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George Washington’s Nemesis: The Outrageous Treason and Unfair Court-Martial of Major General Charles Lee during the Revolutionary War
Revolutionary War historians and biographers of Charles Lee have treated him as either an inveterate enemy of George Washington or a great defender of American liberty. Neither approach is accurate argues author Christian McBurney, who stresses that in order to fully understand the war's most complicated general, objectivity is required. His new book, George Washington's Nemesis: The Outrageous Treason and Unfair Courtmartial of Major General Charles Lee during the American Revolution, relies on original documents (some newly discovered) to combine two dramatic stories involving the military law of treason and court-martials, creating a balanced view of the Revolution's most fascinating personality.
General Lee, second in command in the Continental Army led by George Washington, was captured by the British in December 1776. While a prisoner, he prepared and submitted to his captors a military plan on how to defeat Washington's army as quickly as possible. This extraordinary act of treason, arguably on a par with Benedict Arnold's heinous treachery, was not discovered during his lifetime. Many historians shrug off this ignoble act, but it should not be ignored. Less well known is that throughout his sixteen months of captivity and even after his release, Lee continued communicating with the enemy, offering to help negotiate an end to the rebellion.
After Lee rejoined the Continental Army, he was given command of many of its best troops with orders from Washington to attack the rear of British General Henry Clinton's column near Monmouth, New Jersey. Lee intended to attack on June 28, 1778, but retreated in the face of Clinton's bold move to reverse his march. Two of Lee's subordinate generals--without orders and without informing Lee--moved more than half of his command off the field. Faced with the possible destruction of the balance, Lee ordered a general retreat while conducting a skillful delaying action.
Many historians have been quick to malign Lee's performance at Monmouth, for which he was convicted by court-martial for not attacking and for retreating in the face of the enemy. This was a miscarriage of justice, stresses McBurney, for the evidence clearly shows that Lee was unfairly convicted and had, in fact, by retreating, performed an important service to the Patriot cause. The guilty verdict was more the result of Lee's having insulted Washington, which made the matter a political contest between the army's two top generals--only one of them could prevail.
McBurney's objective pen makes George Washington's Nemesis a gripping, fast-paced study that relies upon facts, logic, and hard evidence to set the historical record straight.
General Lee, second in command in the Continental Army led by George Washington, was captured by the British in December 1776. While a prisoner, he prepared and submitted to his captors a military plan on how to defeat Washington's army as quickly as possible. This extraordinary act of treason, arguably on a par with Benedict Arnold's heinous treachery, was not discovered during his lifetime. Many historians shrug off this ignoble act, but it should not be ignored. Less well known is that throughout his sixteen months of captivity and even after his release, Lee continued communicating with the enemy, offering to help negotiate an end to the rebellion.
After Lee rejoined the Continental Army, he was given command of many of its best troops with orders from Washington to attack the rear of British General Henry Clinton's column near Monmouth, New Jersey. Lee intended to attack on June 28, 1778, but retreated in the face of Clinton's bold move to reverse his march. Two of Lee's subordinate generals--without orders and without informing Lee--moved more than half of his command off the field. Faced with the possible destruction of the balance, Lee ordered a general retreat while conducting a skillful delaying action.
Many historians have been quick to malign Lee's performance at Monmouth, for which he was convicted by court-martial for not attacking and for retreating in the face of the enemy. This was a miscarriage of justice, stresses McBurney, for the evidence clearly shows that Lee was unfairly convicted and had, in fact, by retreating, performed an important service to the Patriot cause. The guilty verdict was more the result of Lee's having insulted Washington, which made the matter a political contest between the army's two top generals--only one of them could prevail.
McBurney's objective pen makes George Washington's Nemesis a gripping, fast-paced study that relies upon facts, logic, and hard evidence to set the historical record straight.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published January 16, 2020
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 5, 2025
Having written five microhistories on the American Revolution, historian Christian M. McBurney returns with a follow-up to his previous 2013 study featuring Charles Lee in Kidnapping the Enemy. As an established attorney in Washington D.C., McBurney uses the knowledge and experience gained from courtroom appearances to evaluate and critique Lee’s guilty verdict, as well as his actions before and after Monmouth that some have alleged to be treasonous. In a concise opening that delves into the research and views of prior Lee biographers (including Dominick Mazzagetti and John R. Alden), McBurney allows that his character study will answer whether Lee should have been tried for his actions at Monmouth, and whether or not he committed treason under the Articles of War.
