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First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles of Morals and Justice
This book restores to us an understanding that was once settled in the "moral sciences": that there are propositions, in morals and law, which are not only true but which cannot be otherwise. It was understood in the past that, in morals or in mathematics, our knowledge begins with certain axioms that must hold true of necessity; that the principles drawn from these axioms hold true universally, unaffected by variations in local "cultures"; and that the presence of these axioms makes it possible to have, in the domain of morals, some right answers. Hadley Arkes restates the grounds of that older understanding and unfolds its implications for the most vexing political problems of our day.
The author turns first to the classic debate between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas. After establishing the groundwork and properties of moral propositions, he traces their application in such issues as selective conscientious objection, justifications for war, the war in Vietnam, a nation's obligation to intervene abroad, the notion of supererogatory acts, the claims of "privacy," and the problem of abortion.
The author turns first to the classic debate between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas. After establishing the groundwork and properties of moral propositions, he traces their application in such issues as selective conscientious objection, justifications for war, the war in Vietnam, a nation's obligation to intervene abroad, the notion of supererogatory acts, the claims of "privacy," and the problem of abortion.
- GenresPhilosophyLaw
447 pages, Paperback
First published August 1, 1986
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 3, 2015
An excellent modern summation of natural law and the dead end of philosophical and moral relativism.
Arkes presents a clear and cogent outline of First Principles - the immutable and undeniable foundations of moral argument. Much political argument today goes off the rails because of the ill-fated modern attempt to avoid these principles.
Understanding these First Principles helps, among other things, to comprehend and articulate the dividing line between the political - those things about which there can be disagreement as we decide how to live together - and those things that are beyond argument, and not subject to debate in the political sphere.
In some sense this is a college education in one volume, or, regrettably, the antidote to one.
Arkes presents a clear and cogent outline of First Principles - the immutable and undeniable foundations of moral argument. Much political argument today goes off the rails because of the ill-fated modern attempt to avoid these principles.
Understanding these First Principles helps, among other things, to comprehend and articulate the dividing line between the political - those things about which there can be disagreement as we decide how to live together - and those things that are beyond argument, and not subject to debate in the political sphere.
In some sense this is a college education in one volume, or, regrettably, the antidote to one.
July 16, 2007
an inquiry into the first principles of morals and justice.
Currently reading
August 22, 2011So good!!!
August 9, 2014
Prof. Arkes begins with little more than "I think, therefore I am" and constructs an impervious Judeo-Christian ethic.
I'd recommend this especially for college students on summer break.
I'd recommend this especially for college students on summer break.
February 13, 2018
Arkes advances a Kantian ethics, and he does so well. At least in theory. His writing requires effort, but it's worth it. My big takeaway is that moral propositions are universal. Meaning they apply the same to everyone in the same circumstances. He adds something that sidesteps the main objection to Kant. Something is wrong when we do it *without justification*. Many have complained that Kant's "categorical imperative" would keep us from lying to the Gestapo. The Secret Police ask if we're hiding anyone. We have to tell the truth, since we can't lie. We can't lie because lying is always wrong. Therefore someone is sent to a camp and loses her life. Seems worse than lying. Arkes draws from Kant's writing and shows the misunderstanding. Lying is permissible when it's done with sufficient justification. Such as in the above scenario. Very helpful.
Notes:
1) Aristotle. Polity arises from the capacity of human beings for moral judgment. The mark of a polity is the presence of Law, and law as we can see now arises directly from the logic of morals (25)
2) Regarding any notion that we shouldn't legislate morality, we shouldn't legislate anything else! (27)
3) Creatures with the capacity for reason may be ruled rightfully only with their consent (47)
4) The language of morals makes no sense when it is directed towards acts that are determined by the causal laws of nature. We could never sensibly say that the Earth is obliged to revolve around the Sun, and that it would be wrong, or worthy of blame, if it did not. The language of morals must presuppose, of necessity, a being who is free to choose one course of action or another (53)
5) When we recognize that the maxim behind any act is to be judged for its rightness or wrongness on grounds that are quite independent of the consequences of the act, we grasp of the force of Kant's explanation that moral imperatives are categorical rather than contingent (90)
6) So ksnt does allow nisnce, "ons. As he came to elaborate his argument on "lying,"
ahowed himself unwilling to condemn, categorically, all instan nal untruth in the expression of o Kan of speaking "a
an intentional untruth in the expression of one's
In his lectures on ethics, Kant remarked that "if we were nbe at all time punctiliously truthful we might often become victims ickedness of others who were ready to abuse our truthfulness There was, for Kant, no obligation to speak the truth for the ake of furthering the work of criminals, and the criminals had no night" to receive the truth. And so, as Kant said, if an enemy were to grab him by the throat and ask where he kept his money, "I need not tell him the truth, because he will abuse it; and my untruth is not a lie (mendacium) because the thief knows full well that I will not, if I can help it, tell him the truth and that he has no right to demand it " Kant went on to say that if force were used to extort a
confession from him, "if my confession is improperly used against me, and if I cannot save myself by maintaining silence, then my lie is a
weapon of defence. The misuse of a declaration extorted by force in defending myself."23 The sense of being coerced toward end is enough to remove the act of speech from the obli- must attach to the speech of communi- and exchange, the speech that is directed toward legitimate
of the ations of truthfulness that ation ave been taken for granted by Kant that it is wrong
to y when the deception would cause injury or deflect people horal" requirement, built into the
become clear then that Kant could not rea
ative, deserved to be made explicit. For it wou
t could not really have rejected, cat- rom truth, and that understanding would e cl
eener t" 109)
7) It is wrong = to do X without justification (113)
8) The notion of morals would be meaningless, and the language of morals would exist in vain, unless it presupposed creatures whose acts were not determined entirely by laws, but who were sufficiently free or autonomous to choose between alternative courses of action(167)
9) If the conscientious objector presents us with claims-based holy on his inner feelings, then he offers a claim who's worth and validity we cannot really know. (190)
10) If one person has a right, another person has a duty (203)
11) Kant: to help others where we can is a duty (290)
12) Excellent conversation about abortion (376)
Notes:
1) Aristotle. Polity arises from the capacity of human beings for moral judgment. The mark of a polity is the presence of Law, and law as we can see now arises directly from the logic of morals (25)
2) Regarding any notion that we shouldn't legislate morality, we shouldn't legislate anything else! (27)
3) Creatures with the capacity for reason may be ruled rightfully only with their consent (47)
4) The language of morals makes no sense when it is directed towards acts that are determined by the causal laws of nature. We could never sensibly say that the Earth is obliged to revolve around the Sun, and that it would be wrong, or worthy of blame, if it did not. The language of morals must presuppose, of necessity, a being who is free to choose one course of action or another (53)
5) When we recognize that the maxim behind any act is to be judged for its rightness or wrongness on grounds that are quite independent of the consequences of the act, we grasp of the force of Kant's explanation that moral imperatives are categorical rather than contingent (90)
6) So ksnt does allow nisnce, "ons. As he came to elaborate his argument on "lying,"
ahowed himself unwilling to condemn, categorically, all instan nal untruth in the expression of o Kan of speaking "a
an intentional untruth in the expression of one's
In his lectures on ethics, Kant remarked that "if we were nbe at all time punctiliously truthful we might often become victims ickedness of others who were ready to abuse our truthfulness There was, for Kant, no obligation to speak the truth for the ake of furthering the work of criminals, and the criminals had no night" to receive the truth. And so, as Kant said, if an enemy were to grab him by the throat and ask where he kept his money, "I need not tell him the truth, because he will abuse it; and my untruth is not a lie (mendacium) because the thief knows full well that I will not, if I can help it, tell him the truth and that he has no right to demand it " Kant went on to say that if force were used to extort a
confession from him, "if my confession is improperly used against me, and if I cannot save myself by maintaining silence, then my lie is a
weapon of defence. The misuse of a declaration extorted by force in defending myself."23 The sense of being coerced toward end is enough to remove the act of speech from the obli- must attach to the speech of communi- and exchange, the speech that is directed toward legitimate
of the ations of truthfulness that ation ave been taken for granted by Kant that it is wrong
to y when the deception would cause injury or deflect people horal" requirement, built into the
become clear then that Kant could not rea
ative, deserved to be made explicit. For it wou
t could not really have rejected, cat- rom truth, and that understanding would e cl
eener t" 109)
7) It is wrong = to do X without justification (113)
8) The notion of morals would be meaningless, and the language of morals would exist in vain, unless it presupposed creatures whose acts were not determined entirely by laws, but who were sufficiently free or autonomous to choose between alternative courses of action(167)
9) If the conscientious objector presents us with claims-based holy on his inner feelings, then he offers a claim who's worth and validity we cannot really know. (190)
10) If one person has a right, another person has a duty (203)
11) Kant: to help others where we can is a duty (290)
12) Excellent conversation about abortion (376)
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews