some excerpts FYI:
The spider at the centre of an emerging international oil and banking industry, Gulbenkian held empires and multinationals to ransom for more than fifty years. He would not have come to wield such power, however, had he not been an exceptionally skilled negotiator and financial architect.
He played an important if previously unacknowledged role helping both Royal Dutch-Shell and Total establish themselves as oil majors.
At his death in 1955 the world oil industry was no longer an American monopoly, but an international cartel. This cartel’s members, the so-called ‘Seven Sisters’, each produced oil from several countries. Several new ‘sisters’ have appeared since. But the oil industry’s structure of multinational production, integration and partnerships remains the same: the web woven by Gulbenkian is with us still.
Even Stalin sought Gulbenkian’s advice, rewarding him with Rembrandts from the famous Hermitage Museum. No other business figure in the history of the oil industry wielded such influence, over such a scale, for so long.
How did a man who knew nothing of geology and who never visited Iraq, Saudi Arabia or any of the Gulf states lay claim to 5 per cent of Middle East oil production?
As Al Jazeera recently put it, Gulbenkian was ‘the world’s first oil fixer, broker and deal-maker’. However, alongside the negotiator, financier, collector and diplomat, he was also a family man.
Why bother with conventions, protocols and treaties when international borders could be fixed your way, for just £2,000 (£100,000)?
In 1903 Gulbenkian was acting as intermediary between the Paris Rothschilds’ Frederick Lane and the Armenian oil magnate Alexander Mantashev. Peevish after a tough round of negotiations, Mantashev brooded as Lane read out the terms of their sales agreement clause by clause. After each clause Lane paused, first to allow Gulbenkian to translate into Armenian and then for Mantashev to confirm his agreement, also in Armenian. Mantashev’s reply on each occasion was ‘mayrt kunem’, Armenian for ‘I’ll fuck your mother.’ Gulbenkian rendered this in English as polite assent, whereupon Lane would thank Mantashev and move on to the next clause.
The following four years saw Gulbenkian work closely with the new regime, and in particular the Finance Minister, Cavid. Gulbenkian became an Ottoman diplomat. He founded the National Bank of Turkey (NBT) in 1909 and the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) in 1912.
Gulbenkian issued the prospectus for a National Bank of Turkey in December 1908. As he noted, ‘Hitherto the Turkish government has been entirely in the hands of a group headed by the Deutsche Bank and the Imperial Ottoman Bank,’ with the result that, ‘so long as the old regime lasted, these Banks had a certain control over the business of Turkey’. The new regime was opposed to those banks and had asked Gulbenkian to assemble ‘such a group of bankers as will enable them to undertake business on behalf of the Turkish government’. This new bank would be built on international cooperation and so work in the interests of the empire, rather than those of France, Germany or any other western power.
In October 1911 Gulbenkian drafted the articles of a new oil company and the Turkish Petroleum Company formally came into existence the following year.
In July 1924 Jersey Standard’s president, Walter Teagle, met with Gulbenkian to discuss the problem. In a report to Allen Dulles he described Gulbenkian as a particularly able and crafty oil man, the holder of the largest individual interest in the Shell Company and a naturalised British subject of Armenian origin and reputedly very wealthy, probably worth several million pounds … Mr. Gulbenkian made clear his position to Mr. Teagle that he was not an oil man, that he did not wish to trade in oil, that he was not interested in the international viewpoint of the question, and that he was interested simply from the standpoint of his own personal business interests and profit. He stated that, as a minority stockholder, he could not agree to the Company’s operating on the basis proposed except by agreement of the other interests to certain terms. He stated that, as a minority stockholder, he had certain rights under British law, which his attorney advised him would entitle him to apply to the courts for an injunction restraining the Turkish Petroleum Company from operating on basis other than for profit or along any lines other than those ordinarily followed by other oil producing companies; i.e., he claimed that the Turkish Petroleum Company should produce oil, transport it to seaboard or refinery, refine it and market it.
In the immediate post-war years Gulbenkian had coached French diplomats on how to claim the quarter-participation in TPC that had formerly belonged to Deutsche Bank. He had established a French firm to take those shares. In 1924 Poincaré had given them to a separate entity, which became the Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP, known today as Total).
Gulbenkian insisted that his negotiating position was consistent, being founded on fixed moral principles. We know that he took these principles seriously because he preached them to his closest relations: to Nevarte in the 1890s, to Nubar in the 1920s and, later still, to his grandson, Mikhael.
Such principles were not only ethically sound, they were ‘healthy’ principles, embracing the private as well as the public sphere, the care of one’s business interests as well as one’s own body. Not drinking or eating to excess was one principle. Otherwise, however, Calouste never spelled out exactly what he meant by ‘principles’; the key thing was to hold on to them, even if those around you did not.
In his exchanges with Gulbenkian, Gwynne repeated the phrase ‘unless the state controls oil, oil will control the state.’
In the end, after so many years of wire-pulling and negotiation, the only export monopoly Gulbenkian managed to get out of the USSR was for another form of ‘black gold’: caviar. Starting in 1924, Gulbenkian had advanced the Soviet caviar export agency hard currency in return for the monopoly. But even here the Soviets proved difficult business partners. After a few successful deals the main Soviet export agency suddenly turned the tables, holding back enough caviar to undercut Vanetzian, the ethnic Armenian caviar merchant Gulbenkian bankrolled. Gulbenkian was landed with two tons of caviar he could find no market for. Having failed to make a dent in supplies by eating it themselves, the Gulbenkians gave away vast quantities to their friends. ‘So generous were we,’ Nubar would later recall, ‘that almost the first question we put to anyone we met was, “Do you like caviare?” If the answer was “Yes”, we made an immediate present of a one- or two-pound tin.’71 Calouste’s ‘big scheme’ ended as a potlatch of caviar. It was magnificent, but also somewhat farcical. (less)
The following year the foundation established by Calouste’s cousin Badrig, the Gullabi Gulbenkian Foundation, funded an AGBU delegation to Armenia intended to identify projects suitable for funding. Plans were made for a new settlement to be built on 7,400 acres south-west of Yerevan, to be named ‘Nubarashen’ in Boghos’s honour.
One of the few Iraqi political parties to have a mass following was the leftist Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati (National Democratic Party). Its vice-president was the Mosul-born, LSE-educated Mohammad Al Hadid, whose daughter Zaha Hadid would become an internationally recognised architect. In August 1946 Al Hadid commented that ‘the history of petrol concessions in Iraq reminds one of those films in which one sees how “the white man” sallies forth into the remote corners of the world and trades toys with ignorant tribes for considerable resources’.
In January 2014 the onshore Abu Dhabi concession, the last of the Gulbenkian-era concessions, expired. Pandi has been transformed into Partex Oil and Gas, a small upstream oil company which survives to this day, and which has invested some of the proceeds from earlier concessions in joint ventures in former Portuguese colonies. Partex is fully owned by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. Valued at just over €500 million, its interests represent around a sixth of the foundation’s €3 billion asset portfolio. This endowment places the foundation thirty-sixth in the list of the world’s wealthiest foundations, a few places below the Rockefeller Foundation. While similar foundations in the United States are required to draw down 5 per cent of their capital each year, it faces no such obligation. It intends to be a perpetual foundation, a permanent legacy to its founder, Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian.