What do you think?
Rate this book
Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War
Most Americans believe that the Second World War ended because the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan forced it to surrender. Five Days in August boldly presents a different that the military did not clearly understand the atomic bomb's revolutionary strategic potential, that the Allies were almost as stunned by the surrender as the Japanese were by the attack, and that not only had experts planned and fully anticipated the need for a third bomb, they were skeptical about whether the atomic bomb would work at all. With these ideas, Michael Gordin reorients the historical and contemporary conversation about the A-bomb and World War II.
Five Days in August explores these and countless other legacies of the atomic bomb in a glaring new light. Daring and iconoclastic, it will result in far-reaching discussions about the significance of the A-bomb, about World War II, and about the moral issues they have spawned.
Five Days in August explores these and countless other legacies of the atomic bomb in a glaring new light. Daring and iconoclastic, it will result in far-reaching discussions about the significance of the A-bomb, about World War II, and about the moral issues they have spawned.
224 pages, Hardcover
First published January 2, 2007
17 people are currently reading
176 people want to read
About the author
Michael D. Gordin
25 books36 followersMichael Gordin is Rosengarten Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at Princeton University, where he specializes in the history of modern science. In 2013-4 he served as the inaugural director of the Fung Global Fellows Program. He came to Princeton in 2003 after earning his A.B. (1996) and his Ph.D. (2001) from Harvard University, and serving a term at the Harvard Society of Fellows. In 2011 he was awarded a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship and was named a Guggenheim Fellow. He has published on the history of science, Russian history, and the history of nuclear weapons.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
July 15, 2014
Gordin tries to prove that atomic weapons were not developed as bombs, but rather "special weapons." Oddly, he never explains the difference, nor could he. It's an atomic bomb; pretty special, I'd say.
Best thing here is the map section, showing how the CBs turned the island of Tinian (from where the planes were launched that dropped the two bombs on Japan) into almost a replica of Manhattan. Tinian is shaped like a miniature Manhattan, so its main street was routed diagonally and called Broadway; the principal East-West road was 42nd Street. And the airfield from which the Enola Gay took off was located about where Harlem would be. Meaning the Manhattan project began and ended at Columbia University. . .
Best thing here is the map section, showing how the CBs turned the island of Tinian (from where the planes were launched that dropped the two bombs on Japan) into almost a replica of Manhattan. Tinian is shaped like a miniature Manhattan, so its main street was routed diagonally and called Broadway; the principal East-West road was 42nd Street. And the airfield from which the Enola Gay took off was located about where Harlem would be. Meaning the Manhattan project began and ended at Columbia University. . .
March 25, 2017
I doubt there are many topics more debated in American - and world - history than the decision to drop the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end WW2. In his book, "Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War", author Michael Gordin gives a masterful account of this chapter in our history. I used to live in Santa Fe and Los Alamos was right up the hill. There's a lot of interest out here on the Bomb and the mechanics of building it and the politics of dropping it. Gordin's book is low key, very well written, which focuses on Tinian Island, as well as the idea that the bomb was initially just one component in an arsenal, to end the war before the proposed Nov 1 invasion of the Home Islands, "Operation Downfall".
Gordin fully explores the notion of the development and dropping of the bombs as yet another weapon in our arsenal to force the Japanese into an "unconditional surrender." The US had done intensive firebombing of the cities of Japan, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths. And even after the atomic bombs were dropped, the firebombings continued. (Truman had decreed no more atomic bombs dropped on August 10, 1945, but the fire bombs were still used.) The Japanese government finally surrendered on August 15. The Americans knew no more bombs would be dropped but the Japanese did not. And the truth is that there was a "Third Shot" - another "Fat Man" - being put together in case more bombs were needed.
In discussing the "Third Shot", Michael Gordin takes the reader to Tinian Island, a huge air base for B29s in the Mariana Islands. The island had been seized by the Americans from the Japanese, and the location was perfect in launching B-29 Superfortress bombers to sites in Japan. The island was designated by the American military to house the 509th Composite Group; pilots being trained in bombing runs to Japan to drop the developing Atomic bombs. Both crews - the "Enola Gay" and the "Bockscar" - left and returned to Tinian. Gordin gives an interesting account of how the "Bockscar" mission to drop the second bomb was very badly handled. Nagasaki was the second choice that day; Kokura was the first and after flying over the city a few times in bad weather, the target city was moved to Nagasaki. But beside being the takeoff site for the bombings, Tinian Island was also where the bombs were put together in their final form.
Another interesting point in Michael Gordin's book is the idea of the atomic bombs not being considered the "ultimate weapon" until after they were used. In the US military, the bombs were seen as another destructive tool. The scientists who developed the bombs were actually quite surprised at the amount of radiation and its harmfulness.
Michael Gordin's book is a true treat for the WW2 history buff. He touches on sensational issues in a non-sensational manner. Strongly recommended.
Gordin fully explores the notion of the development and dropping of the bombs as yet another weapon in our arsenal to force the Japanese into an "unconditional surrender." The US had done intensive firebombing of the cities of Japan, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths. And even after the atomic bombs were dropped, the firebombings continued. (Truman had decreed no more atomic bombs dropped on August 10, 1945, but the fire bombs were still used.) The Japanese government finally surrendered on August 15. The Americans knew no more bombs would be dropped but the Japanese did not. And the truth is that there was a "Third Shot" - another "Fat Man" - being put together in case more bombs were needed.
In discussing the "Third Shot", Michael Gordin takes the reader to Tinian Island, a huge air base for B29s in the Mariana Islands. The island had been seized by the Americans from the Japanese, and the location was perfect in launching B-29 Superfortress bombers to sites in Japan. The island was designated by the American military to house the 509th Composite Group; pilots being trained in bombing runs to Japan to drop the developing Atomic bombs. Both crews - the "Enola Gay" and the "Bockscar" - left and returned to Tinian. Gordin gives an interesting account of how the "Bockscar" mission to drop the second bomb was very badly handled. Nagasaki was the second choice that day; Kokura was the first and after flying over the city a few times in bad weather, the target city was moved to Nagasaki. But beside being the takeoff site for the bombings, Tinian Island was also where the bombs were put together in their final form.
Another interesting point in Michael Gordin's book is the idea of the atomic bombs not being considered the "ultimate weapon" until after they were used. In the US military, the bombs were seen as another destructive tool. The scientists who developed the bombs were actually quite surprised at the amount of radiation and its harmfulness.
Michael Gordin's book is a true treat for the WW2 history buff. He touches on sensational issues in a non-sensational manner. Strongly recommended.
February 12, 2016
The book's author holds that the argument over military justification for the use of the atomic bomb is not significant. “Because so many military planners and influential politicians considered the atomic bomb to be, at least in some degree, an “ordinary” weapon-certainly special, even unique, in some senses, but decidedly not in the senses we appreciate today-dropping one or several of them merited no more justification than the inception of firebombing campaigns, napalm, or other local decisions made largely in the field; that is, little to no justification.”
In other words, the atomic bomb was just another weapon, so no “justification” of its use was necessary at all.
The author also says that the U.S. did not really expect Japan to surrender as suddenly as it did.
The author says a third bomb was in the process of being assembled, and would have been dropped, probably on Tokyo, on August 19th. v
The atomic bomb was not initially a “shock” weapon; it ended up being that way simply through the timing of the surrender.
Some feel that nuclear bombing and firebombing were not really that different. General Curtis LeMay: “Nothing new about death, nothing new about deaths caused militarily. We scorched and boiled and baked to death more people in Tokyo on that night of March 9-10 [1945] than went up in vapor at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.”
The author notes that, in some respects, the atomic bomb was just another “special” weapon, like the V-1, the V-2, and the kamikaze, that was expected to “turn the tide” in the war. This contrasted with another view of the bomb, that it s just another weapon and, like any other weapon, would be used when needed.
The book then discusses the 17 initial targets, and how they were whittled down to 5. According to production schedules, 3 more atomic bombs would have been ready in September of 1945, and at least 7 more in December of that year. The author says that military people at that time figured several or even many atomic bombs might be necessary to get Japan to surrender.
There was a considerable lack of concern in the military about radiation from the bombs. Tokyo Rose made a broadcast about people getting ill (from the effects of radiation), but some of those involved her thought she was not telling the truth.
In other words, the atomic bomb was just another weapon, so no “justification” of its use was necessary at all.
The author also says that the U.S. did not really expect Japan to surrender as suddenly as it did.
The author says a third bomb was in the process of being assembled, and would have been dropped, probably on Tokyo, on August 19th. v
The atomic bomb was not initially a “shock” weapon; it ended up being that way simply through the timing of the surrender.
Some feel that nuclear bombing and firebombing were not really that different. General Curtis LeMay: “Nothing new about death, nothing new about deaths caused militarily. We scorched and boiled and baked to death more people in Tokyo on that night of March 9-10 [1945] than went up in vapor at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.”
The author notes that, in some respects, the atomic bomb was just another “special” weapon, like the V-1, the V-2, and the kamikaze, that was expected to “turn the tide” in the war. This contrasted with another view of the bomb, that it s just another weapon and, like any other weapon, would be used when needed.
The book then discusses the 17 initial targets, and how they were whittled down to 5. According to production schedules, 3 more atomic bombs would have been ready in September of 1945, and at least 7 more in December of that year. The author says that military people at that time figured several or even many atomic bombs might be necessary to get Japan to surrender.
There was a considerable lack of concern in the military about radiation from the bombs. Tokyo Rose made a broadcast about people getting ill (from the effects of radiation), but some of those involved her thought she was not telling the truth.
January 11, 2013
"Even the assumption that atomic bombs were revolutionary seemed questionable immediately after the war, although not for long. Oppenheimer, for example, who would become the most visible scientific spokesman on atomic issues, in an influential essay wavered on what exactly made the atomic bomb ‘special’: ‘But the truly radical character of atomic weapons lies . . . [not] in the fact that they exploit an energy qualitatively different in origin from all earlier sources. It lies in their vastly greater powers of destruction, in the vastly reduced effort needed for such destruction.’ That is, with nuclear weapons, increases in quantity (of blast) shaded into changes in quality (revolutions in warfare). A bright line was hard to distinguish.
Reasonable equivocations like Oppenheimer’s were rare in the first weeks after surrender, even among those who had expressed skepticism about the power of nuclear weapons before their use, and they became almost impossible to find as the year wore on. Public knowledge and fears about the atomic bomb were almost entirely channeled in these first postwar days and weeks into tremendous, almost apocalyptic fears of nuclear annihilation – all at a time when the only atomic bomb on earth was the plutonium Fat Man that was not used for a third atomic strike on Japan. Almost immediately after surrender, the American media began to build a very simple narrative about how ‘the bomb ended the war,’ a marked change from the extensive writing over the course of 1945 about the variety of possible endings of the war: modification of unconditional surrender, Soviet entry into the war, intensified blockade and firebombing. The fact that all of these proposed inducements to Japanese surrender actually took place as well as the atomic bombings faded almost immediately after surrender."
Reasonable equivocations like Oppenheimer’s were rare in the first weeks after surrender, even among those who had expressed skepticism about the power of nuclear weapons before their use, and they became almost impossible to find as the year wore on. Public knowledge and fears about the atomic bomb were almost entirely channeled in these first postwar days and weeks into tremendous, almost apocalyptic fears of nuclear annihilation – all at a time when the only atomic bomb on earth was the plutonium Fat Man that was not used for a third atomic strike on Japan. Almost immediately after surrender, the American media began to build a very simple narrative about how ‘the bomb ended the war,’ a marked change from the extensive writing over the course of 1945 about the variety of possible endings of the war: modification of unconditional surrender, Soviet entry into the war, intensified blockade and firebombing. The fact that all of these proposed inducements to Japanese surrender actually took place as well as the atomic bombings faded almost immediately after surrender."
July 11, 2020
Revisionist (and compelling) argument how the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were part of the US „shock strategy“ to convince Japan to surrender and therefore propagandistically singled out as „special“ weapons (whereas the planning for them was mostly done by normal military procedures, and the military men also had a hard time being convinced that their weapons use was qualitatively different from the firebombing before).
April 7, 2022
I write this review even as Russia continues to commit atrocities in the Ukraine, six weeks into a savage invasion and the killing of a mostly-civilian population. The West has doled out sanctions and sent arms, but otherwise remains on the sidelines.
If Russia 'only' had the equivalent of 334 B-29s, and Ukraine had a city similar to 1945 Tokyo, he could conceivably promise the world a one-night death toll similar to what that number of US bombers did on 9-10 March 1945: the death of over 100,000 people, more than died at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. If that were the state of things, I personally believe the West would have responded directly and militarily to this crime against humanity...
...but for nuclear weapons.
Such is the 'special' nature of the nuclear weapon, a categorization not universally recognized in 1945 or for years after: once you have one, you stand very-near par with nations orders of magnitude 'stronger' militarily. Sitting in a room doused with gasoline, as Carl Sagan said, it matters little if you're holding 8,000 matches and your opponent only has 10.
Well-researched, Gordin has his opinion on the state of affairs leading up to August 1945 and beyond. He closes this worthwhile read with an eye toward the few opportunities the world has had in coming to grips with nuclear weapons, calling the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union 'the third opportunity.'
"The window...on this (opportunity) is closing fast...We may not get a fourth." he writes.
The copyright for 'Five Days in August' is 2007.
If Russia 'only' had the equivalent of 334 B-29s, and Ukraine had a city similar to 1945 Tokyo, he could conceivably promise the world a one-night death toll similar to what that number of US bombers did on 9-10 March 1945: the death of over 100,000 people, more than died at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. If that were the state of things, I personally believe the West would have responded directly and militarily to this crime against humanity...
...but for nuclear weapons.
Such is the 'special' nature of the nuclear weapon, a categorization not universally recognized in 1945 or for years after: once you have one, you stand very-near par with nations orders of magnitude 'stronger' militarily. Sitting in a room doused with gasoline, as Carl Sagan said, it matters little if you're holding 8,000 matches and your opponent only has 10.
Well-researched, Gordin has his opinion on the state of affairs leading up to August 1945 and beyond. He closes this worthwhile read with an eye toward the few opportunities the world has had in coming to grips with nuclear weapons, calling the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union 'the third opportunity.'
"The window...on this (opportunity) is closing fast...We may not get a fourth." he writes.
The copyright for 'Five Days in August' is 2007.
June 12, 2024
A short and sharp monograph that breaks out of the cliches and unfounded battle-lines that have shaped much of the conversation on the use of atomic bombs at the end of World War II. It's fundamental point, which I find to be very persuasive, is that nuclear bombs were not intrinsically regarded as distinct from other weapons systems or strategies of atomic bombing at the time of their use. Our contemporary understanding of nuclear weapons as such is partly a product of the deliberate construction of their "specialness" by allied governments seeking to shock Japan into surrender and by the unexpected fact that Japan did in fact surrender after the use of the bombs (although not in any conclusively established sense because of them). Gordin uses archival information and excellent analytical and historiographical judgment to historicize this conception that we've come to accept as given. And by doing so he gives us the tools to think more clearly about what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and more broadly how we should relate to nuclear weapons today.
September 25, 2020
Interesting coverage of the development of the atomic bomb and how it’s “special” purpose was only rationalized at some point removed from the decision to drop the bomb. Specifically, leadership viewed it as similar to fire bombing campaigns and that it could’ve feasibly taken many more drops to result in Japanese surrender, even with contemplated land invasion.
Author uses secondary sources heavily but does contain a wonderful notes section with plenty of references to other relevant readings.
Author uses secondary sources heavily but does contain a wonderful notes section with plenty of references to other relevant readings.
July 30, 2022
Interesting and nicely concise exploration of how US decision makers actually thought about the atomic bomb before it was used and mythologized, and how plans for atomic bombing fit into American strategy to end the war with Japan. Some places either speak a bit too broadly or at least are insufficiently clear in wording, but overall a very useful book on the topic
November 16, 2018
Provides the context of the atomic weapons and Japan's surrender in WWII and argues nukes are special weapons and Japan surrendered in the context of the war, not solely because of the two nukes.
September 27, 2022
well reseached
August 26, 2025
interesting discussion on interpretations of nuclear weapons before, during, and after their use in WWII. It's more complicated than you think!
April 29, 2016
I doubt there are many topics more debated in American - and world - history than the decision to drop the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end WW2. In his book, "Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War", author Michael Gordin gives a masterful account of this chapter in our history. I live in Santa Fe and Los Alamos is right up the hill. There's a lot of interest out here on the Bomb and the mechanics of building it and the politics of dropping it. Goldin's book is low key, very well written, which focuses on Tinian Island, as well as the idea that the bomb was initially just one component in an arsenal, to end the war before the proposed Nov 1 invasion of the Home Islands, "Operation Downfall".
Gordin fully explores the notion of the development and dropping of the bombs as yet another weapon in our arsenal to force the Japanese into an "unconditional surrender." The US had done intensive firebombing of the cities of Japan, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths. And even after the atomic bombs were dropped, the firebombings continued. (Truman had decreed no more atomic bombs dropped on August 10, 1945, but the fire bombs were still used.) The Japanese government finally surrendered on August 15. The Americans knew no more bombs would be dropped but the Japanese did not. And the truth is that there was a "Third Shot" - another "Fat Man" - being put together in case more bombs were needed.
In discussing the "Third Shot", Michael Gordin takes the reader to Tinian Island, a huge air base for B29s in the Mariana Islands. The island had been seized by the Americans from the Japanese, and the location was perfect in launching B-29 Superfortress bombers to sites in Japan. The island was designated by the American military to house the 509th Composite Group; pilots being trained in bombing runs to Japan to drop the developing Atomic bombs. Both crews - the "Enola Gay" and the "Bockscar" - left and returned to Tinian. Gordin gives an interesting account of how the "Bockscar" mission to drop the second bomb was very badly handled. Nagasaki was the second choice that day; Kokura was the first and after flying over the city a few times in bad weather, the target city was moved to Nagasaki. But beside being the takeoff site for the bombings, Tinian Island was also where the bombs were put together in their final form.
Another interesting point in Michael Gordin's book is the idea of the atomic bombs not being considered the "ultimate weapon" until after they were used. In the US military, the bombs were seen as another destructive tool. The scientists who developed the bombs were actually quite surprised at the amount of radiation and its harmfulness.
Michael Gordin's book is a true treat for the WW2 history buff. He touches on sensational issues in a non-sensational manner. Strongly recommended.
Gordin fully explores the notion of the development and dropping of the bombs as yet another weapon in our arsenal to force the Japanese into an "unconditional surrender." The US had done intensive firebombing of the cities of Japan, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths. And even after the atomic bombs were dropped, the firebombings continued. (Truman had decreed no more atomic bombs dropped on August 10, 1945, but the fire bombs were still used.) The Japanese government finally surrendered on August 15. The Americans knew no more bombs would be dropped but the Japanese did not. And the truth is that there was a "Third Shot" - another "Fat Man" - being put together in case more bombs were needed.
In discussing the "Third Shot", Michael Gordin takes the reader to Tinian Island, a huge air base for B29s in the Mariana Islands. The island had been seized by the Americans from the Japanese, and the location was perfect in launching B-29 Superfortress bombers to sites in Japan. The island was designated by the American military to house the 509th Composite Group; pilots being trained in bombing runs to Japan to drop the developing Atomic bombs. Both crews - the "Enola Gay" and the "Bockscar" - left and returned to Tinian. Gordin gives an interesting account of how the "Bockscar" mission to drop the second bomb was very badly handled. Nagasaki was the second choice that day; Kokura was the first and after flying over the city a few times in bad weather, the target city was moved to Nagasaki. But beside being the takeoff site for the bombings, Tinian Island was also where the bombs were put together in their final form.
Another interesting point in Michael Gordin's book is the idea of the atomic bombs not being considered the "ultimate weapon" until after they were used. In the US military, the bombs were seen as another destructive tool. The scientists who developed the bombs were actually quite surprised at the amount of radiation and its harmfulness.
Michael Gordin's book is a true treat for the WW2 history buff. He touches on sensational issues in a non-sensational manner. Strongly recommended.
September 25, 2011
Attitudes toward war and weapons are as changeable as other opinions are. We now take for granted the machine gun as just another weapon in mankind’s arsenal. To an American inventor named Richard Jordan Gatling during the American Civil War, though, the idea had revolutionary potential. Having observed that war was about men killing other men with rifles, he essentially concluded (though he didn’t put it this way) that if he could make the killing happen faster he could improve war—reduce the size of armies and get the whole thing over with more quickly. Hence the Gatling gun, an early form of machine gun.
Beliefs about atomic weapons may have followed the opposite course, from ordinary to special. We now believe that two of them were used by American forces against Japan during World War II in the expectation that the atomic bomb’s extreme and extraordinary qualities would shock the Japanese into surrendering, and that it did so, thus shortening that war, but historian Michael D. Gordin has marshaled a good deal of evidence to show that this wasn’t the case. He makes and supports a number of arguments to this end, such as: that an attempt to shock the Japanese was a feature of the Allies’ strategy but atomic weapons weren’t the only method considered or used for the purpose; that before it was employed, and even for a while after, The Bomb was regarded by many in the American military and government as in some sense an ordinary weapon; that the firebombing of Japanese cities was already achieving similar results (as General Curtis LeMay later wrote, “We scorched and boiled and baked to death more people in Tokyo on that night of March 9–10 [1945] than went up in vapor at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined”); that the military planned to drop more such bombs and was preparing a third when the war ended; that radiation and fallout effects (now one of the distinguishing features in our view of The Bomb) were little appreciated at the time these weapons were used; and that the Japanese surrender, while hoped for, was not expected.
Gordin mentions in his acknowledgments that some scholars disagree with his conclusions, but he has convinced me, and at the very least he must be credited with showing (as is often the case when we look back) that what we now think we know about the past is too simple to be entirely true.
Beliefs about atomic weapons may have followed the opposite course, from ordinary to special. We now believe that two of them were used by American forces against Japan during World War II in the expectation that the atomic bomb’s extreme and extraordinary qualities would shock the Japanese into surrendering, and that it did so, thus shortening that war, but historian Michael D. Gordin has marshaled a good deal of evidence to show that this wasn’t the case. He makes and supports a number of arguments to this end, such as: that an attempt to shock the Japanese was a feature of the Allies’ strategy but atomic weapons weren’t the only method considered or used for the purpose; that before it was employed, and even for a while after, The Bomb was regarded by many in the American military and government as in some sense an ordinary weapon; that the firebombing of Japanese cities was already achieving similar results (as General Curtis LeMay later wrote, “We scorched and boiled and baked to death more people in Tokyo on that night of March 9–10 [1945] than went up in vapor at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined”); that the military planned to drop more such bombs and was preparing a third when the war ended; that radiation and fallout effects (now one of the distinguishing features in our view of The Bomb) were little appreciated at the time these weapons were used; and that the Japanese surrender, while hoped for, was not expected.
Gordin mentions in his acknowledgments that some scholars disagree with his conclusions, but he has convinced me, and at the very least he must be credited with showing (as is often the case when we look back) that what we now think we know about the past is too simple to be entirely true.
September 20, 2015
An excellent study on how contemporary planners, generals, pilots, and most of all, scientists perceived what the atomic bomb was and could do. Before the destruction of Hiroshima, there was only theory; after, the image of the totally destroyed city prevailed. This is a frank book too, pointing out difficulties to reconstruct history of the development and the use of the atomic bombs, as accounts are never complete or accurate. What Gordin implies is that, when developing the bomb, scientists and military men thought they were merely building a more powerful weapon that might help achieve victory. In this sense, building of the atomic bomb was no different from developing tanks, battleships, radar and strategic bombers. They didn't know how much Japan might endure if atom bombs were used; so they assumed that they would have to drop more than two in the course of 1945 and 1946. With the Japanese surrender, the bomb suddenly acquired a 'special' status, not just because of its destructive power and human suffering it caused, but also because of the shock value it had on Japan. So the question today is, is the bomb really 'special'? Some reader might find this book frustrating, not really answering questions and it does not deal with more humanitarian concerns with nuclear technology. It is a dry history book written by scientist and not for the weak minded.
Want to read
October 25, 2008I saw this for a book discussion at the library. Looks interesting, and concise.
Read
December 9, 2010Evelyn led this book discussion
Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews