy” equipment. It took 3 days to get all the British/Polish forces into the Arnhem area.
Mr. Beevor also illustrates the problem XXX Corps had with a single road to advance up. The plan was for them to relieve the British at Arnhem in 2 or 3 days. After 9 days they still hadn’t gotten there. The problems of advancing up that road, which earned the nickname “Hell'sHighway” as with the rest of the book well told. In first ¼ mile the Irish Guards (the leading unit) lost 5 tanks, bringing the advance to a standstill until the German antitank guns could be dealt with.
While the priority objectives, the Arnhem Bridge and the ground advance were given to British Units, the American contribution is not slighted. There are many pages devoted to telling the story of the 82nd and 101st ABN Div's contributions to the battle and their frustrations with the British way of war. Their fight to keep open the highway is well told, with lots of first person account and other anecdotes.
As it should be, I think LTC John Frost’s and 2nd Para's battle at Arnhem Bridge is the focus of much of the narrative. The desperate fight against long odds is once again superbly told. Their radios were not working and the resulting inability to communicate meant the much of their resupply fell into German hands. In spite of this they held out for 9 days.
In addition to lower level people, the author does an excellent job of examining the commanders. As a whole the British come off every poorly. For example LTG Browning, the British Airborne Corps commander, used 37 gliders, which the Allies were desperately short of, to transport his HQ to Holland. When he got there he really didn’t have a Corps to command. Another problematic commander is LTG Horrocks of XXX Corps. He was, according to the author, a very sick man. He really shouldn’t have been commanding that column. Monty doesn’t escape Beevor’s criticism either. His failure to clear the approaches to Antwerp is well discussed. The British treatment of the 1st Polish ABN BDE and its commander is positively disgraceful!
The German commanders as a rule come off better than the British. Bitterich of the 2nd SS Panzer Corp and Student of the 1st Airborne Army did well with the resources they had and ended up “winning” the battle. A note of the 2nd SS Panzer – the author states that at the beginning of Arnhem, It was down to about 6000 people of the roughly 30,000 authorized and just a handful of armored vehicles.
The Dutch contributions to the battle are not slighted in the narrative. The help they gave to the British forces, both medically and intelligence was invaluable. The German response to that help is covered in the last part of the narrative.
I would rate this a 4.75 star book, so I’ve rounded up for GR. It is an excellent telling of the Battle for the Bridges and for a British author a quite frank discussion of the faults of the British Commanders. Highly recommended.
He tells the story of the battle from the planners and commanders down to the Paratroopers and Guardsmen who had to carry out those plans. From the beginning of the battle, Mr. Beevor opines that, esp for the British what could go wrong, did. Everything from poor selection of drop zones – is some cases more than 8 miles away from the objectives – throwing away the airborne greatest asset, surprise. The drop zones were also on the wrong side of the river. The problems of just getting the men and equipment there is also well done. There was not enough lift for the paratroopers, nor enough gliders for their “heavy” equipment. It took 3 days to get all the British/Polish forces into the Arnhem area.
Mr. Beevor also illustrates the problem XXX Corps had with a single road to advance up. The plan was for them to relieve the British at Arnhem in 2 or 3 days. After 9 days they still hadn’t gotten there. The problems of advancing up that road, which earned the nickname “Hell'sHighway” as with the rest of the book well told. In first ¼ mile the Irish Guards (the leading unit) lost 5 tanks, bringing the advance to a standstill until the German antitank guns could be dealt with.
While the priority objectives, the Arnhem Bridge and the ground advance were given to British Units, the American contribution is not slighted. There are many pages devoted to telling the story of the 82nd and 101st ABN Div's contributions to the battle and their frustrations with the British way of war. Their fight to keep open the highway is well told, with lots of first person account and other anecdotes.
As it should be, I think LTC John Frost’s and 2nd Para's battle at Arnhem Bridge is the focus of much of the narrative. The desperate fight against long odds is once again superbly told. Their radios were not working and the resulting inability to communicate meant the much of their resupply fell into German hands. In spite of this they held out for 9 days.
In addition to lower level people, the author does an excellent job of examining the commanders. As a whole the British come off every poorly. For example LTG Browning, the British Airborne Corps commander, used 37 gliders, which the Allies were desperately short of, to transport his HQ to Holland. When he got there he really didn’t have a Corps to command. Another problematic commander is LTG Horrocks of XXX Corps. He was, according to the author, a very sick man. He really shouldn’t have been commanding that column. Monty doesn’t escape Beevor’s criticism either. His failure to clear the approaches to Antwerp is well discussed. The British treatment of the 1st Polish ABN BDE and its commander is positively disgraceful!
The German commanders as a rule come off better than the British. Bitterich of the 2nd SS Panzer Corp and Student of the 1st Airborne Army did well with the resources they had and ended up “winning” the battle. A note of the 2nd SS Panzer – the author states that at the beginning of Arnhem, It was down to about 6000 people of the roughly 30,000 authorized and just a handful of armored vehicles.
The Dutch contributions to the battle are not slighted in the narrative. The help they gave to the British forces, both medically and intelligence was invaluable. The German response to that help is covered in the last part of the narrative.
I would rate this a 4.75 star book, so I’ve rounded up for GR. It is an excellent telling of the Battle for the Bridges and for a British author a quite frank discussion of the faults of the British Commanders. Highly recommended.
June 19, 2023
Whoever claims Beevor turns a blind eye to British mistakes* hasn't seen him take down the entire script for Arnhem and the slow advance of Horrocks in particular. No plan survives the contact with the enemy Sosabowski, who'd rather have spent that summer in Warsaw, was right when he pointed out that no allowance was made for anything to go wrong, and from the remote designation of LZ's onward it did.
The first 100 pages of so are an enjoyable exposé of the opposing plans; this is where I found myself taking most notes. To summarize the strategic situation: With the 15th Army allowed to escape and regroup under 'Fireman' Model and Kurt Student, the Allied flank was not secure while the Germans were in waterway-rich country, positioned for a favourable defence against an armoured thrust into the Heimat. Like in Normandy, diehards from Russia were aptly regrouping scratch formations.
Bradley was good to push into the Saarland, but any airborne operation was welcome before the war ran out, if only because the interminable series of cancelled plans was eroding the morale of these elite formations.
Once paratroopers take one in the crotch on the downward, there is definitely overlap from other testimony-heavy books, such as Middlebrook*. Yet pay attention to Beevor's Asterix Footnotes for the most outlandish reality-is stranger-than fiction anecdotes on both sides of the Arnhem bridge. My favourite concerns a young German POW shipped off to the USA, declared 'safe', seeking American citizenship & sign up to serve alongside his former captors, the 82nd Airborne.
Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-26 SeptemberbyMartin Middlebrook
* "...Otherwise I believe that British historical studies are still after 70 years too self-important and won't consider other aspects seriously enough...One good example is Mr. A. Beevor, who gets blind at once when his work deals with British forces and their actions"
The first 100 pages of so are an enjoyable exposé of the opposing plans; this is where I found myself taking most notes. To summarize the strategic situation: With the 15th Army allowed to escape and regroup under 'Fireman' Model and Kurt Student, the Allied flank was not secure while the Germans were in waterway-rich country, positioned for a favourable defence against an armoured thrust into the Heimat. Like in Normandy, diehards from Russia were aptly regrouping scratch formations.
Bradley was good to push into the Saarland, but any airborne operation was welcome before the war ran out, if only because the interminable series of cancelled plans was eroding the morale of these elite formations.
Once paratroopers take one in the crotch on the downward, there is definitely overlap from other testimony-heavy books, such as Middlebrook*. Yet pay attention to Beevor's Asterix Footnotes for the most outlandish reality-is stranger-than fiction anecdotes on both sides of the Arnhem bridge. My favourite concerns a young German POW shipped off to the USA, declared 'safe', seeking American citizenship & sign up to serve alongside his former captors, the 82nd Airborne.
Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-26 SeptemberbyMartin Middlebrook* "...Otherwise I believe that British historical studies are still after 70 years too self-important and won't consider other aspects seriously enough...One good example is Mr. A. Beevor, who gets blind at once when his work deals with British forces and their actions"
June 17, 2018
Yep 5 stars. Arnhem and Operation Market-Garden has been a passion of mine for years. So when another book came out I actually said that I wondered if new information could be brought to the table. What a mistake.
Beevor has done a brilliant job of covering the campaign from both the operational and tactical level. The book is very readable without having to descent into a sensationalised journalistic piece. Additionally he highlighted the impact on the individuals involved in the fighting regardless of them being combatants or civilians caught in the middle.
One thing I feel he updated was the war crimes that happened during the battle. Both the Germans, Americans and British regularly shot surrendering combatants. Sometimes the reasons were pragmatic such as no spare capacity to handle prisoners and sometimes vengeance driven. It goes as far as Gavin having to specifically order his officers of the 82nd to restrain the executions as he wanted some prisoners taken for intelligence. Luckily for a lot of Allied soldiers the unspoken rule of war crime prosecution is that for an action to be a war crime it has to be done by the defeated side.
Beevor also went into the effects on the Dutch population. He covers the resulting forced evacuation of the population of Arnhem to the hunger winter that followed across the Netherlands. A lot of this was the direct result of the offensive that falsely created hope for the population to the point they started both actively and passively resisting the Germans.
Monty and his staff do get off lightly either. Apart from the traditional criticisms of the plan, he is especially criticised for refusing to listen to critics who highlighted the insanity of fighting with mechanised forces beyond Nijmegen, failure to open the Scheldt and their treatment of the Polish commander Sosabowski.
In all a great addition to the Market Garden literature and well worth the read.
Beevor has done a brilliant job of covering the campaign from both the operational and tactical level. The book is very readable without having to descent into a sensationalised journalistic piece. Additionally he highlighted the impact on the individuals involved in the fighting regardless of them being combatants or civilians caught in the middle.
One thing I feel he updated was the war crimes that happened during the battle. Both the Germans, Americans and British regularly shot surrendering combatants. Sometimes the reasons were pragmatic such as no spare capacity to handle prisoners and sometimes vengeance driven. It goes as far as Gavin having to specifically order his officers of the 82nd to restrain the executions as he wanted some prisoners taken for intelligence. Luckily for a lot of Allied soldiers the unspoken rule of war crime prosecution is that for an action to be a war crime it has to be done by the defeated side.
Beevor also went into the effects on the Dutch population. He covers the resulting forced evacuation of the population of Arnhem to the hunger winter that followed across the Netherlands. A lot of this was the direct result of the offensive that falsely created hope for the population to the point they started both actively and passively resisting the Germans.
Monty and his staff do get off lightly either. Apart from the traditional criticisms of the plan, he is especially criticised for refusing to listen to critics who highlighted the insanity of fighting with mechanised forces beyond Nijmegen, failure to open the Scheldt and their treatment of the Polish commander Sosabowski.
In all a great addition to the Market Garden literature and well worth the read.
July 24, 2022
Antony Beevor has written what will be my second favorite book on Operation Market Garden. My favorite, is still, Cornelius Ryan's masterful work "A Bridge Too Far". As a side note, Ryan's WWII trilogy ("The Longest Day", "A Bridge Too Far", and "The Last Battle") is superb and well worth your time. Beevor's version is quite good as well.
Operation Market Garden was the last gasp plan of that arrogant imbecile, Bernard Law Montgomery. Montgomery is emblematic of an overrated General, who was able to play a pivotal part due to the relative inexperience of the American General Officers, as well as the politics between the US and the British Empire.
OMG was a two-part operation. The Airborne forces (Market) would seize the bridges and the ground forces (Garden) would use those bridges to skip through German territory. At least, in theory. A variety of problems, made lethal due to Montgomery's hubris, will cause this operation to be one of the most costly and useless operations of the war.
I shall not waste time on the events, since if you are unaware then you should read this book. An interesting and detailed look at this rather epic cluster fuck.
Operation Market Garden was the last gasp plan of that arrogant imbecile, Bernard Law Montgomery. Montgomery is emblematic of an overrated General, who was able to play a pivotal part due to the relative inexperience of the American General Officers, as well as the politics between the US and the British Empire.
OMG was a two-part operation. The Airborne forces (Market) would seize the bridges and the ground forces (Garden) would use those bridges to skip through German territory. At least, in theory. A variety of problems, made lethal due to Montgomery's hubris, will cause this operation to be one of the most costly and useless operations of the war.
I shall not waste time on the events, since if you are unaware then you should read this book. An interesting and detailed look at this rather epic cluster fuck.
November 11, 2019
I am both puzzled and fascinated with operation Market Garden. This has to be the worst plan by the Allies in the war and the Beeves blows the lid off it. What a terrible plan. What was Monty thinking? Was he the Manchurian General? He couldn’t fight in the desert. He couldn’t fight in France. Why not let this imbecile concoct a scheme to kill off the finest airborne troops in the free world in the Netherlands (not to mention those poor Dutch civilians that suffered at the hands of the retribution minded Germans.) This book made me sick. One needs only to read the first and last chapters to understand the folly of this scheme. The battle was lost when Brown did not insist upon drop zones closer to the bridge and it went downhill from there. To add insult to injury, Monty and his staff tried to make a scapegoat of Stanislaw Sosabowski of the Polish 1st Independent Airborne Brigade after the battle was over. Sosabowski was the greatest opponent of this miserable scheme from the onset. The chapters in between contain all the sordid details including plenty of interesting anecdotes that one would associate with the writings of Antony Beevor.
This book is very good but not the authors best. I would put this one just behind Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege and Berlin: The Downfall 1945. It is on par with his book on Crete and much easier to follow than the Battle for Spain. It is a good read if I’ve ever read one and the best book on Market Garden I've ever come across.
I am not for toppling statues but if there is a monument to the stupid, arrogant, stuffed–shirt of a jackass, Bernard Law Montgomery, I might be tempted to throw rotten fruit at it.
Here’s to all the brave men that sacrificed their lives in Market Garden and those poor Dutch civilians! I’m rounding up to 5 stars.
This book is very good but not the authors best. I would put this one just behind Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege and Berlin: The Downfall 1945. It is on par with his book on Crete and much easier to follow than the Battle for Spain. It is a good read if I’ve ever read one and the best book on Market Garden I've ever come across.
I am not for toppling statues but if there is a monument to the stupid, arrogant, stuffed–shirt of a jackass, Bernard Law Montgomery, I might be tempted to throw rotten fruit at it.
Here’s to all the brave men that sacrificed their lives in Market Garden and those poor Dutch civilians! I’m rounding up to 5 stars.
May 31, 2018
I really enjoyed 'Stalingrad' as well as a few of Antony Beevor's other History classics. I had an extra level of fascination for this book, since my mother is Dutch, I was born in Eindhoven, and spent a lot of my childhood in the exact area that 'Operation Market Garden' (couldn't they have come up with a more exciting name for this Paratrooper mission?) happened in; Osterbeek, Arnhem, Nijmegen and EDE.
It's amazing that not so long ago, a huge battle waged in this quiet area. My favourite part was where the retired managing director of the Dutch East India company, had a troop of British soldiers move in. A gun battle ensued and his entire beautiful tennis court was blown up by German shells!
Strange to think that not so long ago, Germans were unwanted occupiers of Holland; starving them, shooting them, stealing their property, massacring their Jewish population. It's so important to remember history. I actually enjoyed this book more than Stalingrad, because of the quality of the writing and my personal connection with the area.
It's amazing that not so long ago, a huge battle waged in this quiet area. My favourite part was where the retired managing director of the Dutch East India company, had a troop of British soldiers move in. A gun battle ensued and his entire beautiful tennis court was blown up by German shells!
Strange to think that not so long ago, Germans were unwanted occupiers of Holland; starving them, shooting them, stealing their property, massacring their Jewish population. It's so important to remember history. I actually enjoyed this book more than Stalingrad, because of the quality of the writing and my personal connection with the area.
June 21, 2018
I have just completed reading Anthony Beevor’s book ‘Arnhem’. Let me say firstly, that this is not a detailed military account of Operation Market Garden; rather it is high level overview of the whole operation, where Beevor dives deep to find examples of the point he is making.
My father loathed Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. In addition, he would very rarely ever talk about his wartime glider experiences, especially Arnhem. He fought at Arnhem and eventually escaped by swimming the River Rhine having been left behind after the evacuation. Having read this book I think I now have a grasp of why my father felt the way he did regarding Montgomery.
Operation Market Garden was probably one of the greatest examples of the damage that ‘Group Think’ can inflict. By mid-1944 it was becoming apparent that the German army was slowly collapsing. In the North-West European Theatre, the ground troops were making great progress; no sooner had an airborne landing been planned, than it was postponed because the landing zones had already been overrun by Allied forces. The highly trained and very expensive 1st Airborne Division was beginning to think it would never see action. Indeed, many senior army officers as well as politicians were of view that the best way to utilise the 6th Airborne was to break it up and add the extra manpower to existing regular army units.
Senior 1st Airborne Commanders were desperate “to have a go.” Montgomery was engaged in a constant political battle with the Americans, desperate to cover himself in glory by demonstrating how his master plan would drive the allies deep into the Ruhr Valley cutting off a vast section of German manufacturing and bringing the war to a rapid close. It was after the cancellation of several planned airborne landings that Montgomery saw his opportunity in Market Garden to demonstrate his “military superiority” and airborne commanders saw their opportunity to finally get to demonstrate how effective the 1st airborne really were. The ‘Group Think’ was now in place and woe betide any who spoke against it. In a matter of a few days plans were rushed through and the assault took place.
Early in the book Anthony Beaver demonstrates the huge flaws in the planning that Montgomery and several British airborne commanders refused to accept. General Urquhart who was detailed to draw up the ”Market” element of the plan, delivered his plan to General Browning saying he had done as requested but the General must understand this was going to be “a suicide mission!” There were many other contrary indicators and contrary advice that the ‘Group Think’ simply shut out. In some cases, those offering the advice had their careers threatened.
The airborne fought like tigers at Arnhem even eliciting praise from the dreaded Waffen SS for their fighting qualities. This was not only two armies in conflict, it also involved the people of Arnhem and notably the vastly underestimated (by the British) Dutch Resistance. After the battle the city of Arnhem was not only totally depopulated by the Germans, their properties and houses were looted and stripped of all they contained as well as many properties being deliberately destroyed. For the Dutch the price of failure was horrific.
Many of you will have a fair understanding of the above but Beevor’s book succinctly brings the whole story together in a way I have not seen before; and I have read several books on Arnhem. (‘A Street in Arnhem’ is a tremendous read from the Dutch point of view). Operation Market Garden was a shambles in the planning and therefore became a shambles on the ground. The sacrifice of British, American and Dutch lives was horrific and had people with good experience been listened to it would never have taken place.
I now fully understand my late father’s feelings for Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. I strongly commend the book and especially the last chapter on the aftermath.
My father loathed Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. In addition, he would very rarely ever talk about his wartime glider experiences, especially Arnhem. He fought at Arnhem and eventually escaped by swimming the River Rhine having been left behind after the evacuation. Having read this book I think I now have a grasp of why my father felt the way he did regarding Montgomery.
Operation Market Garden was probably one of the greatest examples of the damage that ‘Group Think’ can inflict. By mid-1944 it was becoming apparent that the German army was slowly collapsing. In the North-West European Theatre, the ground troops were making great progress; no sooner had an airborne landing been planned, than it was postponed because the landing zones had already been overrun by Allied forces. The highly trained and very expensive 1st Airborne Division was beginning to think it would never see action. Indeed, many senior army officers as well as politicians were of view that the best way to utilise the 6th Airborne was to break it up and add the extra manpower to existing regular army units.
Senior 1st Airborne Commanders were desperate “to have a go.” Montgomery was engaged in a constant political battle with the Americans, desperate to cover himself in glory by demonstrating how his master plan would drive the allies deep into the Ruhr Valley cutting off a vast section of German manufacturing and bringing the war to a rapid close. It was after the cancellation of several planned airborne landings that Montgomery saw his opportunity in Market Garden to demonstrate his “military superiority” and airborne commanders saw their opportunity to finally get to demonstrate how effective the 1st airborne really were. The ‘Group Think’ was now in place and woe betide any who spoke against it. In a matter of a few days plans were rushed through and the assault took place.
Early in the book Anthony Beaver demonstrates the huge flaws in the planning that Montgomery and several British airborne commanders refused to accept. General Urquhart who was detailed to draw up the ”Market” element of the plan, delivered his plan to General Browning saying he had done as requested but the General must understand this was going to be “a suicide mission!” There were many other contrary indicators and contrary advice that the ‘Group Think’ simply shut out. In some cases, those offering the advice had their careers threatened.
The airborne fought like tigers at Arnhem even eliciting praise from the dreaded Waffen SS for their fighting qualities. This was not only two armies in conflict, it also involved the people of Arnhem and notably the vastly underestimated (by the British) Dutch Resistance. After the battle the city of Arnhem was not only totally depopulated by the Germans, their properties and houses were looted and stripped of all they contained as well as many properties being deliberately destroyed. For the Dutch the price of failure was horrific.
Many of you will have a fair understanding of the above but Beevor’s book succinctly brings the whole story together in a way I have not seen before; and I have read several books on Arnhem. (‘A Street in Arnhem’ is a tremendous read from the Dutch point of view). Operation Market Garden was a shambles in the planning and therefore became a shambles on the ground. The sacrifice of British, American and Dutch lives was horrific and had people with good experience been listened to it would never have taken place.
I now fully understand my late father’s feelings for Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. I strongly commend the book and especially the last chapter on the aftermath.
August 28, 2021
This is definitely a well-written account of a WWII battle closely connected to my family history. My mother was a teenager in the Dutch town of Nijmegen in 1944. This town, south of the main objective of the bridge at Arnhem, saw ferocious fighting to capture its own bridge over the River Waal in order for the infantry to get to the British airborne troops up in Arnhem. This period of my mother's life was obviously quite a turning point, in which she was happily introduced to many British and Canadian soldiers who became life-long friends, which in turn played somewhat of a role in her eventual emigration to Canada in 1966. In some ways, I often think my very existence relates back to this story of Operation Market Garden, General Montgomery's plan to jump over the Rhine delta and into the German industrial heartland of the Ruhr to try to end the war by Christmas 1944.
Beevor's book goes into an extraordinary amount of detail why this daring, but ill-conceived and poorly executed plan failed. Not only does the author explain the character flaws and in-fighting amongst the Allies (and Germans), he goes further and reports on the aftermath of the battle: the terrible retribution against the Dutch people and the Hunger Winter that followed.
Being such an important part of my family history, I have known much about the battle since I was a teenager. Back in those days, I read the excellent account by Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. I must admit, I still feel that older book was a true masterpiece of WWII non-fiction, but that is likely for sentimental reasons, as I have not read it for years. It would be interesting to reread it now in comparison with Beevor. I did feel I was picking up some new information, at least to me, in this one, so it is in any case an excellent complementary read to Ryan.
Beevor's book goes into an extraordinary amount of detail why this daring, but ill-conceived and poorly executed plan failed. Not only does the author explain the character flaws and in-fighting amongst the Allies (and Germans), he goes further and reports on the aftermath of the battle: the terrible retribution against the Dutch people and the Hunger Winter that followed.
Being such an important part of my family history, I have known much about the battle since I was a teenager. Back in those days, I read the excellent account by Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. I must admit, I still feel that older book was a true masterpiece of WWII non-fiction, but that is likely for sentimental reasons, as I have not read it for years. It would be interesting to reread it now in comparison with Beevor. I did feel I was picking up some new information, at least to me, in this one, so it is in any case an excellent complementary read to Ryan.
October 12, 2018
It has been immensely interesting to read this book and walk the locations at Oosterbeek, Arnhem and Nijmegen. Other locations in the locality of which I had no idea of their importants come to life; the ferry at Pannerden and castle Slangenburg fore one. Walking the dog at the ‘Duiveslberg’ (at Berg and Dal) and reading about it being the frontline that same evening makes the story all the more gripping.
A lot has been said about Anthony Beevor’s ‘Arnhem’ and I have not much to add to the other positive reviews out there. What I would like to add however is that which Beevor's new work changes for the history of Market Garden in the conception of the Dutch.
First of all this is the first (non-Dutch) work I read in which the side of the Dutch resistance and civilian population were told. Until now, the resistance was blamed for their supposedly unsupporting role in the campaign. Beevor however, wrights this wrong and gives these brave people of the Underground the moment in the spotlight they deserve. Little is know about this and in and around Oosterbeek, Nijmegen and Hell’s Highway not much reminds of these silent heroes.
In many other books the plight of the Dutch civilians is all but overlooked. The reprisals and the Hunger winter are only told about in national history (de Jong) and through what is told by parents and grandparents who experienced this terrible period of history.
Then there is the view of history on Polish general Sosabowski and his brigade. They have received a lot of unjust blame and Beevor corrects this. At the Westerbouwing ferry (close to where the Para’s crossed the Rhine) there is a street named after the general. A sign there tells the ‘old’ story. It might be only just to replace this sign with a new one and ask Beevor to write the text for it.
Yesterday, when walking the perimeter (Westerbouwing to Oosterbeek) I noticed how little actually reminds of the fight Next year is the 75th anniversary of the battle. Perhaps it might be about time to dedicate some more signs and panels informing visitors and passers-by about the monumental struggle which was fought in these parks, forests, meadows and streets.
A lot has been said about Anthony Beevor’s ‘Arnhem’ and I have not much to add to the other positive reviews out there. What I would like to add however is that which Beevor's new work changes for the history of Market Garden in the conception of the Dutch.
First of all this is the first (non-Dutch) work I read in which the side of the Dutch resistance and civilian population were told. Until now, the resistance was blamed for their supposedly unsupporting role in the campaign. Beevor however, wrights this wrong and gives these brave people of the Underground the moment in the spotlight they deserve. Little is know about this and in and around Oosterbeek, Nijmegen and Hell’s Highway not much reminds of these silent heroes.
In many other books the plight of the Dutch civilians is all but overlooked. The reprisals and the Hunger winter are only told about in national history (de Jong) and through what is told by parents and grandparents who experienced this terrible period of history.
Then there is the view of history on Polish general Sosabowski and his brigade. They have received a lot of unjust blame and Beevor corrects this. At the Westerbouwing ferry (close to where the Para’s crossed the Rhine) there is a street named after the general. A sign there tells the ‘old’ story. It might be only just to replace this sign with a new one and ask Beevor to write the text for it.
Yesterday, when walking the perimeter (Westerbouwing to Oosterbeek) I noticed how little actually reminds of the fight Next year is the 75th anniversary of the battle. Perhaps it might be about time to dedicate some more signs and panels informing visitors and passers-by about the monumental struggle which was fought in these parks, forests, meadows and streets.
January 31, 2019
A clear, compelling, and well-researched history of the battle from all sides, thoroughly covering both Market Garden and Arnhem’s liberation in April 1945.
Beevor does a great job ramming home the suffering of Dutch civilians and the atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht, the SS, and their Dutch accomplices. He also covers how the operation (“doomed from the start”) was hampered by bad planning, bad coordination, communications problems, and Montgomery’s ego (and Eisenhower’s willingness to soothe it). He ably describes the Germans’ confidence in victory even on the battle’s first day, and how rapidly they were able to respond despite their declining fortunes. Beevor also does a great job balancing the strategic context with individual, human stories, and smoothly transitions from the higher to lower levels of command.
The narrative is suspenseful, insightful and fluid but seems a little disorganized at times. At one point Patton is called “George C. Patton.” Beevor’s discussion of the plan’s failure could have been covered more clearly or more in-depth; a lot of times it seems limited to fleeting mentions throughout the narrative. Some more material on artillery forces may have helped. Beevor mentions why the plan was flawed, but perhaps he could have spent more time on such issues as the Dutch resistance, the Dutch famine, communications problems, and lower-lever decisions. Beevor also seems to go easy on Eisenhower for authorizing the operation in the first place. The maps could also have been more detailed.
A balanced, well-written, vivid, and very readable work.
Beevor does a great job ramming home the suffering of Dutch civilians and the atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht, the SS, and their Dutch accomplices. He also covers how the operation (“doomed from the start”) was hampered by bad planning, bad coordination, communications problems, and Montgomery’s ego (and Eisenhower’s willingness to soothe it). He ably describes the Germans’ confidence in victory even on the battle’s first day, and how rapidly they were able to respond despite their declining fortunes. Beevor also does a great job balancing the strategic context with individual, human stories, and smoothly transitions from the higher to lower levels of command.
The narrative is suspenseful, insightful and fluid but seems a little disorganized at times. At one point Patton is called “George C. Patton.” Beevor’s discussion of the plan’s failure could have been covered more clearly or more in-depth; a lot of times it seems limited to fleeting mentions throughout the narrative. Some more material on artillery forces may have helped. Beevor mentions why the plan was flawed, but perhaps he could have spent more time on such issues as the Dutch resistance, the Dutch famine, communications problems, and lower-lever decisions. Beevor also seems to go easy on Eisenhower for authorizing the operation in the first place. The maps could also have been more detailed.
A balanced, well-written, vivid, and very readable work.
April 26, 2019
This is just one small episode during WW2, that basically has been almost romanticised over, a defeat for the British along the same scale as the evacuation from Dunkirk. The British can uncannily turn a military loss into something to be proud of, and always have done. However, if we are familiar with Operation Market Garden (I believe most people would have heard of the most tragic tale of lightly armed British Airborne troops parachuting into a veritable hornets nest of resting and recuperating Panzer SS units in the Netherlands in September 1944), and I would wager most people have, then the whole operation became a high cost failure, centering around the ego of Field Marshall Montgomery in his deluded state; a man who would talk over his superior Eisenhower and who wanted control over, not just the British, but also parts of the American forces as well. Also, the Allies had this massive airborne army at their disposal, and since D-Day were just wasting away, with operations for their use being cancelled at the last moment because of the the rapid advance of the Allies across Europe and incredible disintegration of the Germans. So a totally ambitious plan was hatched, calling for three airborne divisions to land deep into the Netherlands to seize important bridges that, the intention being, would drive a wedge up a narrow corridor leading eventually to the capture of Arnhem and a bridge across the Rhine right into Germany. They had about a week to plan. A week.
Whilst the American endeavors basically succeeded (although high casualty rates) and allowed the British XXX Corps to travel up this secured corridor (one or two small bridges were blown however), almost calmly (the road was initially called the 'club route', later on given the moniker of 'Hells Highway') due to the initially slow reaction of the Germans who then tried to keep cutting this strip of road with counterattacks and so on, the British success lost the element of surprise, and one of the most beneficial aspects of a paratroop drop was initial surprise and to act quickly. The British 1st Airborne Division landed about 8 miles away in heathland well away from the Arnhem Bridge. It took only one British Battalion, the 2nd Parachute Battalion under John Frost to arrive into Arnhem to seize the Northern end of the Bridge, whilst the other units coming in from different directions into Arnhem were held up initially at first by small German units (who were initially surprised) blocking the various routes into the City. By the end of the first day, then the Germans awoke and as they say, lightly armed paratroopers fighting elite Panzer formations was a recipe for disaster, and not only that reason either; the first drop did not contain the whole of the 1st Airborne Division, and over the next few days the remainder of the unit were gradually parachuted in. There were simply not enough gliders and air-transport to drop on the first day. Two lifts should have happened on day one, instead of it being staggered whilst the Germans set up formidable flak units around the drop zones.
There is a basic outline of the operation. I do not want this review to get too bogged down with operational mistakes - read the book, watch the 1970's film based around Cornelius Ryans tale (which is not dissimilar to Antony Beevors structure) but Beevor has written this masterpiece using all the de-classified reports which were not available to earlier works, so it is amazingly researched with pages upon pages of references -impressive - incredibly so. And true to Antony Beevors military histories (I have read 4 of his books now), he covers all combatants as well the social costs of these exercises. Arnhem is no exception; he writes towards the end of both the failure of the British as well as of the reprisals against the Dutch Civilians in the Netherlands and then forcibly exiled from their home city of Arnhem who, initially at first were more than happy to greet the British Airborne and were seen as liberators. In the town of Oosterbeck a few miles from Arnhem where the remnants of the 1st Airborne set up a defensive perimeter, then the Dutch as well the the British suffered in both equal measures, and yet still, the population were forgiving having lost family members, all hiding in cellars, no food, lack of medicine - I mean that takes faith in supporting the Allies during the slowly rising fatalities, destruction of their homes and so on. Even after the battle was over with only roughly 2,000 paratroopers managing to cross the Rhine out of a combined force of over 10,000 men initially and the Germans forcibly evacuating the remaining citizens for collaboration with the Allies, would take some incredible stamina, belief that the cause of the liberators from the boot of the Nazis etc, was astoundingly forgiving. It did not end there either, after the battle of Arnhem was lost. The Nazis and Dutch lackeys destroyed and looted most of the proud city of Arnhem and as I mentioned, forcibly extracted the starving population elsewhere.
I believe Antony Beevor is a unique historian; whilst this work is a military history, it also is a social one as well. The last several chapters deal with the recriminations against the British High Command, everyone was trying to pass the blame whist Montgomery really said little. One of the most tragic results was the removal of the Polish Independent Brigades commander, Sosabowski, who really was one of the only outspoken critics against the whole operation, saying that it would lead to failure (his unit did not arrive till Day 4 and by then the Northern control of the Arnhem Bridge under John Frost and the 2nd Parachute Battalion were all but wiped out or surrendered), so the Polish were used to help ferry the remaining remnants over the Rhine. Because he had the tenacity to speak out showing the flaws in the plan to the British High Command, he was scapegoated and removed from command. He was the only real 'casualty' amongst the Top Brass.
The Winter of 1944/45 was the worst Europe had seen, and the real casualties were the Dutch as the Nazis and their Dutch lackeys stripped what they could in terms of food and fuel from the remaining cities they still held. Starvation on a similar scale to that of the siege of Leningrad during WW2 happened, which is little known about but Beevor covers in the last chapter like no other Military Historian. I believe that is important to show the Human cost of warfare, so at least you can balance out between the Military and Social dimensions. This book did not dissapoint in any way, and whilst I have read Martin Middlebrooks detailed study of the British sector, Beevors more updated version wins as it covers the whole Market (meaning airborne invasion) Garden (the ground advance) similar, as I previously mentioned to Cornelius Ryans method of eyewitness accounts. This has to be a 5 star book, mainly from having the tenacity to lay blame on Montgomery and his staff. He went a bridge too far, creating bad consequences for the Dutch.
Whilst the American endeavors basically succeeded (although high casualty rates) and allowed the British XXX Corps to travel up this secured corridor (one or two small bridges were blown however), almost calmly (the road was initially called the 'club route', later on given the moniker of 'Hells Highway') due to the initially slow reaction of the Germans who then tried to keep cutting this strip of road with counterattacks and so on, the British success lost the element of surprise, and one of the most beneficial aspects of a paratroop drop was initial surprise and to act quickly. The British 1st Airborne Division landed about 8 miles away in heathland well away from the Arnhem Bridge. It took only one British Battalion, the 2nd Parachute Battalion under John Frost to arrive into Arnhem to seize the Northern end of the Bridge, whilst the other units coming in from different directions into Arnhem were held up initially at first by small German units (who were initially surprised) blocking the various routes into the City. By the end of the first day, then the Germans awoke and as they say, lightly armed paratroopers fighting elite Panzer formations was a recipe for disaster, and not only that reason either; the first drop did not contain the whole of the 1st Airborne Division, and over the next few days the remainder of the unit were gradually parachuted in. There were simply not enough gliders and air-transport to drop on the first day. Two lifts should have happened on day one, instead of it being staggered whilst the Germans set up formidable flak units around the drop zones.
There is a basic outline of the operation. I do not want this review to get too bogged down with operational mistakes - read the book, watch the 1970's film based around Cornelius Ryans tale (which is not dissimilar to Antony Beevors structure) but Beevor has written this masterpiece using all the de-classified reports which were not available to earlier works, so it is amazingly researched with pages upon pages of references -impressive - incredibly so. And true to Antony Beevors military histories (I have read 4 of his books now), he covers all combatants as well the social costs of these exercises. Arnhem is no exception; he writes towards the end of both the failure of the British as well as of the reprisals against the Dutch Civilians in the Netherlands and then forcibly exiled from their home city of Arnhem who, initially at first were more than happy to greet the British Airborne and were seen as liberators. In the town of Oosterbeck a few miles from Arnhem where the remnants of the 1st Airborne set up a defensive perimeter, then the Dutch as well the the British suffered in both equal measures, and yet still, the population were forgiving having lost family members, all hiding in cellars, no food, lack of medicine - I mean that takes faith in supporting the Allies during the slowly rising fatalities, destruction of their homes and so on. Even after the battle was over with only roughly 2,000 paratroopers managing to cross the Rhine out of a combined force of over 10,000 men initially and the Germans forcibly evacuating the remaining citizens for collaboration with the Allies, would take some incredible stamina, belief that the cause of the liberators from the boot of the Nazis etc, was astoundingly forgiving. It did not end there either, after the battle of Arnhem was lost. The Nazis and Dutch lackeys destroyed and looted most of the proud city of Arnhem and as I mentioned, forcibly extracted the starving population elsewhere.
I believe Antony Beevor is a unique historian; whilst this work is a military history, it also is a social one as well. The last several chapters deal with the recriminations against the British High Command, everyone was trying to pass the blame whist Montgomery really said little. One of the most tragic results was the removal of the Polish Independent Brigades commander, Sosabowski, who really was one of the only outspoken critics against the whole operation, saying that it would lead to failure (his unit did not arrive till Day 4 and by then the Northern control of the Arnhem Bridge under John Frost and the 2nd Parachute Battalion were all but wiped out or surrendered), so the Polish were used to help ferry the remaining remnants over the Rhine. Because he had the tenacity to speak out showing the flaws in the plan to the British High Command, he was scapegoated and removed from command. He was the only real 'casualty' amongst the Top Brass.
The Winter of 1944/45 was the worst Europe had seen, and the real casualties were the Dutch as the Nazis and their Dutch lackeys stripped what they could in terms of food and fuel from the remaining cities they still held. Starvation on a similar scale to that of the siege of Leningrad during WW2 happened, which is little known about but Beevor covers in the last chapter like no other Military Historian. I believe that is important to show the Human cost of warfare, so at least you can balance out between the Military and Social dimensions. This book did not dissapoint in any way, and whilst I have read Martin Middlebrooks detailed study of the British sector, Beevors more updated version wins as it covers the whole Market (meaning airborne invasion) Garden (the ground advance) similar, as I previously mentioned to Cornelius Ryans method of eyewitness accounts. This has to be a 5 star book, mainly from having the tenacity to lay blame on Montgomery and his staff. He went a bridge too far, creating bad consequences for the Dutch.
August 20, 2022
The book tells about one of the major airborne operations at the end of World War II.
Plot. Rating 5
The book features a very meticulous study of the plot. Several chapters show the preparation of the operation, then there is a detailed account of the battle with the plans and actions of both sides. The author presents many versions of the failure of this daring offensive at the strategic and tactical level. A large role is assigned to the influence of random events in the war. It seems to me that overconfidence after recent victories, poor planning and insufficient preparation of the operation contributed the largest percentage to the defeat of the allies.
Characters. Rating 5
There are a huge number of characters in the book, and despite their number, as well as the genre of the book, all characters are drawn with a skilful pencil. I especially liked the study of the personalities of commanders of different levels and their influence on the course of hostilities.
Dialogues. Rating 4
Dialogues are found in this non-fiction book in considerable quantity. These are good dialogues, many of them are quite tragic, some of the dialogues have dark military humor.
Writing style. Rating 4
Due to the detailed descriptions of unit movements and various small-scale combat operations, the book is a slow read. However, it gives a complete picture of all aspects of the Battle of Arnhem.
Worldbuilding. Rating 5
The book tells about the actions of British, American, German, Polish units, about all the branches of the troops involved in the operation, about numerous examples of courage, about fighting in the environment and the inevitable capture. The troubles of the civilian population in the thick of hostilities are well shown, as well as the actions of the numerous Dutch Resistance. There are many difficult scenes in the book, connected with the fighting bitterness of soldiers, wounds and death.
Conclusion. Overall rating 5
Fundamental research for readers who are interested in the Second World War.
Plot. Rating 5
The book features a very meticulous study of the plot. Several chapters show the preparation of the operation, then there is a detailed account of the battle with the plans and actions of both sides. The author presents many versions of the failure of this daring offensive at the strategic and tactical level. A large role is assigned to the influence of random events in the war. It seems to me that overconfidence after recent victories, poor planning and insufficient preparation of the operation contributed the largest percentage to the defeat of the allies.
Characters. Rating 5
There are a huge number of characters in the book, and despite their number, as well as the genre of the book, all characters are drawn with a skilful pencil. I especially liked the study of the personalities of commanders of different levels and their influence on the course of hostilities.
Dialogues. Rating 4
Dialogues are found in this non-fiction book in considerable quantity. These are good dialogues, many of them are quite tragic, some of the dialogues have dark military humor.
Writing style. Rating 4
Due to the detailed descriptions of unit movements and various small-scale combat operations, the book is a slow read. However, it gives a complete picture of all aspects of the Battle of Arnhem.
Worldbuilding. Rating 5
The book tells about the actions of British, American, German, Polish units, about all the branches of the troops involved in the operation, about numerous examples of courage, about fighting in the environment and the inevitable capture. The troubles of the civilian population in the thick of hostilities are well shown, as well as the actions of the numerous Dutch Resistance. There are many difficult scenes in the book, connected with the fighting bitterness of soldiers, wounds and death.
Conclusion. Overall rating 5
Fundamental research for readers who are interested in the Second World War.
June 13, 2018
A return to form from Mr Beevor.
Antony Beevor's latest book covers the Arnhem campaign. He starts, as so many others do, at the planning stage, proceeds to the military operations and the eventual unraveling of allied strategy.
The difference between this book and previous books on Arnhem is the slowly shifting focus from the military, with its heroes (Sosobowski, Frost) and its villains (Montgomery, Browning and Thomas) to the civilian. The ultimate heroes and victims of this book, with a narrative that ends post-war, are the brave Dutch people.
I look forward to seeing the author (for the second time) in an hour.
Antony Beevor's latest book covers the Arnhem campaign. He starts, as so many others do, at the planning stage, proceeds to the military operations and the eventual unraveling of allied strategy.
The difference between this book and previous books on Arnhem is the slowly shifting focus from the military, with its heroes (Sosobowski, Frost) and its villains (Montgomery, Browning and Thomas) to the civilian. The ultimate heroes and victims of this book, with a narrative that ends post-war, are the brave Dutch people.
I look forward to seeing the author (for the second time) in an hour.
October 14, 2021
A 17 hour unabridged audiobook.
The author does a better job of describing the Polish troops/leaders efforts (and their frustrations over what has happening in Warsaw at the time) than any other author I've come across in relation to Market Garden histories. Their leadership unfairly scapegoated by the British.
The same can be said about the atrocities committed against the Dutch citizens afterward, the reprisals where 200,000 civilians were forcibly relocated, their homes looted and often damaged or burned, the population starved. These parts were difficult to listen to, but so necessary to never be forgotten.
The bravery and skill of the British paratroopers is very well detailed. The frustration at the armored advance and British planners seems well placed.
Finally, the author makes a good combination of combat accounts and operational planning details. I really enjoyed this book.
The author does a better job of describing the Polish troops/leaders efforts (and their frustrations over what has happening in Warsaw at the time) than any other author I've come across in relation to Market Garden histories. Their leadership unfairly scapegoated by the British.
The same can be said about the atrocities committed against the Dutch citizens afterward, the reprisals where 200,000 civilians were forcibly relocated, their homes looted and often damaged or burned, the population starved. These parts were difficult to listen to, but so necessary to never be forgotten.
The bravery and skill of the British paratroopers is very well detailed. The frustration at the armored advance and British planners seems well placed.
Finally, the author makes a good combination of combat accounts and operational planning details. I really enjoyed this book.
Read
November 4, 2018It comes as no surprise that Antony Beevor has written a great book again. A highly detailed account of the ill fated Operation Market Garden bringing to life the desperate struggle for the bridges. The author manages to give new insights to the various decisions and stages of the battle. Besides the gripping tale of the military operations the author doesn't fail to look into the human aspect of the battle. The little personal stories of combatants and civilians alike give a whole different dimension to Beevor's books, getting the reader close to the battle at a personal level.
I think this book it will be one of the great reference books about the battle in the years to come.
I think this book it will be one of the great reference books about the battle in the years to come.
December 11, 2019
An excellent book.
This is my second read of Antony Beever, after an equally superb book on the Spanish Civil War, and I have to say, Antony writes with style, wit and passion.
The book focuses on Operation Market Garden (you may have seen the star-laden movie from the late 70s), an ambitious attempt to capture the major bridges across eastern Netherlands, all the way to Arnhem, and thus allow passage over the Rhine into Germany. Indeed, ambitious, because it did not work out, and Arnhem was only liberated seven months later, after Germany surrendered.
The book gives an excellent overview of the botched operation, the ins and outs. Highly detailed and highly personal, with fascinating snippets of personal stories from Dutch civilians, common soldiers, officers in the field, generals in the headquarters, on both sides of the war. And of course, as always, there's political intrigue among the military commands, the dislike between Montgomery and Patton, the blunders around Antwerp, the infuriating way people's lives were almost casually tossed aside. I found the meekness of General Urqhuart particularly vexsome, and then there's the story of the Polish Brigade led by General Sosabowski. The author is fairly disdainful of the allied leaders, but you do get to see a lot of interesting and opposing personalities throughout. If anything, Arnhem is a super-detailed and long book, with an immense amount of information.
The book also does not neglect the German side, the Dutch collaborators, the occasional bystander caught in the middle. It's funny and tragic reading about the wounded British and German soldiers sharing the same hospitals, the absurdity of it all, the humor, and the crazy stories that always trump fiction. You don't get that in the movie by the way, so the book gives far more reality and depth to the events.
If you like history, this one sheds remarkable light on one of the major operations of the West Front, apart from the Normandy landings and the Ardennes. Much recommended!
I have already bought two more books by this author - Berlin and Stalingrad, and will be reading them in the coming weeks.
Igor
This is my second read of Antony Beever, after an equally superb book on the Spanish Civil War, and I have to say, Antony writes with style, wit and passion.
The book focuses on Operation Market Garden (you may have seen the star-laden movie from the late 70s), an ambitious attempt to capture the major bridges across eastern Netherlands, all the way to Arnhem, and thus allow passage over the Rhine into Germany. Indeed, ambitious, because it did not work out, and Arnhem was only liberated seven months later, after Germany surrendered.
The book gives an excellent overview of the botched operation, the ins and outs. Highly detailed and highly personal, with fascinating snippets of personal stories from Dutch civilians, common soldiers, officers in the field, generals in the headquarters, on both sides of the war. And of course, as always, there's political intrigue among the military commands, the dislike between Montgomery and Patton, the blunders around Antwerp, the infuriating way people's lives were almost casually tossed aside. I found the meekness of General Urqhuart particularly vexsome, and then there's the story of the Polish Brigade led by General Sosabowski. The author is fairly disdainful of the allied leaders, but you do get to see a lot of interesting and opposing personalities throughout. If anything, Arnhem is a super-detailed and long book, with an immense amount of information.
The book also does not neglect the German side, the Dutch collaborators, the occasional bystander caught in the middle. It's funny and tragic reading about the wounded British and German soldiers sharing the same hospitals, the absurdity of it all, the humor, and the crazy stories that always trump fiction. You don't get that in the movie by the way, so the book gives far more reality and depth to the events.
If you like history, this one sheds remarkable light on one of the major operations of the West Front, apart from the Normandy landings and the Ardennes. Much recommended!
I have already bought two more books by this author - Berlin and Stalingrad, and will be reading them in the coming weeks.
Igor
May 15, 2019
Knighted in 2017, the much-honoured Antony Beevor is indeed the greatest historian of our age. Rather than riding on his laurels and writing opinion pieces, Beevor continues to work intensely in the archives. Given that he is now over 70, one wonders how long he can continue such an intense regime of work. I am giving "The Battle of Arnhem" a mere four-star rating primarily to acknowledge that it is still not on the same level of either of his two masterpieces "Stalingrad" and "The Fall of Berlin".
Arnhem stands as a monumental blotch on the record of Field Marshall Montgomery who was the hero of El Alamein and of the British offensive in Italy. Beevor makes it very clear that Montgomery was the prime person responsible for the debacle. The attack was planned in less than two weeks which was much less than was required. To compound matters, Montgomery was absent for several key meetings. The plan that emerged was simply dreadful. Troops were flown in by glider and parachuted in too far behind enemy lines, for there to have been any reasonable hope for the ground support to have arrived in time. Amongst many things, the planners failed to realize that if there was any damage to the roads, the British tanks would not be able to advance over the soft Dutch terrain. No contingency plans existed to address unexpected events or incorrect assumptions.
As in all his books, Beevor is able to integrate the experiences of the civilians in the war zone with the narrative of the military events. As usually the reader is presented with a frightful story of civilian suffering that meshes with the tales of the fighting armies.
Beevor has produced a fine history of the Battle of Arnhem. Unfortunately I have not read Cornelius Ryan's celebrated "A Bridge Too Far" so I cannot comment on its merits relative to those of Beevor's book. I am also unable to comment on Beevor's contention that the disaster attack on Arnhem set of a string of events with led to the loss of 30,000 civilian Dutch lives in the famine of the Hunger Winter of 1944-45. On the face of hit however Beevor's case seems very strong.
Arnhem stands as a monumental blotch on the record of Field Marshall Montgomery who was the hero of El Alamein and of the British offensive in Italy. Beevor makes it very clear that Montgomery was the prime person responsible for the debacle. The attack was planned in less than two weeks which was much less than was required. To compound matters, Montgomery was absent for several key meetings. The plan that emerged was simply dreadful. Troops were flown in by glider and parachuted in too far behind enemy lines, for there to have been any reasonable hope for the ground support to have arrived in time. Amongst many things, the planners failed to realize that if there was any damage to the roads, the British tanks would not be able to advance over the soft Dutch terrain. No contingency plans existed to address unexpected events or incorrect assumptions.
As in all his books, Beevor is able to integrate the experiences of the civilians in the war zone with the narrative of the military events. As usually the reader is presented with a frightful story of civilian suffering that meshes with the tales of the fighting armies.
Beevor has produced a fine history of the Battle of Arnhem. Unfortunately I have not read Cornelius Ryan's celebrated "A Bridge Too Far" so I cannot comment on its merits relative to those of Beevor's book. I am also unable to comment on Beevor's contention that the disaster attack on Arnhem set of a string of events with led to the loss of 30,000 civilian Dutch lives in the famine of the Hunger Winter of 1944-45. On the face of hit however Beevor's case seems very strong.
July 7, 2025
You’ve seen the film, A Bridge Too Far and you’ve heard that the battle for the bridge over the Rhine was a tale of plucky British paratroops fighting and losing against the far superior forces of the German SS, but this history book may well revise your opinion, negatively, of this utter disaster.
This in-depth, well researched book is another from the pen (keyboard?) of Antony Beevor, one of our pre-eminent military historians, and a fine book it is. Mr Beevor delves into the background and genesis of the mission, which was a previous mission that was cancelled, and the reasons for it ever being agreed. This part is one that makes you really angry because, unfortunately, it was a case of Field Marshal Montgomery trying to hog the limelight and get into Germany before the Americans, who had a better chance further south.
The background explanation … (it’s a bit long, sorry)
I can understand why Monty’s nose was out of joint: he was slated for being ‘too slow’ to capture Caen in Normandy after D-Day even though the British were fighting up to seven SS Panzer divisions at any one time, whereas the Americans faced fewer and poorer quality opposition much of the time. This is not to say they had an easy time of it – far from it, simply that much of the criticism against Monty at that time was biased and unfair. It was also the British who had the most experience fighting the Germans, though the Americans learned fast and had adapted their tactics enormously since D-Day (and, indeed, did so in Sicily the year before that), but Monty and other British generals felt they were gradually being sidelined by the Americans, who were more gung-ho and ‘exotic’ to the Europeans. Remember that the British had been fighting WWII since September 1939 and the land war had been going on since April (Norway) and May 1940 when British forces tried to halt the German invasion of Holland, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, whereas the American army’s first battle was during Operation Torch in November 1942. (Even in the Pacific, US ground troops did not see action until August 1942.) This meant that the British were suffering from manpower shortages and didn’t want to run down their armies to such an extent that they became almost irrelevant, so they were more conscious of casualty rates. The Americans, however, had not suffered as many casualties or disasters, so had no such qualms, despite some very hard fighting, e.g. in Hürtgen Forest.
Churchill, the government and the British High Command were smarting from having to relinquish a lot of control to General Eisenhower and the US government which, quite understandably, demanded more say because they not only had sent thousands of troops and air crew to Europe but were supplying most of the tanks, aircraft and other weapons that had kept the war going; British production could not have kept up on its own by a long way. The overall impression beginning to be made, then, was that ‘the Americans are winning the war’, which was hard to take after all the sacrifices the British and other Allies had made.
So, basically, the alliance was holding together well but with niggles on both sides, not helped by Monty’s acerbic nature and arrogance towards his fellow officers, most of whom disliked him, whatever their nationality. He could have worked more collaboratively with Ike, Bradley and Patton (another prima donna!) in which case lives could have been saved. In any case, Monty cajoled, persuaded and threw his teddies out of the pram until he was given priority over supplies, stating that a strong thrust in the northern sector would result in a rapid crossing of the Rhine and a swing round to the right into the Ruhr – Germany’s industrial heartland and source of production, and ‘end the war by Christmas’. This was despite the fact that Patton was in a good position to thrust through the Alsace and into central Germany.
Students of WWII know that thanks to America’s industrial capacity and amazing ability and effort to ramp up war production, the likes of GM, Ford and Boeing were turning out military vehicles, tanks and planes at an enormous rate, so Allied forces could replace their assets almost instantly when they got blown up. They also had a huge capacity to produce small-arms and fuel, so why, you may ask, were the Allied generals arguing over priority of supplies? The answer is that while the Allied armies were by now in eastern France and Belgium, they were still having to bring the majority of their supplies from the beaches and Mulberry harbours in Normandy hundreds of miles away. This also entailed using huge amounts of petrol for the supply trucks, detracting from that needed by the armies.
The most logical answer to this was to prioritise the capture of the Belgian port of Antwerp and the Scheldt Estuary which leads to it; that way they could have brought thousands of tons of supplies in much closer to the action. Unfortunately, Monty was not interested in Antwerp, possibly because that battle was being gallantly fought by the Canadians, who were making a good job of a very difficult situation. They captured the port but the Germans held Walcheren Island, which dominated the river leading to the port, so it couldn’t be used.
As a result of all this and more, Monty and his closest group decided to throw caution to the wind and make a plan to grab the headlines and the glory by capturing the first bridge over the Rhine and being the first Allied troops into Germany. This also served another purpose; the British 1st Parachute Brigade was a highly trained elite unit that had hardly been used at all up to that point. They were frustrated and bored, and wanted to get in on the action, whereas the American 82nd (All American) and 101st (Screaming Eagles) Parachute divisions were doing a magnificent job and getting a lot of attention.
The whole point of parachute troops is that they are used in a coup de main capacity, which means they are only lightly armed but are dropped very close to their objective and, as highly motivated shock troops they hit the enemy hard and fast, with the element of surprise giving them an edge, to be relieved by regular and more heavily armed ground troops supported by artillery and tanks before the enemy has time to react, e.g. when 6th Parachute Brigade captured ‘Pegasus Bridge’ at the opening of D-Day.
So that’s the background.
Unfortunately, the plan was a bad one, especially once the RAF had made it considerably worse by refusing to drop the paras anywhere near the bridge – over eight miles away, in fact, because of the number of German anti-aircraft guns in the area. In fact, there weren’t as many as feared. This one operational fact should have prompted the abandonment of the plan at that stage; there would be no element of surprise if the paras had to march eight miles to even get near their objective, giving the Germans time to react. The Allies had also not learned, after all this time, that the Germans were actually masters of quick reaction – on many occasions they had saved themselves from disaster by extremely quick decisions and actions to rush additional weapons and troops to an area of danger, and cobble together disparate elements of shattered units into a cohesive force. This is in addition to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was in the Arnhem area for refit and a rest, and eastern Holland’s close proximity to Germany also meant that the German supply lines were very short.
I think that’s enough about that because you need to read the book, but the important thing is that this is an excellent book which covers all the elements, both military and political, that contributed to the utter disaster that was the Arnhem débacle, as a result of which thousands of gallant paras died or were taken prisoner, and hundreds more British, American and Dutch troops died, were wounded or captured, not to mention the thousands of Dutch civilians who were killed, had their houses blown up by the fighting all the way from Belgium to Arnhem, or who were severely punished or murdered by the Nazis for helping the Allies after they had won the battle. Ultimately, Arnhem was not liberated until April 1945 and Patton was the first general to cross the Rhine in strength, at Remagen. As for Monty, his reputation never recovered.
The book has several maps and photographs, which are valuable additions, and is very well written, as we have come to expect from Mr Beevor. It makes sobering reading and is an excellent addition to the canon of WWII history.
This in-depth, well researched book is another from the pen (keyboard?) of Antony Beevor, one of our pre-eminent military historians, and a fine book it is. Mr Beevor delves into the background and genesis of the mission, which was a previous mission that was cancelled, and the reasons for it ever being agreed. This part is one that makes you really angry because, unfortunately, it was a case of Field Marshal Montgomery trying to hog the limelight and get into Germany before the Americans, who had a better chance further south.
The background explanation … (it’s a bit long, sorry)
I can understand why Monty’s nose was out of joint: he was slated for being ‘too slow’ to capture Caen in Normandy after D-Day even though the British were fighting up to seven SS Panzer divisions at any one time, whereas the Americans faced fewer and poorer quality opposition much of the time. This is not to say they had an easy time of it – far from it, simply that much of the criticism against Monty at that time was biased and unfair. It was also the British who had the most experience fighting the Germans, though the Americans learned fast and had adapted their tactics enormously since D-Day (and, indeed, did so in Sicily the year before that), but Monty and other British generals felt they were gradually being sidelined by the Americans, who were more gung-ho and ‘exotic’ to the Europeans. Remember that the British had been fighting WWII since September 1939 and the land war had been going on since April (Norway) and May 1940 when British forces tried to halt the German invasion of Holland, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, whereas the American army’s first battle was during Operation Torch in November 1942. (Even in the Pacific, US ground troops did not see action until August 1942.) This meant that the British were suffering from manpower shortages and didn’t want to run down their armies to such an extent that they became almost irrelevant, so they were more conscious of casualty rates. The Americans, however, had not suffered as many casualties or disasters, so had no such qualms, despite some very hard fighting, e.g. in Hürtgen Forest.
Churchill, the government and the British High Command were smarting from having to relinquish a lot of control to General Eisenhower and the US government which, quite understandably, demanded more say because they not only had sent thousands of troops and air crew to Europe but were supplying most of the tanks, aircraft and other weapons that had kept the war going; British production could not have kept up on its own by a long way. The overall impression beginning to be made, then, was that ‘the Americans are winning the war’, which was hard to take after all the sacrifices the British and other Allies had made.
So, basically, the alliance was holding together well but with niggles on both sides, not helped by Monty’s acerbic nature and arrogance towards his fellow officers, most of whom disliked him, whatever their nationality. He could have worked more collaboratively with Ike, Bradley and Patton (another prima donna!) in which case lives could have been saved. In any case, Monty cajoled, persuaded and threw his teddies out of the pram until he was given priority over supplies, stating that a strong thrust in the northern sector would result in a rapid crossing of the Rhine and a swing round to the right into the Ruhr – Germany’s industrial heartland and source of production, and ‘end the war by Christmas’. This was despite the fact that Patton was in a good position to thrust through the Alsace and into central Germany.
Students of WWII know that thanks to America’s industrial capacity and amazing ability and effort to ramp up war production, the likes of GM, Ford and Boeing were turning out military vehicles, tanks and planes at an enormous rate, so Allied forces could replace their assets almost instantly when they got blown up. They also had a huge capacity to produce small-arms and fuel, so why, you may ask, were the Allied generals arguing over priority of supplies? The answer is that while the Allied armies were by now in eastern France and Belgium, they were still having to bring the majority of their supplies from the beaches and Mulberry harbours in Normandy hundreds of miles away. This also entailed using huge amounts of petrol for the supply trucks, detracting from that needed by the armies.
The most logical answer to this was to prioritise the capture of the Belgian port of Antwerp and the Scheldt Estuary which leads to it; that way they could have brought thousands of tons of supplies in much closer to the action. Unfortunately, Monty was not interested in Antwerp, possibly because that battle was being gallantly fought by the Canadians, who were making a good job of a very difficult situation. They captured the port but the Germans held Walcheren Island, which dominated the river leading to the port, so it couldn’t be used.
As a result of all this and more, Monty and his closest group decided to throw caution to the wind and make a plan to grab the headlines and the glory by capturing the first bridge over the Rhine and being the first Allied troops into Germany. This also served another purpose; the British 1st Parachute Brigade was a highly trained elite unit that had hardly been used at all up to that point. They were frustrated and bored, and wanted to get in on the action, whereas the American 82nd (All American) and 101st (Screaming Eagles) Parachute divisions were doing a magnificent job and getting a lot of attention.
The whole point of parachute troops is that they are used in a coup de main capacity, which means they are only lightly armed but are dropped very close to their objective and, as highly motivated shock troops they hit the enemy hard and fast, with the element of surprise giving them an edge, to be relieved by regular and more heavily armed ground troops supported by artillery and tanks before the enemy has time to react, e.g. when 6th Parachute Brigade captured ‘Pegasus Bridge’ at the opening of D-Day.
So that’s the background.
Unfortunately, the plan was a bad one, especially once the RAF had made it considerably worse by refusing to drop the paras anywhere near the bridge – over eight miles away, in fact, because of the number of German anti-aircraft guns in the area. In fact, there weren’t as many as feared. This one operational fact should have prompted the abandonment of the plan at that stage; there would be no element of surprise if the paras had to march eight miles to even get near their objective, giving the Germans time to react. The Allies had also not learned, after all this time, that the Germans were actually masters of quick reaction – on many occasions they had saved themselves from disaster by extremely quick decisions and actions to rush additional weapons and troops to an area of danger, and cobble together disparate elements of shattered units into a cohesive force. This is in addition to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was in the Arnhem area for refit and a rest, and eastern Holland’s close proximity to Germany also meant that the German supply lines were very short.
I think that’s enough about that because you need to read the book, but the important thing is that this is an excellent book which covers all the elements, both military and political, that contributed to the utter disaster that was the Arnhem débacle, as a result of which thousands of gallant paras died or were taken prisoner, and hundreds more British, American and Dutch troops died, were wounded or captured, not to mention the thousands of Dutch civilians who were killed, had their houses blown up by the fighting all the way from Belgium to Arnhem, or who were severely punished or murdered by the Nazis for helping the Allies after they had won the battle. Ultimately, Arnhem was not liberated until April 1945 and Patton was the first general to cross the Rhine in strength, at Remagen. As for Monty, his reputation never recovered.
The book has several maps and photographs, which are valuable additions, and is very well written, as we have come to expect from Mr Beevor. It makes sobering reading and is an excellent addition to the canon of WWII history.
February 20, 2023
Een heel goed boek die in de detail vertelt over, niet alleen de slag om Arnhem, maar de gehele Operation Market Garden. Het leest af en toe rommelig omdat van de ene persoon naar de andere wordt gepraat, maar dat doet de kwaliteit niet ten minder omdat de schrijver een levendige en gedetailleerde manier van schrijven gebruikt. Een aanrader voor iedereen die meer over deze slag te weten wilt komen.
September 1, 2018
Hard to review this book, as it containers obvious strengths, as well as its flaws. The book excels in its thorough research and use of sources. The book is able to give a nee and nuanced view on what has happened. On the other hand, it is a shame Beevor does not reserve more room for argumentation for its major points. Furthermore, the enormous amount of details overwhelmes and sometimes deflects from the important stories.
October 30, 2023
This book has merits - the description of localised fighting, particularly around Arnhem, the acknowledgement of the bravery of the the average fighting man, the highlighting of the outstanding courage of the Dutch, the effort to give some of the German perspective and the positive attempt to rehabilate the unfortunate and wrongly maligned Sosabowski are all creditable insights.
However, it is abundantly clear that that the author falls into the elementary trap of disparaging Montgomery because of who he was and not because of his generalship. While there is no doubt Montgomery was his own worst enemy and that he made errors over the course of the war, especially with regard to not prioritising the Scheldt estuary, it is also true that he was the most effective allied battlefield general in the Western European Theatre, with the possible exception of Alexander. What other Allied general had fought, generally successfully, in retreat (Dunkirk), defense (UK, Caen), counter attack (Ardennes) and attack (El Alamein/ North Africa, Italy, Belgium, Rhine) over six years of continuous war? The author has taken the conventional approach of laying the blame of the failure of Market Garden at Montgomery’s door, probably because it’s the path of least resistance when looking for book sales.
It is very easy to argue that Arnhem was, strategically, a bad plan but it must not be forgotten that it almost succeeded despite so much going wrong. Notwithstanding the failures on issues such intelligence, utilisation of the Dutch Underground and communications generally, decision making below Montgomery around ground force delivery (Brereton and Williams) resulting in sacrificing surprise, the speed of XXX Corps (Browning and Horrocks) and above all Gavin’s failure to take the Nijmegan bridge in due time played a far greater role in defeat than the failures in the strategic plan itself.
Unfortunately, the Author really doesn’t make this clear, especially with regard to the failure at Nijmegen; at one point he refers to Gavin’s leadership as exceptional, even though Gavin singularly failed to show the initiative which the author so cavalierly suggests the British lacked. (Read John Buckley’s Monty’s men for a first class appraisal of the 21st Army Group).
Only once does the author get to the nub of the issue - on page 220, he states that “the simple truth is that XXX Corps was too late, and so was the capture of the Nijmegan bridge as a result of the defending of the Groesbeck heights”. Of course, even here clarity is lacking - the two factors the author mentions above are not somehow mutually exclusive - part of the reason for the delay of XXX Corp was precisely because the bridge hadn’t been taken.
The author also seemed prone to making little, almost snide references, with regard to the British fighting prowess and almost always from the perspective of the Americans - he quotes Dick Winters, of band of brothers fame, suggesting that The British lacked aggression (ex airborne) - this is the same British army who had been fighting since 1939. Elsewhere he quotes an American cliche that the British were “happy to fight to the last ally” - this type of thing is highly invidious given the British took on the vast bulk of the fighting during Market Garden (and in fact had since the June landings) and consequently suffered four times the casualties the Americans did in the Market Garden operations.
In summary, there are baises here which are cliched and sloppy which In turn means it simply isn’t as good a book as either Stalingrad or Berlin.
Lastly - a lot more maps please!
However, it is abundantly clear that that the author falls into the elementary trap of disparaging Montgomery because of who he was and not because of his generalship. While there is no doubt Montgomery was his own worst enemy and that he made errors over the course of the war, especially with regard to not prioritising the Scheldt estuary, it is also true that he was the most effective allied battlefield general in the Western European Theatre, with the possible exception of Alexander. What other Allied general had fought, generally successfully, in retreat (Dunkirk), defense (UK, Caen), counter attack (Ardennes) and attack (El Alamein/ North Africa, Italy, Belgium, Rhine) over six years of continuous war? The author has taken the conventional approach of laying the blame of the failure of Market Garden at Montgomery’s door, probably because it’s the path of least resistance when looking for book sales.
It is very easy to argue that Arnhem was, strategically, a bad plan but it must not be forgotten that it almost succeeded despite so much going wrong. Notwithstanding the failures on issues such intelligence, utilisation of the Dutch Underground and communications generally, decision making below Montgomery around ground force delivery (Brereton and Williams) resulting in sacrificing surprise, the speed of XXX Corps (Browning and Horrocks) and above all Gavin’s failure to take the Nijmegan bridge in due time played a far greater role in defeat than the failures in the strategic plan itself.
Unfortunately, the Author really doesn’t make this clear, especially with regard to the failure at Nijmegen; at one point he refers to Gavin’s leadership as exceptional, even though Gavin singularly failed to show the initiative which the author so cavalierly suggests the British lacked. (Read John Buckley’s Monty’s men for a first class appraisal of the 21st Army Group).
Only once does the author get to the nub of the issue - on page 220, he states that “the simple truth is that XXX Corps was too late, and so was the capture of the Nijmegan bridge as a result of the defending of the Groesbeck heights”. Of course, even here clarity is lacking - the two factors the author mentions above are not somehow mutually exclusive - part of the reason for the delay of XXX Corp was precisely because the bridge hadn’t been taken.
The author also seemed prone to making little, almost snide references, with regard to the British fighting prowess and almost always from the perspective of the Americans - he quotes Dick Winters, of band of brothers fame, suggesting that The British lacked aggression (ex airborne) - this is the same British army who had been fighting since 1939. Elsewhere he quotes an American cliche that the British were “happy to fight to the last ally” - this type of thing is highly invidious given the British took on the vast bulk of the fighting during Market Garden (and in fact had since the June landings) and consequently suffered four times the casualties the Americans did in the Market Garden operations.
In summary, there are baises here which are cliched and sloppy which In turn means it simply isn’t as good a book as either Stalingrad or Berlin.
Lastly - a lot more maps please!
January 5, 2020
Market-Garden, A Bridge too Far call it what you will, it is one of the battles that gets a great deal of coverage on the printed page (for European Battles maybe second only to the Battle of the Bulge). Books on this particular Operation tend to focus on certain aspects of it. Generally the Airborne components, and the delays that were caused to the land forces. Mostly the run up to the battles is treated either quickly or almost as an afterthought sprinkled throughout the action to show what effect it had on operations.
Beevor, however, takes the time at the beginning of the book to show just what a mess the planning was. This early spadework makes the rest of the nightmare that the Operation became much more understandable. I would say that this is one of the best books on Operation Market-Garden there is out there at this time.
Beevor, however, takes the time at the beginning of the book to show just what a mess the planning was. This early spadework makes the rest of the nightmare that the Operation became much more understandable. I would say that this is one of the best books on Operation Market-Garden there is out there at this time.
December 9, 2018
Aunque el asunto, objetivamente, es muy interesante, no se consigue la claridad expositiva necesaria, lo que hace que la lectura sea difícil. No obstante, como en ocasiones anteriores Beevor profundiza en las anécdotas personales que van más allá de la "historia" oficial para mostrarnos más aspectos de lo ocurrido.
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