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Self-Knowledge and Resentment
In Self-Knowledge and Resentment , Akeel Bilgrami argues that self-knowledge of our intentional states is special among all the knowledges we have because it is not an epistemological notion in the standard sense of that term, but instead is a fallout of the radically normative nature of thought and agency. Four themes or questions are brought together into an integrated philosophical position: What makes self-knowledge different from other forms of knowledge? What makes for freedom and agency in a deterministic universe? What makes intentional states of a subject irreducible to its physical and functional states? And what makes values irreducible to the states of nature as the natural sciences study them? This integration of themes into a single and systematic picture of thought, value, agency, and self-knowledge is essential to the book's aspiration and argument. Once this integrated position is fully in place, the book closes with a postscript on how one might fruitfully view the kind of self-knowledge that is pursued in psychoanalysis.
- GenresPhilosophy
416 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
3 people are currently reading
49 people want to read
About the author
Akeel Bilgrami
23 books19 followersAkeel Bilgrami [(born 1950)] is an Indian-born philosopher of language and of mind, and the author of Belief and Meaning, Self-Knowledge and Resentment, and Politics and the Moral Psychology of Identity (forthcoming), as well as various articles in Philosophy of Mind as well as in Political and Moral Psychology. Some of his articles in these latter subjects speak to issues of current politics in their relation to broader social and cultural issues. He has also increasingly joined debates in the pages of larger-circulation periodicals such as The New York Review of Books and The Nation. He has two upcoming books, "What is a Muslim?" and "Gandhi the Philosopher". Bilgrami is currently the Sidney Morgenbesser Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University in New York.
Bilgrami received a degree in English Literature from Bombay University before switching to philosophy. He attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, leaving with a bachelor's degree in philosophy, politics, and economics. He earned his Ph.D from the University of Chicago with a dissertation titled "Belief and Meaning", focusing on Michael Dummett's critique of realist accounts of meaning and on the indeterminacy of translation, in which he argues in support of Donald Davidson's thesis that meaning is a form of invariance between underdetermined theories of meaning. (He was supervised by Davidson while at Chicago.) He has been in the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University since 1985 after spending two years as an Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Bilgrami is a secularist and an atheist who advocates an understanding of the community-oriented dimension of religion. For Bilgrami spiritual yearnings are not only understandable but also supremely human. He has argued in many essays that in our modern world, "religion is not primarily a matter of belief and doctrine but about the sense of community and shared values it provides in contexts where other forms of solidarity—such as a strong labor movement—are missing."
(from Wikipedia)
Bilgrami received a degree in English Literature from Bombay University before switching to philosophy. He attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, leaving with a bachelor's degree in philosophy, politics, and economics. He earned his Ph.D from the University of Chicago with a dissertation titled "Belief and Meaning", focusing on Michael Dummett's critique of realist accounts of meaning and on the indeterminacy of translation, in which he argues in support of Donald Davidson's thesis that meaning is a form of invariance between underdetermined theories of meaning. (He was supervised by Davidson while at Chicago.) He has been in the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University since 1985 after spending two years as an Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Bilgrami is a secularist and an atheist who advocates an understanding of the community-oriented dimension of religion. For Bilgrami spiritual yearnings are not only understandable but also supremely human. He has argued in many essays that in our modern world, "religion is not primarily a matter of belief and doctrine but about the sense of community and shared values it provides in contexts where other forms of solidarity—such as a strong labor movement—are missing."
(from Wikipedia)
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July 20, 2017
There is something of the philosophical groupie in me, and the latest object of my philosophical interest is Akeel Bilgrami. For those who want to know more about him personally, there is a good article on the net, including political opinions and a revealing childhood story of an early encounter with an ethical argument.
In Self-Knowledge and Resentment, he is difficult to get to know personally because the book consists of highly technical argument, with no attempt to connect to everyday life. This is not a style of philosophical writing that I admire, but some of his points are challenging and provocative.
He attempts to bring together four philosophical themes: agency, value, intentionality and self-knowledge. He argues that these are conceptually related, and that connecting them throws light on the philosophical problem (or "mystery") that each represents.
By "agency," he means moral agency or freedom, as in the old debate between free will and determinism. Bilgrami argues a compatibilist position, meaning that the two sides can be reconciled by considering moral agency a particular kind of cause, namely the kind of cause that is subject to "reactive attitudes" (after P. F. Strawson) from oneself or from other people. To put this into conversational language (which Bilgrami does not), one is free when one can look at one's own actions (or someone else can) and say "You could do this differently."
By "value," he means the "ought" and "good" of ethical statements, in the debate whether values can be reduced to naturalistic (scientific) facts. Bilgrami follows G. E. Moore in arguing that an "ought" cannot be derived from an "is."
By "intentionality," Bilgrami means intentional states (such as beliefs and desires, but also including hopes, fears, etc.) which are states of the human body or nervous system which refer to propositions. These are also know as "propositional attitudes." An example would be, "I believe that p." where p is the proposition "The Yanks will win." or any proposition you like. Bilgrami argues that intentional states are "commitments" (following Isaac Levi), suggesting something one would defend, as opposed to "dispositions," suggesting something one is inclined to (like a bad habit) no matter whether one would defend it. Commitments lend themselves to ethical discussion (moral agency, free choice) as well as to assertions of value.
By "self-knowledge," Bilgrami means the seemingly privileged knowledge we have about our own beliefs, desires, etc. To put this conversationally (which, again, Bilgrami does not), if someone says to you, "You don't know whether you believe that or not," then you might readily respond, "Of course I know what I believe. I'm the authority on what I believe." Because Bilgrami wraps all of these concepts together, this authority carries over to our values and to the actions we perform freely as moral agents.
In Self-Knowledge and Resentment, he is difficult to get to know personally because the book consists of highly technical argument, with no attempt to connect to everyday life. This is not a style of philosophical writing that I admire, but some of his points are challenging and provocative.
He attempts to bring together four philosophical themes: agency, value, intentionality and self-knowledge. He argues that these are conceptually related, and that connecting them throws light on the philosophical problem (or "mystery") that each represents.
By "agency," he means moral agency or freedom, as in the old debate between free will and determinism. Bilgrami argues a compatibilist position, meaning that the two sides can be reconciled by considering moral agency a particular kind of cause, namely the kind of cause that is subject to "reactive attitudes" (after P. F. Strawson) from oneself or from other people. To put this into conversational language (which Bilgrami does not), one is free when one can look at one's own actions (or someone else can) and say "You could do this differently."
By "value," he means the "ought" and "good" of ethical statements, in the debate whether values can be reduced to naturalistic (scientific) facts. Bilgrami follows G. E. Moore in arguing that an "ought" cannot be derived from an "is."
By "intentionality," Bilgrami means intentional states (such as beliefs and desires, but also including hopes, fears, etc.) which are states of the human body or nervous system which refer to propositions. These are also know as "propositional attitudes." An example would be, "I believe that p." where p is the proposition "The Yanks will win." or any proposition you like. Bilgrami argues that intentional states are "commitments" (following Isaac Levi), suggesting something one would defend, as opposed to "dispositions," suggesting something one is inclined to (like a bad habit) no matter whether one would defend it. Commitments lend themselves to ethical discussion (moral agency, free choice) as well as to assertions of value.
By "self-knowledge," Bilgrami means the seemingly privileged knowledge we have about our own beliefs, desires, etc. To put this conversationally (which, again, Bilgrami does not), if someone says to you, "You don't know whether you believe that or not," then you might readily respond, "Of course I know what I believe. I'm the authority on what I believe." Because Bilgrami wraps all of these concepts together, this authority carries over to our values and to the actions we perform freely as moral agents.
Displaying 1 of 1 review