Flesh and Steel During the Great War: The Transformation of the French Army and the Invention of Modern Warfare

by Michel Goya, Hew Strachan (Foreword), Andrew Uffindell (Translation)

Michel Goya's Flesh and Steel during the Great War is one of the most thoughtful, stimulating and original studies of the conflict to have appeared in recent years. It is a major contribution towards a deeper understanding of the impact of the struggle on the Western Front on the theory and practice of warfare in the French army. In a series of incisive, closely argued chapters he explores the way in which the senior commanders and ordinary soldiers responded to the extraordinary challenges posed by the mass industrial warfare of the early twentieth century.

In 1914 the French army went to war with a flawed doctrine, brightly-colored uniforms and a dire shortage of modern, heavy artillery How then, over four years of relentless, attritional warfare, did it become the great, industrialized army that emerged victorious in 1918?

To show how this change occurred, the author examines the pre-war ethos and organization of the army and describes in telling detail how, through a process of analysis and innovation, the French army underwent the deepest and fastest transformation in its history.

Genres: History, World War I, France

344 pages, Hardcover

Published December 21, 2018

Reviews

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

An eye-opening and much-needed portrait of how the French Army modernized itself in the midst of ferocious combat during the First World War. We English-readers are awash in (generally excellent) books about changes and improvements in combat methods in the British Army of that war, so it is refreshing and appropriate that this translation of French Army officer Michel Goya's well-researched and compellingly-written book see the light of day to portrait what was, after all, the largest and most important army of the Western Front. Much of the book covers the equipment, tactics and doctrine of the pre-war French Army which had more in common with the army of Napoleon than a 20th-century military, especially in its devotion to the cult of the offensive and its tactics, to say nothing of its uniforms. The fiery forge of combat and the very heavy casualties - the French Army suffered just over 1 million dead in WWI, half of whom fell in the first 16 months of the conflict - forced many changes, many of which were carried out by the units in contact with the enemy, and other adaptations were the result of efforts by the combat branches (the infantry, artillery, etc.). The role of the high command was to standardize these changes, encourage them when necessary and write the doctrines needed to make them work in battle. New equipment and methods (i.e. tanks, aviation, heavy artillery, motorization, better infantry weapons and much more wireless communications) rather quickly, if unsystematically, made their way to the army, eventually creating a well-armed and tactically adept force which could eventually help defeat the Germans and win the war. A few more and better maps of the battles and of the Western Front would not have gone amiss but, all in all, this is a remarkable portrait of how an army can reform itself, both from above and below, in the course of a terrible conflict. A fine addition to your World War I bookshelf, especially if the French Army is an interest of yours.

[Matt · Rating 5 out of 5]

Michel Goya's excellent study of the evolution of the French Army during the First World War finally received, after 14 years, an English translation in 2018. This study is an excellent look at the strengths and weaknesses of the French military and how it reacted, as an institution, to the challenges it faced during the First World War. Of particular interest to me was the chapter on the sights, sounds, and smells of a battle - especially the parts on sound. That's a dimension that I feel is often misconstrued, especially in regards to the crack and whizzes of bullets (in short, hearing the report is much more difficult and most of the time soldiers would be hearing the crack and whizzes of shots). It talks about the different level of commands and different branches.

That said, I did disagree with some of Goya's assessment of the Internal Combustion Engine and Cavalry. Goya argues that the Cavalry should have made a much more pronounced effort to mechanize and move away from horses during the conflict. I feel this criticism is a bit misguided, especially in the light of some important and major revision done in regards to the BEF Cavalry by authors such as Stephen Badsey and David Kenyon. That is not to say Cavalry was supremely useful - but their usefulness overall needs a fresh look, at least in regards to the French.

Still, this is a historiographical sticking point rather than an error with the book. Goya crafted one of the best works on the French military during the First World War and anyone interested in the conflict can not miss this.

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you were to ask me when I first became aware of Michel Goya, and that he was part of a new wave of French military history, I really couldn't answer that question except to suspect that this sometime around 2010. I was thus very interested when this work came out in English, and the only reason that I didn't get to it sooner I'm essentially going to blame on COVID.

Having said that, I have to say that Goya deserves the hype, as he offers the most systematic examination of the ins and outs of the doctrinal development of the French army of the early 20th century, why it often seemed to deliver less than hoped, but was still contributed to creating the most modern military in the world in 1918. A lot of this boiled down to necessity being the mother of invention, and that the French officer corps did contain a lot of smart analytic minds.

However, for Goya, the biggest single deal was not concepts, as different French officers at different points during 1914-1918 demonstrated that they could make most doctrinal concepts work, the real issue was investing enough in training. Training was hard because it was expensive for an army that was frankly bigger than France could support, and the rot set in again by the late 1920s. As much as one could scoff at the 1914 French doctrine of all-out offense, it did build spirit; a spirit that was lacking in 1940. But that's a different book.

Highly recommended, as I found out something insightful and new to me on almost every single page. The only reason I don't give out five stars is that this is an academic book, it was published over twenty years ago, and such books tend to have a limited shelf life. This is not to mention that this work presumes a fair amount of base-line knowledge from the reader.