McBurney begins the first few chapters by following the events of General Lee’s capture in December 1776, addressing his controversial penning of “Mr. Lee’s Plan” for the Howe brothers (and Great Britain), which quite plainly mapped out the best techniques for subduing the rebellion. Upon further investigation into the Articles of War and their constant adaptation during the Revolution, McBurney resolves that as second in command of the Continental Army, Lee unquestionably committed treason in aiding the enemy. He resolves that Lee’s hopes of the Howes peacefully and speedily bringing the colonies back to His Majesty’s good graces—as well as the general not taking any form of bribe or stance against his Patriot contemporaries—paints him in a better light than the long-term treachery of Benedict Arnold or James Wilkinson.
Fortunately, McBurney gives a concise background of Lee’s early life, noting his family ties, education in both England and Switzerland, and budding military career leading into the Seven Years’ War—fighting in North America and Portugal—and travelling through the better part of Europe including Poland, Turkey, and Russia. Moving on to his embarkation across the Atlantic, the Whig-friendly Lee sought out and was thereupon referred to the Continental Army for his military experience and intellect. McBurney chronicles each of his celebrated engagements early on in the war effort, showing his bravery at Charleston, yet also his irrational sentiments, odd behaviors, and rather angry outbursts that tended to leave his contemporaries confused and distanced.
McBurney’s careful study of Lee’s papers—as well as his constant acknowledgement of other biographers’ conclusions—shows that while in captivity, Lee not only committed treason with his “Plan,” but even continued to believe the Americans were fighting a lost cause some four months after its submission to the Howe’s. After effectively debating whether or not Lee’s “Plan” was a trick in hopes of a British blunder, McBurney time and again determines through the general’s correspondence and first-hand accounts (Benjamin Rush, Henry Laurens, Henry Clinton, etc.) that Lee was willing to negotiate a general peace, and significantly, did not support the colonies in their Declaration of Independence. Indeed, George Washington’s Nemesis uniquely reads as a highly engaging criminal investigation, with useful footnotes following each page that appropriately complement both the sources and arguments put forth.
The Battle of Monmouth (and most importantly, Lee’s command of the field) is dissected in gripping detail, with numerous battle maps depicting the formations and movements of each side, as well as McBurney’s own photos from the site that contribute to his vivid telling of the engagement. From McBurney’s descriptive timeline, failures in both leadership and following orders and are not apparent for Lee’s part of the engagement, as it’s all too clear that there were multiple subordinates who were not following his commands—or delaying due to the fatigue brought on by extreme humidity and the intensity of the battle. Following this exemplary chapter on the battle itself, McBurney traces the foundations of various false accusations pressed upon Lee’s conduct, which would in turn lead to his court-martial:
The next day, he wrote to another friend that as a result of Lee’s orders to retreat, “we lost the fairest opportunity this war has afforded to destroy the British army.” McHenry did not explain how Lee’s detachment of 4,500 soldiers could have defeated Clinton’s first division of 6,000 soldiers, never mind the entire British army of 12,000, but that was the common narrative in camp at the time.
McBurney addresses Lee’s grievances from his inopportune (and highly inappropriate) correspondence to Washington, noting that while Washington’s initial charges of neglect in command were perhaps premature when seen in the aftermath, the fact that Lee rashly made it a contest and quarrel with the acting commander-in-chief sealed his fate. Introductions and backgrounds are given to all of the primary players at Lee’s trial (many of whom were in the good graces of Washington), including Lord Stirling who acted as president of the proceedings, and similarly McBurney highlights the dates and locations where Lee defended his honor. Alas, after almost six weeks and an astounding 27 court meetings, Lee was found guilty on all three charges and suspended from command for one year.
Continuing the investigative nature of his study, McBurney’s forensic-like arguments are shown with a keen judicial eye, expertly sifting through the evidence to point out that Lee indeed had the authority to avoid a general engagement. The second and third charges against Lee are also each given their own chapter, where McBurney makes the case that the alleged guilty party’s two subordinates—Generals Maxwell and Scott—had already initiated a retreat before their commander had been given the chance to initiate such an order. Indeed, McBurney’s careful analysis even goes as far as proving false the rumors contending that Washington swore and used colorful profanity when addressing Lee face-to-face at Monmouth.
Lee’s rather inadequate attempt at leading a large body of men (not to mention his inability to inform his commander-in-chief through multiple aides) showed both a lack of dependence and rationality. With a divided Congress’s final approval of the charges, McBurney relates each of Lee’s political and military supporters who defended him, as well as those seeking satisfaction by duel—whether for their own honor, or Washington’s. Apart from minor grammatical errors (such as a few misspellings of Charles Willson Peale) that likely will be edited in future editions, McBurney’s study is a crucial understanding of Charles Lee—honestly critiquing the general’s errors in judgement—and giving him due justice with a fitting closing statement following his burial. Battle maps and illustrations are featured throughout including photos taken from McBurney’s own lens, as well as an appendix and index.
McBurney begins the first few chapters by following the events of General Lee’s capture in December 1776, addressing his controversial penning of “Mr. Lee’s Plan” for the Howe brothers (and Great Britain), which quite plainly mapped out the best techniques for subduing the rebellion. Upon further investigation into the Articles of War and their constant adaptation during the Revolution, McBurney resolves that as second in command of the Continental Army, Lee unquestionably committed treason in aiding the enemy. He resolves that Lee’s hopes of the Howes peacefully and speedily bringing the colonies back to His Majesty’s good graces—as well as the general not taking any form of bribe or stance against his Patriot contemporaries—paints him in a better light than the long-term treachery of Benedict Arnold or James Wilkinson.
Fortunately, McBurney gives a concise background of Lee’s early life, noting his family ties, education in both England and Switzerland, and budding military career leading into the Seven Years’ War—fighting in North America and Portugal—and travelling through the better part of Europe including Poland, Turkey, and Russia. Moving on to his embarkation across the Atlantic, the Whig-friendly Lee sought out and was thereupon referred to the Continental Army for his military experience and intellect. McBurney chronicles each of his celebrated engagements early on in the war effort, showing his bravery at Charleston, yet also his irrational sentiments, odd behaviors, and rather angry outbursts that tended to leave his contemporaries confused and distanced.
McBurney’s careful study of Lee’s papers—as well as his constant acknowledgement of other biographers’ conclusions—shows that while in captivity, Lee not only committed treason with his “Plan,” but even continued to believe the Americans were fighting a lost cause some four months after its submission to the Howe’s. After effectively debating whether or not Lee’s “Plan” was a trick in hopes of a British blunder, McBurney time and again determines through the general’s correspondence and first-hand accounts (Benjamin Rush, Henry Laurens, Henry Clinton, etc.) that Lee was willing to negotiate a general peace, and significantly, did not support the colonies in their Declaration of Independence. Indeed, George Washington’s Nemesis uniquely reads as a highly engaging criminal investigation, with useful footnotes following each page that appropriately complement both the sources and arguments put forth.
The Battle of Monmouth (and most importantly, Lee’s command of the field) is dissected in gripping detail, with numerous battle maps depicting the formations and movements of each side, as well as McBurney’s own photos from the site that contribute to his vivid telling of the engagement. From McBurney’s descriptive timeline, failures in both leadership and following orders and are not apparent for Lee’s part of the engagement, as it’s all too clear that there were multiple subordinates who were not following his commands—or delaying due to the fatigue brought on by extreme humidity and the intensity of the battle. Following this exemplary chapter on the battle itself, McBurney traces the foundations of various false accusations pressed upon Lee’s conduct, which would in turn lead to his court-martial:
The next day, he wrote to another friend that as a result of Lee’s orders to retreat, “we lost the fairest opportunity this war has afforded to destroy the British army.” McHenry did not explain how Lee’s detachment of 4,500 soldiers could have defeated Clinton’s first division of 6,000 soldiers, never mind the entire British army of 12,000, but that was the common narrative in camp at the time.
McBurney addresses Lee’s grievances from his inopportune (and highly inappropriate) correspondence to Washington, noting that while Washington’s initial charges of neglect in command were perhaps premature when seen in the aftermath, the fact that Lee rashly made it a contest and quarrel with the acting commander-in-chief sealed his fate. Introductions and backgrounds are given to all of the primary players at Lee’s trial (many of whom were in the good graces of Washington), including Lord Stirling who acted as president of the proceedings, and similarly McBurney highlights the dates and locations where Lee defended his honor. Alas, after almost six weeks and an astounding 27 court meetings, Lee was found guilty on all three charges and suspended from command for one year.
Continuing the investigative nature of his study, McBurney’s forensic-like arguments are shown with a keen judicial eye, expertly sifting through the evidence to point out that Lee indeed had the authority to avoid a general engagement. The second and third charges against Lee are also each given their own chapter, where McBurney makes the case that the alleged guilty party’s two subordinates—Generals Maxwell and Scott—had already initiated a retreat before their commander had been given the chance to initiate such an order. Indeed, McBurney’s careful analysis even goes as far as proving false the rumors contending that Washington swore and used colorful profanity when addressing Lee face-to-face at Monmouth.
Lee’s rather inadequate attempt at leading a large body of men (not to mention his inability to inform his commander-in-chief through multiple aides) showed both a lack of dependence and rationality. With a divided Congress’s final approval of the charges, McBurney relates each of Lee’s political and military supporters who defended him, as well as those seeking satisfaction by duel—whether for their own honor, or Washington’s. Apart from minor grammatical errors (such as a few misspellings of Charles Willson Peale) that likely will be edited in future editions, McBurney’s study is a crucial understanding of Charles Lee—honestly critiquing the general’s errors in judgement—and giving him due justice with a fitting closing statement following his burial. Battle maps and illustrations are featured throughout including photos taken from McBurney’s own lens, as well as an appendix and index.
September 30, 2022
This book is more a study of court martial rules and procedures surrounding General Charles Lee than the life and motivation of the man himself, and has the flair of a court document, not a biography. Readers should look to other books for a fulsome and lively account of General Lee's life and misdeeds.
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October 28, 2025A cursory knowledge of the American Revolutionary War is expected as the author, likely correctly, assumes that anyone reading this book already understands the broad strokes of the War and the Battle of Monmouth. I liked the deep dive into this relatively niche topic and the thoroughness of the author to look at all sides.
February 6, 2021
A close look at Charles Lee and his trial for court martial. Lee always thought he should have been the top general instead of Washington. He also was inclined to think he was smarter than anyone else and he had a terrible temper to which he was inclined to give way to. It was this last which got him court martialed. He could have avoided a court martial in all likelihood if he had not allowed his indignation over remarks of Washington's of his retreat to get the better of him. His behavior was such, that Washington had almost no choice. If he had held his temper and talked to Washington quietly, everything could likely have been sorted out. It was Washington's hasty words that led to Lee's brash behavior.
But what everyone was unaware of, was that Lee had committed treason months earlier when he was in British captivity. He wrote a letter to the British commander on how the Americans could be defeated. He also exchanged correspondence with some of the British. Nothing ever came of this treasonable action. It was only uncovered years after his death, when some papers stolen from the British commander's estate were sold to a historian who discovered the letter Lee had written.
Quite interesting historical details.....
But what everyone was unaware of, was that Lee had committed treason months earlier when he was in British captivity. He wrote a letter to the British commander on how the Americans could be defeated. He also exchanged correspondence with some of the British. Nothing ever came of this treasonable action. It was only uncovered years after his death, when some papers stolen from the British commander's estate were sold to a historian who discovered the letter Lee had written.
Quite interesting historical details.....
July 19, 2022
A scholarly analysis of Charles Lee’s leadership at the Battle of Monmouth and his famous 1777 plan for the British to win the war. McBurney well reasoned arguments reflect his legal training and substantial prior scholarship.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews