Growing up with the assumption that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was evil, it’s amazing I enjoyed this book so much. Of course, I’ve learned a lot during that time and nearly accidently read his book, On China. That was an amazing book explaining China’s history and his role in opening up China’s economy to the world. This book is better, although shorter and different. This book must read for anyone who is curious about our country’s foreign relations no less anyone who would want to explore a career in diplomacy. It’s an admittedly non-self-critical view of his and President Nixon’s diplomatic relations that opened an avenue of diplomatic relations with China, put us on the path of resetting the cold war (that worked for decades), helped to settle down the Middle East in a major manner from war to three peace agreements with two major adversaries, and brought the Viet Nam war to an end. Kissinger is interviewed on air a number of times and those heavily edited words consume this book. It’s hard to keep in mind that the former diplomat was in his nineties when he participated in these interviews since his mind was so sharp and memory so stellar.
From the start, Nixon selecting Kissinger was surprising, at least to me. He had been an aide of Nixon’s republican adversary, Nelson Rockefeller for twelve years. Kissinger again turned down the future president even after Nixon secured the Republican nomination. The two had not worked with one another. Yet, they shared a vision of the world that brought them together. According to Kissinger, Nixon wanted to dominate international politics, make his mark and change the world. The two thought that opening a dialogue and formal relations with China would put the Soviets in check, would assure that the Soviet Union would not expand into this populated nation like they overtook Czechoslovakia.
Like today, the world – and our country – was messy. Nixon was elected after three political assassinations, Viet Nam demonstrations that shut down the Democratic Party Convention and the city where it was held, and where the Soviet Union was on the hunt for more countries to expand their geographic span while the Middle East was especially dangerous. Americans constantly worried that the Cold War might turn hot with way too many nuclear war heads pointed at one another.
This gentle book, where Kissinger is interviewed by a fellow assistant, Nixon had already passed and there are no footnotes or anyone to question Kissinger’s statements, raises so many interesting points about diplomacy, United States’ foreign policy, and behind the scenes stories about negotiations with the Russians and, especially, China. It’s shocking to think how isolated China was to the West and especially to our country when Nixon and Kissinger started their journey of developing a relationship with this huge communist country. Little is made in the book that Nixon was the unexpected leader who would take this journey, an anti-communist throughout his career, a politician who shamelessly used communist as a way to put the spotlight on himself after WWII. The book describes that the issue holding back the start of discussions was not the question of Taiwan but simply how to open up a discussion. There was absolutely no discussion, no contact, and no way for Nixon or Kissinger to have any discussion with a Chinese leader.
The approach to talk to China was almost comical. With no ambassador to try to open a discussion with the Chinese and the inward nature of the Chinese government since the Cultural Revolution, the administration used a number of unique opportunities where the key members of the Nixon crew were around Chinese government officials. They went to Charles de Gaulle’s funeral soon after their election and wanted to talk with the Chinese ambassador who attended but he was never standing alone for even a moment. They told their ambassador in Poland that they wanted to have him talk with the Chinese. He didn’t respond so they called him on the carpet – in the Oval office. This time he went to talk with the Chinese ambassador during a fashion show at the Yugoslav embassy but the Chinese representative ran away. An attempt to use the French Ambassador in Hanoi also fell short. Nixon finally took action himself – speaking to the Pakistani president who had a relationship with the Chinese. At first the Chinese said they only wanted to talk about Taiwan but slowly agreed to add to the discussion points.
It was interesting to read how the Russian threat was an incentive to the Chinese to develop a relationship with America and how Russia’s dispute with China encouraged them to also develop a relationship with our country. Due to the uncertainty, Kissinger had to take his secret trip to make sure that if his boss took the risk, it wouldn’t blow up in his face. Making it even more to talk to China for the first time in over two dozen years riskier was that Lin Biao, Mao’s long-time designated successor, had been exiled from the government. Key to the negotiations was how to recognize One China without selling out Taiwan. Our ally on the island remained an issue, resolved last but still an issue to this day. Even when they successfully negotiated an agreement, the crew was worried about the response both back home – and with their own party in Washington D.C.
Kissinger included some interesting stories about the negotiations. Communications was a real issue. Kissinger was not able to communicate back to the President or anyone in DC while in China negotiating. At one point during the negotiations with the USSR, Brezhnev whisked President Nixon away in his car to his dacha, leaving Nixon’s secret service and aides wondering what happened to him. After discussions and a long dinner, Kissinger and his counterpart were tasked with following up on discussions throughout the night to reach agreement that could be announced to the world the following day. This led to the first limitations on offensive weapons with the two superpowers. It led the framework for future SALT agreements under Reagan.
Kissinger’s ability to remember details of the negotiations was fascinating, even if not fact-checked. At one point, the Russian leaders and negotiations scolded the Americans about Viet Nam but that didn’t stop the progress; it was as if they just wanted to be able to report back that they had their fellow communist’s back without anyone moving anyone on the war. He spoke about how the Chinese negotiations are so different than the style of Americans; they view every solution as an opening of a new problem. Chinese negotiations look longer term than Americans.
Kissinger spoke of the various world leader he negotiated with, sharing stories of their approach and personality. Many of these people are already well into the history books but many were people I remember having power when I grew up. He spoke about:
how Zhou Enlai was brilliant and had “great personal charm.” His approach changed significantly when he was sitting aside Mao.
Mao got the audience’s attention immediately, starting many discussions with a question. He had a vast knowledge of many countries in the world. Prior to the discussions with Nixon, Mao had been ill and could only last short times in negotiations. He became increasingly frail as he took the journey to change the direction of his country. During Ford’s presidency, he even had a hard time speaking.
Dobrynin was a top-notch professional who came prepared. Unlike many of Russian’s diplomats, he understood America. He colored in the lines.
Gromyko was a “diplomat’s diplomat.” He stayed within the lines of the Politburo and often didn’t have full knowledge. Kissinger spoke about when he raised something about a missile and, clearly, Gromyko didn’t know anything about the subject. A Russian General gave Kissinger a tip to wait a day and the problem went away.
Brezhnev was a chain smoker who liked to have the meetings in his office, allowing him to sign papers and do other work while the negotiators had to wait. His limited imagination didn’t permit him to move the negotiations. By the time they were making progress with the SALT negotiations, a stroke had limited the leader to only working a couple of hours at any given time.
To fully appreciate the discussion of the Viet Nam Paris Peace Accords, I would want to have another, less biased person review what was said to determine facts. Yet, the discussion about the Middle East peace agreements was a topic I knew more about and could nod my head with agreement of a job well done and still learn more. It was interesting that while Sadat was the aggressor in the war, they knew that they couldn’t resolve the issue through war. Rather, peace could only be achieved through negotiations. America played an incredible, yet delicate role having Israel’s back and assuring that their country would remain safe while backing Israel away from some actions they may otherwise take.
Throughout the book, Kissinger points out that the president and he looked for historic and strategic movement and not just “enter the fray” when there was a problem.
Part of the weakness of this rich, although short book, was that there were no other voices or any corrective views from this book that had limited views of disappointments or setbacks. Kissinger claimed that a major problem with our system moving to a more partisan one was that lawmakers didn’t stay in DC and, rather, returned to their states/districts. Kissinger didn’t talk about segmented media or huge dark money operations that totally changed our system.